Opinion of Commissioner 154 Ct. Cl. The petition sets forth additional claims. Mary expended $4,000 in 1941 to prepare 100 acres at the Niland farm to plant cantaloupes, but cantaloupes were not planted. They would normally have been planted from late December 1941 through January 1942, and there is no explanation of why Tom did not plant them after spending so much in preparation, unless it is that he could then see the impossibility of securing farm labor to cultivate and harvest them and so decided to stop sending good money after bad. This loss of $4,000 in preparatory costs is not properly attributable to the evacuation of the Sonoda family, but to a climate of public opinion which the statute does not reach. The same can be said of Mary's $8,800 claim for the loss of the 17acre tomato crop under cultivation at the Niland and Imperial farms from late November 1941 through the early months of 1942. Tom admittedly could get insufficient help to cultivate, harvest, pack and ship the entire crop so twothirds of it was left to die on the vine. The Filipino sharecropper who tended Mary's two-acre tomato crop at the Imperial farm quit in early January for patriotic reasons and so this small acreage was completely lost. Clearly the tomato loss cannot be charged to the evacuation and is not reimbursable. The record is silent as to what happened to the proceeds of sale of that part of the Niland tomato crop which was harvested, and in the void of proof no inference can be drawn favorable to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also claims $2,881.10 as the loss of her investment in converting two rented tracts to rice cultivation. One of them was the Hancock farm which the plaintiff rented for $250 for a seven-month period expiring November 30, 1941, and spent another $250 on after the termination of the lease in removing a levee as the lease required. Another was a tract of virgin land rented for two years commencing May 1, 1941, on which the plaintiff spent $1,669.27 in clearing and preparing for rice cultivation. By February 5, 1942, the plaintiff had received proceeds of rice sales totaling $5,440.55 from these two properties. The costs of the Hancock lease and removal of the levee therefrom were purely lease obligations and not evacuation casualties, for all of the loss had transpired long prior to any pre 130 Opinion of Commissioner evacuation effects, and it is not inferred that the plaintiff contemplated further rice cultivation at that location under a renewal lease. The plaintiff's costs in clearing and preparing the virgin land for rice cultivation, however, can be considered to be a capital investment spread over the twoyear lease period, the profits from the first half of which had already been garnered. Evacuation of the Sonoda family in May 1942 prevented the planting of rice for the second year of the lease, thus depriving the plaintiff of half of her initial preparatory expenses, or about $835. This was in fact a loss of capital investment in a leasehold and is reimbursable in that amount. It is not barred by 50 U.S.C. App. 1982 (b) (5) precluding consideration of claims for loss of anticipated profits or earnings, for plaintiff is not seeking restoration of the profits she may have earned in the second year of the lease, but rather the loss of benefit from half of the capital investment already made and whose utilization her evacuation prevented. Another claim dealt with in finding 53 concerns a $370 difference between a loan made to Mary by one Esther Rhoads which Mary's attorney in fact, Charles B. Ralphs, closed out by paying Rhoads $1,630 from Mary's funds in his possession. As the special finding indicates, the claim is based on a non sequitur, for the money represented by the $2,000 loan did not go through Ralphs, and he otherwise accounted for all the receipts that did. As background, the $2,000 was borrowed to pay off an attaching creditor who was suing Mary on some crop loans in March 1942, as referred to earlier. The crop loans were on Mary's tomato crop then languishing, and the suitor had acquired the notes at discount from the original obligee. Mary contended but failed to prove that the original obligee had been fully paid by the shipment of tomatoes, and that thus in paying off the suitor she paid the same obligation twice. It is true that one-third of the tomato crop was harvested, but when or for how much is not shown, and there is no trace of the sales whatsoever. The precise theory urged by the plaintiff for recovery is not clear, but the facts disclose nothing to be reimbursable on any theory for which the evacuation was responsible. It cannot be expected that all claimants who were evacuated will have preserved their records Opinion of Commissioner 154 Ct. Cl. intact in anticipation of future lawsuits, so some measure of tolerance is due. Exactly where liberality ends and requirement of legal proof begins resists a categorical standard applicable to all cases. Still another item in plaintiff's claim is for $1,919.85 which she says her attorney, Hickcox, received for her in December 1942 and that she never got. Hickcox had advised Mary on December 31 that he had collected the money and had applied it to her guardian account as instructed. Here the story ends, for the record provides no clue as to the guardianship account referred to or the ultimate resting place of the money. Neither Mary nor Tom ever asked Hickcox for an accounting for this sum, and it must be assumed that the Sonodas received it. Mary's contention is that Hickcox retained it, perhaps as a fee due from Tom, in which case it would not have been proper for Hickcox to have satisfied it with her money. The claim is not supported by qualitative evidence