the countries involved to share their technological developments since many of the systems needed will be based on new technology.

AIRLAND BATTLE CONCEPT

Senator NUNN. What is your view of the AirLand Battle concept, and how do you plan to implement this in NATO?

General ROGERS. It must be kept in mind that the AirLand Battle doctrine is a U.S. Army doctrine based on a global perspective. The AirLand Battle doctrine should not be confused with the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle 2000 concept that deals with potential developments and capabilities in the year 2000.

When we developed the ACE concept for the attack of Warsaw Pact follow-on forces, the SHAPE staff analyzed the efforts of nations in this field, including the U.S. Army's AirLand battle doctrine. The ACE concept, approved by me in June 1981, incorporated those elements from all the nations' (and subordinaate commands') thinking which were most applicable for ACE. There are some aspects of the U.S. Army's doctrine, developed for global applicationing which are not appropriate for the defensive posture of ACE.

Senator NUNN. What is the current capability in the intelligence area needed to implement the AirLand Battle concept, what are the problem areas, and what programmatic initiatives are needed? What problems, if any, exist in the intelligence fusion area?

General ROGERS. From an intelligence perspective, the ACE concept for attacking Pact follow-on forces, requires the integration of intelligence collection, communications, data processing, and dissemination to a degree that was not even conceivable a few years ago. Because we can expect to face a numerically superior force in Europe, we must have the capability to track, identify and target our adversary over an extended battlefield. To accomplish these goals, continued programmatic support for collection systems capable of monitoring the extended battlefield is essential. In this area we have made substantial progress. The TR-1, with its [deleted] imaging radar systems, will provide a significant capability for day-night, all-weather monitoring of first and second echelon forces. JSTARS, with its moving target tracking capability, will provide the timely and accurate positional data needed to employ effectively our present and planned extendedrange weapons systems. Continued improvement and developmemnt of satellitebased collection systems with the capability to disseminate information rapidly to operational commanders will support critically needed monitoring of follow-on forces. With all of these systems, programmatic support for development of day-night, all-weather collection capabilities is mandatory. Collection, however, is only part of the equation. The amount of data that current and future collections systems will provide to operational commanders can be a detriment without the ability to fuse this data rapidly into a coherent stream of usable information. Intelligence fusion presents our greatest challenge and we are making progress in this area.

[Deleted.]

LONG-TERM DEFENSE PLAN

Senator NUNN. How well is NATO doing implementing the long-term defense plan and what is your view on how United States can, if needed, revitalize this effort?

General ROGERS. I believe the LTDP has led to considerable improvement in NATO's defense posture. [Deleted.] So there has been progress.

As you may know, the LTDP as a separate program has been phased out. Many of its principles have been incorporated in other planning processes, such as Force Goals. It is important that NATO build on the progress that we made under LTDP. We need to ensure that the analytical advantages the LTDP brought to the planning process are not lost in the transition. We also must continue to point out, as Secretary Weinberger and others have been doing, that many of the actions begun under LTDP have not been completed. [Deleted.]

CONVENTIONAL PREPARATIONS

Senator NUNN. What is the current capability of the United States and our allies to support the type of conventional conflict envisioned for NATO center? What are our objectives in terms of ammunition and war reserves and what do we currently have? What is in the 5-year plan and what are the major deficien

cies? What is the current objective of our NATO allies and what is the current level on hand?

What is your view of the recent proposal of former Secretary of Defense McNamara and others that the United States cut our procurement of ammunition and war stores for NATO since we are so far in front of our allies?

