Page images

Mr. Bugge next proceeds to few that Belidor has entirely mistaken the theory of this machine, and then goes on to lay down and explain' the true theory of it; in doing which he delivers the following principles :

ift, If the resistance of the ground, and the masses of the piles, be equal, the depths to which they will be driven with a single blow will be as the product of the weight of the Ram into the height through which it falls.

2d, If the masses of the Ram and heights through which it falls are both equal, the depths to which the piles will be driven will be in the inverse ratios of the masses of the piles into the superficies of that part of them which is already immersed'in the earth.

3d, If all these things be unequal, the depths will be in a ratio compounded of the direct ratio of the heights through which the Ram falls into its mass, and the inverse ratio of the mass of the pile into its immersed superficies.

4th, If the weights of the Ram be equal, and also the weights of the piles; the depths to which they will be driven will be as the heights through which the Ram falls directly, and the immersed superficies of the piles inversely. Or, because the immersed superficies of the piles are as the depths which they are already driven into the earth, the depths they will be driven are fimply as the square roots of the heights through which the Ram falls.

From these principles, which are in a manner self-evident, our ingenious Mechanician determines, that the distance which a pile will be driven by each succeeding blow will be less and less, as the superficies of that part of the pile which is immersed in the ground increases; contrary to what had been afferted by M. Belidor : and, consequently, that there is a certain depth, beyond which a pile of a given mass and scantling cannot be driven; the mass of the Ram and the height through which it falls at first being assigned. He also refutes the notion which had been entertained by some, that the driving of piles is facilicated by loading them with weights : for the depth to which a pile can be driven by any single blow (all other things remaining the same) being inversely as its mass, it is manifest that thus loading the pile, and thereby increasing its mass, will be so far from accelerating its descent, that it will absolutely retard it. He concludes his paper with some very useful practical hints; and observations, relative to proportioning the several parts of the machine to one another, the number of men which ought to be employed, examining the ground, and the part of it where the firft pile ought to be driven, so that the others may with the greatest ease posible.


ART. XIII. Dedication to the collective Body of the People of England,

in which th: Source of our present political Difradtions are pointed out, and a Plan proposed for iheir Remedy and Redress. By the Earl of Abingdon. 8vo. 1 s. 6d. Almon, &c. 5780.

IS Lordship opens this Epifle Dedicatory with an ex

planation of the reason why his Thoughts (see Monthly Rev. vol. Ivii. p. 249) are dedicated to the collective body of the people of England at this period of their publication, and not at firft.

• The public good, says he, was my object : but whether I had made use of the proper means to that end, or no, was not for me to determine. So far indeed as my intentions went, of their rectitude I was conscious: but how far I had succeeded in ability reited upon the judgment of others.

To the judgment of others I appealed, and I called upon the Public, if I was wrong to set me right. I declared that. Truth being my only object herein, I should as readily look for it in others as seek it in myself ;' and I have waited impatiently for the event: but notwithstanding five editions of these Thoughts have been bad, and much time has since elapsed, to this very hour, not the colour of objection, nor the shadow of argument have been opposed to them.

• These chen are the circumstances under which this Dedication now makes its appearance to you. What diffidence had before with-held, acquired confidence hath fince produced ; and as, on the one hand, if truth be with me, my reward will be in its use to you ; so, on the other, if error, my consolation is, that I have been ever ready to retract it.

• But having faid, that not the colour of objection, nor the shadow of argument have been opposed to these Thoughts ; I feel myself obliged to offer a few words in answer to one writer, who has been pleased to honour me with his public correspondence. This writer is a Ms. Cartwright, and who, in a Letter addressed to me t, has, fuppofing me wrong in a position that I have laid down, called upon me, with great propriety, for my juftification. I rejoice to meet such inquiries. They are the avenues to truth. And I am no less pleased with the inquirer. He has written like a gentleman, and what is more than this, like an honest man: for, unlike those anonymous writers, whose fears are left the infamy of their names should increase the infamy of their writings, he has affixed his name to what he has written. 'It is therefore matter of concern to me to find myself miltaken by this writer : but my hopes are, that to remove his mistake will be equally satisfactory to him, as to me.'

