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the United States, bringing his wife with him, did not thereby cease to be a citizen of the United States. Id.

Oath of allegiance.-Browne v. Dexter (1884), 66 Cal. 39, 4 Pac. 913.

Naturalization.-By the common law, allegiance to the Government of the country of one's birth can not be discharged by naturalization in a foreign country. Ainslie v. Martin (1813), 9 Mass. 454.

Expatriation in time of war. In re Look Tin Sing (C. C. 1884), 21 Fed. 905; (1857) 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 63.

Secession. The acts of the people of the States in rebellion merely suspended the practical relations of those States to the Union, but did not for a moment effect their separation therefrom. Shortridge v. Macon (C. C. 1867), Fed. Cas. No. 12,812.

A citizen of a seceding State, who adheres to the Union cause, and retires within the Federal lines, and remains there during the rebellion, though he intends to return after hostilities cease, continues to be a citizen of the United States. Planters' Bank e. St. John (C. C. 1869), Fed. Cas. No. 11,208.

2955. Expatriation by prolonged residence in a foreign country.— When any naturalized citizen shall have resided for two years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state it shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen, and the place of his general abode shall be deemed his place of residence during said years: Provided, however, That such presumption may be overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the Department of State may prescribe: *** Sec. 2, act of March 2, 1907 (34. Stat. 1228).

2956. Expatriation prohibited in time of war.And provided also, That no American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war. Sec. 2, act of March 2, 1907 (34 Stat. 1228).

2957. Repatriation of veterans of allied armies.-Twelfth. That any person who, while a citizen of the United States and during the existing war in Europe, entered the military or naval service of any country at war with a country with which the United States is now at war, who shall be deemed to have lost his citizenship by reason of any oath or obligation taken by him for the purpose of entering such service, may resume his citizenship by taking the oath of allegiance to the United States prescribed by the naturalization law and regulations, and such oath may be taken before any court of the United States or of any State authorized by law to naturalize aliens or before any consul of the United States, and certified copies thereof shall be sent by such court or consul to the Department of State and the Bureau of Naturalization, and the Act (Public fifty-five, Sixty-fifth Congress, approved October fifth, nineteen hundred and seventeen), is hereby repealed. Par. 12, added to sec. 4, act of June 29, 1906, sec. 1, act of May 9, 1918 (40 Stat, 545).

2958. Restraint of alien enemies in time of war.-Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or government, and the President makes public proclamation of the event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government, being of the age of fourteen years and upward, who shall be within the United States and not setually naturalized, shall be liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured, and removed as alien enemies. The President is authorized, in any such event. by his proclamation thereof, or other public act, to direct the conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States, toward the aliens who become so liable; the manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be subject and in what cases, and upon what security their residence shall be permitted,

and to provide for the removal of those who, not being permitted to reside within the United States, refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to establish any other regulations which are found necessary in the premises and for the public safety. R. S. 4067, as amended by act of April 16, 1918 (40 Stat. 531).

Notes of Decisions.

Construction.-This section is not limited by R. S. 4069, the latter section simply providing a method of dealing with alien enemies additional to that in this section. Ex parte Graber (D. C. 1918), 247 Fed. 882.

Validity. Alien enemies have no rights and privileges, unless by special favor, during time of war, and an act authorizing the restraint and removal of alien enemies is not invalid as depriving such persons of liberty without process of law; the constitutional safeguards not extending to enemies. De Lacey v. U. S. (C. C. A. 1918), 249 Fed. 624.

Ex parte

Habeas corpus.-The action of the President in ordering the summary arrest and detention of an alien enemy under this section is conclusive, and not subject to judicial review on habeas corpus. Graber (D. C. 1918), 247 Fed. 882; Ex parte Fronklin (D. C. 1918), 253 Fed. 984. The court may inquire, on habeas corpus, whether the person apprehended is in fact a native, citizen, denizen, or subject of a hostile nation or government, since the statute provides for no preliminary hearing; but the proceeding is not further reviewable, being essentially an executive function, within the discretion of the President. Ex parte Gilroy (D. C. 1919), 257 Fed. 110.

