I point out, Mr. Chairman, that the 10.5 billion dollars is divided into three parts. Roughly speaking, around 6 billion is basic build-up and the remaining 4.5 billion is to cover the current costs of the war.

Now, in short, the program was arrived at in an orderly fasion and represents the views of the three services. It was not a hit-ormiss proposition, putting it together at the last minute as the result of the Korean operation at all. It was a subject of discussion among the Joint Chiefs of Staff for months. That is the first point.

Secondly, I think a study of the program will show that it is pointing the Air Force in the right direction to carry out its responsibilities. Now, the Air Force has four main responsibilities the first being strategic air attack on any power which might attack us.

The second function it has is the air defense of the United States; in other words, to stop anybody who would come and try to bomb us. The third one is the tactical support, and that is to have the necessary number of planes, crews, and so forth, in relation to the Army, and it is as it is planned to be, so there will be a properly coordinated Army-Air Force team, which will be able to operate on the ground. The fourth function is the function of the air transport which serves the three other functions.

Now, if you will study the requests in terms of increases in the three

programs

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary, I do not want to take all the time in interrogating you. Just give us a general statement.

Secretary FINLETTER. The general statement is that in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Vandenberg and I am going to ask him to say something about it-in his opinion, and in my opinion, there is the proper movement forward on these three main basic tasks of the Air Force.

Now, if you were to examine me in detail, I could give you quickly the answers. None of those are satisfactory even under the program as projected. They are good. They are a great improvement over what exists, but there may very well prove to be individual deficiencies in quantity and quality.

Mr. MAHON. If you know what they are and you can establish that before the committee, we will be glad to hear from you.

Secretary FINLETTER. I want to support what has been submitted; not because anybody is asking us to support that, but because this represents an orderly step forward at this time.

I could go into great detail on this and show you that certain kinds of build-up would not be advantageous now, but I am making this reservation-we may be back before you for various deficiencies as our studies and changing events indicate them to be necessary. Mr. MAHON. You do not want additional funds now? Secretary FINLETTER. We want exactly this program.

Mr. MAHON. General Vandenberg, will you comment briefly? General VANDENBERG. That is my position. I believe these are the funds that the Air Force can utilize in building toward the minimum we think we should have. I think this is the amount of money that we can spend advantageously at this time in getting toward that program, and I believe that we probably will, as it develops, be back for some additional money if we find it is necessary. Right now this is our best estimate as to what we can utilize advantageously.

IMPOUNDING OF FUNDS, 1946-50

Mr. MAHON. One further observation.

This committee is responsible for putting through the House funds which would have put us on the road last year to a 58-group program. We finally were able to get reluctant assent from the other body for this program. It was rejected unanimously on one occasion, but the record shows that we were finally able to get it.

Those funds were impounded.

In fairness to the other body and in fairness to the President, I am constrained to say that had our program been placed into operation for the 58 groups last year, the so-called 58 groups would have had no significance or important impact on the fighting in Korea.

Secretary FINLETTER. May I make an observation? There would have been a build-up toward the kind of force which we believe to be necessary quite apart from Korea, or anything else.

Mr. MAHON. I readily agree, but so far as Korea is concerned, and insofar as our over-all military strength is concerned, it is a different situation.

I yield to no one in my support of more air power than we have— 58 groups and 70 groups, or anything else we can provide ourselves with to defend ourselves.

Secretary FINLETTER. I agree with that.

Mr. ENGEL. How much of the 1948 and 1949 funds provided by this committee were frozen?

General RAWLINGS. I do not have the figures with me, but in the record I presented to the committee on the regular 1951 hearing there are details of the whole amount.

Mr. ENGEL. Do you recall how much it was?

General RAWLINGS. Roughly, $755,000,000 of funds.

Mr. ENGEL. The 1949 funds were frozen also?

General RAWLINGS. No, sir; not the 1949 funds.

Mr. TABER. The contract authorization that was given beyond the budget by the Congress in May of 1948 never was used?

General RAWLINGS. The contract authorization on the aircraft program, in the 1948 supplemental, was used, as I recall, and that was the basis by which we provided the tooling from which we were able to expand the program.