His Lordship then enters upon his vindication, and, as we think, fully proves that the error has arisen merely from a mirconception of his expreffion; and that, in fact, with respect to

# Vid. A Letter to the Earl of Abingdon discusing a position relative to a fundamental right of the Constitution, &c. By John Cartwright. See Review, vol. lviii. p. 237. Rev. May 1780. Сс


the matter in dispute he and Mr. Cartwright are both of the same opinion. He then proceeds to the discussion of another point; fiamely, the nature of allegiance; on the due solution of which, as his Lordship observes, the most important conftitutional doctrine hangs. On this subject his Lordship reasons with singular acuteness and ingenuity. In the course of his ar. gument he examines the maxim that the King can do no wrong ; in illustration of which doctrine Sir William Blackstone lays it down, that the King is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness.

But let us fee, says this spirited writer, how this Westminsterhall inference (for it is called a legal maxim) and its comment agree with the Conflitution, with nature, with reason, with common fense, with experience, with fact, with precedent, and with Sir William Blackstone himself; and whether, by the application of these rules of evidence thereto, it will not be found, that (from the want of attention, as I have taken notice of before, to that important line of distinction which the Constitution has drawn between the King of England, and the Crown of England) what was attributed to the monarchy has not been given to the monarch, what meant for the kingfhip conveyed to the King, what designed for the thing transferred to the perfon, what intended for theory applied to practice; and so in consi quence that whilit the premisses of the perfection of the monarchy) be true, the conclufion (that the King can do no wrong) be not false ..

• And firit in reference to the Constitution: to which if this matter be applied (meaning what it expresses, and if it do not it is unwor, thy of notice) it is fubversive of a principle in the Constitution, upon which the preservation of the Constitution depends; I mean the principle of refiftance : a principle which, whilit no man will now venture to gainfay, Sir William Blacktlone himself admits, ' is juftitable to the person of the Prince when the being of the State is endan. gered, and ine public voice proclaims such relistance necessary ;” and thus, by such admillion, both disproves the maxim, and oversets bis own comment thereupon : for to say that “ the King can do no wrong," and that he is incapable even of thinking wrong," and then to admit that “ selittance to his person is juftifiable," are fuch jarring contradictions in themselves, chat until reconciled, the necef, fory of argument is suspended t.

With respect then, in the next place, to the agreement of this maxim and its comment with nature, with reason, and with common fenie, I should have thought myself futficiently justified in appealing *{o every man's own reflecuon for decision, if I had not been made to understand that nature, reason, and common sense had had nothing to do with either. Sir William Blackstone says, ' That though a philosophical mind will consider the royal person merely as one man

• How easily does the worship of the divinity degenerate into a worthip of the idol?' Vid. Hume's Eifays, p. 46. + Vid. Blackstone's Comm. v. 1. p. 251.


appointed by mutual consent to preside over others, and will pay bim that reverence and duty which the principles of society demand, yet the mass of mankind will be ape to grow insolent and refractory if taught to coolider their Prince as a man of no greater perfe&ion than themselves; and therefore the law ascribes to the King, in his high polirical character, certain attributes of a great and transcendent natore, by which the people are led to consider him in the light of a superior being, and to pay him that awful respect which may enable him with greater eafe to carry on the business of Government." So that, in order to govern wi:h greater ease, (which by the bye is mere affertion without any proof) it is necessary to deceive the mass of mankind, by making them believe, not only what a philosophical mind cannot believe, but what it is imposible for any mind to believe; and therelore in the investigation of chis subject, according to Sir William, neither nature, reason, nor common sense can have any concern.

