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Not unexpectedly, Comptroller McCarl's expansionist and independent activities raised objections, especially during the New Deal period. Referred to as the

"watchdog of the Treasury," 26/ McCarl, whose 15-year term lasted until 1936,

On two occasions,

incurred the wrath of the Democratic Administration. President Roosevelt attempted to limit the Comptroller General's powers through reorganization but those efforts failed. Following McCarl's retirement, the office's responsibilities were handled for three years by Acting Comptroller General Richard Elliott, an Indiana Republican, much in the same mold as McCarl. The disputes between the GAO and the newly-formed TVA became legendary, prompting TVA's own comptroller, E.L. Kohler, to criticize the GAO, its

powers and methods:

It has long been recognized that the Comptroller General
regards himself not as an accountant but as a glorified watch-
dog, and that he has surrounded himself with a narrow-visioned
legal staff that recognizes no superior except a decision of
the Supreme Court directly in point. In my opinion, he has more
than once been sadly out of line with the spirit of the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921 from which he derives his primary
authority.

A review of his report (1934) and frequent contact this
year with the field staff, convinced me quickly and decisively
that the field staff had made no real audit originally and had
made none since; the staff has consisted of persons styled "in-
vestigators" who have had little accounting training or experi-
ence; and the 1934 report was in no sense an audit report but
rather a disorderly miscellany of fact and fancy that could
succeed only in misleading the reader, regardless of his skill
in auditing, accounting, or sleuthing. 277

In mid-1939, Fred Brown, a former Democratic Senator from New Hampshire,

was appointed Comptroller General.

Brown had served on a joint congressional

committee investigating the GAO operations regarding the TVA and participated

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Statement made in 1939 in Congressional testimony, recorded in Brown. op. cit. P. 21.

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in recommending changes in methods and investigatory personnel, some of
which recommendations were incorporated in the 1945 Government Corporations
Control Act. Brown apparently had little difficulty in being confirmed by
his former colleagues in the Senate but served only 14 months, resigning
because of ill health. His replacement, also nominated by President
Roosevelt and a former congressman, was Lindsay Warren. Warren encountered
little opposition at the time of his appointment and throughout his tenure.
In fact, Warren's efforts to improve the GAO professionally, to increase
its operating capacity, and to extend its domain to government-owned cor-
porations (through the 1945 Government Corporation Control Act) resulted
in one analyst calling the office "the new GAO".

28/

The next appointment of Comptroller General occurred in December, 1954. President Eisenhower nominated Joseph Campbell (who was eventually confirmed by the Senate), who served as treasurer of Columbia University while Eisenhower was president of the university and who was a member of the Atomic Energy Commission. The difficulties Campbell experienced in the confirmation hearings appear to have been confined to the Dixon-Yates controversy. Rep. Holifield, then a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, advised that Campbell, as Comptroller General, "should disqualify himself when the Dixon-Yates contract came before the GAO on the question of payments under

the contract, because they would be payments he (Campbell) 'has been sponsoring.'"29/

28/

no.

29/

Gerald Schulsinger. The General Accounting Office: Two Glimpses. 35, Inter-University Case Program Series. University of Alabama.

Case

1956.

Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 1954. P. 551.

- 19

The current Comptroller General, Elmer B. Staats, had served in the executive counterpart to the GAO, the Bureau of the Budget, from 1939 to 1953 and from 1958 to 1966, the latter years as Deputy Director. For part of the interim he served with the NSC. The appointment of Staats evidenced general support.

Although this is but a cursory review of the appointments of the Comptrollers General, it is evident that at the time of nomination and confirmation there was little opposition to the nominees and few attempts to intrude upon their independence. When such attempts were most likely, following the McCarl and (Acting Comptroller General) Elliott tenure, 19211940, President Roosevelt nominated a former Senator who had been one of the critics and proponents of reform of the GAO. The most intense controversy surrounded Joseph Campbell due to the Dixon-Yates dispute. One possible reason for the limited criticism of the nominees appears to be the partisan configuration at the time of the appointments. At the time of each of the five appointments of Comptrollers General, coincidently, the same party occupied both the White House and Capital. Thus, inter-party conflict would not have exacerbated the potential conflict inherent in the appointments to an office which investigates the executive at the behest of the legislature. Other factors, such as the background and experience of the nominees, have undoubtedly been important considerations in muting which has experienced the ramifications of the Comptroller General's independence criticism of a nominee. On the issue of independence, it is the executive / (from executive

/departments). Congress as an institution has been less concerned in debate with the office's independence (from the Congress) and has enhanced the Comptroller General's independence (from the executive) throughout the years.

Frederick M. Kaiser

Analyst, American National Government Government and General Research Division September 26, 1975

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Congressional Research Service

By Stuart Glass, Legislative
Attorney, American Division,
October 1, 1975

ANALYSIS OF S. 2268, THE "GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE ACT OF 1975"

This is in response to your request of September 10, 1975, for

an analysis of S. 2268, entitled the "General Accounting Office Act of

1975."

This memorandum will be in two major sections: a section-bysection narrative analysis of the bill, and an analysis of the legal aspects of the authority which would be delegated by the bill to the Comptroller General. An appendix will contain present provisions in law creating Congressional oversight over executive functions.

I. Section-by-Section Analysis

The bill generally would authorize the Comptroller General to bring suit for declaratory relief against any employee or officer of the United States to prevent the unlawful expenditure, obligation, or authorization of public funds; would provide procedural remedies to assist the Comptroller General in gaining access to records of non-federal persons and organizations regarding federal contracts; would provide a procedural remedy to assist the Comptroller General in enforcing access to records

CRS-2

of federal departments and establishments regarding federal financial activities; and would authorize the Comptroller General to conduct a profits study of contractors having contracts with the federal government. Title I.--Title I of S. 2268 would amend the Budget and Account

ing Act of 1921, as amended, 31 U.S.C. §§42, et. seq., by adding a new section 320, which would permit the Comptroller General of the United States to institute a civil action for declaratory relief in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia whenever he:

...in the performance of any of his functions
authorized by law, has reasonable cause to
believe that any officer or employee of the
executive branch is about to expend, obligate,
or authorize the expenditure or obligation of
public funds in an illegal manner,....

$320 (b), S. 2268, §101.

Section 320 (b) of the Act, as proposed to be amended, would

further authorize the Attorney General, if in disagreement with the Comptroller General, to represent the defendant official in any such action. Other parties, including the prospective payee or obligee, would be allowed to intervene, or could be impleaded as otherwise provided by law. Such other parties would be entitled to be served with notice or process. Beyond the territorial limits of the District of Columbia, process would be permitted to be served by certified mail.

Section 320 (c) would permit the payment of interest at the rate

of six per centum per annum upon any payment for goods or services actually

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