There seems to be some discussion that we ought to rely more on our Reserves. I brought up the question that if you look at NATO, given the political concerns, and I think a closed session is much better to talk about it than in open session, I hope you can give me as much direction or tell us what kind of communication we really are doing with some of our allies. Serious discussion of this issue is taking place in the political system here, I am not one of those saying that we should withdraw, I am concerned about the amount of sentiment.

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

I am also concerned about our contribution to NATO. Are we concerned about this? You talk to other people at your level, do they express the political problem they have? If so, what is the reaction and what direction can we quietly take to perhaps get a reallocation or a change in the mix and attitudes and assumption of responsibility of our NATO allies compared to what we have today?

General ROGERS. The fertile field is mobilization of war reserves and particularly as it relates to the deployment of the Rapid Deployment Force [RDF] and the void that deployment creates in NATO when those same units that are committed to NATO will not be coming to Europe but will go with the RDF.

We are just at the point right now in NATO where we have gotten the information from the United States as to what forces she would expect to deploy with the RDF, and we are now asking our allies how are they going to fill the void?

One approach is through their mobilizable Reserves. Even though they can't create mechanized division or armored divisions, still an infantry division consisting of reserve forces located in the urban sprawl in the Northern Plain of Europe or in the rear area still can be an effective unit.

So, you are pointing toward an area of which I think we must take greater cognizance. The long-term defense program of 1978 called for the creation of 10 additional brigades by our allies. The only ones that have been forthcoming to date are two home defense brigades now committed to NATO by Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany has four more which I expect will be committed sometime in the future. There are many reservists in West Europe because most nations have conscription.

So, our country is using the instrument of the possible deployment of the Rapid Deployment Force to push our allies into doing more than just giving the RDF overflight and base rights and to have allies Create forces that will be available to fill the void. To create such forces for that purpose is going to take some sacrifice on the part of the West Europeans, and they will be reluctant to make it.

That is the approach I would take, and it would be under the umbrella of the Rapid Deployment Force.

Senator QUAYLE. What could we do to sort of push that along and to also increase the degree of efficiency of mobilizable Reserves, that is really a key factor. It seems we as a country overlook that or at least not place proper emphasis on it.

Do you think that is true?

General ROGERS. The allies have more Reserves that can be mobilized than we do. I think our country is doing extremely well in the past 3 or 4 years in meeting the levels of Reserve component strength mandated by the Congress, both the Reserves and the National Guard and doing so with good people.

As a nation if you wish to use more Reserves than active troops, the place to use them is in the combat service support [CSS] area. That is what we have done; for example, 67 percent of the combat service support units necessary to support our Active Army Forces are in the Army Reserves.

Now, if you deploy the Rapid Deployment Force, you must send along with the RDF nearly all the CSS units that are earmarked to support not only our forward-deployed forces in Europe-already short 28 percent of CSS-but all the other forces that might come to Europe. The bulk of the Army's CSS units will have to go to Southwest Asia with the RDF.

So there is the place for this Nation to concentrate more on reservists in combat service support units; give them the proper training and get them up to a high level of readiness.

I would not create additional divisions in our Army Reserve; perhaps in the National Guard.

That is the way I would go, both with respect to NATO and here at home.

U.S. STATUS IN GREECE

Senator QUAYLE. Can you give us any update on what is happening in Greece, particularly with the base there? I just happened to stop off there on the way from Lebanon and talked to the base commander there. It is a very tenuous situation.

I have read more statements from Papandreous to the people. I know it is for domestic consumption. Do you think we will get forced out of there?

General ROGERS. [Deleted.]

Senator QUAYLE. [Deleted.]
General ROGERS. [Deleted.]

Senator QUAYLE. There is to them.

General ROGERS. [Deleted.] We depend on Turkey too much to hold that very strategic part of the world and she needs the modern weapon systems with which to do it.

Senator WARNER. I think that is going to be done. [Deleted.] That ratio of $1 U.S. defense-$212 social programs vice $1 to $7, I was not certain whether that was a reference to certain NATO nations or overall.

General ROGERS. If you take all the Western European nations in NATO, for every dollar for defense they spend $7 for social programs. Senator WARNER. Thank you, General.

[Whereupon at 10:20 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in open ses

sion.]

[The questions submitted by Senate Armed Services Strategic and Theater Nuclear Force Subcommittee to be answered by General Rogers follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN W. WARNER, ANSWER SUPPLIED BY
GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS

SOVIET SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Senator WARNER. How is the overall capability of Soviet shorter-range nuclearcapable systems being affected by the introduction of SS-21's, SS-22's and SS-23's?