General ROGERS. The NATO minimum stockage objective for war reserves is 30 days with the exception of the U.S. The NATO recognized U.S. stockage objective is [deleted] as our forces must be sustained until the transAtlantic LOC is established. DOD resource planning guidance has supported the [deleted]. The services have attempted to comply with the Defense Guidance. With the exception of Army class VII and some high technology missiles, the service POMs for FY 84-88 would satisfy [deleted] of U.S. European Forces war reserve requirements if fully funded/implemented. As you are aware, there is a tendency to place the bulk of funds needed to correct a given problem in the program outyears. Thus, while we have gradually improved our theater war reserve status, full realization of the [deleted] level has remained perpetually five years in the future. USCINCEUR has no access to specific status of Allied efforts to achieve war reserve objectives; however, unclassified sources reveal varying degrees of success depending on the commodity and nation concerned. All freeworld western nations are currently experiencing some degree of economic stagnation or depression making real growth in defense spending a difficult and often politically unpopular choice. It is especially important during these economically troubled times, that the United States maintain the goals we are encouraging our allies to achieve. To cut back on our procurement of war reserve materiel now, particularly ammunition and critical items for U.S. European Forces, would be self-deluding, dictate early resort to nuclear weapons in any major conflict and send the wrong signal to both our allies and potential adversaries.

FORWARD DEFENSE CONCEPT

Senator NUNN. In the recent issue of Army magazine, First Lieutenant Peters wrote a very thoughtful and provocative article on the forward defense concept. Would you have your staff comment on this article both from a political perspective but primarily from a military capability standpoint?

General ROGERS. Lieutenant Peters' article is a well-written exposition of current discussions concerning implementation of the NATO Forward Defense concept, and he makes several valid points. However, he incorrectly suggests that Forward Defense is directed toward defending a small strip of NATO territory, whereas, in fact, NATO is seeking the flexibility to carry the war to the enemy's rear by attacking reinforcing units before they trespass NATO territory. Forward Defense thus remains a valid principle and I support it. Our commitment to Forward Defense can best be implemented, in my view, once NATO is attacked, by carrying the battle forward-to the enemy's own territory. We continue, as you know to evaluate improved methods for stopping and punishing an aggressor as deeply in his territory as possible in order to preserve the credibility of Forward Defense.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROBLEMS

Senator NUNN. Are there any short-term legislative initiatives that can be taken to address technology transfer problems that we are all concerned about? General ROGERS. I would be pleased to see you take any legislative or other measures that would make it more difficult for the Warsaw Pact to acquire critleal Western military-relevant technologies. Protection of our technological lead for national security should continue to be a matter of real concern to the Congress as it is to the U.S. military. I do not have specific legislative initiatives in mind. I certainly do not underestimate the difficulty involved in legislating control measures over technology transfer, but I do endorse efforts to deal with this Important matter.

Senator NUNN. [Deleted.]

General ROGERS. [Deleted.]

SOVIET-WARSAW PACT WEAKNESSES

Senator NUNN. What is your view of a principle of military strategy that would envision exploiting inherent Soviet-Warsaw Pact weaknesses? I have in mind the tenuous land lines of communication, the "unreliability" of the Pact

Allies, and the lack of ready ocean access. What is your view on whether or not the Soviets should enjoy a sanctuary in Eastern Europe?

General ROGERS. Any sound military strategy must be aimed at exploiting an adversary's weak points. Interrupting Warsaw Pact lines of communication and taking the war to the Warsaw Pact are part of the rationale for attacking the follow-on forces. As for an Eastern European sanctuary, I do not feel NATO can afford such a luxury. If the Warsaw Pact should attack, NATO must disrupt the flow of supplies and reinforcements while they are still in the Eastern bloc territory.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Senator NUNN. What is your view on the need to improve the special operations forces that would have the capability to disrupt Soviet military activity? General ROGERS. Improvement of Special Operations Forces is important to the successful containment of Soviet/Warsaw Pact aggression. Three major areas need attention. First the forces. We presently have [deleted] allocated to USEUCOM for planning. [Deleted] and may not be available. We require a [deleted] to fulfill adequately mission requirements. There are [deleted] which limits them to replacement and follow-on requirements. Secondly, [deleted] USEUCOM requirements were established in July 1979, and have been revalidated annually. [Deleted] Currently there are [deleted] and [deleted] for planning purposes. These [deleted] Third, to exploit fully the potential of Special Operation Forces requires dependable communications. Communication systems currently fielded do not include state-of-the-art technology required in the high threat Soviet environment. Increased funding and support of Special Operations Communications/Electronics research and development and procurement efforts are urgently required.

