quality which enables the lessor to evade responsibility for his own acts by referring persons injured thereby to a third party for relief.

2. The right to create a nuisance by means of a pipe through which water flows upon the sidewalk cannot be made a matter of grant, nor can the right be acquired by prescription. If such a pipe, by natural operation, causes and creates a nuisance, the owner of the premises must know it, or must be presumed to know it. In such cases actual notice of the existence of such a nuisance is unnecessary.

3. On the facts in this case the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence was for the injury.

4. Both bones of the plaintiff's leg were fractured immediately above the ankle. He suffered considerable pain and remained in the hospital nearly two months. His hospital bill was $150, and, in addition to this, there was a doctor's bill of $50. At the time of the trial, which was nine months after the accident, he was still lame and obliged to wear an elastic stocking or anklet; and, according to the testimony, would be obliged to wear the same for about a year longer. He was unable to follow any active occupation for several months after the injury. Held, that a verdict for $1000 did not indicate that the jurors were influenced by passion or prejudice.

COLLINS, 7-The defendants Broderick were the owners of a brick block in the city of Minneapolis, and had been such owners for many years, but at the time of the accident upon which this action was based the premises were occupied by two separate and independent tenants. The building had a flat roof, and from this roof, leading to a point a few inches from the sidewalk, was a six-inch iron pipe or conductor, put in and used for the purpose of conveying water from the roof to the ground. At the bottom of this pipe was an elbow spout, which turned toward the street, some eight or nine inches in length, and the water which made its way down through this pipe and was discharged upon the sidewalk was supposed to be carried off through a gutter-like depression in the sidewalk, which extended to the curbing. This has been the condition of things for more than fifteen years. It was shown upon the trial that almost every winter water came down through this pipe, was discharged therefrom, and froze upon the sidewalk in a ridge some four or five inches in height at the point directly below the discharge, and decreased in height as it spread out towards the curbing. It was not a case where ice had formed upon the sidewalk naturally, and in the manner to be expected in this climate, and really unavoidable. The attention of the city authorities had more than once been drawn to this common occurrence, but there was no testimony from which it appeared that the direct attention of the owners of the building had been called to it. On this particular winter the water had frozen and had formed in this uneven and dangerous manner some two or three weeks prior to the accident, which occurred one night about twelve o'clock. The plaintiff was coming out of the building, and, stepping upon this ridge near the spout of the pipe, slipped, fell and broke his leg. He brought this action for damages and was awarded a verdict of $1000 against both defendants. There are two appeals; one by the Brodericks, the other by the city.

DONOHUE v. LONSDALE COMPANY.

SUPREME COURT, RHODE ISLAND, MAY, 1903.

Master and servant-Defective appliance-Seats for women employees-Girl injured by seat overturning. Where it appears that under sec. 8, c. 68 of the Gen. Laws of R. I., requiring that in every establishment where women were employed seats should be provided for such employees, and it was alleged that the seat furnished the plaintiff was unsafe in being topheavy and liable to be turned over at a very slight contact of the skirts of the employees, and that the feet of the seat were so pointed when turned upwards as to injure a person who might fall on them; and that while exercising due care the plaintiff sat down on the stool, and while thus seated her duties required her to stand momentarily, and that when she went to sit down again the stool had turned over and she fell on one of the points and was injured. A demurrer to the declaration on the ground that the plaintiff's contributory negligence in attempting to sit down without first ascertaining whether the stool was standing was sustained.

Misuse of appliance.-The mere fact that a machine or appliance may become dangerous if carelessly used is not a test of the master's liability.

Duty of master-Warning not required.-Plaintiff's employer was not bound to furnish seats which would not tip over when caught in the skirts of its employees, or to warn them of the danger of sitting down where a stool had been placed without first ascertaining whether it was standing on its legs or not.

