maybe several billion dollars a year. (A GAO study stated that if Presidents Bush and Reagan had had the line-item veto from 1984 to 1989, savings would have been at least $70 billion and given the generous assumptions used by GAO, actual amounts would have been far lower.) This is not to say that I belittle saving the taxpayers several billion dollars a year -- I still think a billion dollars is a lot of money. But it will take a lot more than that to balance the budget. What it will take to dig us out of our budget hole is a combination of reforms, including a balanced budget amendment with tax limitation feature, a flexible spending freeze, budgetary process reform, and entitlement reform. Some might say that an enhanced rescission or a line-item veto would make Congress even less responsible. But we have had almost two hundred years of experience with presidential impoundment and did not experience such problems. Moreover, a 1987-88 comprehensive study by Ray Brown in the Government Accountant Journal on the line-item veto at the state level concluded that, "expenditures were lower in those states with the line-item veto." Those 10 states that have "special" line-item authority -- allowing a governor to reduce dollar amounts, rather than zeroing an appropriation out completely (enhanced rescission would allow for this) saw spending average 14 percent lower than in the states with no line-item veto authority. In the final analysis, the overriding reason we should adopt some presidential check on spending is accountability. And if we get some spending relief in the process, then so much the better. A presidential check on spending has been oversold by its proponents and undersold by its critics. Some say it means the end of the deficit. Others claim it means the end of the Constitution. It means the end of neither. And besides, if it did not work out it could always be repealed -- just as the president's impoundment power was repealed back in 1973. Constitutional Balanced Budget Amendment If spending restraint is our target, then I am convinced that a balanced budget amendment will reach it. Twice in the 102nd Congress, we considered such a reform, and both times, partisan politics doomed it to a premature demise. In past consideration of this subject, I preferred the amendment offered by Rep. Jon Kyl of Arizona, which limited spending, the real cause of the deficit, to 19 percent of GNP. Yet this is not essential for my support. The important thing is that a constitutional amendment to balance the budget would place more of a burden upon Congress to do something it refuses to do on its own. We have tried statutes in the past and they are continually ignored or waived. Several years ago, I wrote a newspaper column in which I detailed Congress' habitual lawbreaking when it came to the budget. The lawbreaking has continued to this day. In fact, the Budget Act of 1974 has been waived over 600 times since it was enacted. So a balanced budget statute is obviously not the answer. We need to go further. We need a process that favors a balanced budget as a mandate of the Constitution. Amending the Constitution is not something we should take lightly. Indeed, it is the most serious legislative undertaking in our system of government. But I think that in this case a serious response is necessary to break the legislative logjam we find ourselves in, with regard to the deficit. Once enacted, we would still have to make tough choices. But in the end, the deficit might become a thing of the past. As Michael Kinsley pointed out, "Many of (the Constitution's) clauses address concerns that now seem trivial. See the Third Amendment, about quartering soldiers. We should only be so lucky that fiscal responsibility seems a passe issue in future years." Critics of the amendment rightly point out that we already have the ability to take the steps required to balance the budget, but that we don't use them. They remind us that the problem is really one of a lack of political will and courage. But political courage means different things to different people. I would argue that Republicans have the political will to cut spending to the bone. And I believe that the Democrats have the political will to raise taxes sky-high. But neither side can impose their political will without the cooperation of the other. So the question becomes: How do we break the logjam and get Congress and the White House to do what is right? Members of Congress will, no doubt, take a constitutional duty much more seriously than a statutory one. Further, by making it a constitutional requirement, the budget will receive more media scrutiny and the public will become more attentive and more involved. And if a balanced budget amendment does nothing but lead to a serious, honest, national debate on spending and taxes a debate I know my side would win -- then it will have been worth it. In short, a constitutional amendment ups the political ante. - As Social Security is in the news again, let me add something else here. It is worth noting that in the past debate, seniors groups worked their constituencies into a frenzy, touting the fallacy that a balanced budget amendment would result in a raid on Social Security and Medicare. This was, of course, nothing but a scare tactic used by opponents of the amendment to defeat it. Social Security would be no more vulnerable under a constitutional amendment than it is now. In fact, I believe Social Security is less safe without the amendment. If Congress wants to raid Social Security, they will do it anyway. The single biggest threat to the trust fund is our mounting federal deficit. (Social Security is already treated as a cash cow for underfunded programs.) Under the prescribed procedure of a constitutional amendment, Congress would be forced to prioritize items such as Social Security COLAS, and budget for them accordingly. A balanced budget amendment would conform to the basic historical proposition of no taxation without representation. In this case, that means the current generation has no right to saddle future generations -- the unrepresented -- with a mounting pile of debt taxation. Thomas Jefferson made precisely this same point - in recommending such a constitutional procedure over 200 years ago. If it was good enough for Tom, it should be good enough for all of us. Limiting Terms for Members of Congress This brings me to my third and most important proposal, the one to limit terms for senators and representatives. The voters' disenchantment with Congress provided for a lively election cycle in 1992, as many incumbents had to fight for their political lives against little-known, and inexperienced challengers. Still, even in this atmosphere of reform, sitting members of Congress proved surprisingly resilient -- 3 of 26 senators lost their jobs, meaning 88.5 percent of those incumbents up for reelection won. And a mere 24 of 348 House incumbents were defeated, translating into a 93 percent reelection rate. This is not much better than the 96 percent rate achieved in 1990. Yet in the same year, state term limit initiatives enjoyed incredible popular support nationwide, prevailing in all 14 states where they made the ballot. The fact is, the relatively recent trend toward "professional legislators" is generally recognized as a disturbing turn for representative government. Voters feel increasingly isolated from their elected officials, and they are yearning for a solution to the entrenched bureaucracy which has created the sort of policy gridlock referred to so often during the campaign. The answer you hear more and more is term limits. Of the various proposals currently discussed, I think my legislation provides the best formula. H.J.Res 21 is a proposed amendment to the Constitution which would limit representatives to six consecutive terms, and senators to two. Former members of Congress could return to office only after an intervening idle term, but with a full loss of seniority. (My resolution, H.Res. 15 would change House rules to do the same.) This addresses, I think, both the concerns of those who want to limit terms, as well as those who say term limits restrict voters' choice. Limiting service in government would have an enormous effect on Congress. Mark Liedl of the Heritage Foundation, in a paper supporting term limits, drew upon the work of liberal political scientist Morris Fiorina to describe how since the time of the Great Society, members of Congress have transformed their roles from national policy-makers to constituent ombudsmen. He points out that in an incredible perversion of the role of government, because more and more congressmen prefer ombudsmanship to policy-making -- ombudsmanship gets them reelected -- Congress now has an incentive to further feed the inefficient bureaucracy so that they can get credit for guiding their helpless constituents through the huge morass that is our federal government. All of this comes at the expense of sound policy. Liedl concludes that term limits would force congressmen to focus more on national policy, rather than casework, and would therefore help to break the so-called "iron triangle" relationship between Congress, interest groups and the federal bureaucracy. This point should not be lost on this important debate. A congressional seat is, effectively, a safe job that consequently engenders a ruling class attitude in those who hold it. With a job for life, most members of Congress stop making the tough, sometimes politically unpopular decisions, and adopt a "go along, get along" stance. The result is a Congress that embraces old ideas for new problems, which only leads to bad public policy. Congress now responds more readily to inside-the-beltway special interest groups than it does to the will of the |