XLIV. commanded the troops in this part of the field. On CHAP. his extreme right, and posted at intervals along a curve drawn from his right front to his centre rear, Prince Mentschikoff placed his cavalry, a force comprising 3400* lances, with three batteries of horse-artillery.** Each of these bodies of horse, when brought within sight of the Allies, was always massed in column. Thus, then, it was to bar the Pass and the great road, to defend the Kourganè Hill and to cover his right flank, that the Russian General gathered his main strength; and this was the part of the field destined to be assailed by our troops. That portion of the Russian force which directly confronted the English army, consisted of 3400 cavalry, twentyfour battalions of infantry, and seven batteries of field-artillery, besides the fourteen heavy guns in the Great Redoubt, making together 23,400 men*** and eighty-six guns. The force *The Russian official authorities confess to but 3000. consisted of the brigade of Hussars, 6th division of cavalry, and two regiments of Cossacks of the Don. Chodasiewicz. **The No. 12 Light-Horse battery, 6th brigade of Horse-Artillery (Chodasiewicz), and two batteries of the Cossacks of the Don. Anitchkoff. *** Twenty-four battalions at 750 each, Three heavy batteries at 263 each, Six light batteries at 210 artillerymen each, Nine batteries at 8 guns each, 18,000 789 1,260 3,400 Heavy guns from Sebastopol in the Great Redoubt, 14 Guns, 86 CHAP. The numbers actually opposed to the French and the English respectively. But besides this force, Prince Mentschikoff, at the commencement of the action, had posted across the great road leading down to the bridge a force of seven battalions of infantry,* with two batteries** of artillery. These troops he called his "Great Re'serve;" and they were, in fact, his last. Yet he held them so closely in rear of the battalions facing the bridge, that they might be regarded as forces actually operating in support. Plainly this disposition of his troops was governed by a keen anxiety to defend the great road and the Kourganè Hill-for it was so ordered that, to sustain the struggle there, it would cost him but a few moments to bring his last reserves into action; and, in truth, he committed himself so deeply to this, his favourite part of the battle-field, that, when he afterwards endeavoured to shift a portion of his reserves towards his left, he was unable to make their strength tell. It will be seen, however, that in the course of the action the Prince took off to his left, to use against the French, three of the battalions belonging to his great reserve, and also moved in the same direction two light batteries, together with a few squadrons of Hussars, which formed, as it seems, his personal escort. So, omitting only from the calcula * The four battalions of the Volhynia corps, and three battalions, Nos. 1, 3, 4, of the Minsk corps. - Anitchkoff, Chodasiewicz. ** The No. 4 and No. 5 light batteries of the 17th brigade of Artillery; Chodasiewicz and Anitchkoff differ. tion the change effected by moving those horsemen,* it would follow that the whole force which, sooner or later, confronted the French, was a force of 13,000 men** and thirty-six guns; and that the force which confronted the English was a force of 26,000 men*** with eighty-six guns. CHAP. the Allies. The forces with which the Allied commanders Forces of prepared to assail this position were thus composed: There were some 30,000 French infantry and artillerymen,† with sixty-eight guns; and, added to this force, under the command of the Marshal St Arnaud, was the division of 7000 Turkish infantry.tt With Lord Raglan, and present under arms, there was a force of fully 1000 cavalry, 25,000+++ infantry and *I omit these horsemen from the calculation because I do not know their number. Anitchkoff calls the body "a portion of the Hussar "brigade." The French official account says the force was one of eight squadrons. I imagine that an estimate putting it at 400 would not be far from the truth. **Strictly 12,998. This figure is attained by adding to the 10,328 before given, the three battalions taken from the Great Reserve (at 750 each) and the 420 artillerymen of the two light batteries which were moved during the action. *** Strictly 26,029. This figure is attained by adding to the 23,449 before detailed the four battalions of the Great Reserve which were dealt with by English alone, and by subtracting the 420 artillerymen referred to in the preceding note. Précis Historique, p. 101-102, which gives 30,204 as the total, but that is a computation of the force embarked; and, since cholers was prevailing, the deductions from strength between the 7th and the 20th of the month must have brought the numbers below 30,000. ++ Ibid. +++ Or, speaking more closely, 24,400. The "morning state" which I have before me is of the 18th September, and it gives as present under arms (without including the cavalry, of which there was no "state") a XLIV. CHAP artillerymen, and sixty pieces of field-artillery.* In all, the Allied armies advancing upon the Alma comprised near 63,000 men and 128 guns. ** St Arnaud, with 37,000 men and sixty-eight guns, and effectually supported by the fire of nine war-steamers, was destined to confront a Russian force of 13,000 men and thirty-six guns. The English, with 26,000 men *** and sixty guns, had to deal with a Russian force comprising, so to speak, the same number of men, † but having with it eightysix guns. Therefore the French had to do with somewhat more than one-third of the Russian force; and the other two-thirds of it two-thirds of it, speaking roughly-were left to the care of the English. St Arnaud was to his adversaries in a proportion not very far short of three to one; †† Lord Raglan was, so to speak, equal in numbers to his total of 26,004 officers and men, and deducting the 1600 men detached under Colonel Torrens, there remained 24,404 infantry and artillery men. *The official "state" prepared for Lord Raglan gives two troops of horse-artillery, and only seven batteries, but it omits the battery attached to the 4th Division. ** Official despatch of Admiral Hamelin. *** Or, speaking more closely, 25,404. Speaking more strictly, the English were 25,400, and the Russians they dealt with 26,000. In that calculation, as in those preceding it, the change effected by moving the horsemen of the escort is left unnoticed; but if that change be taken into account, by subtracting 400 (the estimated number of the horsemen who were moved) the numbers of the English would be only 200 less than those of the Russians with whom they had to deal. **Or, more strictly, 37 to 13. XLIV. adversaries, and was inferior to them in point of CHAP. artillery by a difference of twenty-six guns. under the French English That part of the position which was attacked by the French presented some physical obstacles to the advance of the assailants, but was not very strong in a military sense, and was defended by no field-works. The ground attacked by the English The tasks did not oppose great physical obstacles to the ad- taken by vance of the assailants, but it was intrenched, and, and the besides, was so formed by nature as to give great respectdestructive power, and, by consequence, great strength, ively. to an enemy defending it with the resources of modern warfare. The French were covered and supported on their right by the sea and the ships their left by the English army.* The English had the French on their right, but they marched with their left flank quite bare; the French advanced upon heights well surveyed from the sea. Except in an imperfect way from maps, the English knew nothing of the ground before them. No spies or deserters had come in. on * This sentence, perhaps, may help to elucidate the one which goes before it, by showing what is meant when soldiers speak of "the "strength of a position." In these days mere inert physical obstacles are commonly overcome or eluded; and the security of the defender depends not in general upon those geographical features which would make access difficult for travellers, but rather upon such a conformation of ground as will give him the means of doing harm to his assailants. |