TILLINGHAST, J.-The negligence alleged in this case was the failure of the defendant corporation to provide a reasonably safe seat for the use of the plaintiff when the duties of her work did not require her to be standing. Gen. Laws R. I., c. 68, sec. 8, provides as follows: "In every manufacturing, mechanical or mercantile establishment in which women and girls are employed, there shall be provided conveniently located seats for such women and girls, and they shall be permitted to use them when their duties do not require their standing.' The plaintiff alleges that the seat which was furnished her was unsafe in this: That it was made with a round seat screwed upon a piece of piping, which piping was screwed into a standard having three feet, flattened and triangular in shape, after the style of the points of anchor; that the seat or stool was heavier at the top than at the bottom and was, therefore, liable to fall or turn over upon the floor at a very slight contact with any substance-e. g., the skirt or clothing of any of the women and children working in the room-and that the feet of the stool or seat were so pointed and sharp, when turned upwards, as to injure any person who might fall upon them. The plaintiff further alleges that while in the exercise of due care she sat down upon the stool furnished her, at a time when her duties did not require her to be standing, and while thus seated it became necessary that she should stand momentarily upon her feet in the discharge of her duties, which she did, and that when she went to sit back again upon said stool, it had fallen or turned over upon the floor, leaving the points or feet thereof projecting upwards, and that she fell upon one of said poiuts, and was seriously and permanently injured.

COLE v. GERMAN SAVINGS AND LOAN SOCIETY.

UNITED STAtes Circuit Court of APPEALS, EIGHTH Circuit, UTAH, JULY, 1903.

1. Negligence-Proximate Cause-Test.-An injury that is the natural and probable consequence of an act of negligence is actionable, and such an act is the proximate cause of the injury.

2. Same-Remote Cause-Test-But an injury which could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence is not actionable, and such an act is either the remote cause, or no cause whatever, of the injury.

3. Same-Intervening cause-Test.-An injury that results from an act of negligence, but that could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as its probable consequence, and that probably would not have resulted from it had not the interposition of some new and independent cause interrupted the natural sequence of events, turned aside their course and produced it, is not actionable, and such an act of negligence is the remote cause, and the independent intervening cause is the proximate cause, of the injury. 4 Same-Concurring negligence-Effect. It is no defense to an action for damages for an injury of which the act or omission of the defendant was the proximate cause that the negligent or wrongful act of another concurred with the recklessness of the defendant to produce the untoward result.

5. Same.-But the concurring negligence of another cannot transform the remote into the proximate cause of an injury, or create or increase the liability of the defendant. It cannot make an injury which was not the natural and probable result of the negligent acts or omissions of the defendant their natural and probable consequence. No act contributes to an injury, in the legal acceptation of that term, unless it is a proximate cause of that injury, and no one is liable for an injury unless it was a natural and probable result of his act.

6. Same-Evidence.-The plaintiff entered and passed along a hall in the building of the defendant to take the elevator, the well or shaft of which opened into the hall. A boy, who was a stranger to her and to the defendant, hurried past ber in the hall, pushed the sliding door of the well of the elevator, which was open from one to ten inches, back as far as it would go, and stepped back. The plaintiff supposed this boy was the operator of the elevator, and stepped in. The elevator was at an upper floor in charge of its regular operator, and the plaintiff fell to the bottom of the well and was injured. The hall was so dark that it was difficult, but not impossible, to see the elevator when it was at the lower floor, and when it was not there nothing but darkness was visible in the well. The strange boy had been seen by witnesses riding and visiting on the elevator a dozen times and endeavoring to operate it once. The door of the shaft or well could be opened from the outside when it was latched by lifting and sliding it. It would bound open from one to ten inches when the operator jammed it, and it was often left open to that extent. Held-the negligent acts and omissions of the defendant were not, and those of the strange boy were, the proximate cause of the injury, the latter constituted an independent, intervening cause, which interrupted the natural sequence of events between the negligence of the defendant and the injury of the plaintiff, insulated the defendant's negligence from the plaintiff's hurt, broke the casual connection between them, and produced her injury.

7. Same-Violation of law or duty not reasonably to be anticipated-The act of the strange boy could not be foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of the negligent acts or omissions of the defendant. A violation of law or duty by a third party, when not intended by a defendant, is not regarded by the law as the natural consequence of his acts of negligence, and cannot be reasonably anticipated as their probable result.

CHESLEY v, ROCHEFORD & GOULD.

SUPREME COURT, NEBRASKA, JULY, 1903.

Dangerous premises-Licensee-One entering upon another's premises with his consent, but without an invitation, and not in the discharge of a duty imposed upon him is a bare licensee, and there is no duty owed to him by the occupier except to refrain from wantonly or willfully injuring him.

Employee of contractor going upon part of building where employees of other contractor were at work and injured.-Where it appeared that the plaintiff was a carpenter engaged in laying the flooring of a reservoir some sixteen feet from a part of the building where defendant's employees were laying brickwork and where there was a rough cable hoist or elevator used to furnish material to the brickmen, and that in the shade of the elevator was a bucket of drinking water for the use of the brickmen, and the plaintiff went from where he was at work to the bucket to get a drink, and while there was struck and injured by a wheelbarrow that fell from the elevator upon him, the evidence showed that the plaintiff was a bare licensee, and a direction to find a verdict for defendants was proper.