Burden of proof.-On habeas corpus the burden of proof is on the petitioner to satisfy the court that he is not a native, citizen, denizen, or subject of a hostile nation or Government. Ex parte Risse (D. C. 1919), 257 Fed. 102.

"Native" defined.-"Native" indicates the place of birth, although one may not owe allegiance to the place where he was born. Minotto v. Bradley (D. C. 1918), 252 Fed. 600.

Citizenship.-A man was born in the United States, but his parents took him to Germany during his minority and were naturalized there. Before attaining his majority, he returned to this country to live, and there was no conduct on his part after he became of age amounting to an election of German citizenship. Held he is an American citizen. Steinkauler's Case, 12 Ops. Atty. Gen. 15, 17; Ludlam v. Ludham, 25 N. Y. 356, 376; State ex rel. Phelps v. Jackson, Vt. Sup. Ct. 1907, 65 Atl. 657.

A naturalized citizen who returns to the country of his origin does not lose his citizenship, though he remains there indefinitely, if his purpose is to return to the land of his adoption; the test being one of intention. Banning v. Penrose (D. C. 1919), 255 Fed. 159.

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2959. Restraint of declarants in time of war.Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be taken or construed to interfere with or prevent the apprehension and removal, agreeably to law, of any alien enemy at any time previous to the actual naturalization of such alien; and section twenty-one hundred and seventy-one of the Revised Statutes of the United States is hereby repealed: * Par. 11, added to sec. 4, act of June 29,

*

1906 (34 Stat. 596), by sec. 1, act of May 9, 1918 (40 Stat. 545).

R. S. 2171 was as follows:

"No alien who is a native citizen or subject, or a denizen of any country, state, or sovereignty with which the United States are at war, at the time of his application, shall be then admitted to become a citizen of the United States."

Notes of Decisions.

Restraint of alien.-The petitioner was interned under the provisions of the presidential proclamation with reference to alien enemies. He claimed to be a citizen of Italy. He sought release from internment by writ of habeas corpus. The peti

tioner was born in Germany, his mother was born in Germany, his .ather was born in Austria, and the family resided in Germany until a short time before the petitioner came to the United States. The writ of habeas corpus was denied, on the

ground that since the petitioner was a native of Germany the action of the President in interning him can not be controlled by the courts. Minotto v. Bradley, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. Dist. Ill. Interpretation of War Statutes, Bulletin 105. Treasonable acts by alien.-Note concluding that an interned alien may be convicted and punished for treasonable acts committed during internment, citing Car

lisle v. United States (16 Wall. 147), 22 Law Notes 102.

Declarant an alien enemy.-A subject of Austria-Hungary, residing within the United States when war was declared, who had declared his intention to become a citizen but had never been naturalized, is an alien enemy. Ex parte Graber (D. C. 1918), 247 Fed. 882.

2960. Attempt of interned aliens to escape.-Whoever, being a person belonging to the armed land or naval forces of a belligerent nation or belligerent faction of any nation and being interned in the United States, in accordance with the law of nations, shall leave or attempt to leave said jurisdiction, or shall leave or attempt to leave the limits of internment in which freedom of movement has been allowed, without permission from the proper official of the United States in charge, or shall willfully overstay a leave of absence granted by such official, shall be subject to arrest by any marshal or deputy marshal of the United States, or by the military or naval authorities thereof, and shall be returned to the place of internment and there confined and safely kept for such period of time as the official of the United States in charge shall direct; and whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States and subject thereto, shall aid or entice any interned person to escape or attempt to escape from the jurisdiction of the United States, or from the limits of internment prescribed, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Sec. 7, title V, act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 223).

*

2961. Control of telegraph lines in Alaska.- * *Provided further, That no telegraph or cable lines owned or operated or controlled by persons not citizens of the United States, or by any foreign corporation or government, shall be established in or permitted to enter Alaska. Act of May 26, 1900 (31 Stat. 206).

