General and special funds:

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES

For necessary expenses, not otherwise provided for, for arms control and disarmament activities, including not to exceed $15,000 for official reception and representation expenses, authorized by the Act of September 26, 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2551 et seq.), [$10,500,000] $11,800,000.

[For "Arms control and disarmament activities" for the period July 1, 1976, through September 30, 1976, $2,700,000.] (89 Stat. 634; Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1976.)

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS

Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

In the spring of 1974,

India became the world's sixth nation to cross the nuclear threshold with its detonation of a nuclear explosive device. Since then, public concern has increased over the most fundamental and potentially most dangerous problem of the nuclear age the further spread of nuclear weapons.

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The threat nuclear proliferation poses to the fragile stability of the present international system as well as to the security and very survival of the United States cannot be overemphasized. A world of additional nuclear weapons states has the potential of intensifying regional conflicts, of undermining the security guarantees of alliance structures and of making nuclear war more likely. Increased opportunities for nuclear blackmail and terrorism make the threat of nuclear proliferation that much more ominous.

It is the policy of the United States Government to use effective diplomatic and political means to meet the challenges of nuclear proliferation. The U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has primary responsibility within the Government for accomplishing this.

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The number of peaceful nuclear facilities throughout the world is expected to increase dramatically by 1980. Such facilities produce materials which can be converted to weapons use. It is necessary, therefore, for ACDA (which chairs the interagency coordinating committee on non-proliferation) continually to increase its involvement in efforts to establish tighter international safeguards and more stringent controls over exports of nuclear technology. addition, the Agency must increase its participation in the development of measures to detect -- and physical security arrangements to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to the manufacture of weapons. In this regard, the Agency must expand its program of assistance to the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A closely related issue involves the increasing threat of nuclear terrorism. A senior ACDA official is currently chairing inter-agency efforts to cope with the threat of nuclear terrorism and other means of mass destruction by terrorists.

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Among diplomatic activities undertaken during the past year, an event of particular significance was the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, held in Geneva in May 1975. ACDA played the principal role in

formulating initiatives for this conference and contributed a substantial part of the U.S. delegation, which was led by the Director of the Agency. The Review Conference produced increased support for non-proliferation efforts from a number of states, and called for stronger safeguards measures by the IAEA. Although several important nations acceeded to the NPT last year, a number of potential nuclear weapon states remain outside the agreement and efforts must continue to induce those countries to agree to forego the development of nuclear weapons.

ACDA is playing a prominent role in the planning and execution of efforts to arrive at concerted export policies among nuclear suppliers. An ACDA official chairs the international working group appointed to work out detailed papers on this subject, and ACDA also chairs an interagency task force examining the possibilities of multinational fuel cycle centers as a means of inhibiting nuclear weapons spread.

SALT. The Agency must continue to devise and negotiate, in both bilateral and multilateral forums, other arms control initiatives for which it has statutory responsibility. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will continue as an important activity of ACDA. In November 1974 at Vladivostok President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev reaffirmed their intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms to be effective through 1985. That process was further actuated at the January 1976 Moscow meeting of Secretary Kissinger and Brezhnev, at which they explored means of resolving the issues that had delayed progress in the talks.

Having completed two sessions in FY 1975, the SALT negotiators held a six-month session in the first half of FY-76. A new session began immediately following Secretary Kissinger's return from Moscow in January 1976 and is now underway in Geneva, and continued negotiations are expected. Thus the Agency must plan for a heavy SALT workload in FY-1977.

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The Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which was established in 1972 as the implementing body for the SALT agreements held three sessions during FY 1975, and at least two sessions of six weeks duration each are expected in FY 1976. A senior ACDA official continues to be the U.S. Commissioner on the SCC, and several other ACDA personnel are deeply involved in SCC work. Any new SALT agreements will increase the workload of the SCC, and the Commission will continue to be active throughout FY 1977. As part of its key role in both SALT and SCC, ACDA also chairs and provides staff support for the SALT and SCC backstopping committees in Washington.

Nuclear Test Limitations.

Work in this area led to

the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and associated Protocol, signed at the 1974 Moscow Summit, which provides for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests of over 150 kilotons by the U.S. and Soviet Union after March 31, 1976. The Protocol provides for the exchange of technical data to facilitate verification.

A separate bilateral agreement to regulate peaceful nuclear explosions (PNES) must be negotiated before the TTBT can be sent to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. During the past year, a U.S. Delegation including a senior ACDA official, has been meeting in Moscow with Soviet counterparts to develop this separate agreement. ACDA also chairs the Washington backstopping of these discussions. In addition, ACDA will continue to support IAEA efforts to draft international agreements relating to

PNES.

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MBFR, Conventional and Regional Arms Control. FY 1977, ACDA will continue its support of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR), as well as conventional and regional arms control activities in general.

The MBFR negotiations between the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact, intended to lead to an agreement that would lower the level of military confrontation in Europe, have been under way in Vienna for over two years. Given the multiplicity of interests and issues, MBFR is an exceedingly complex set of negotiations. In effect, there are two negotiating forums, one in Vienna with the Soviets and their allies, and the other at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, where allied positions must be agreed upon. ACDA chairs the MBFR Interagency Coordinating Committee, which backstops these negotiations in Washington and contributes an important component to the U.S. Delegation at Vienna.

When the first phase of MBFR negotiations is completed, ACDA will be involved both in the implementation of any follow-on measures agreed upon (particularly verification steps) and in preparation for the second phase.

With regard to conventional and regional armaments, ACDA will continue to explore possible limitations in different parts of the world, especially where the potential for great-power confrontation is high. For example, the possibilities for the application of arms control measures in the Indian Ocean will continue to receive attention in the months ahead.