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ed to him of gaining a much more valuable ally. A Greek of Cyzicus, who was connected by the ties of hospitality with Pharnabazus, and had recently entered in the same relation with Agesilaus, proposed to him to bring about an interview between him and the satrap. The preliminaries were arranged, and a place of meeting appointed in the open air, to which Agesilaus came, accompanied by the Thirty, and they seated themselves on the grass to wait for Pharnabazus. He came attended by a train of servants, who, according to the Persian fashion, proceeded to lay down a carpet and cushion for their master. But the intelligent Persian, struck by the contrast of the Spartan simplicity, in a fortune at present so much more prosperous than his own, ordered these instruments of luxury to be removed, and, in his splendid attire, took his seat without ceremony on the green sward by the side of Agesilaus. After the forms of a friendly greeting had been interchanged, Pharnabazus opened the conference with an expostulation on the hard treatment which he had suffered. He reminded his hearers of the zeal and constancy with which he had espoused the cause of Sparta in the war with Athens; that he had spared no expense, and shrunk from no risk, not even from that of his life, in her behalf, and that he had never, in any of their transactions, subjected himself, like Tissaphernes, to the reproach of double-dealing. Nevertheless, Spartan hostility had now reduced him to such a condition that even in his own territory he did not know how to find a meal, except such as he could collect, like a dog, from the orts and leavings of their lapine; while his fair patrimonial mansions, his pleasant woods and parks, had been all burned, and felled, and spoiled. If, he concluded, it was his ignorance that made him unable to reconcile such conduct with the obligations of justice and gratitude, he desired that the Spartans would enlighten him. This address, Xenophon says, struck the Thirty with shame, and it was some time before Agesilaus broke the silence that ensued. Yet the complaint, as Xenophon reports it, falls very far short of the real hardship of the case; for Pharnabazus might have observed, not only that he had not been exempted by his old allies from any of the evils of war, as his former services might have entitled him to expect, but that their hostility had been directed with a special preference against him, and that Agesilaus himself had spared the faithless Tissaphernes, stained as he was with Grecian blood, in order to fall upon the ancient and tried ally of Sparta. Such a charge Agesilaus might have sound it difficult to answer; but for that which Xenophon attributes to Pharnabazus he had a ready and fair reply. Private friendship must always give way to reasons of state. The Spartans being at war with the king of Persia, were compelled to treat all his subjects as their enemies; and Pharnabazus among the rest, however glad they might be to gain him for their friend. And what they had now to propose was not that he should exchange one master for another, but that he should at once become their ally, and independent of every superior, Nor was it a poor or barren independence that they held out to him, but a rich addition to his hereditary possessions, which their aid