Mr. ENGEL. What about the 1949 contract authorization?
General RAWLINGS. I cannot remember about that.

Mr. ENGEL. You are going to give a detailed statement on that?
General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

(The following information was submitted:)

During fiscal year 1947, the Bureau of the Budget impounded $75,000,000 of funds appropriated for Air Force research and development. This amount was then recommended by the Bureau of the Budget and approved by the Congress,

for transfer to the appropriation "Pay of the Army" to cover a deficiency in that appropriation in fiscal year 1947.

During fiscal year 1950, a total of $809,778,281 was impounded by the Secretary of Defense which included $735,754,000 reserved by direction of the President. This latter amount represented the funds appropriated by the Congress in contemplation of an increase in the size of the Air Force. Of the total amount impounded during fiscal year 1950, $36,975,878 were released for use by the Department of the Air Force, leaving a net balance impounded of $772,802,403. Of the net amount impounded during fiscal year 1950, $726,151,000 contract authority has been applied by the Bureau of the Budget toward partly financing the aircraft procurement program for fiscal year 1951; $22,461,000 cash has been applied by the Bureau of the Budget toward partly financing the Air Force research and development program for fiscal year 1951; $19,633,000 cash and contract authority is to be used in fiscal year 1951 toward the completion of certain construction projects for which Congress made funds available in fiscal year 1950. The application of these amounts as indicated, are included in the budget estimates which have been approved by both Houses of Congress.

General RAWLINGS. What happened was this: We were on the way to a 66-group program as a part of that appropriation. When the 1950 program was set up it was established at 48.

Mr. ENGEL. That is right.

General RAWLINGS. Therefore, during the year we had to reprogram our resources to the new program.

Mr. ENGEL. And this committee gave you 58?
General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. And that was frozen back?
General RAWLINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SIKES. I am going to say that I think this committee and the House has been substantiated in everything that has taken place in its insistence upon a 58-group Air Force. Whether or not the planes would actually have been used in Korea, we would have gone a long way forward toward the over-all objective of building up our strength for emergencies in any part of the world.

FUNDS REQUESTED TO MEET KOREAN WAR AND FOR BUILD-UP

PROGRAM

I would like to have some information, Mr. Secretary, as to just where Korea fits into the current monetary picture. Could we, with our present 48-group Air Force, cope with the Korean situation without the funds that are requested in this budget?

Secretary FINLETTER. No, sir. As I said, Mr. Sikes, to the chairman, the 10.5 billion dollars comprises two items: One is the basic build-up, which is what has been shown to you; the other is the amount necessary to pay the current costs of the Korean war, and an estimate for a forward 12 months. It is the roughest kind of an estimate. The Korean conflict could not be carried out unless those funds were available.

Mr. SIKES. What you are saying is, if I understand it correctly, that, if we are to maintain our own security, we must have first the forces which are now in being and then an additional force for the Korean conflict, or for the attrition of that conflict, and then we will have to speed up our over-all preparedness program for which we must have additional funds; is that the picture?

Secretary FINLETTER. That is what I am saying; yes.

General RAWLINGS. If that had not happened it being the beginning of the fiscal year we had all annual funds available. At any other time it would have been necessary to immediately come to the Congress to get additional money. But we have the funds which we

are spending in advance of normal schedules, so we are requesting funds because of the greater rate of expenditure.

Mr. SIKES. I think that is an important contribution. Considering only Korea the rate of utilization of funds was much faster than in our normal peacetime operations.

Secretary FINLETTER. That is correct. The preparation is not as costly as it actually looks. In this small operation we are carrying an estimate of 1.6 billion dollars for the Korean situation. The build-up which gives us a better force plus an improved base for emergency expansion amounts to roughly 3.4 billion dollars.

COMPARISON OF OPERATION OF JET WITH CONVENTIONAL TYPE AIRCRAFT IN KOREA

Mr. SIKES. What about the cost of the operation in Korea? The use of jet planes operating out of Japan to support the ground forces probably is resulting in the costliest support ever given to ground forces. I am glad you explained the tactics in use on the Korean front but I feel that other planes could have been used much more economically and, from reports, more effectively.

