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Tunc homo, quum temere ingenio confidit, et audet
Abdita naturæ scrutari, arcanaque Divum,
Cum re vera ejus crassa imbecillaque sit mens.
Si posita ante pedes nescit, quo jure videbit
Quæ Deus et natura sinu occuluere profundo?
Omnia se tamen arbitratur noscere ad unguem
Garrulus, infelix, cæcus, temerarius, amens;
Usque adeo sibi palpatur, seseque licetur."
See also vv. 538, 568, sq.

21.-MELANCHTHON and STADIANUS. (Letter to Calvin, 1543):-" Habebam amicum Tubinga, Franciscum Stadianum, qui dicere solebat: se utrumque probare, evenire omnia ut divina Providentia decrevit, et tamen esse contingentiam, sed se haec conciliare non posse."

22. Multa tegit sacro involucro Natura, neque ullis
Fas est scire quidem mortalibus omnia; multa
Admirare modo, nec non venerare: neque illa
Inquires quæ sunt arcanis proxima; namque
In manibus quæ sunt, hæc nos vix scire putandum.
Est procul à nobis adeo præsentia veri!'

("Full many a secret in her sacred veil

Hath Nature folded. She vouchsafes to knowledge

Not every mystery, reserving much

For human veneration, not research.

Let us not, therefore, seek what God conceals;
For even the things which lie within our hands-
These, knowing, we know not.-So far from us,
In doubtful dimness, gleams the star of truth!")

"Sapi

23.-JULIUS CESAR SCALIGER. (De Subtilitate; Ex. cclxxiv.) :entia est vera, nolle nimis sapere." (Ib. Ex. cccvii. sect. 29; and compare Ex. cccxliv. sect. 4):-"Humanæ sapientæ pars est, quædam æquo animo nescire velle." + (Ib. Ex. lii.):-" Ubique clamare soleo, nos nihil scire."

—he had probably this passage of Palingenius in his eye, and not Plato. Warburton and his other scholiasts are aware of no suggestion.

* I know not the author of these verses. I find them first quoted by Fernelius, in his book De Abditis Rerum Causis, (L. ii. c. 18), which appeared before the year 1551. They may be his own. They are afterwards given by Sennertus, in his Hypomnemata, but without an attribution of authorship. By him, indeed, they are undoubtedly taken from Fernelius. Finally, they are adduced by the learned Morhof in his Polyhistor, who very unlearnedly, however, assigns them to Lucretius. They are not by Palingenius, nor Palearius, nor Hospitalius, all of whose versification they resemble; for the last, indeed, they are almost too early. + I meant (above, p. 38) to quote this passage of Scaliger, but find that my recollection confused this and the preceding passage, with, perhaps, the similar testimony of Chrysologus, (No. 11.) Chrysologus, indeed, anticipates Scaliger in the most felicitous part of the expression.

24. JOSEPH JUSTUS SCALIGER. (Poemata; Iambi Gnomici. xxi.):

"Ne curiosus quære causas omnium,
Quæcunque libris vis Prophetarum indidit
Afflata cœlo, plena veraci Deo,

Nec operta sacri supparo silentii
Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter praeteri.
Nescire velle, quæ magister maximus
Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.'

25.-GROTIUS. (Poemata: Epigrammata; L. i.):

ERUDITA IGNORANTIA.

"Qui curiosus postulat Totum suæ
Patere menti, ferre qui non sufficit
Mediocritatis conscientiam suæ,
Judex iniquus, æstimator est malus
Suique naturæque. Nam rerum parens,
Libanda tantum quæ venit mortalibus,
Nos scire pauca, multa mirari jubet.
Hic primus error auctor est pejoribus.
Nam qui fateri nil potest incognitum,
Falso necesse est placet ignorantiam;
Umbrasque inanes captet inter nubila,
Imaginosæ adulter Ixion Deæ.

Magis quiescet animus, errabit minus,
Contentus eruditione parabili,

Nec quæret illam, siqua quærentem fugit.