would enable him to make at the expense of his fellow-subjects, who would then be sorced to own him as their master. Pharnabazus, in answer to these overtures, said that he would frankly declare his mind to them. If the king should attempt to place any other general in authority over him, he would renounce his allegiance, and ally himself to Sparta; but if his master intrusted him with the supreme command in that part of his dominions, he would do his best to defend them. Agesilaus grasped his hand, and assured him of his warmest regard, and, under the excitement of a generous feeling, forgetting the excuse he had just before made for his past conduct, promised to withdraw immediately from his territories, and, though they should continue at war, to abstain from invading them, as long as there was any other quarter in which he could employ his forces. So the interview ended. It was followed by a little scene which Xenophon seems to have described in order to show the prepossessing effect produced by the demeanour of Agesilaus on the by-standers. A young son of Pharmabazus, when his father rode away, lingered behind, and running up to Agesilaus, proposed to become his guest. Agesilaus accepted the of fer, and the engagement was immediately sealed by an interchange of presents. The youth gave a javelin of beautiful workmanship, and in return received the rich caparisons of a horse on which one of the king's officers rode. He then set off to overtake his father. The friendship of Agesilaus was afterward useful to him when he was driven out of his father's dominions by one of his brothers, and was forced to take refuge in Greece. Agesilaus kept his word, and withdrew his forces from the satrapy of Pharnabazus, where, indeed, it is probable he would not otherwise have stayed much longer, as the spring was coming on, and he was meditating a new expedition, in which he meant to advance as far as he could into the interior. By this movement, if he gained no more decisive advantage, he expected that he should at least separate all the provinces which he left behind him from the Persian Empire. With this design, he proceeded to the plain of Thebe, where he encamped, and began to collect all the forces he could raise from the allied cities. He was in the midst of these preparations, when he received a message from the ephors, which was brought by a Spartan named Epicydidas, who apprized him of the new turn which affairs had taken in Greece, and summoned him to march with the utmost speed for the defence of his country. Agesilaus received this intelligence with fortitude, though it stopped him at the outset of the most brilliant career that had everyet been opened by a Greek, and obeyed the command of the ephors with as much promptness as if he had been present in their council-room at Sparta. But he first called an assembly of the allies, and announced his approaching departure to them; adding, however, a promise that he would not forget them, but as soon as he should have despatched the business which called him away, would return to protect them. The assembly received these tidings with marks of deep concern, but unanimously determined to send their forces with of the whole political system. To explain its origin, we must take a view of some changes which had crept into the Spartan Constitution after the conquest of Messenia. We have already seen reason to believe that one effect of the long and perilous struggle with Messenia was a communication of a limited franchise to a numerous body of new citizens; and we were disposed to conjecture that this event was closely connected with the great enlargement of the authority of the ephors, which appears to have taken place in the same period.* They rose, as we conceived, to a new stage of power, chiefly as representatives of the whole commonalty, which included both the new and the old citizens. But before the epoch at which we have now arrived, both the internal condition of the commonalty and the position of the ephors with regard to it underwent several important changes. It is possible that the distinction between the two classes of citizens, which, as appears from the legends concerning the founding of Tarentum, and from other evidence, excited much discontent at the time it was introduced, may have been removed in a subsequent generation. But other causes af. terward produced similar effects. The earthquake, which gave occasion to the third Messenian war, appears to have inflicted a wound on the population of Sparta from which it never recovered. Its numbers were continually reduced by the struggles of the ensuing period; and the deep impression made at Sparta by the events of Sphacteria proves how much the value of a Spartan life had then risen. It was not, however, by war only that this part of the population had been thinned. During the same period the growing inequality of private fortunes was contributing to the same effect. The highest political privileges belonged only to those citizens whose means permitted them to associate at the public tables.f All who were unable to defray this expense were, it seems, by the very fact, and without any fault but their indigence, degraded into a lower class, from the rank of peers to that of inferiors or commoners. But while some sank into this lower sphere through a blameless poverty, others rose into it from an humbler station by their merits. The services of the Helots and the provincials were frequently rewarded with emancipation and a share of the franchise, so qualified as to keep them below the ancient citizens, and, it would appear, still separate from one another, as they were distinguished by peculiar titles. Another addition to this inferior body was made through marriages contracted by Spartan freemen with women of inserior condition. Gylippus, Callicratidas, and Lysander were probably among the offspring of such marriages, and notwithstanding the high military stations which they filled, were never accounted equal in civil rank to their fathers. They were, perhaps, originally, in legal estimation, on a level with the favoured Helot children, who were often reared in their master's family, together with his sons, under the appellation of Mothones or Mothaces; and they are therefore

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described in loose language as belonging to that class.

In proportion as the numbers of the ancient freemen decreased, the dignity and advantages of their position were augmented, and they were consequently more and more unwilling to share them with others. They had cause to fear, not only the loss of their power and political privileges, but also the introduction of an agrarian law to restore the equality of property which Lycurgus was believed to have established. On the other hand, the inserior citizens, without any view to these objects, when they considered their numbers, and the ment and services of many among them, could not be satisfied with a condition which, in such a conmunity as Sparta, where honour was accounted the highest good, exposed them to continual humiliation. This feeling was, perhaps, rather irritated than soothed by the high employments to which those whose talents and character fitted them for such promotion were frequently advanced. The distinction itself was galling. even where it involved no injurious consequences; and it was the more keenly felt the more clearly it was seen not to correspond to any real difference in worth or desert.

