should ever exceed that of experience, which is its source? Yet that it greatly exceeds this evidence, appears not only from what hath been observed already, but still more, from what I shall have occasion to observe in the sequel. One may safely affirm, that no conceivable conclusion from experience, can possess stronger evidence, than that which ascertains us of the regular succession and duration of day and night. The reason is, the instances on which this experience is founded, are both without number and without exception. Yet even this conclusion, the author admits, as we shall see in the third section, may, in a particular instance, not only be surmounted, but even annihilated by testimony.

Lastly, let it be observed, that the immediate conclusion from experience is always general, and runs thus: This is the ordinary course of nature.' Such an event may rea'sonably be expected, where all the circumstances are entirely similar. But when we descend to particulars, the conclusion becomes weaker, being more indirect. For though all the' known circumstances be similar, all the actual circumstances' may not be similar: nor is it possible in any case to be assured (our knowledge of things being at best but superficial,) that all the actual circumstances are known to us. On the contrary, the direct conclusion from testimony is always' particular, and runs thus; This is the fact in such an individual instance.' The remark now made will serve both to' throw light on some of the preceding observations and to indicate the proper sphere of each species of evidence. Experience of the past is the only rule whereby we can judge concerning the future: And as when the sun is below the horizon, we must do the best we can by light of the moon, or even of the stars; so in all cases where we have no testimony, we are under a necessity of recurring to experience, and of balancing or numbering contrary observations*. But

* Wherever such balancing or numbering can take place, the opposite evidences must be entirely similar. It will rarely assist us in judging of facts supported by testimony; for even where contradictory testimonies come to be considered, you will hardly find that the characters of the witnesses on the opposite sides are so precisely equal, as that an arithmetical operation will evolve the credibility. In matters of pure experience it hath often place. Hence the com-> putations that have been made of the value of annuities, insurances, and several other commercial articles. In calculations concerning chances, the degree of probability may be determined with mathematical exactness. I shall here take the liberty, though the matter be not essential to the design of this tract, to correct an oversight in the essayist, who always supposes, that where contrary evidences must be balanced, the probability lies in the remainder or surplus, when the less. number is subtracted from the greater. The probability doth not consist in the surplus, but in the ratio, or geometricai proportion, which the numbers on the opposite sides bear to each other. I explain myself thus. In favour of one sup

the evidence resulting hence, even in the clearest cases, is acknowledged to be so weak, compared with that which results from testimony, that the strongest conviction built merely on the former, may be overturned by the slightest proof exhibitedby the latter. Accordingly the future hath in all ages and nations been denominated the province of conjecture and uncertainty.

From what hath been said, the attentive reader will easily discover, that the author's argument against miracles, hath not the least affinity to the argument used by Dr. Tillotson against transubstantiation, with which Mr. Hume hath introduced his subject. Let us hear the argument, as it is related in the Essay, from the writings of the Archbishop. "It is " acknowledged on all hands, says that learned prelate, that "the authority either of the scripture or of tradition, is "founded merely on the testimony of the apostles, who were "eye-witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour, by which he "proved his divine mission. Our evidence then for the truth " of the Christian religion, is less than the evidence for the "truth of our senses; because even in the first authors of our “religion, it was no greater; and it is evident, it must dimi"nish in passing from them to their disciples; nor can any "one be so certain of the truth of their testimony, as of the "immediate objects of his senses. But a weaker evidence

can never destroy a stronger; and therefore, were the doc"trine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scrip"ture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning "to give our assent to it. It contradicts sense, though both "the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be "built, carry not such evidence with them as sense, when they "are considered merely as external evidences, and are not "brought_home to every one's breast, by the immediate ope❝ration of the Holy Spirit." That the evidence of testimony is less than the evidence of sense, is undeniable. Sense is the source of that evidence, which is first transferred to the memory of the individual, as to a general reservoir, and thence transmitted to others by the channel of testimony. That the original evidence can never gain any thing, but must lose, by the transmission, is beyond dispute. What hath been rightly

posed event, there are 100 similar instances, against it 50. In another case under consideration, the favourable instances are 60, and only 10 unfavourable. Though the difference, or arithmetical proportion, which is 50, be the same in both cases, the probability is by no means equal, as the author's way of reasoning implies. The probability of the first event is as 100 to 50, or 2 to 1. The probability of the second is as 60 to 10, or 6 to 1. Consequently on comparing the different examples, though both be probable, the second is thrice as probable as the first. * p. 173, 174.