General VANDENBERG. The jet airplane, while it costs more money for fuel, is the most stable bombing platform in the fighter class that we have; it is more stable than the conventional type of plane. In addition to that, while the jet fighter can spend less time over the target, it can get around much faster and cover much more ground. Therefore to my mind it would be very difficult to assess the actual comparative costs.

Mr. SIKES. Then it is your feeling, that, even though we have had very limited use of the jets because of weather and distance and a resulting very high cost, that you are right in emphasizing the use of the jets?

General VANDENBERG. There is no doubt about that. I talked to groups and squadron commanders and I talked to a lot of pilots on the recent trip and I asked the boys who were being transferred from the F-80's to F-51's how they felt about it. Without exception every man told me that as far as he was concerned it was not a very pleasant thought. In the first place, if a jet from northern Korea should appear he would feel that he was lost. If that happened he could not pay full attention to doing a good strafing job on the ground.

On the other hand, the boys who were flying the F-80's said they could slow them down and do a more accurate bombing job than with a conventional fighter, that they could see better, and that they could cover more area.

The only reason the F-51 is being used in that area is because they can be landed closer to the front, use less time in flying back and forth, and get in more missions. The F-51 is a lighter airplane and can operate from the unimproved fields available there.

Mr. SIKES. It has been my understanding that there have been no Russian jets used by the North Koreans.

General VANDENBERG. That is right; they are only using the conventional planes.

Secretary FINLETTER. But they have been seen. They have not been in combat.

Mr. SIKES. I have great respect for your judgment, but it has seemed to me that the necessity of using fuel to fly jets from Japan to

the target, with only a few minutes over the target with reduced fire power before it is necessary to fly back to Japan for refueling makes this an extremely costly operation and a much less efficient operation than that of the conventional type of plane.

General VANDENBERG. The newspaper reports on that have been greatly exaggerated. I asked pilots about the time over targets, and they say they can stay about 20 minutes over the ground. And if they cannot find a target in 20 minutes they ought to get out anyway; they are just wasting time and fuel. The additional tanks have allowed additional time. But I think 20 minutes allows them about as much time as they need in most cases.

Mr. SIKES. Staying over a target 20 minutes, or trying to spot a target in 20 minutes, with reduced fire power, is not to be compared with what can be done in 6 to 8 hours, which is possible with P-51's.

General VANDENBERG. It depends upon what you are after. If you are looking for a hidden battery, where there is little groundfire or opposition, more time might help. On the other hand, with the jet you can move much more rapidly and you can see much better than you can with the F-51.

Mr. SIKES. Can you tell me approximately the cost of operating the jet fighter as compared with the reciprocating engine under Korean conditions?

General RAWLINGS. If you take the fuel consumption alone obviously you are going to get a greater figure with the jet, but that is only one item. You have to take into consideration also the area to be covered.

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. SIKES. I would like to ask if the contracts that will be awarded in building toward the 69-group force will be restricted to the types of planes which are now in use?

General VANDENBERG. I can supply you that information.

Mr. MAHON. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion.)

BASIS FOR INCREASING AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

Mr. ENGEL. General Vandenberg, about how long have you been Chief of Staff of the Air Force?

General VANDENBERG. A little over 2 years.

Mr. ENGEL. A little over 2 years. I have been with this committee for 14 years. I have attending every hearing, of course, that has had to do with the increase of the Air Force to a 70 or a 48 group, or whatever it may have been. I have attended several meetings over in the Pentagon Building, and I know you have been at those hearings? General VANDENBERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ENGEL. I have heard a great deal of testimony regarding the building of this Air Force up to 48, 58, 70, or 69, and I have never supported any group with any idea of having it for just a war like Korea. And if there is any idea in anyone's mind that we are building up a 58- or 69-group Air Force for that purpose, it is wrong. I supported that program with the one idea in mind, and that is to give us a force to start out with, in case of a European war against some large potential enemy. That is the basis upon which I am supporting this $10,000,000,000 program today. I am not supporting it because of two divisions or whatever there may be in Korea, or 65 planes, or whatever the Koreans from the north may have. I am supporting