Under these circumstances, it becomes interesting to inquire by what means the higher class, notwithstanding its inferiority in phystcal force, and the universal discontent which prevailed among its subjects, still maintained its ground. Some weight must undoubtedly be attributed to the general reverence for the ancient institutions, which continued to guard them, even after they had degenerated, and no longer answered the end for which they were designed. But there were safeguards of another kind which, perhaps, contributed still more to secure their stability. The great variety of conditions and interests which distinguished the inferior classes from each other, served as a barrier to prevent their union, and to shelter the higher class from the danger which it would have had to apprehend if they could have been brought to act in concert with each other. Not only were the Helots and the provincials thus disunited, but it is probable there was a like want of unanimity among the lower orders of the freemen themselves. And there may be ground to suspect that it was a leading object of state policy to nourish their mutual Jealousy, and that the names and other distinctions by which they were kept apart were contrived for this end. They had no common organ. nur any legitimate opportunities of united action: for the assembly in which they met as one commonalty was so much under the control of the presiding magistrates as to be scarcely a deliberative body. On the other hand, the strength of the government lay in the all-pervading authority of the ephors, which was nearly absolute; and, whatever might be the ditference of their views on certain points of foreign and domestic policy, was unifortaly exerted to promote the interests of the oligarchy The advantage derived from the unity of purpose, secrecy of deliberation, and rapidity o action, which resulted from such a concentre. tion of power in a few devoted hands, may :

easily conceived, and will be illustrated by to a history of the conspiracy which we are about to relate. But it may be useful here to observe, that the more insecure the dominion of the oligarchy became, the more was the control of the ephors needed to guard against revolutionary projects of the kings. The kings had, perhaps, as much reason as any of their subjects to be dissatisfied with the existing state of things. According to the universally-received tradition, they were much more closely connected by blood with the ancient inhabitants of the country than with the Spartans. They were the natural protectors of the whole people, and had no interests in common with the ruling caste. As their authority had been originally abridged by the encroachments of the ephors, so they were subject to the constant superintendence of the rival magistracy, which not only restricted them in the exercise of all the functions of royalty, but interfered with the most private concerns and relations of their domestic life. This dependance was the more galling from its contrast with their nominal greatness, and they could scarcely fail to perceive, that a change which should deprive the ruling body of its exclusive privileges might operate in their favour, release them from many irksome restraints, and enable them to exchange their empty honours for the real dignity of chiefs of the nation. Such a project had been formed by Pausanias:* it might again be conceived, and with fairer prospects of success, by a man of enterprising spirit. This seems to have been the true ground of the jealousy with which the kings were certainly viewed by the peers. But the hereditary

rivalry between the two royal families offered

one security against their ambition, if directed towards this object; and it was therefore studiously cherished. Another was supplied by the unremitting vigilance of the ephors, kept alert by their zeal for the maintenance and extension of their own authority. So far all seems sufficiently clear; but there is one interesting point connected with this subject which is involved in great obscurity. The power of the ephors appears, indeed, to have risen to the height at which we find it in the later times at the expense of the royal dignity; but, according to the view we have taken of their elevation,t they were considered as representatives of the whole commonalty, and at least quite as much of the lower as of the higher class. Even, however, if that view should be wholly rejected, the account which Aristotle gives of the mode of their election would have prepared us to expect that, instead of being uniformly subservient to the will of the privileged class, they would be found as often acting the part of demagogues, and that they would have been disposed rather to take the lead in a revolution than steadily to uphold the established order of things. Aristotle contrasts the qualifications required for the ephoralty with those required for the senate, and describes the class out of which the ephors were elected in

