Secretary MATTHEWS. Mr. Chairman, I think the subject has been pretty well covered in its general aspects about the probable things that might happen in the future.

There is one phase of this situation which concerns the Navy directly and which the Secretary of Defense has suggested to you. That is the inadequacy which we feel in the amount of the money requested in this bill in the area of aircraft procurement for the Navy. Now, in order to conserve your time and to avoid repetition, I am going to let Admiral Sherman explain our position on that, and it will save going over the field twice.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you.

Admiral SHERMAN. With respect to aircraft procurement, the money that is in the bill now is an increment to care for the immediate needs as we see them. It does not, however, provide for the long-term procurement in the same manner that it does for the Air Force; and, therefore, I think that we will want to ask for a supplemental prior to completion of these hearings for inclusion in the present bill.

One important area which is not covered is the equipment of the Naval Air Reserve. The public-works items that we foresee the need of have to do with the readying of the airfields and facilities for the operation of the newer aircraft as they come in during this emergency at a greater rate than we have heretofore planned for.

Those two items are pretty well associated, and in due course they should be covered.

With respect to the general situation, probably this should be off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MAHON. Do I understand that you feel this more or less intermediate course we are now pursuing is the proper course to pursue at this moment in the light of all the facts and circumstances? Admiral SHERMAN. I do, indeed.

Mr. MAHON. And you think that the thing for us to do as a nation now is to provide the $10,500,000,000 to carry out the program which is being suggested?

Admiral SHERMAN. That is correct, augmented if practicable to provide for the deficiencies in aircraft procurement and public works which I mentioned.

IMPACT OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Secretary Johnson, you spoke of military considerations now outweighing fiscal considerations.

Do you mean to say by that that we should more or less ignore repercussions upon our domestic economy in our preparedness program, or not?

Secretary JOHNSON. No. I think if you read the whole statement, Mr. Chairman, we say that the same effort to get the dollars spent wisely and correctly will be pursued, but we do say that we have reached that stage where the Korean move and the build-up of perhaps hostile forces in other parts of the world require not alone a decision in the Korean matter, but an enlarged and expanded Military Establishment for the security of the United States which will turn the scales against what has been the policy started back in 1948, and theretofore; so these are things which, even thought they have an

impact upon our economy and our well-being, taxwise and controlwise, that must be done in order that we be strong enough to deter those who would take from us freedom and maybe life.

In that connection, Mr. Chairman, there is a lot of misinterpretation of the impact of this program in the press. I have something here that may be of some interest to you.

I have here a sheet from the Munitions Board's file which indicate that the amount of steel involved in this program and the original program is about 4,000,000 tons. One reason is that there is no great shipbuilding program as was the case 8 or 10 years ago.

The amount of copper in the whole program for 1951 is about 175,000 tons.

The amount of aluminum in the whole 1951 program would be about 100,000 tons, which is estimated to be approximately 14 percent of the estimated current production at the time of peak impact.

The way the headlines read we are taking a great deal more than that amount of such material. The impact is estimated to be approximately 4 percent for steel and 7 percent for copper, and not the fabulous figures that have been reported in the press.

SUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS REQUESTED FOR DEPARTMENT OF THE

AIR FORCE

Mr. MAHON. I would like to pursue this same question with respect to the Air Force that was presented by the other services.

In view of all the facts and circumstances, what is your viewpoint, Mr. Secretary Finletter, and General Vandenberg, as to the sufficiency at the moment of the present request?

Secretary FINLETTER. As I understand it, you are asking whether the figure of $10,500,000,000 is, in my opinion and in that of General Vandenberg, a proper figure to ask for at this time for two purposes: first, to pay the current charges of the Korean war for a future 12month period, and, secondly, to make for a proper build-up in the Military Establishment as a whole and the Air Force in particular? Mr. MAHON. Yes, improving your military posture, as you military people say.

Secretary FINLETTER. My answer is yes, it is.

I would like to elaborate briefly. It is the figure we recommended when the three Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed as to what the amount was and should be for these two purposes.

I would like, however, to make this one reservation; that is, both of these items are fluid.

As pointed out, the cost of the Korean war will certainly vary, and I point out there may be further requests with respect to the building up of the basic structure of the Military Establishment, which may be necessary in the future.

Mr. MAHON. I would like to have you add anything, General Vandenberg.

General VANDENBERG. I concur in what Secretary Finletter has said. In addition, I would like to say it is possible we will come again for more later on. At this time I think this is the proper sum to go in for.

I think if we do come back it will probably be on military personnel which at the moment we cannot say is adequate. We may possibly have to come back.

Mr. MAHON. I would like to point out that we have been schooled in thinking that to blow hot and cold and to stop and start is very expensive and wasteful, and I do not want to have any part in one of these stop-and-start programs unless such a program is absolutely

necessary.

Of course, we have to start when we begin a war, and we have to stop one of these days when it is over, but I would like to have the assurance that this is not going to be a wasteful program with a tremendous cut-back and an alteration that might prove wasteful.

Secretary JOHNSON. I think you will have that assurance in the way it is going to be presented in detail; part for the Korean operation and part for the permanent build-up of the forces without regard to the Korean situation.

ADEQUACY OF SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR THE OVER-ALL MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

Mr. MAHON. General Bradley, the question has been presented to the Secretary of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs, the representatives of the three services, as to whether or not this fund requested here of $10,500,000,000 is adequate now under the facts and circumstances. The question is not, Will you later on request and need additional funds, because we cannot predict the future and we do not believe you can with complete accuracy, but the question is, Is this enough money for Congress to appropriate at this time for the Korean situation and for the improvement of the military posture of the country? That question has been answered by others, but I would like to have your viewpoint.

