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In the fiscal year 1952 this program would change so that your cost of aircraft procurement reduces. The reason for that is, following General Shepard's chart, where he showed the rapid build-up. You are paying for the rate in this build-up. Therefore, the dollar costs in the next fiscal year would drop. They drop to 2.5 billion dollars. In 1953 it is 1.2 billion dollars. It starts building back up to 2 billion dollars. The level-off cost for aircraft procurement on that program is 2.8 billion dollars.


That would make the total estimated costs of carrying this program forward 6.9 billion dollars in 1952, 5.6 billion dollars in 1953, 6.4 billion dollars in 1954, and 7.2 billion dollars at a continuing level-off rate.

Mr. Mahon. That is the total over-all cost to all parts of the Air Force?

General RAWLINGs. Yes, sir. That is the entire Air Force program.

Mr. ENGEL. Pardon me. Is that the construction program, or everything?

General RAWLINGS. That includes everything, sir, in the program.
Mr. ENGEL. Personnel, operation, and everything?
General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. Does that include the cost of the 58-group increase to 69 groups, or just the 58 groups?

General RAWLINGS. Sir, in the build-up it will provide the 58 groups initially. This level-off cost is on the basis of the 69 groups.

Mr. ENGEL. The 69 groups would cost 7.2 billion dollars a year in 1955 and after?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.
Mr. ENGEL. 6.4 billion dollars in 1954?
General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mahon. Pardon me. That is not quite clear to me. For the 48-group program for fiscal year 1951 the cost will be 9 billion dollars plus?

General Rawlings. Yes, sir. That is because you are paying in this fiscal year for the additional cost of the Korean operation, which is roughly 1.6 billion dollars. Then, in addition to that you are paying for the basic 48-group program. Then you are paying for the acceleration of the aircraft program on the way to 69 groups, and you are paying for the actual build-up of the operating force from the 48 groups to 58 groups. For that reason the dollars will run high this year. Then they start dropping down in terms of aircraft procurement.

The total does not drop as rapidly, because you are paying more personnel cost in the second year. Then it will level off at 7.2 billion dollars.

BUILD-UP OF AIR GROUPS, 1952-54 Mr. Mahon. How many groups do you have under this proposed program in the fiscal year 1952?

General RAWLINGS. In fiscal 1952 we would have 58, şir.
Mr. MAHON. What is it in fiscal 1953?

General RAWLINGS. In fiscal 1953 we are on the way to the 69 groups. We hit 69 groups at the end of the calendar year 1953, or the middle of the fiscal year 1954.

Mr. Mahon. Then in the fiscal year 1954 you would have a 69group program?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.


Mr. Mahon. Now, if you should not approach the 69-group program but should proceed on the 58-group program what would your figures be? General RAWLINGS. Sir, if you

determined next


when we came in for the 1952 money that we would level off at 58 groups rather than proceeding on to the 69 groups

General TODD. May I put those figures in, sir?
Mr. MAHON. Yes.

General Todd. There are some comparisons here which I think we can explain.

General RAWLINGS. Obviously, in your aircraft procurement, since we have peaked in this year

Mr. Mahon. Do you mean in fiscal year 1951?

General RAWLINGS. Using fiscal year 1951 money. It means if you level off the 58-group program you have procured in advance more aircraft than you would actually need for a continuing 58-group program, so you can utilize some of those further out. That, therefore, reduces your dollar requirements next year for aircraft to 1.6 billion dollars. The reason it is higher here is because of the weight.

General TODD. You should recall General Shepard's other chart.

Mr. Mahon. This peak production grew out of the appropriations made by the Eightieth Congress.

General Todd. That would probably be leveled off, sir.
Mr. MAHON. Yes.

General TODD. The contour of this delivery curve would be changed quite a bit. Out in the latter part of 1951, when we had some idea of what the 1952 program requirements were going to be, necessary action could be taken to extend delivery dates on some of this.

General RAWLINGS. Therefore, your figure then starts building back up, and in 1954 it will be 1.8 billion dollars. The level-off cost for the 58-group aircraft program would be 2.4 billion dollars. Your total figures then will change so that in 1952 the total 58 groups would be 5.4 billion dollars, in 1953 5.2 billion dollars, and in 1954 5.6 billion dollars, with a level-off of 6.2 billion dollars.

Mr. Mahon. In fairness to yourself, I think you should point out that the type of aircraft and the method of improvement and the rate of attrition and a lot of other things might alter these figures to some extent?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir. I am sorry I did not make that clear. Obviously, these figures are computed on the basis of existing known conditions. If those conditions change they would be subject to some change.

Mr. Mahon. There could be changes in the labor market and in the price structure and so on which would alter your picture?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir. However, I believe, sir, that the order of magnitude of these figures is about right. It will not be far off.

Next we get into the actual appropriations we have in the first column.

(Discussion off the record.)

General RAWLINGS. Sir, I would like to report on one thing I neglected to mention.



In the last week of July, when the Korean situation was winding up, we were able to take $39,000,000 of maintenance and operation funds which were scheduled to be saved out of the fiscal 1950 appropriation and use that money to withdraw the F-51's, B-29's, and B-26's for initiating support for the Korean operation.

Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

General RAWLINGS. That would not have been possible without this performance-type budget. It is a very valuable device. In case of emergency you do have an opportunity to do things that are very helpful and essential.


The "Construction of aircraft” appropriation is broken down into its two segments. There is construction of aircraft, which we gave you on the other chart, the 1.550 billion dollars, in the 1951 basic budget. That is the way this committee forwarded this to the Senate.

Then we have the program which provides for the Korean situation, the replacement aircraft for Korea and for the build-up to the 58 groups, $2,672,600,000; or a total of $4,222,600,000.

MAJOR AND SPECIAL PROCUREMENT For the other major procurement, which includes primarily ammunition and electronics, what we have done in this program on ammunition is to increase our stock levels so that we would be in a position to pick up procurement in case of an emergency, and to have all of our ammunition and bomb stocks satisfactory. That makes $161,400,000 in 1951 in the regular appropriation and $104,700,000 in the supplemental.

Next is special procurement. I am sorry, but I have this reversed. The special procurement has the ammunition in it. I reversed my explanation.

There is $147,900,000 in the basic budget and $460,700,000 in the supplemental. This is the item where the ammunition and bomb stocks are increased.


Next is the "Acquisition and construction of real property." We had in the regular 1951 appropriation $139,800,000, and we have in this supplemental $169,700,000. This includes the $39,800,000 for com

pletion of the radar fence, and the balance of the items are related to minimum operational facilities, which means runway extensions, parking aprons, high-speed refueling, and communications for the strategic strike force and for the deployed fighter units on that air defense plan you saw on the previous chart.

MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION With regard to "Maintenance and operation,” our basic budget was $1,041,000,000. The supplemental is $799,100,000. That provides for increased flying hours, the gasoline and oil, maintenance personnel, spare parts, and so forth.


The next item is "Military personnel.” This is $1,254,400,000 in the basic estimate and $307,000,000 in the supplemental. This is to provide for the build-up of strength to this end figure.

Actually, the requirement we calculated on our military personnel is a little higher than this. The reason that we have this end strength is because the best guess of the reviewing authority was that this was as high as we could

economically go in the fiscal year. We think we need an end strength about 20,000 higher. We are presenting a program to the Secretary of Defense to show him that we think we can make it. If so, it will take some more dollars.


Research and development remains at the same figure in the Air Force estimate, however, in the Secretary of Defense's over-all appropriation he has $120,000,000 which, as I understand it, they contemplate will be divided (based on the recommendations of the Research and Development Board) and then transferred to the responsible departments for administration.

Mr. Mahon. You will have to have some additional research and development money if you are going to expedite the program?

General Rawlings. Yes, sir. There will be $120,000,000 divided on the basis of the Research and Development Board's estimates.

SALARIES AND EXPENSES, ADMINISTRATION Salaries and expenses, administration, is $58,500,000, with $21,600,000 in the supplemental.

Mr. Mahon. How many additional civilian employees will you hire?

General RAWLINGS. On the civilian employees, I do not have that figure. General Wood. Over-all, about 40,000 man-years.

It is about 50,000 spaces.


General RAWLINGs. In the contingency items there is no charge so far as the Air Force is concerned. There is a single item for the Secretary of Defense.

69887–50—pt. 2-17


We have held the civilian components at the same level. We had considerable discussion on that point. Of course, with the withdrawing of some of the guard and reserve personnel, into the regular program, they would be supported out of our dollars. This will make it possible for us to carry on the original program.

That completes the summary of the dollar figures. We have the estimate justification sheets here, sir. We an go into any amount of detail which you would like.

Mr. Mahon. This morning I went through this book of estimates, and I find that you have a pretty adequate breakdown of the details.

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

I would like the committee to know, sir, that we did not have the normal amount of time in preparing this estimate. I would be unfair if I would lead you to believe that they were as accurate as our estimates usually are. They are not. However, I think they are about right. We

We may have made mistakes, either up or down. I think the order of magnitude is about right. The Korean situation, as you know, is fluid. We based this on an estimate of the year's operation. It may be more or it may be less.

We plan on trying to watch our resources so that we make good use of them. If we need more we will aks for it. If we do not need as much as we have we will let




Mr. Mahon. Can we have assurance from you that as your information increases and your program takes firmer shape you will keep us posted as to the situation?

General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. And supply us at all times with any information you have which we might request with respect to this augmentation?

General RAWLINGS. Y es, sir. We will keep you advised of our progress on this program,


Mr. MAHON. Can we have the complete assurance of you, General Rawlings, as Comptroller of the Air Forces, that none of this money is going to be spent in a profligate and wasteful manner?

General RAWLINGS. Sir, I would like to tell you a little bit of what we are trying to do in that regard.

Obviously, I cannot guarantee no waste. I will do my very best to prevent it, however.

The attitude of the staff has been completely on the side of trying to make the best use of our resources; so we are all trying. I am sure that we will make some mistakes. However, I have my auditor, the Auditor General, instructed to keep a very close tab of contracts so that we can immediately find areas where a contractual relationship does not look good. The matériel people are doing the same on the procurement side.

I have in progress what we call progress analysis, and Colonel Burchinal, who is here with us today, is in charge. It is a program review, where we will watch the progress of these programs.

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