General ROGERS. The overall nuclear capabilities of Soviet forces are increasing with the deployment of greater range and more accurate third-generation short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM's)-SS-21, SS-22, and SS-23.

[Deleted.] The SS-21 has a range of 120 kilometers (km) versus a 70-km range for the FROG-7 and the [deleted].

The SS-22 SRBM is believed to be replacing the SS-12 Scaleboard [deleted]. It is projected, however, to replace front and Army level Scud SRBM's. The SS-23 has both improved range and accuracy over the Scud [deleted].

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS

DEFENSE POSTURE IN EUROPE

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, we here on the Armed Services Committee rely very heavily on your judgment and wisdom in regards to our defense posture in Europe.

Would you give us your assessment of the strength of the NATO alliance? General ROGERS. I believe the alliance is fundamentally sound. As has been pointed out many times before, NATO is a defensive alliance whose first mission is to deter war. In the 34 years since NATO came into existence, not a square meter of allied territory has been lost. So I believe the alliance has been one of history's most significant successes. I do not subscribe to the view that the alliance is in disarray.

At the same time, I am deeply disturbed about the unabated growth of military power of the Soviet Union. This growth has created a serious threat to the alliance. I am concerned that many in the West have not responded to the Soviet threat with the appropriate sense of urgency, as evidenced by, in some cases, reduced defense expenditures and a lack of rapid progress toward improving our defense posture. I am particularly concerned about the widening capabilities gap in conventional forces that exists between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We need to improve our conventional forces quickly and dramatically, we face the prospect of political intimidation stemming from overwhelming Russian military power. If enough is not done to beef up NATO conventional forces, the West would have no recourse in war except the early use of nuclear weapons.

PERSHING II FUNDS CANCELLATION

Senator THURMOND. How have our allied military leaders reacted to congressional actions such as cancellation of funds for Pershing II?

General ROGERS. NATO military leaders take great interest in what our Congress does and says, especially regarding issues that bear on the defense of Europe. They find it difficult to understand when the United States makes what are perceived to be abrupt changes in defense policy. Such actions cause confusion and uncertainty, and play into the hands of those who profess to see a Weakening of the U.S. commitment to NATO.

RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, I believe you made reference to our increased reliance on nuclear weapons resulting from failures to meet conventional mmitments during your testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. For the record, would you assess the impact of canceling funds for host nation support and POMCUS sets 5 and 6 on our increased reliance on nuclear weapons? General ROGERS. The impact of canceling funds for German wartime host na

tion support and for POMCUS sets 5 and 6 would be significant. POMCUS sets 5 and 6 are essential and integral part of long-standing United States and NATO plans to reinforce Europe in order to provide a credible deterrence, or if necessary, adequate combat power in NATO's northern part of the central region to contain a Warsaw Pact attack. Critical to achievement of these goals is the 10 division-D-Day force. The 10 division force is contingent upon six full sets of POMCUS on the ground to complement the four divisions forward deployed. Therefore, lack of POMCUS sets 5 and 6 forward deployed places achievement of those essential goals at risk. How early I must ask for release of nuclear weapons may well be determined by the early availability of the divisions whose equipment would comprise sets 5 and 6. The impact of canceling funding for wartime host nation support is severe, and falls primarily in the area of sustainability. As a result of previous congressional mandates, there is inadequate combat service support force structure forward deployed to sustain U.S. Army Europe's forward deployed, in-place forces. [Deleted.]

The 93,000 German reservists earmarked under full implementation of the wartime host nation support agreement will provide such essential service supoprt as transportation and material handling, airfield damage repair, resupply, medical evacuation, and decontamination. Without this support, the six reinforcing divisions cannot be properly received and appropriately deployed in theater and conventional combat operations cannot be sustained. Taken together, cancellation of funding for POMCUS sets 5 and 6 as well as wartime host nation support would jeopardize successful conventional defense of central Europe, and force early escalation to the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

SAFETY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STORAGE SITES

Senator THURMOND. General Rogers, I am concerned about the safety of our nuclear weapons storage sites and about the various delivery systems. My specific concern deals with the capabilities of Soviet special purpose forces.

Would you detail for us the threat that these highly trained Soviet troops pose?

General ROGERS. The main intelligence directorate of the Soviet General Staff maintains a large, standing force of elite special purpose (Spetsnaz) forces. [Deleted]. These forces are subordinate to, and tasked directly by, the front intelligence directorate. [Deleted].