1975 NUNN AMENDMENT

Senator NUNN. What has happened with U.S. forces in NATO since the implementation of the Nunn "tooth-to-tail" amendment in 1975? (This amendment required the reduction of 30,000 support troops with a permissive add-back of 20,000 combat troops.) What is the current U.S. combat to support ratio and how has this changed in the last 5 years? What are the projections for the next 5 years?

General ROGERS. At the time of the Nunn amendment of 1975, you stated that the combat to support ratio was 49/51, according to your figures. Similarly, your figures showed that this ratio remained fairly constant at about 52/48 during the period 1976-1980. The Department of the Army, however, computed the ratio as 62/38 during 1976-1980, with the difference being the method of computation. You counted combat support (CS) forces such as artillery, signal, engineers and military police as "providers of combat support" rather than "consumers of logistic support" as viewed by DA and USAREUR. [Deleted.] By 1982, the ratio was 62/38 (source; your report on this matter). The cur rent ratio as reported to Department of the Army in the USAREUR Essential Force Package Report is 67/33. By Army doctrine, the optimal ratio is 53/47. The USAREUR goal is leaner than that, with the objective in the next five years being 58/42. It is difficult to predict how closely this goal will be met as we are still working with the European troop strength ceiling problem, and this ceiling will have an impact on the final ratio. I remain concerned, however, that we may have reduced too much "tail." In addition to known CSS shortfalls in the Central Region, we currently lack the ability to support U.S. divisions committed to the NATO flanks. USCINCCENT shares similar concerns, as we double-count many of the same CONUS-based active and reserve component forces for support of our respective theaters. This issue demands a reevaluation.

WARTIME HOST NATION SUPPORT

Senator NUNN. How important is the Wartime Host Nation Support with the Federal Republic of Germany and what would U.S. requirements be without this? Is this type of agreement compatible with the views of some that our allies should shoulder a greater portion of the burden of common defense? General ROGERS. Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) from the Federal Republic of Germany is essential for the United States to reinforce NATO rapidly and effectively with sustainable combat forces. U.S. combat forces cur

rently allocated to the European theater lack the logistics support structure needed to conduct sustained wartime operations. Without WHNS from Germany the U.S. would have to forward deploy additional active CS/CSS units and equipment to achieve comparably responsive support for the deploying combat divisions and associated Air Force units. In order to sustain the planned U.S. 10-Division D-Day forces the FRG has agreed to provide 93,000 Reservists plus an estimated equivalent of 100,000 civilian labor spaces. Use of U.S. reserve or active duty support troops would be at 10 to 40 times the cost of the German WHNS alternative. WHNS from Germany is a classic example of a U.S. ally assuming greater share of the common defense burden. Traditionally within NATO this logistical support has been considered a national responsibility. The U.S.-GE WHNS agreement represents a major breakthrough because, for the first time, a NATO ally has agreed to pay a portion of support costs for U.S. combat units. In summary, WHNS is critically needed and cost effective for sustainment of U.S. combat forces, while enhancing the credibility of the forward conventional defense of NATO.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS

THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

Senator LEVIN. General Rogers, you have said a new rationale has been developed for determining the needs for short-range nuclear systems—the modernization of which you support.

You also have said that the short-range balance now also has shifted against us with their 152-millimeter artillery becoming nuclear capable. You said that you do not yet know how the new rationale will be translated into specific warhead requirements in your annual requirements study.

How has this rationale for need/use of short-range systems changed? Is it just for short-range or all systems?

General ROGERS. In the past, requirements were developed to attack each Forward Division, plus those of the follow-on Armies. Currently we are not developing requirements against each and every WP Division facing ACE. Rather we now allocate capabilities to various ACE command levels to hold elements of the WP at risk. Through assessment of the threat and the expected deployment against the three regions, force requirements are developed for [deleted]. The purpose of allocating ACE resources within sectors and regions is to give flexibility at these levels to react to major threats which exceed the capability of a particular corps and/or sector. This approach provides requirements against [deleted] targets at both short and medium ranges, to include artillery weapon systems, surface-to-surface missiles and aircraft. Another major category, [deleted] includes targets for attack with medium and long range weapon systems.