and so is not entitled to consideration. The sole element of the plaintiff's claim to which the defendant accedes is a loss of $5,837.50 for household furnishings, farm equipment, rice seed and motor vehicles due to the evacuation of the Sonodas and, there being no disagreement, this amount is allowable. The defendant seeks to offset against this recovery a bill for $700 for fertilizer which the plaintiff is said to have been charged with prior to evacuation and escaped payment of because of her evacuation. Evidence both as to the charge and the failure to pay is equally inconclusive. Even if the facts were established it should not result in the offset. It must be assumed that the creditor could have pursued collection through legal channels against Mary even during her absence and, if he did not do so, this was not so much a boon to Mary created by the evacuation as it was remissness on the creditor's part. Of the plaintiff's total claim, elements aggregating $9,300 for the northern half of the Imperial farm, plus $17,719.49 ($11,046.99 for loss of the Niland farm, $835 for loss of capital investment in rice cultivation, and $5,837.50 for loss of household furnishings, etc.) have been shown to be the reasonable and natural consequence of evacuation or threat 130 Findings of Fact of evacuation, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the amount of $27,019.49. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The plaintiff, Mary Taki Sonoda, is a citizen of the United States and was born at Imperial, California, on October 5, 1914. She is now a resident of Chicago, Illinois. She is a person of Japanese ancestry, being the daughter of Tomoji and Sachi Sonoda, both of whom were born in Japan. As a matter of convenience, the plaintiff will hereinafter be referred to as Mary and her father as Tom. As of December 7, 1941, Mary resided in Los Angeles, California. 2. On March 2, 1942, Public Proclamation No. 1 was promulgated, pursuant to Executive Order 9066, dated February 19, 1942, establishing Military Areas Numbers 1 and 2 and announcing the imminence of the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1, which included Imperial County, California. As early as midFebruary 1942, and perhaps before, the plaintiff, her two parents, and her two sisters expected, with reason, to be evacuated from their home in Imperial County, California. Tom was arrested on March 17, 1942, pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. 21-24), and was interned as an alien enemy under that Act successively at Tujunga in California, and at Santa Fe and Lordsburg, in New Mexico, until his release on parole in March 1943, when he was removed to the Poston Relocation Center in Arizona to join his family in evacuation and exclusion under Executive Order 9066. Had he not been so arrested under the Alien Enemy Act it is "deemed" (under 50 U.S.C. 1981 (b) (3)) that he would have been evacuated with the rest of his family in May 1942. In May 1942 the plaintiff, together with her mother and two sisters, was removed from Imperial County by order of a military commander pursuant to Executive Order 9066, and was involuntarily evacuated to the Poston Relocation Center in Arizona. Plaintiff remained there until her release in April 1943. The plaintiff and her entire family were prohibited from returning to Imperial County by virtue of the same military authority until January 2, 1945. Findings of Fact 154 Ct. Cl. Approximately 110,000 other American-born citizens of Japanese ancestry, mostly from California, were similarly evacuated and excluded. 3. On July 2, 1948, Congress passed an Act "To authorize the Attorney General to adjudicate certain claims resulting from evacuation of certain persons of Japanese ancestry under military orders" (62 Stat. 1231). This Act was amended by the Act of August 17, 1951 (65 Stat. 192) and further amended by the Act of July 9, 1956 (70 Stat. 513), which latter Act was entitled "An Act to amend the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948, as amended, to expedite the final determination of the claims and for other purposes." As amended (50 U.S.C. App. 1981-1987 (1958 Ed.)), the Act reads in pertinent part as follows: § 1981. *** (a) The Attorney General shall have jurisdiction to compromise and settle and make an award in an amount not to exceed $100,000 as hereinafter provided on any claim by a person of Japanese ancestry against the United States arising on or after December 7, 1941, when such claim is not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for damage to or loss of real or personal property (including without limitation as to amount damage to or loss of personal property bailed to or in the custody of the Government or any agent thereof), that is (except as is otherwise provided by subsections 1(b) (2) and 1(b) (3) [subsection (b) (2) and (b) (3) of this section] a reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation or exclusion of such person by the appropriate military commander from a military area in Arizona, California, Oregon, or Washington; *** under authority of Executive Order Numbered 9066, dated February 19, 1942 * * * (1) "Evacuation" shall include voluntary departure from a military area prior to but in anticipation of an order of exclusion therefrom. (2) "Claims by a person of Japanese ancestry" shall include claims that were filed by any profit or nonprofit organization, corporate or otherwise, the majority of whose stock was owned by, or the majority of whose stockholders or members were, on December 7, 1941, and on the date of the filing of the claim, persons of Japanese ancestry actually residing within the continental limits of the United States or its Territories: Provided, how |