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS

RELIABILITY OF SOVIET ALLIES

Senator JACKSON. General Rogers, don't you believe that the Soviets increasingly must distrust or doubt the military reliability of their allies that is, Polish forces and military infrastructure?

General ROGERS. Reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces is a special problem for the U.S.S.R., [deleted]. The main problems contributing to this uncertainty are historical antagonisms, latent nationalism and the adverse impact of the continuing recession on Warsaw Pact economies. [Deleted]. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armed forces would almost certainly cooperate and prove reliable in the defense of their own territory. [Deleted.]

Senator JACKSON. Doesn't this doubt increase the deterrence we provide the Soviets?

General ROGERS. [Deleted.] Even though the Soviets have sought to insure unity within the Warsaw Pact through political indoctrination and security programs, traces of doubt obviously remain. These factors probably detract from Soviet leaders' confidence in their allies. In a military sense, the political and economic dissatisfaction and discontent among the U.S.S.R.'s East European allies ultimately could have the effect of weakening loyalty to Soviet military objectives and [deleted].

SOVIET PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Senator JACKSON. Don't we too often ignore the very real military problems e Soviets face in Eastern Europe?

General ROGERS. [Deleted.] Over the past decade the Soviets have concenrated their efforts on correcting military deficiencies in Eastern Europe, and indications point toward a continuation of this effort.

[Deleted.] The Soviets have also made great strides in quantitative and qualitative improvements in their ground forces in the forward area. Army its are being equipped with the newest models of tanks, the latest artillery weapon systems and multiple rocket launchers. Older missile systems are in the process of being replaced by more sophisticated models. The Soviets are also gradually modernizing East European forces selectively with emphasis on artillery and attack helicopters. [Deleted.]

While the Soviets may harbor some doubts about the genuine enthusiasm some of its East European allies have for membership in the Warsaw Pact [deleted].

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS

PROBLEMS FACING ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

Senator NUNN. What is your view of the progress that is occurring in NATO in moving to the deep strike/second echelon attack capability that you have endorsed? What doctrinal problems still exist, if any?

General ROGERS. Allied Command Europe (ACE) is developing procedures for attacking follow-on forces. The Major Subordinate Commanders in ACE are playing a key role in this process. As for the NATO countries, some such as Germany, are vigorously working toward developing and fielding the capability to strike follow-on forces. Others have been more cautious in their approach to the issue and are still examining the problem, in large part because of budgetary reasons. As for the doctrinal issues involved, Allied Command Europe is addressng these as it develops procedures for attacking follow-on forces. In the process the views of the various nations will be taken into account. The result of efforts to date indicate that no major doctrinal issues need emerge, since what is being done is fully supportive of the flexible response strategy and the forward defense Concept. Any major future impediments to implementation of attack of follow-on forces are not likely to be doctrinal, but rather hardware problems. Developing adequate target acquisition means and weapons with requisite range/accuracy/ responsiveness are the real challenges, both for the United States and its allies. Senator NUNN. How do you answer the critics of this concept? What problems are in the U.S. budget to fulfill this requirement and what programmatic initiatires are needed? What opportunities exist for NATO cooperative programs in this area?

General ROGERS. As for the first question, it makes little sense to allow Warsaw Pact follow-on formations to supply and close rapidly on NATO defenses withat being disrupted and attritted enroute. By directing some of our force against these deeper targets, we can slow the rate of advance and reduce the volume and rate of presentation at the forward edge of the battlefield. Moving Warsaw Pact formations present lucrative targets against which weapon effectiveness can be maximized. Attacking follow-on forces also introduces a confusion factor that will disrupt the orderly battle plan that the Warsaw Pact would like to execute. As for the second and third quesiton, there are four elements, all of which must faction successfully to attack the follow-on forces. The first element is target

cation.

[Deleted.] The second element required is secure, survivable communication tems to transmit the information detected by sensor systems to intelligence cessing centers. [Deleted.] The third element required is a fusion system ich can rapidly process the sensor data and transmit, in real time, targeting formation to the appropriate attack systems. [Deleted.] To send aircraft deep to enemy territory to attack a moving target based on information that is more an several hours old is a less than optimal proposition. The final element rered is an accurate, survivable attack means. Today, attack of a deep target requires an aircraft in most cases. In the future, we need a standoff capability hat will allow these targets to be attacked without necessarily having a manned urcraft overfly the target area. As for cooperative programs within NATO, we have had some success with both the F-16 and AWACS. The number of opportunities available in the future will to a great extent depend on the willingness of