Oldham, C.-The facts underlying this controversy are that in the summer of 1898 the Armour Packing Company was engaged in the construction of a large building in South Omaha, Neb. The firm of Rocheford & Gould, the defendants in this action, were independent contractors who had charge of the brickwork on the piers of one of the structures called the "Oleo building," and also were laying brick on the east wall of that building at the time of the injury complained of. From eight to sixteen feet east of the piers of the Oleo building a gang of carpenters in the employ of Armour, and not of Rocheford & Gould, were engaged in flooring a reservoir about 10 feet deep, 50 feet wide and 250 in length. Among these carpenters was the plaintiff, Chesley, who had been in Armour's employ for some time previous, but commenced work on the reservoir the day he was injured. The floor of the elevator and the ground west of it on which the defendant's men were working on the piers were practically on the same level and 30 or 40 feet below the level of the street. For the purpose of getting brick down to their men working on the piers, defendants used a rough cable hoist or elevator on which a wheelbarrow of material would be lowered from the street to the ground near the pier where the brick was being laid. This elevator was double, so that while a wheelbarrow of brick was descending an empty wheelbarrow was ascending for another load. It was propelled by power, and was in use continuously during working hours. The framework around the elevator was stayed by cross-braces 8 to 10 feet apart. Wheelbarrows were placed in the elevator from the north and south sides, which were open and unprotected. The employees of Rocheford & Gould were supplied with water from a bucket which was placed in the shade of the elevator, and at the time of the injury complained of-the afternoon of July 23d-the bucket was on a rock some 6 or 8 feet north of the center of the hoist, and perhaps a little to the west. The carpenters who were at work on the reservoir were supplied with water by men or boys sent around among them for that purpose by Armour's foreman. The afternoon of the injury was very warm, and the waterboys, as they were called, did not come around as frequently as desired among the carpenters to supply their thirst. Consequently, as appears from plaintiff's testimony, some of the carpenters went over to the bucket in the shade of the elevator to get water. It appears that he was flooring along on the southwest portion of the reservoir and not very far distant from the elevator immediately before the injury. He also claimed that the carpenters while at work would sometimes saw off ends of the boards, which would fall three or four feet west from the floor of the reservoir, and that they would from time to time pick up these pieces of plank for the purpose of patching out the floor. There is also some evidence tending to show that they would sometimes lay their planes, squares and other tools on the ground immediately west of the reservoir and within a few feet thereof. At the trial of this case in the court below plaintiff testified that he stepped from the floor of the

266

reservoir to pick up a piece of plank which had been sawed off, and that when he came near to the piece of plank he noticed the water bucket on the rock and went there to get a drink, and that while he was drinking some heavy weight fell on his head, rendering him senseless and inflicting a severe, if not a permanent, injury upon him. Other witnesses who saw the injury agree that plaintiff was standing with his back to the elev tor hoist, drinking, and that an empty wheelbarrow, which was ascending in the elevator, caught its handle on one of the cross-braces of the elevator and was hurled down upon him.

There was evidence offered on the part of the defendants tending to show that plaintiff, immediately before the injury, was at work a considerable distance from the elevator, on the floor of the reservoir, and that he came by one of the defendants' men on his way to the water bucket and was remonstrated with for interfering with the brickmasons by going over their work to the water bucket. One of the defendants' brickmasons testified that plaintiff asked him for permission to go and get a drink from the bucket, and that he told plaintiff he might do so, but to look out for the elevator and not stand in front of it, as it was dangerous. Defendants also showed that on each of two former trials of this case in the court below the plaintiff testified in his own behalf and made no claim that he went in search of boards or tools at the time of his injury, but that at each of the former hearings he alleged that he saw the water bucket on the stone and went there because he was thirsty and because the waterboys did not come around as often as they should to supply the carpenters. Defendants' evidence also tended to show that there were no pieces of boards or tools of the carpenters anywhere near the elevator. The evidence, however, was disputed. The court, after the testimony was all in, directed a verdict for the defendants, and plaintiff brings the

cause here on error.

RICE v. EUREKA PAPER CO.

COURT OF APPEALS, NEW YORK, APRIL, 1903.