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN EUROPE

Senator LEVIN. Do you expect this changed rationale to increase or decrease our requirements for short-range nuclear warheads in Europe?

General ROGERS. The requirements study is not complete. Until the study is completed and has been thoroughly reviewed, I consider it premature to provide an answer. Further, I do not want to interfere nor preempt the ongoing work of NATO's High Level Group which is developing a study to determine essential requirements for those NATO nuclear forces with range capabilities less than Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces. The results of the High Level Group study will be presented to NATO Ministers of Defense this fall.

MODERNIZATION OF THE 155MM SHELL

Senator LEVIN. Why should we approve modernization of the 155-millimeter shell, which Congress rejected last year, until you translate your new rationale into requirements in your anual needs statement? Shouldn't Congress know the overall scope in numbers and total program cost before we begin this program?

General ROGERS. Modernization with the 155mm shell is a significant part of the theater's nuclear modernization program. At present, 155 howitzers comprise the majority of nuclear artillery units in theater. [Deleted]. The new 155mm warhead is being designed with required state-of-art safety and security features and will provide increased accuracy, range, and effectiveness. As I indicated earlier, the results of our requirements study and the HLG effort should provide numbers of 155mm nuclear weapons needed to determine final production funding. However, funding support is required now to continue development of the new warhead.

MODERNIZATION OF SHORT-RANGE SYSTEMS

Senator LEVIN. Even though you support modernization of our short-range systems, it sounds like NATO parliamentarians will be ambivalent about it; according to the Washington Post on March 15, 1983. They want large reductions of present short-range systems. Has the North Atlantic Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary group, endorsed modernization of our short-range nuclear weapons?

General ROGERS. In 1978 SACEUR developed proposals to improve theater nuclear forces. Included in this was a proposal to develop, produce, and deploy new technology warheads for short-range nuclear systems. These proposals were supported and endorsed by NATO Defense Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Group. The proposal to modernize short-range nuclear weapons has subsequently been included in NATO's Force Goals which are a product of NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC). Future short-range nuclear weapons are under review by the High Level Group and results will be presented to the Defense Ministers of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group this fall. This effort is providing the basis for full alliance participation in developing short-range nuclear requirements at the government level. As far as is known, the inter-parliamentary group of the North Atlantic Assembly has not addressed the modernization of our short-range nuclear weapons. They have however, endorsed the ongoing review of shorter range nuclear weapons aimed at rationalization of essential requirements of short-range nuclear forces.

Senator LEVIN. You say the short-range launcher balance has shifted from about three to one for us to against us with conversion of the many 152-millimeter artillery tubes to dual mission and conversion capability. Do we know whether they have the nuclear shells-enough of them to use this edge effec tively? Do they have the trained crews for this yet? How meaningful is this edge then?

General ROGERS. The 152-mm howitzer equipped with dual mission artillery tubes is organic to Soviet armies [deleted].

SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator LEVIN. General, there are reports the Pentagon is reassessing the need for the thousands of short-range nuclear weapons we currently have deployed in Europe, supposedly because their yields are too large, their ranges are too short, their accuracies too poor and their storage sites too vulnerable. All this degrades their deterrent utility.

Do you agree that we should reduce the numbers of these warheads? General ROGERS. NATO is continously reviewing its requirement for nuclear weapons. Although current short-range artillery fired atomic projectiles are aging, they still serve as a viable deterrent. We may be able to reduce the numbers of short-range weapons as advanced technology weapons are introduced. However, requirements must be based on the threat, which is continuously changing, as well as weapon capabilities. That is why the subject remains under continuous review.

Senator LEVIN. Reportedly, some people in the Pentagon also are considering that we should not produce new nuclear artillery shells, [deleted]. You yourself said that modernizing our chemical warfare capabilities was more important to you than deploying neutron warheads.

Considering the political problems facing the alliance with the GLCM/PII deployments this year, why should Congress approve any neutron warhead funding and thereby add to the burden on the political and military cohesion of NATO?