perceived, may be misremembered; what is rightly remem bered may, through incapacity, or through ill intention, be misreported; and what is rightly reported may be misunder stood. In any of these four ways therefore, either by defect of memory, of elocution, or of veracity in the relater, or by misapprehension in the hearer, there is a chance, that the truth received by the information of the senses, may be misrepre sented or mistaken; now every such chance occasions a real diminution of the evidence. That the sacramental elements are bread and wine, not flesh and blood, our sight and touch, and taste, and smell concur in testifying. If these senses are not to be credited, the apostles themselves could not have evidence of the mission of their master. For the greatest external evidence they had, or could have, of his mission, was that which their senses gave them, of the reality of his miracles. But whatever strength there is in this argument with regard to the apostles, the argument with regard to us, who, for those miracles, have only the evidence, not of our own senses, but of their testimony, is incomparably stronger. In their case, it is sense contradicting sense; in ours it is sense contradicting testimony. But what relation has this to the author's argument? None at all. Testimony, it is acknow ledged, is a weaker evidence than sense. But it hath been already evinced, that its evidence for particular facts is infinitely stronger than that which the general conclusion from experience can afford us.-Testimony holds directly of memory and sense. Whatever is duly attested must be remembered by the witness; whatever is duly remembered must once have been perceived. But nothing similar takes place with regard to experience, nor can testimony, with any appearance of meaning, be said to hold of it.

Thus I have shown, as I proposed, that the author's reasoning proceeds on a false hypothesis.It supposeth testimony to derive its evidence solely from experience, which is false. It supposeth by consequence, that contrary ob servations have a weight in opposing testimony, which the first and most acknowledged principles of human reason, or,

if you like the term better, common sense, evidently shows that they have not.It assigns a rule for discovering the superiority of contrary evidences, which, in the latitude there given it, tends to mislead the judgment, and which it is impos sible, by any explication, to render of real use,

SECTION II.

Mr. Hume charged with some fallacies in his way of managing the argument.

IN the essay there is frequent mention of the word experience,

and much use made of it. It is strange that the author hath not favoured us with the definition of a term of so much mo

ment to his argument. This defect I shall endeavour to supply; and the rather, as the word appears to be equivocal, and to be used by the essayist in two very different senses. The first and most proper signification of the word, which, for distinction's sake, I shall call personal experience, is that given in the preceding section. 'It is,' as was observed, founded in memory, and consists solely of the general maxims or conclu*sions, that each individual hath formed, from the comparison of the particular facts he hath remembered.' In the other signification, in which the word is sometimes taken, and which I shall distinguish by the term derived, it may be thus defined. It is founded in testimony, and consists not only of all the ex'periences of others, which have through that channel been communicated to us, but of all the general maxims or conclusions we have formed, from the comparison of particular facts attested.'

In proposing his argument the author would surely be understood to mean only personal experience; otherwise, his making testimony derive its light from an experience which derives its light from testimony, would be introducing what logicians term a circle in causes. It would exhibit the same

things alternately, as causes and effects of each other. Yet nothing can be more limited, than the sense which is conveyed under the term experience, in the first acceptation. The merest clown or peasant derives incomparably more knowledge from testimony, and the communicated experience of others, than in the longest life he could have amassed out of the treasure of his own memory. Nay, to such a scanty portion the savage himself is not confined. If that therefore must be the rule, the only rule, by which every testimony is ultimately to be judged, our belief in matters of fact must have very narrow bounds. No testimony ought to have any weight with us, that doth not relate an event, similar at least to some one observation, which we ourselves have had access to make. For example, that there are such people on the earth as negroes, could not, on that hypothesis, be rendered credible to one who had never seen a negro, not even by the most numerous and

the most unexceptionable attestations. Against the admission of such testimony, however strong, the whole force of the author's argument evidently operates. But that innumerable absurdities would flow from this principle, I might easily evince, did I not think the task superfluous.

The author himself is aware of the consequences; and therefore, in whatever sense he uses the term experience in proposing his argument; in prosecuting it, he with great dexterity shifts the sense, and ere the reader is apprised, insinuates another. "It is a miracle," says he, "that a dead man "should come to life, because that has never been observed "in any age or country. There must therefore be an uniform "experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the " event would not merit that appellation*." Here the phrase, an uniform experience against an event, in the latter clause, is implicitly defined in the former, not what has never been ob served BY US, but (mark his words) what has never been observ ed IN ANY AGE OR COUNTRY.-Now, what has been observed, and what has not been observed, in all ages and countries, pray how can you, Sir, or I, or any man, come to the knowledge of? Only I suppose by testimony, oral or written. The personal experience of every individual is limited to but a part of one age, and commonly to a narrow spot of one country. If there be any other way of being made acquainted with facts, it is to me, I own, an impenetrable secret; I have no apprehension of it. If there be not any, what shall we make of that cardinal point, on which his argument turns? It is in plain language, Testimony is not entitled to the least degree of faith, but as 'far as it is supported by such an extensive experience, as if we had not had a previous and independent faith in testimony, we could never have acquired.'

66

A

How natural is the transition from one sophism to another! You will soon be convinced of this, if you attend but a little to the strain of the argument. "A miracle," says he, "is "violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unaltera"ble experience hath established these laws, the proof against "a miracle is as entire, as any argument from experience can possibly be imaginedt." Again, "As an uniform experi"ence amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, "from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any mi66 racle." I must once more ask the author what is the precise meaning of the words firm, unalterable, uniform ? An experience that admits no exception, is surely the only experience, which can with propriety be termed uniform, firm, unal † p. 180. + p. 181.

p. 181.