Nescire quædam, magna pars Sapientiæ est." +

26.- DESCARTES. (Principia, P. i., §§ 36, 41):—"Neque tamen ullo modo Deus errorum nostrorum author fingi potest, propterea quod nobis intellectum non dedit omniscium. Est enim de ratione intellectus creati, ut sit finitus; ac de ratione intellectus finiti, ut non ad omnia se extendat." "Illis vero nos expediemus, si recordemur :-mentem nostram esse finitam; Dei autem potentiam, per quam non tantum omnia, quae sunt aut esse possunt, ab æterno praescivit, sed etiam voluit ac præordinavit, esse infinitam. Ideoque hanc quidem a nobis satis attingi, ut clare ac distincte percipiamus, ipsam in Deo esse ; non autem satis comprehendi, ut videamus quo pacto liberas hominum actiones indeterminatas relinquat. Libertatis autem et indifferentiae quae in nobis est, nos ita conscios esse, ut nihil sit, quod evidentius et perfectius comprehendamus. Absurdum enim est, propterea quod non comprehendimus unam rem, quam scimus ex natura sua

*It is manifest that Joseph, in these verses, had in his eye the saying of his father. But I have no doubt, that they were written on occasion of the controversy raised by Gomarus against Arminius.

+ In this excellent epigram, Grotius undoubtedly contemplated the corresponding verses of his illustrious friend, the Dictator of the Republic of Letters; but, at the same time, he, an Arminian, certainly had in view the polemic of the Remonstrants and anti-Remonstrants, touching the Divine Decrees. Nor, appa. rently, was he ignorant of testimonies, Nos. 17, 18.

nobis esse debere incomprehensibilem, de alia dubitare, quam intime comprehendimus, atque apud nosmet ipsos experimur."-On this see also Spinoza, (Princ. Cartes.; Append. P. I., c. iii., p. 103, ed. 1.)

27.-PASCAL. (Pensées; Partie I. Art. vi. sect. 26):—"Si l'homme commençoit par s'étudier lui-même, il verroit combien il est incapable de passer outre. Comment pourroit-il se faire qu'une partie connût le tout ?”* "Qui ne croiroit, à nous voir composer toutes choses d'esprit et de corps, que ce mélange-là nous seroit bien compréhensible? C'est néanmoins la chose que l'on comprend le moins. L'homme est à lui-même le plus prodigieux objet de la nature; car il ne peut concevoir ce que c'est que corps, et encore moins ce que c'est qu'esprit, et moins qu'aucune chose comment un corps peut étre uni avec un esprit. C'est là le comble de ses difficultés, et cependant c'est son propre être : Modus, quo corporibus adhaeret spiritus, comprehendi ab hominibus non potest; et hoc tamen homo est.”+

28.-BOSSUET. (Traité du libre Arbitre; ch. iv.):—"Quand donc nous nous mettons à raisonner, nous devons d'abord poser comme indubitable, que nous pouvons connoitre très-certainement beaucoup de choses, dont toutefois nous n'entendons pas toutes les dépendances, ni toutes les suites. C'est pourquoi la première regle de notre Logique, c'est qu'il ne faut jamais abandonner les vérités un fois connues, quelque difficulté qui survienne, quand on veut les concilier: mais qu'il faut au contraire, pour ainsi parler, tenir toujours fortement comme les deux bouts de la chaine, quoiqu'on ne voie pas toujours le milieu, par où l'enchainement se continue."-But see, besides the whole treatise, chapters iii. and iv. throughout.

29.-LOCKE. (Essay, &c., Introd., § 4) :— "I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.”(Letter to Molyneux, 1693):-"I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding: though it be unquestionable, that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God, our maker, and though I cannot have a clearer perception of any thing, than that I am free; yet I cannot make freedom in man

*This testimony of Pascal corresponds to what Aristotle says:-"There is no proportion of the Infinite to the Finite." (De Cœlo, L. i. cc. 7, 8.)

+ Pascal apparently quotes these words from memory, and, I have no doubt, quotes them from Montaigne, who thus (L. ii. ch. 12) adduces them as from St Augustin: "Modus, quo corporibus adhærent spiritus, omnino mirus est, nec comprehendi ab homine potest; et hoc ipse homo est."-Montaigne's commentator, Pierre Coste, says that these words are from Augustin, De Spiritu et Anima. That curious farrago, which is certainly not Augustin's, does not however contain either the sentence or the sentiment; and Coste himself, who elsewhere gives articulate references to the quotations of his author, here alleges only the treatise in general. [The sentence occurs in the genuine work of Augustin, De Civitate Dei, L. xxi. c. 10.]

consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both, as of any truths I most firmly assent to. And, therefore, I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion :-that, if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free; though I see not the way of it."