Master and servant-Risk of employment-Continuing employment after promise to repair defective machinery.-Where it appeared that an employee at a rag cutter in defendant's paper mill knew that the machine was defective and complained to an officer of the company and threatened to quit work unless the defect was remedied, and the officer at the close of the week promised to repair the machine during the fore part of the following week, and the employee continued to work the following week, relying on the promise, and was injured on Wednesday, he did not assume the risk of injury and the company was liable. Promise to repair within a reasonable time.-The promise to repair the machinery during the fore part of next week was a promise to repair within a reasonable time.

WERNER, 7.-This action is brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff through defendant's alleged negligence. The fact which for the purposes of this appeal must be taken as true are briefly as follows: In April, 1900, and for a number of years prior thereto, the defendant was engaged in the manufacture of paper in its mill located at Oswego Falls, N. Y. As part of its equipment it had a machine known as a "rag-cutter," which was on the second floor of the mill, almost directly over the main power shaft, which extended through the first story of the building, near the ceiling. This rag cutter, roughly described, consisted of a feed-table about three feet long, one end of which connected with a large, slowly revolving cylinder, with teeth or spikes upon its circumference. Underneath this cylinder was a stationary plate, and behind this an arrangement of rapidly revolving knives. The rags, rope and other materials to be cut up were fed into the machine by the operator, who stood at the end of the feed table. As this material reached the spiked cylinder it was drawn in and subjected to pressure, which brought it into contact with the knives, where it was cut into small fragments. Near the end of the axle or shaft of this machine, but beyond the reach of the operator when standing at his position in front of the feed table, were two pulleys-one tight, the other loose, and both covered by a box. On the power shaft in the lower story there were also two pulleys similarly arranged. These two sets of pulleys were connected by a belt, which, when on the tight pulleys, transmitted the power from the main shaft to a rag cutter and set it in which this machine could be stopped in the room where it was located was to lift motion. The only way the cover or box from the pulleys on the machine's axle and with a stick to guide the belt from the tight pulley to the loose one; and in starting the machine this process was, of course, reversed. If the power was to be shut off at the main shaft, that was done on the floor below, by means of a longer stick, with which the belt was shifted to the loose pulley on the power shaft. Beyond these contrivances there were no means by which the machine could be stopped when the power shaft was in operation. Belt shifters and belt tighteners were then in common use in other mills upon machines of this character, and by their use an operator could, without leaving his position, stop his machine almost instantly. Defendant then had in its mill a belt tightener, which had been made for this machine, but which, for some unexplained reason, had not been used. On the fourth day of April, 1900, while the plaintift was engaged in feeding this machine, his right hand became entangled in a mesh of string, and was being drawn slowly towards the spike cylinder. In attempting to disengage it the other hand was also caught in the mesh, and both were drawn to the cylinder and upon the knives, where they were so mangled that the right hand was utterly destroyed and the left one was annihilated with the exception of a small portion of the palm and a single finger. At this time the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for nearly eighteen months, and had been operating this machine for over a year. He was forty years of age, ordinarily bright, and fully understood the construction and operation of this machine. He knew that a belt tigh ener had been made for it, but not used, and he was aware of the danger incident to the operation of the machine without either a belt He says that the treasshifter or a belt tightener. This is clearly established by his testimony to the effect that, on the Saturday night preceding the Wednesday on which he was injured, he told defendant's treasurer that the machine ought to be provided with a shifter, and that he would quit if one was not put on. urer then told him the mill would be shut down for other repairs the fore part of the following week, and while shut down they would put on a shaft or a tightener, and that, relying upon this promise, he continued work until he was injured.

KEARINES v. CULLEN.

SUPREME JUDICIAL Court, MassachuSETTS, MAY, 1903.

Landlord and tenant-Agreement to repair.-In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, a landlord is under no obligation to keep premises demised to a tenant in repair.

Agent repairing step that caused injury, no admission of landlord's liability.-The act of an agent having charge of a landlord's property of repairing a step that had caused an injury to a tenant cannot be

taken as an admission by the landlord of liability, or that at the time of the injury he retained possession of the step, when it was not shown that the agent acted under the authority or direction of the landlord.

Voluntary repairs by landlord-Voluntary repairs by a landlord after an accident to a tenant of demised premises is not an admission of the landlord's liability.

