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107 C. Cls. Opinion of the Court time, for only the time in excess of forty hours per week which the employees concerned devoted to actual work as nearly as could be determined. Congress appears to have made these determinations in the statutes referred to. As to the first group of employees having an established workweek of more than 40 hours, all of which they devoted to actual work, or employees having a workweek of 40 hours and at certain times required to work a greater number of hours, it was a simple matter to apply the provisions for overtime compensation at time and one-half for the excess hours devoted to actual work when ordered. As to other groups of employees referred to in the last proviso of Section 1 of Joint Resolution 170, above quoted, and in section 3 of the act of May 7, 1943, Congress recognized that the matter of keeping accurate records of the exact number of hours per week devoted to actual work by certain classes of employees, or of establishing a workweek during which all of the time or hours included therein would be devoted to actual work, would not be feasible as a practical proposition. Congress, therefore, after entirely excluding certain officers and employees, prescribed different methods for the determination and computation of the amounts of compensation for overtime work payable to the several groups of employees cov. ered by the statutes, and authorized and directed the President, the Civil Service Commission and the heads of the Departments concerned to make necessary and proper regulations for the administration of the statutes. As to all groups of employees covered by the statutes, we think Congress intended that the authorized overtime compensation and also the specified additional compensation, in lieu of overtime, should be based as far as possible on hours of service devoted to actual work, and that in order to carry out this rule with reference to all employees it used the word "employment” contained in the earlier acts of 1940 and 1941, carried forward into the later acts, and the words "hours of duty” in the last proviso of Joint Resolution 170 and in section 3 of the act of May 7, 1943, in the sense of time or hours devoted to actual work, rather than in the sense of tours of duty of certain employees during portions of which tours of duty they were not engaged in actual work. Under
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this interpretation as to the intent and meaning of the statutes the plaintiffs, by reason of the nature of their assignments, were properly classified as employees whose "hours of duty" were intermittent or irregular. Our interpretation of the statutes and our conclusion that plaintiffs were, under the regulations promulgated, properly classified and paid additional compensation in lieu of overtime, in accordance with the statutes, is supported by the language of the report of the Senate Civil Service Committee on Joint Resolution 170 (Senate Report No. 1847, 77th Cong., 2d session), which stated, with reference to the last proviso of section 1, as follows:
Provision is made for the payment of additional compensation to certain employees, the nature of whose work does not readily lend itself to an overtime pay program. Such additional compensation would amount to 10 percent of so much of an employee's salary as does not exceed a rate of $2,900 per annum
Included in this category would be employees
whose hours of duty are intermittent, irregular, or less than full time.
[Italics supplied.] While it is true, as plaintiffs contend, that the aim and purpose of Congress was to provide for the payment of overtime compensation and the statutes should be interpreted with that fact in mind, it does not necessarily follow from the language of the statutes and the Committee report that Congress intended to direct the payment of overtime compensation at time and one-half for the full number of hours in tours of duty, in excess of 40 hours per week, for certain groups of employees, such as lighthouse keepers, forest rangers and firefighters, the nature of whose work and employment made it necessary that they remain, subject to call, at or near their posts of duty for extended periods of time, but did not require that all of their time be devoted to actual work. It would be unreasonable to suppose that Congress thought that employees would, or intended that they should, be required to engage in actual work for 24hour periods. Congress prescribed the standards for the classification of employees for overtime pay purposes but left the decision as to what specific groups of employees should come within the specified classifications to be taken care of 107 C. CLS. Opinion of the Court by “necessary and proper” regulations to be prescribed by the President, the Civil Service Commission and the heads of the departments concerned. Regulations so prescribed have the force and effect of law unless clearly beyond the authority conferred or produce a result clearly different from that intended by Congress. It appears, as defendant points out, that Congress viewed the provisions for overtime compensation as producing an increase in compensation of approximately 2143 per centum for employees earning $2,900 or less per annum. If plaintiffs' contention that they should be placed in the classification of employees entitled to overtime compensation at time and one-half, they would receive, upon the basis of their full 24-hour tours of duty, an increase of 165 per centum in their pay. A similar application of the statute to lighthouse keepers and other similar groups of employees required to remain, subject to call, at their posts of duty for more than 84 hours per week, which was the average number of hours in plaintiffs' tours of duty, the increased overtime compensation payable under the statute could amount to as much as 480 per centum. We do not think Congress intended such results.