opponents of all innovations tending to encroach on oligarchical privileges, has induced some writers to interpret Aristotle's words in a sense which they seem scarcely to bear; so that they may represent the ephors as elected exclusively from the peers." But there appear to be two ways in which it may be possible to solve the difficulty without resorting to this expedient. All that we know of the assembly at Sparta is consistent with the supposition that the ruling Spartans possessed a sufficient influence over the elections to secure a majority, at least, in the ephoral college; and so long as this could be done there was a manifest advantage in keeping up the illusion that they were representatives of the commonalty, which, as Aristotle observes,t was kept quiet by the share it had—or seemed to have—in the highest office in the state. But it may also be observed that the attractions of the office itself, which grew with the enlargement of the Spartan power, the plenitude of authority over kings, subjects, and allies which it conferred, would, with ordinary minds, and most of all with persons of the lowest condition, be sufficient pledges for their willingness to maintain its privileges, and, consequently, the whole system on which they depended, unimpaired. To this it may be added that the ephors, in the midst of their high functions, were surrounded by watchful eyes, and by hands which would not have remained long inactive if they had ever been suspected of harbouring designs hostile to the interests of the peers; and they seem, for many purposes, to have been subject to the control of the smaller assembly, which, however it may have been composed, was undoubtedly devoted to those interests with perfect unanimity. Such seems to have been the internal condition of Sparta at the accession of Agesilaus; and the history of the conspiracy which threatened the Constitution in the first year of his reign, though related by an author deeply prejudiced in favour of the prevailing party, throws a strong light on the state of public feeling among the inferior classes, and on the spirit and resources of the government. The first intimation of the danger, according to Xenophon, was given to Agesilaus himself, as he was engaged in a public sacrifice, by the attendant soothsayer, who professed to read evidence of a most formidable plot in the aspect of the victims. He had, perhaps, received some private information on the subject; and his public warning, by the alarm it occasioned among the conspirators, may have hastened the discovery which followed. Five days after, the whole affair was revealed to the ephors by an accomplice. He charged a young man named Cinadon—a person, Xenophon observes, of high courage, but not one of the peers—as the author of the conspiracy; and, in answer to the questions of the ephors, gave the following account of it: Cinadon, he said, having met him one

terms which apparently include the whole com- day in the agora, at an hour when it was

monalty, or all who were admissible to the great assembly. He says that they were chosen

without any regard to eminent merit, and were were to be seen there. The more than the official persons who were trans

often extremely poor, and therefore venal.

thronged with people, drew him aside into a corner, and bade him count the Spartans that He could observe no forty. These, said Cinadon, you have to consider as your enemies; the rest of the multitude assembled here, whose numbers must exceed theirs a hundred fold, are all allied with you against them. Cinadon then bade him notice the passengers in the streets, where he would find a like proportion between the numbers of his enemies and his friends, and reminded him that the case was the same throughout the country, where each Spartan landowner lived surrounded by a host of aliens. He then informed him that a plot had been concerted for the destruction of their oppressors. Only a few trusty persons, indeed, were in the secret; but they, Cinadon emphatically remarked, were in the secret of the whole subject population of Laconia. For, with regard to the Spartans, the language of all classes—Helots, neodamodes, provincials, citizens of the lower order—wherever they ventured to speak freely, was the same; they did not disguise the bitterness of their hatred, which, according to Cinadon's phrase, was such that they were ready to eat their flesh raw. The conspirators, he said, had regular arms of their own, and as to the multitude, he had shown the informer how they might find weapons by leading him into the iron market, and pointing out to him, besides knives and swords, a variety of implements of husbandry, and other tools, which might all be applied to that use; and, indeed, there was scarcely any handicraft which could not arm the workmen with weapons sufficient for the purpose of an insurrection, especially as they should surprise their enemies unarmed. Finally, the informer added that a day was fixed for the execution of the plot. The ephors, convinced of its reality, and of the urgency of the danger, took their measures with the promptitude and secrecy which the occasion required. They did not even convene the smaller assembly, but privately called the senators together, and deliberated with them on the course to be pursued. The object was both to arrest Cinadon in the quietest manner, and to secure his accomplices. He had often been employed by the ephors in commissions which demanded energy and address. They now sent him to Aulon, on the northern frontier of Messenia, with instructions to apprehend some of the inhabitants, and certain Helots, who were described in the scytale. Among the persons to be arrested was a woman of Aulon, of uncommon beauty,” who, it seems, had been charged with corrupting the Spartan citizens who passed through the town. The more effectually to blind him to the real object of his mission, he was directed to apply to the commander of the royal guard for a small party of soldiers to serve under him, and was told that wagons should be sent for the prisoners. But such instructions were given to his attendants, that on his arrival at Aulon he was taken into custody; and, for greater security, a troop of horse was sent to support them. He was then

difficulty of reconciling these statements with acting business there, one of the kings, the senthe policy invariably pursued by the ephors, as ators, ephors, and other magistrates, in all about

* See p. 289. t Wachsmuth, i., 2, p.214.