Entrance step to tenement defective.-Where a tenant was entering the doorway of a double tenement house divided by a partition, and each part having its own entrance, the step that was used in common by the tenants of both houses turned over, and the tenant was injured, the landlord was not liable. BRALEY, 7.-This is an action of tort for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff by reason of the giving away of an alleged defective step leading to a tenement in the building owned by the defendant, and hired and occupied at the time by the plaintiff s husband. This building was a dwelling house one story and a half in height, divided into two tenements by a partition through the center, with a front door to each. These doors were adjoining, but were separated by the partition. The thresholds of the doors, being some twelve inches above the ground level, were approached by a step or tread, which was six inches above the level, and consisted of a single plank raised on blocks at each end and extending in front of both doors. There was no rail or other division of the step corresponding with the line of partition. While using the step which led to her tenement, "the whole step came out and turned right over," and the plaintiff received the injury complained of.

LOOMIS v. HOLLISTER.

SUPREME COURT of Errors, CONNECTICUT, JULY, 1903.

Master and servant-Scope of employment-Driver deviating from route directed by employer and leaving horses that ran away and collided with a wagon.

Where it appeared that a servant was employed to deliver ice over a route covering several miles and to drive back to the stables, and was shown the specific route to take, and while returning to the stables, he drove out of the prescribed route to the extent of about half a mile for the purpose of stopping at the post office to get his own mail, and left the team unhitched, and the team ran away and struck the wagon of plaintiff, who was injured, the servant was acting within the scope of his employment, and the master was liable for plaintiff's injuries.

Instruction.-An instruction that the master would not be liable "where there is not merely a deviation, but a total departure from the course of the master's business, so that the servant may be said to be on a frolic of his own," is not open to the claim that the jury might be misled into believing that the court intended to say that no deviation on business of the servant could become a total departure unless that business were of a hilarious nature.

On August 11, 1899, a heavy ice cart, drawn by a pair of horses, being the property of the defendant, collided with a wagon in which the plaintiff was seated, whereby she was thrown upon the ground and received the injuries complained of. The defendant's team was in charge of his servant, named Beebe. The following facts were claimed by the parties to have been proved: The defendant had employed Beebe the preceding May. His daily duties were, early in the morning to take the defendant's team and deliver ice over a route covering several miles, and drive the horses back to the defendant's stable. Upon returning to the stables his duties ended for the day, until six o'clock, when he would ordinarily feed the horses. When Beebe was first employed, in May, the defendant when about with him in the peddling of ice and showed him the specific route to take. On the day in question Beebe started with the team from the stables at an early hour in the morning, and was returning to the s'ables after making the last delivery of ice, on the natural route home, and the one specifically prescribed for him by the defendant; but instead of continuing on this route he took a roundabout and longer route for the purpose of stopping at the post office, leaving the horses unhitched and unattended. It was then about 1.30 P. M. The horses had not been fed for seven hours, and were left standing headed towards the stables, which were about a quarter of a mile distant. While Beebe was in the post office the horses started for home, ran against the wagon of the plaintiff and so caused her injury.

JACKSON v. MERCHANTS AND MINERS' TRANSP. CO.
SUPREME COURT, GEORGIA, AUGUST, 1903.

Master and servant-Safe place to work-Employee in hold of ship struck by trucks falling down hatchway.

1. It is the duty of the master to provide for his servant a reasonably safe place in which to work, and to that end he is bound to make reasonable provision for the protection of the servant against dangers to which he is exposed while engaged in the work he is employed to perform. For a failure to discharge such duty the master is liable to the servant for injuries caused thereby, and this is true though the injuries result from the concurrent negligence of the master and a fellow-servant of the one injured, where the injury could not have been sustained but for the failure of the master to perform such duty.

*** The petition alleged, in substance, that plaintiff was an employee of defendant, and at the time of receiving the injury, about seven o'clock A. M., was engaged in the hold of one of defendant's ships, assisting in storing away lumber; that immediately above the place where he was at work, was an open hatchway, through which lumber and other freight was being loaded into the ship; that the hatchway was open at the time, so that it was possible for trucks and other heavy objects to fall or drop through it from above upon plaintiff and injure him, unless some person were stationed at the hatchway to give warning to plaintiff or to prevent it; that, in order to render the place where plaintiff was at work a safe place, it was necessary that a hatch tender should be stationed at the hatchway; that it was the custom of defendant to have a hatch tender there to protect its employees engaged as plaint ff was; that all these facts were known to defendant at the time plaintiff was injured; that at the time plaintiff was at work and injured he was under the belief that there was a hatch tender above him, at the open hatchway, and he was relying upon the custom of defendant to have a hatch tender there; that it was the duty of defendant to provide a safe place for plaintiff to perform the duties in which he was engaged, and to use the proper safeguards to make the place where he was at work safe from dangers to which he might be exposed while performing his duty; that defendant failed to have a hatch tender at the hatchway immediately above the plaintiff upon the occasion when he was hurt, and in consequence of such negligence on defendant's part a pair of heavy trucks