Pursuant to authority contained in section 5 (a) of the act of June 28, 1940, which was continued by Joint Resolution 170, the President issued Executive Order No. 9289, dated December 26, 1942 (finding 6), which contained, among others, the following provision :
SECTION 7. Employees such as certain forest-fire lookouts, forest guards, and lighthouse keepers the nature of whose work (as determined by the head of the department or agency concerned) requires them to remain at or within the confines of their posts of duty for more than 40 hours per week but does not require that all of their time be devoted to actual work shall be considered to have intermittent or irregular hours of duty within the meaning of the last proviso of section 1 of the said
Senate Joint Resolution 170, 77th Congress. Pursuant to this Executive Order the Secretary of War issued regulations (finding 7), which contained the following paragraph:
a. Employees such as firefighters who because of the nature of their work are required to remain at or within the confines of their posts of duty for more than 40 hours
Opinion of the Court per week, but who are not required to devote all their time to actual work, will be considered to have intermittent or irregular hours of duty and are subject to the
provisions of this paragraph. It must be assumed that Congress was aware of these contemporaneous interpretations when it enacted the Overtime Pay Act of May 7, 1943, which contained, in section 3, almost exactly the same language which had been enacted in the last proviso of Joint Resolution 170.
Section 9 of the act of May 7, 1943 (finding 8), authorized and directed the Civil Service Commission to promulgate rules and regulations for the administration of that act, and by section 20.7 of regulations promulgated May 8, 1943 (finding 9), the Commission continued the above-mentioned interpretation as applicable under the provisions of section 3 of the 1943 act. Similar regulations were promulgated by the Secretary of War (finding 11).
The regulations above referred to were promulgated under and within the authority expressly conferred and they cannot be held invalid under the applicable provisions of the statutes, as applied to the facts and circumstances of these cases.
The facts and the provisions of the statutes and regulations here involved distinguish these cases from Armour de Co. v. Wantock, supra, and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., supra, relied upon by plaintiffs. Those cases were decided under a statute, the language of which did not contain the restrictions and limitations found in the Federal overtime pay acts and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto with reference to employment and hours of work for the purposes of the determination and payment of compensation for overtime to Federal employees.
We do not deem it necessary to discuss at length the amended regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission, January 4, 1945 (finding 12), and by the Secretary of War, January 25, 1945 (finding 13), effective January 1, 1945. Under these regulations the plaintiffs and employees similarly situated were considered as working 16 hours within the spread of each 24-hours daily tour of duty, thereby, in effect, establishing for them an average workweek of 56 hours for the purpose of overtime compensation at time and onehalf of their hourly rate of pay, determined in accordance
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with the formula prescribed by the statutes. These amended regulations were within the authority conferred upon the Civil Service Commission under section 9 of the Overtime Pay Act of 1943, and they were favorable rather than unfavorable to plaintiffs. However, we find nothing in the statutes of 1942 and 1943 that requires the conclusion that such regulations should, in effect, be applied or enforced retroactively.
As to plaintiffs' contention that defendant erred in computing their hourly rates of pay for the purpose of additional compensation in lieu of overtime, under the original regulations, and for the purpose of overtime compensation under the amended regulations, it is sufficient to say that the method employed was that expressly prescribed by the statutes and the regulations. The statutes providing for payment of overtime compensation which were carried into Joint Resolution 170, provided that “in determining the overtime compensation of per annum Government employees the pay for one day shall be considered to be one threehundred-and-sixtieth of the respective per annum salaries." This same basis of computation was carried into section 2 of the act of 1943 (finding 8). The regulations provided that “the daily rate shall be considered to be 1360 of the annual rate, and the hourly rate shall be considered to be 48 of the daily rate.” As to employees who were entitled to additional compensation in lieu of overtime and whose annual compensation was such as to entitle them to $300 per annum, respectively, the regulations provided for the payment of “1360 of $300 for each day in a pay status.” For the reasons stated the rule applied in Townsley v. United States, 101 C. Cls. 237, which involved a different statute, is not applicable.
The number of hours for which plaintiffs claim overtime compensation for the periods involved during their scheduled tours of duty of 24 hours each, in excess of 40 hours per week, as set forth in findings 23 (b), 24 (b), and 25 (b), and the amounts stated in findings 23 (c), (d), 24 (c), (d), and 25 (c), (d), are taken from the figures stipulated by the parties. However, it should be noted that under the regulations of the Civil Service Commission and the Secretary