[29*.-BOLINGBROKE. (Philosophical Works, vol. v. p. 82) :—“ We comprehend as little God's manner of knowing, as we do His manner of being; and we should, therefore, presume to reason no more about one, than about the other. But these men, applying their ideas of human to the divine knowledge, maintain that God could not foreknow certainly what is to happen, if He did not make it necessary and certain, by pre-ordaining that it should happen. So they argue on their notion of prescience. Now, it seems, and it has seemed to me ever since I turned my thoughts to subjects of this kind, that the whole system of predestination may be blown up by the change of an improper word. Let us talk no more of prescience, nor imagine things future relatively to God, as they are relatively to man. Let us acknowledge His omniscience, to which the future is like the present, and we may conceive, without any extraordinary effort of mind, that He knows, though He does not pre-ordain, in the sense of predestinating, the future. If we persuade ourselves of this great truth, that the whole series of things is, at all times, actually present to the divine mind, we may say as properly that God knows things because they are actual to Him, and not that they are actual to Him because he knows them, or much less pre-ordains them; as we say that things are seen by us because they are visible, and not that they are visible because they are seen by us.”—(Ib. p. 406) :—“The Freewill of man, no one can deny he has, without lying, or renouncing his intuitive knowledge."-See also vol. i. pp. 40, 102; vol. iv. pp. 97, 382; vol. v. pp. 29, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 150; and Reflections upon Liberty and Necessity, &c. (1759), p. 4.]

30.-JACOBI. (Werke II., p. 317, Ueber die Unzertrennlichkeit, &c.—On the inseparability of the notions of Liberty and Foresight from the notion of Reason):—" The union of physical Necessity and moral Freedom in one and the same being, is an absolutely incomprehensible fact, a miracle and mystery like to the creation. He who comprehends the creation may comprehend this fact; he who comprehends this fact may comprehend the creation and God himself."-The Italics are the author's. But Descartes speaks even more strongly:-" There can be nothing nobler in us than our Free Will; which, in a certain sort, renders us equal to God, and apparently exempts us from his dominion."-Analogous opinions are however expressed by Aristotle and the elder Scaliger; whilst many philosophers and theologians maintain,-it is only through his Free Will that "Man is created in the image of God."

In fact, I have been very chary of adducing those testimonies, which rest the proof of the imbecility of the human intellect on the impossibility it finds of reconciling divine Prescience and Predestination with the Liberty of man. Of these there need be

no end.

Cicero, followed by sundry philosophers and even a few divines,* to save, as he thought, the Freedom of the human will, ventured to deny the Foreknowledge of God; so that, as Augustin well expresses it,-" dum vult facere liberos, facit sacrilegos." Armachanus (Richard Fitz Ralph, Archbishop of Armagh,) a distinguished schoolman of the fourteenth century, specially devoted himself for twenty years to a solution of the problem, but, as he was acute enough to find, in vain. The subtle Cajetanus, whom we have already quoted, prudently adjourns the question for the life to come. Our recent writers upon metaphysical questions, frequently do not even comprehend the difficulty; and not a few confound the Liberty of Spontaneity (to Do as we Will)-a liberty which no fatalist ever disallowed, with the Liberty from Necessity (to Will as we Will)-the liberty which is alone in question.

II.-Testimonies to the more special fact, that all our Knowledge, whether of Mind or of Matter, is only phænomenal.

Our whole knowledge of mind and of matter is relative,--conditioned, relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, or know them only as incognisable; and we become aware of their incomprehensible existence, only as this is indirectly and accidentally revealed to us, through certain qualities related to our faculties of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we cannot think as unconditioned, irrelative, existent in and of themselves. All that we know is therefore phænomenal,-phænomenal of the unknown.† The philosopher speculating on the worlds of matter and of mind, is thus, in a certain sort, only an ignorant admirer. In his contemplation of the universe, the philosopher, indeed,

["The Chevalier Ramsay and Dr Adam Clarke deny that God knows the free actions of moral agents before they take place."-Dr Eadie, On the Ephesians (1853), p. 24.]

Hypostasis in Greek, (of ovoía I do not now speak, nor of hypostasis in its ecclesiastical signification,) and the corresponding term in Latin, Substantia, (per se subsistens, or substans, i.e. accidentibus, whichever it may mean,) expresses a relation-a relation to its phænomena. A basis for phænomena, is, in fact, only supposed, by a necessity of our thought; even as a relative it is not positively known. On this real and verbal relativity, see St Augustin, (De Trinitate, L. vii., cc. 4, 5, 6.)-Of the ambiguous term Subject (Tokelμevov) I have avoided speaking.

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