General BRADLEY. Yes; I think it is at this time. We do not know, as you say, what will develop, but we think this amount of money does the thing we would like to see done at this time; that is, it supports the Korean operation and replaces in the United States the units we have sent over there.

In addition to that, it will create some additional units that we, the Joint Chiefs, think necessary at this time to increase our military capabilities. It does that at this time. Whether or not we will have to do more than that, or whether or not the Korean situation folds up, no one can foresee, but as I see it, these are the things that we need now and the things that we can come to you with and say that we honestly need now. But we must also honestly tell you that we may have to come back later and ask for more.

Mr. MAHON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SHEPPARD. I will try to be as brief as possible. I want to commend you on the general construction of your statement, Mr. Secretary. Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you.

Mr. SHEPPARD. I think it is a splendid one.

There are a few places in your statement that appear to be inconsistent, but I would like to have a response from you in regard to them in order that I may follow your thinking in handling these appropriations.

For example, I quote the first sentence in the second paragraph of page 17 of your statement:

Our Military Establishment has been geared to provide a sound mobilization base and a swift striking force in case of a third world war.

Well, that statement, I assume, is a general one and not predicated upon a literal interpretation as it pertains to the swiftness of defense attainable under our present preparatory plans?

Secretary JOHNSON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. SHEPPARD. There is a statement contained in the third paragraph on page 17 that is extremely interesting to me, and I quote: * * It is also a program designed to promote world peace by deterring further aggression.

UNITED STATES POLICY IN KOREA PRIOR TO OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

Now, I am under the impression from the information I have obtained from various sources that considerable difficulty was involved in the Korean situation because there was publicly announced that we were finished in that particular area and we had no further intent of interjecting ourselves in the picture, at least so far as the military are concerned, until very recently, and that was the decision upon which you were basing your operational conclusions. Is that a correct assumption on my part?

Senator JOHNSON. That is correct, both as to the Military Establishment and as to General MacArthur. He has been unfairly criticized with reference to his responsibility in Korea.

Mr. SHEPPARD. That was a decision of top echelon and not at the moment a part of the military conclusions as such?

Secretary JOHNSON. Correct, sir.

Mr. SHEPPARD. Off the record.

(Discusison off the record.)

Mr. SIKES. There is lack of understanding, a rather widespread lack of understanding, about some aspects of the present crisis, and there are some questions that could and should be answered by people in the policy level of Government.

REASON FOR LACK OF COMBAT READINESS IN KOREA

One of the most common queries is why was there no combat readiness in Korea, and that is an easy question to answer. We had taken our military forces out of Korea. We were not committed to a policy of meeting aggression by force in the Far East and were not prepared to do so. As a matter of fact, the administration policy was directly the opposite. It was not until the act of aggression took place in Korea that the administration's policy was reversed and our military forces were directed to begin to meet force with force. Secretary JOHNSON. That is correct.

Mr. SIKES. I do not believe that the American people generally realize how important that change was in its military application. Then there is the question a lot of people are asking: Why is there no more defense for the billions that have been spent?

69887-50-pt. 2-2.

First, there is the fact that our defenses had to be spread over the greater part of the world and actually had to be spread thin. The forces at any given point are necessarily limited. Then ours is an expensive military organization, even though comparatively small. We try to pay our people a decent living wage, to provide them with adequate food and clothing and a proper place of shelter. It is obvious that a great part of the money has gone into so-called housekeeping expenses. Actually about half of the money has been so spent.

AMOUNT OF SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS TO BE USED FOR KOREA

But when we take this bill to the floor we certainly are going to be required to answer this question, and I would like to have your comment on it, Mr. Secretary: How much of the $10,500,000,000 is for defense now, and by "now" I mean within a very few months? In other words, how much of it is going to be available in time to help us at an early date in Korea, or for any emergency which develops subsequent to Korea?

Secretary JOHNSON. We are already moving men and supplies and have taken steps to replace certain of the material shipped as well as to accelerate the production and delivery of needed items.

We had available under the continuing resolution, pending the passage of the bill as of July 1, the equivalent of a normal full year's appropriation. All three services are moving along as rapidly as possible to do all the things in and about the Korean situation that the Joint Chiefs and General MacArthur-and there is agreement among them think advisable. Everything in that field will have top priority.

The rest of these things, like the building of new tanks, new airplanes in the original program will be produced just as fast as the American economy can bring them and deliver them. When action is taken on this request-the minimum of time will elapse in the placing of orders for critical matériel.

The men are being called as fast as the services can get to it and get their instructors, and so forth, present. I think that answers your question generally.

Each of the chiefs of the services, or their budget officers, will be able to break down the estimates for you. The supporting data will all be available. We are not asking for a blank check.

Mr. SIKES. That is too general. I realize it is difficult for you to be specific, but I think the Congress and the country are going to want to know how speedily we can be prepared by this additional appropriation to cope with the world conditions that now confront us-6 months or 6 years?

Secretary JOHNSON. I do not think either figure is right. I think this program is going to run across the next 2 or 3 years. The Korean situation, I hope, is a 6 or 8 months' proposition. You are talking about the basic thing?

Mr. SIKES. I am talking about the over-all program. Can we, out of this appropriation, get striking forces quickly to help in Korea, or make them available elsewhere if needed.

Secretary JOHNSON. To help in the Korea situation; yes. With replacement as soon as possible.