* Wachsmuth, i., 2, p. 214. t Pol., ii., 6, 15.

* It seems not impossible that this may have been one of the persons meationed by Theopompus in a passage of the fifty-sixth book of his IIistories, cited by Athenæus, xiii., p. 609, b. “Theopompus relates that Xenopithea, the mathor of Lysandridas, excelled all the women of Peloponnesus in beauty. She was put to death by the Lacedæmonians, with her sister Chryse, at the time when King Agesilaus, through his intrigues (karaaracticag), caused Lysandridas, who was his enemy, to be banished.”

put to the torture, and the names of his accomplices, as soon as they were wrung from him, were taken down, and transmitted by express to Sparta. It is remarkable that the list included the soothsayer Tisarmenus. a descendant of the Elean of the same name, who had received the Spartan franchise as the price of his services in the Persian war." Nothing more clearly marks the extent of the danger to which the government was exposed; for the Elean Tisamenus, as Herodotus informs us, had expressly stipulated for the full franchise;t so that his descendant must have enjoyed all the privileges of the highest class of citizens. But possibly they were imbittered by the consciousness that the genuine Spartans still looked down upon him as an alien. He and the others were arrested, and then Cinadon himself was brought to Sparta and examined. When he had confessed the whole plot, and confirmed his first information against his accomplices, he was asked what had been his object. “Not to be inferior,” was his reply, “to any man in Lacedaemon.” It only remained to punish the prisoners; and the government, conscious that it could only maintain itself by terror, determined to make their fate a warning to the disaffected. They were first ignominiously led through the city, and publicly goaded and scourged, and were then put to death. So, Xenophon calmly observes, they met with their deserts. As a warm admirer of the institutions which the conspiracy was designed to overthrow, and as a pensioner of the Spartan government, he could not, perhaps, make a less severe remark on the defeated party; as an historian, he could scarcely have subjoined a more frivolous and unseasonable reflection on such a train of oecurrences. Not long after this event news was brought to Sparta by a Syracusan named Herodes, who had just returned from Phoenicia, of preparations which he had witnessed in the Phoenician ports for a great armament, which he had learned was to consist of 300 galleys. He had not been able to ascertain its object, but it had induced him to quicken his departure, that he might bear the tidings to Greece. The Spartaa government was alarmed, and called a congress of the allies to deliberate on preventive measures. But to Lysander the intelligence afforded a highly welcome opportunity of resuming his ambitious plans, and recovering his influence among the Asiatic Greeks. He seems, however, to have been aware that he was hintself viewed with jealousy at home, anti that a proposal coming directly from himself. and immediately tending to his own aggranduzernent, would probably be ill received. He resolved, therefore, to make use of his friend Agesslaus to accomplish his purpose, and easily prevailed on him to undertake, with a small force, to give such employment to the Persian arms in Asia as would secure Greece from the threatened invasion. Agesilaus, who was in the prime of life, was no less eager to display his military talents in such a brilliant field than Lysander to renew his intrigues, and to replace his creatures in the posts from which they had been dislodg