were thrown or dropped down through the hatchway by someone from above, without warning to plaintiff, and fell heavily upon his foot, breaking three of the bones thereof and otherwise mangling it; that the failure of defendant to have a hatch tender at the hatchway when the trucks fell upon plaintiff was unknown to him at the time; that plaintifl was exercising all ordinary and reasonable care at the time. The effects of the injury, the age and earning capacity of the plaintiff at the time, were also alleged.

Upon the frial the evidence admitted in behalf of the plaintiff tended to show that he had been at work all night in the hold of one of defendant's vessels, assisting in storing lumber; that about seven o'clock next morning, without any warning to him, a pair of heavy trucks were thrown by an emp'oyee of defendant down through the hatchway immediately under which plaintiff was at work, falling upon and injuring him as alleged in the petition; that at this time no hatch tender was at the hatchway; that it was customary for defendant to have a hatch tender there all the time, whose duty it was to give warning to the workmen below when freight was about to be loaded through the hatchway; that a hatch tender had been at the hatchway all during the previous night, "singing out" and giving such warnings; that just before the trucks were thrown down the hatchway, the foreman of all the employees engaged in loading the vessel blew, as was customary, a "mouth whistle' ou on the dock, as a signal for the hands to quit work for breakfast, and that thereupon the hatch tender left his place of duty at the hatchway and was not there when the trucks were thrown down; that plaintiff did not know of the custom to quit work when the whistle blew; that, on accourt of the noise being made on the iron deck above and in the hold while the ship was being loaded, the whistle could not be heard in the hold where plaintiff was, and he did not hear it, and did not know that the hatch tender had left the hatchway, but thought he was still there; that plaintiff could not see what was going on above him; that it was customary for those at work in the hold to quit work for breakfast when the trucks above stopped. There was evidence as to plaintiff's age, earning capacity, expectancy, his injuries, etc.

INCREASING LONGEVITY.

There seems to be no doubt that the average age of mankind, at least in civilized countries, is gradually increasing. The scriptural limit of three score years and ten has long been passed, the healthy man of seventy being so frequently at the height of his mental powers as no longer to excite comment. Men not only live longer, but they live better than they did a few generations ago. The comforts and luxuries of an advanced civilization, the discoveries in medical science, the better knowledge of hygienic principles, the diffusion of wealth and the extension of education are the principal elements which have contributed to the increased longevity of our time. But long life is not always an unmixed blessing. The old man or the man who has passed middle age is apt to have a hard struggle in these strenuous days, unless he is so fortunate as to have saved a fortune or a competence during his more productive years. There are few sadder sights than the man who is crowded out of his place in the struggle for existence by younger and more vigorous competitors, while he is still in full possession of his faculties and still willing and anxious to work. But in many respects this is the day of the young man. He it is who is in demand, not only for such positions as particularly require strength and energy, but even for places of responsibility where judgment, executive ability and special knowledge are the chief requisites for success. In business, in the profession and in the great corporations, the younger men are coming more and more to the front and the older men must make way for them. This is as inexorable as the processes of evolution, and it carries with it a lesson which no young man can afford to ignore. In time of prosperity prepare for adversity. No man's future is absolutely secure and no prudent man neglects to provide for the years to come when his earning powers must decline. When he has a family dependent upon him this duty becomes still more imperative and there is but one sure and safe way to do it. To save and invest as large a proportion of one's income as possible will provide for the lean years to come, unless one of two things happens. Death may come before it has been possible to accumulate a substantial sum, or the accumulation of years may be swept away through unfortunate investments. But, fortunately, both of these contingencies may be provided against. Life insurance has robbed death of half its terrors by making it possible to secure an estate as soon as the first premium is paid, and in a good company there is no possiblity of loss through ill-considered invesments. A policy in such a company gives security to the young man and assures a competency to the old man. It provides for every necessity through its various forms of life and endowment policies and annuities, and it solves the anxious problems which confront every thoughtful and prudent man.