| Hilary Putnam - Philosophy - 1981 - 244 pages
...‘true' was that it should yield all sentences of the form ‘P' is true if and only if P, eg (T) ‘Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white as theorems of the meta-language (where P is a sentence of the formal notation in question). But the... | |
| Donald Wiebe - Philosophy - 1981 - 318 pages
...which it refers. This is closely akin to Tarski's definition of 'true' which implies, for example: "'snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white. 1 But Tarski's definition now appears to equate a sentence with an action. This anomaly can be eliminated... | |
| M. J. Inwood - 2002 - 620 pages
...is white” is of the subject-predicate form', but also ‘The word “rabbit” denotes rabbits' or ‘The sentence “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white', where we speak directly about things that the object-language speaks about.” We have already seen... | |
| Carl G. Hempel, H. Putnam, Wilhelm K. Essler - Philosophy - 1983 - 438 pages
...property which sentences have or lack depending on two things: what they mean and how the world is. '"Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" states that the sentence "Snow is white" has the property of truth (and this is the property with respect... | |
| Jeffrey Stout - Philosophy - 2001 - 388 pages
...might learn, with Davidson, that seeing how the expression is true functions in sentences of the form '"Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white" gets us further in the philosophy of language than we might have thought. Or we might learn, with JL... | |
| Kuo-Tsai Liou - Political Science - 2001 - 818 pages
...term mystifies. Or. to take another example from philosophy, Tarski's insight that “The statement ‘snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white” is regarded as profound only inside the language game called analytical philosophy. Outside that language... | |
| M. J. Inwood - Philosophy - 1983 - 608 pages
...is white” is of the subject-predicate form', but also ‘The word “rabbit” denotes rabbits' or ‘The sentence “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white', where we sipeak directly about things that the object-language speaks about. 7 ' We have already seen... | |
| Barry Stroud - Philosophy - 2002 - 260 pages
...English speakers in which it is already true that the word “rabbit” refers to rabbits and that the sentence “Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white, That is what prevents a regress. The language is there, and we find a ‘home' in it. or in some other.... | |
| Peter Gärdenfors, Jan Wolenski, K. Kijania-Placek - Science - 2002 - 584 pages
...superficial similarity between the sentence ‘Accept the sentence “I am hungry” if you are hungry' and the sentence “ Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white'. Be that as it may, the crucial point is that these rules are useless unless one has already mastered... | |
| Crispin Wright, Alexander Miller - Language Arts & Disciplines - 2002 - 318 pages
...not susceptible to conceptual analysis and has no underlying nature. No one doubts that the English sentence, "snow is white", is true if and only if snow is white. 5 And, for a large range of cases, this equivalence can be generalized. Thus, instances of the so-called... | |
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