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ed. He therefore offered to take the command of an expedition to Asia, for which he required no more than 2000 neodamode troops, and 6000 of the allies, and desired to be accompanied by a council of thirty Spartans—which he probably knew would, according to usage, be forced upon him—and by Lysander among them. His offer was accepted, and all his requests granted, with the addition of six months' pay for the army. Corinth, Thebes, and Athens were called upon to contribute their forces, but they all refused.* The Corinthians pleaded the damage which had lately befallen one of their temples through the effects of an earthquake, as an omen which deterred them from taking part in the war.f The Athenians alleged their weakness as an excuse.; The Thebans, though they were solicited by Aristomenidas, the grandfather of Agesilaus, who, having been one of the five Judges who passed sentence on the Plataeans, was considered as their benefactor, seem not to have condescended to cover their refusal with any pretext. In the spring of 397, having fixed the contingents of the other allies, and appointed the place of rendezvous for their troops, and having celebrated the usual sacrifices for a foreign expedition, he set sail for Aulis in Boeotia. It was the first time since the expedition of Menelaus that a King of Sparta had undertaken to invade Asia; and Agesilaus, partly perhaps for the sake of the omen, and partly for the sake of his own renown, was willing to assoeiate his enterprise with the recollection of that heroic adventure. He therefore stopped at Aulis, to sacrifice there after the example of Agamemnon. But before he had completed the rite, the Boeotarchs sent a party of horse to enjoin him to desist, and the men did not merely deliver the message, but scattered the parts of the victim which they found on the altar. Plutarch, who seems willing to extenuate the insult which his countrymen offered to his hero, represents Agesilaus as having infringed the established usage, by employing a soothsayer of his own on this occasion, instead of the Boeotian to whom the superintendence of the ceremony properly belonged. But Xenophon leaves us to conclude that the interruption was a simple indication of the hostile spirit with which the expedition was viewed by the Boeotian government; and if Agesilaus saw it in this light, he had reason to dread the omen. He, however, stifled his resentment, and embarked again for Geraestus, where he found the bulk of his armament assembled, and sailed with it to Ephesus. Soon after his arrival he received a message from Tissaphernes, calling on him to explain the design of his coming. Agesilaus replied, that his object was to restore the Asiatic Greeks to the independence which their brethren enJoyed on the other side of the AEgean. The satrap on this proposed a truce until the king's pleasure could be taken on this demand; he engaged himself to support it with all the credit he possessed, and professed to believe that * Paus., iii., 9, 2. + Pauxanias represents them as refusing with great reluctance; but the sequel of the history renders this very doubtful. t Pausannas says that they pleaded the Peloponnesian war and the pestilence (or, but that their real motive was the

the court would comply with it. Agesilaus consented to the proposal, only requiring security for the observance of the engagement, and even this security was no more than the oath of Tissaphernes, which he pledged with due solemnity to Dercyllidas, and two other Spartan commissioners, who were sent to ratify the convention. Nothing, however, was farther from the mind of either party than the thought of peace. Tissaphernes, as soon as he had taken the oath, sent to the king for a re-enforcement to enable him to take the field; and Agesilaus, who was well aware of his intentions, and probably would not otherwise have granted the truce, though he observed it with strict fidelity, undoubtedly did not suffer the time to be lost with regard to the progress of his own preparations. During this interval a breach, which the characters and views of the two men rendered almost inevitable, rose between him and Lysander. The rumour of the expedition, and of the part which Lysander was to take in it, seems to have rekindled the flames of discord in the Asiatic cities, which, after the expulsion of his creatures, had for a time been kept tranquil by the wise forbearance of the ephors and the prudent administration of Dercyllidas. When he came to Ephesus, his door was immediately besieged by a crowd of petitioners, who desired a license to oppress their countrymen under his patronage. After the victory of Ægos-potami, Lysander, as the man who for the time wielded the irresistible power of Sparta, had been courted with extravagant servility by the Asiatic Greeks. They did not content themselves with the ordinary honours of golden crowns and statues, but raised altars and offered sacrifices, and sang pacans, and consecrated festivals to him as a god:* the first example of that grossest kind of adulation, which afterward became common among the Greeks, and was reduced to a system by the Romans. When he now appeared again in Asia, though in the train of a Spartanking, it was still supposed that the substance of power resided with him, and that he would direct the exercise of the royal authority as he thought fit. He did not discountenance this persuasion, for he shared it himself. He had calculated on the subserviency of Agesilaus, whom he considered as mainly indebted to his friendship, first for the throne, and then—an obligation little inferior—for the command in Asia. But his colleagues, the rest of the Thirty, felt that the homage paid to him by the allies was derogatory, not only to the royal dignity, but to their own; and they complained to Agesilaus of his presumption. The king himself had been hurt by it, and resolved to check it, not by a friendly remonstrance, but in a way the most grating to Lysander's feelings. He rejected all applications which were made to him in reliance on Lysander's interest; and his purpose at length became so evident, that Lysander was obliged to inform his clients that his intercession, instead of furthering, would only obstruct their suits. He had, however, sufficient self-command to stifle or disguise his resentment; and, after a very mild expostulation with Agesilaus on the harshness of his conduct, requested to be removed from the scene of his humiliation to some other place, where

intelligence they had received of Conon's journey to the Persuan cuurt.

* Plut., Lys., 18.

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