'It remaios to examine in how much this maxim and its comment agree with experience, with fact, with precedent, and with Sir William Blacktione himself. And here it is matter of most curious speculation, to observe a maxim laid down, and which is intended for a rule of government, not only without a single case in support of it, but with a string of cases that may be carried back to Egbert the firft manarch of England, in direct opposition to the doctrine. Who is the man, that reading the past history of this country, will shew us any King that has done no wrong? Who is the Reader that will not find, that all the wrongs and injuries which the free Confti. tucion of this country has hicherto suffered, have been solely derived from the arbitrary measures of our Kings? And yet the mass of mankind are to look upon the King, as a superior being; and the maxim that “the King can do no wrong,” is to remain as an article of bę. hef. But without pothing this inquiry any further, let us see what encouragement Sir William Blackstone himself has given us for our credulity. After ftating the maxim, and presenting us with a molt lively picture, “ of our sovereign Lord thus all perfect and immortal," what does he make this all perfection and immortality in the end to come to *? His words are these : “ For when King Charles's deluded brother attempted to enslave the nation,” (no wrong this, to be Jure)" he found it was beyond his power : the people both COULD, and did seliit him :. and in consequence of such reiiftance obliged him to quit his enterprize and his throne together t.”

The sum of all is inis: that the Crown of England and the King of England are diitinguishable, and not synonimous terms: that allegiance is due to the Crown, and shrough the Crown 20 the King : that the attributes of the Crown are fovereignty, perfection, and perperuity ; but that it does not therefore follow, “ that the King can do no wrong.

Is is indeed to be admitted, that in high respect. for the Crown, high respect is also due to the wearer of that Crown; that is, to the King: but the Crown is to be preferred to the King,

# Vide Blackfone's Comm, v. I. p. 250.
+ Id. 8.
4. P. 4.3.

Сс 2


for the first veneration is due to the Constitution. It is likewise so be Supposed, that the King will do no wrong; and as to prevent this, a Privy Council is appointed by the Constitution to all{t the King in the execution of the government, so if any wrong be done, “ these men,” as Montesquieu expresses it, “ may be examined and punilhed ."

• But if any future King fall think to screen these evil counsellors, from the just vengeance of the people, by becoming his own Minister; and, in so doing, lall cake for his sanction, “ihe attribute of perfection,” shall truit to the deception of his being "a superior being,and cloak himself under the maxim, that “the King can do no wrong ;" I say, in such a cafe, let the appeal already made to the Constitution, to nature, to reason, to common sense, to experience, to fact, to precedent, and to Sir William Blackstone himself fuffice; and preclude the necessity of any further Remarks from me I.'

After enumerating the various disorders under which the Conftitution is supposed to labour, this state phyfician, whose abilities, independent of other considerations, sufficiently save him from the imputation of being a quack, recommends as a restorative that an A&t should be immediately pafled declaratory of the constitution, for settling the constitution, and for obtaining uniformity in the State.' Those who wish to know what is advanced on this subject must be referred to the book itself, in which its noble Author has displayed great extent of political knowledge. His Lordship, though not an elegant, is a

Except the parliament, which is the great council of the nation, the judges, and the peers, who, being the hereditary counsellors of the crown, have not only a right, but are bound in Foro Confcientia to advise the King for the public good ; the Constitucion knows of no other council than the Privy Council. Any other council, like Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Alhley, Lauderdale, and as the initial letters of these names express, is a CABAL, and as such should be fupprefled. Nat. Bacon, speaking of the lofs of power in the grand council of Lords, says,• The sense of Stare once contracted into a Privy Council, is soon recontracted into a Cabinet Council, and last of all into a favourite or (wo; which many times brings damage to the Public, and both themselves and Kings into extreme precipices ; partly for want of maturity, but principally through the Providence of God over-ruling irregular courses to the hurt of fucb as walk in them.' Pol. Disc. part 2. pag. 201.

For experience, fal, and precedent, see the reigns of King John, Henry III. Edward II. Richard II. Charles I. and James II. See also Mirror of Juftices, where it is said, that this grand assembly (meaning the now Parliament or then Wittena-gemotte) is to confer the government of God's people, how they may be kept from fin, live in quiet, and have right done them, according to the cuf. coms and laws; and more especially of turong done by the King, Queen, or their children:” to which Nat. Bacon adds this noie, A this time the king might do curong, &c. and so fay Bracion and Fleta of Kings in their time.' Difc. part 1. pag. 37. Lond. 1739.


« PreviousContinue »