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2962. Control of necessaries in time of war.-That by reason of the existence of a state of war, it is essential to the national security and defense, for the successful prosecution of the war and for the support and maintenance of the Army and Navy, to assure an adequate supply and equitable distribution, and to facilitate the movement of foods, feeds, wearing apparel, containers primarily designed or intended for containing foods, feeds, or fertilizers; fuel, including fuel oil and natural gas, and fertilizer and fertilizer ingredients, tools, utensils, implements, machinery, and equipment required for the actual production of foods, feeds, and fuel, hereafter in this Act called necessaries; to prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculation, manipulation, and private controls affecting such supply, distribution, and movement; and to establish and maintain governmental control of such necessaries during the war. For such purposes the instrumentalities, means, methods, powers, authorities, duties, obligations, and prohibitions hereinafter set forth are created, established, conferred, and prescribed. The President is authorized to make such regulations and to issue such orders as are essential effectively to carry out the provisions of this Act. Sec. 1, act of Aug. 10, 1917 (40 Stat. 276), as amended by sec. 1, act of Oct. 22, 1919 (41 Stat. 297). This is similar to sec. 1, of the act of Aug. 10, 1917, with the exception of the words, "wearing apparel, containers primarily designed or intended for containing foods, feeds, or fertilizers ;"

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2963. Validity of the Food and Fuel Act.--That if any clause, sentence, paragraph, or part of this Act shall for any reason be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remainder thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the

clause, sentence, paragraph, or part thereof, directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have been rendered. Sec. 22, act of Aug. 10, 1917 (40 Stat. 283).

Notes of Decisions.

Validity. Sec. 4 of the food control act (by which title this act is to be cited, under a provision of the act of Oct. 22, 1919), as amended by the act of Oct. 22, 1919, providing that it is unlawful "wilfully to make an unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries," or to conspire "to exact excessive prices for any necessaries," is void and unconstitutional, as repugnant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, because referring to no fixed standard of guilt and inadequate to inform persons accused of violation thereof of the

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nature and cause of the accusation against them, and because purporting to delegate the legislative power of Congress to courts and juries to determine what acts shall be held to be criminal and punishable. C. S v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. (1921), 254 U. S. ; 65 L. Ed. 300.

Sec. 25 of this act, authorizing the Prest dent to fix the price of coal and coke as s war measure, is not unconstitutional as de priving persons of property without due process of law. U. S. v. Ford (D. C. 1920), 265 Fed. 424.

2964. Definitions of terms used in the Food and Fuel Act.-That words used in this Act shall be construed to import the plural or the singular, as the case demands. The word person," wherever used in this Act, shall include individuals, partnerships, associations, and corporations. Sec. 23, act of Aug. 10, 1917 (40 Stat. 283).

*

2965. Period of operation of the Food and Fuel Act.-That the provisions of this Act shall cease to be in effect when the existing state of war between the United States and Germany shall have terminated, and the fact and date of such termination shall be ascertained and proclaimed by the President; but the termination of this Act shall not affect any act done, or any right or obligation accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil case before the said termination pursuant to this Act; but all rights and liabilities under this Act arising before its termination shall continue and may be enforced in the same manner as if the Act had not terminated. Any offense committed and all penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities incurred prior to such termination may be prosecuted or punished in the same manner and with the same effect as if this Act had not been terminated. Sec. 24, act of Aug. 10, 1917 (40. Stat. 283.)

For joint resolution, providing that certain statutes, the operation of which is contingent upon the existence of a state of war, shall be construed as if the World War had ended on Mar. 3, 1921, see 2835, ante.

Notes of Decisions.

Termination of war.-A similar phrase used with reference to the termination of the state of war ("date of which shall be determined and proclaimed by the President ") held in the war-time prohibition act of Nov. 21, 1918 (40 Stat. 1046), so definite as to leave no room for construction. The requirement could not be satisfied by passing references in messages to

Congress, nor by newspaper interviews
with high officers of the Army or with
officials of the War Department. Hamilton
v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co. (1919),
251 U. S. 146; 64 L. Ed. 194. See also
Ruppert v. Caffey (1919), 251 U. S. 264;
64 L. Ed. 260; U. S. v. Armstrong (D. C.
1920), 265 Fed. 683; U. S. v. Russel (D. C.
1920), 265 Fed. 414.

2966. Requisition of supplies and storage facilities.-That the President is authorized, from time to time, to requisition foods, feeds, fuels, and other supplies necessary to the support of the Army or the maintenance of the Navy, or any other public use connected with the common defense, and to requisition,

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