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years, and which finally concluded it was too big a job for a single committee of the Congress to undertake.

Mr. Van HORN. The sum of your argument would be that you would not favor the inclusion of that provision of the resolution?

Dr. GALLOWAY. That is correct.

Senator BRICKER. The remainder of the resolution is just a question of policy as to whether or not we ought to cut this big committee to a small joint committee on the budget.

Dr. GALLOWAY. On that, Mr. Chairman, I think that it would be a wise move to reduce the size of the Joint Budget Committee to more manageable proportions. As you know, section 138 of the Legislative Reorganization Act provides that the Joint Budget Committee can carry out its function through a subcommittee thereof, and that has been the practice. A subcommittee composed of five members each of the four constituent committees has been set up, and I understand is performing the function assigned by that section of the act. It might be possible to reduce even further the size of the subcommittee to 12 members composed of three each from the four constituent committees.

Senator BRICKER. Do I understand that this resolution proposes a substitute for the Committee on the Budget, or is it supplementary? Mr. Van HORN. Substitute. Senator BRICKER. Substitute? Mr. Van HORN. Yes, sir.

Senator BRICKER. This would reduce it to eight, I believe, wouldn't it?

Mr. VAN HORN. No, sir. This would reduce it to 12.

Senator THYE. Mr. Chairman, I find it necessary to leave, and I would like to ask a question of Dr. Galloway.

Senator BRICKER. Senator Thye.

Senator THYE. From observation of the functioning of the various standing committees in the first session of the Eightieth Congress, have you any criticism of the number of subcommittees that have been established within these standing committees?

Dr. GALLOWAY. Well, Senator, I have studied the subcommittee structure of the standing committees of both Houses of Congress as presently organized and my opinion is that on the whole the subcommittee structure is a sound one. It is true that there are some 16 more standing subcommittees at the present time than there were prior to the passage of the act under review. But if you examine the structure of those subcommittees you will find that they have been set up for the most part along parallel lines in the two Houses and that they have been defined so as to cover principally the jurisdiction of the former standing committees of both Houses which were absorbed by the new committees. So, while there may be some room for improvement in the standing subcommittee structure in a few cases, on the whole I think that that structure is a good one.

Senator THYE. I am sorry that I cannot stay, Mr. Chairman, but I am committed to another meeting.

Senator FERGUSON. I am sorry to be late this morning but I have four committees in which I am interested this morning.

Senator BRICKER. You might comment on that. (Laughter.]

Dr. GALLOWAY. I intend to comment on that, Senator, in just a few minutes.

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In the third place, I suggest the possibility of the selection of committee chairmen by some better method than seniority. The preponderant judgment of many legislators, political scientists, and students of the congressional committee system is that the seniortiy custom is not the best method of selection and that some substitute should be sought.

I recognize the advantages of the automatic protocol, so-called, that the seniority custom permits, and I recognize also that the abolition of the seniority custom is less necessary, perhaps, now since Public Law 601 eliminated 47 seniors by abolishing that many committees, and also because of the fact that section 133 of the act regulates committee operations by placing certain controls upon the chairmen in the conduct of the standing committees. Nevertheless, I think it is worthy of this committee's consideration.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, Dr. Galloway, you do recognize, do you not, the power of a chairman in a committee?

Dr. GALLOWAY. Yes. He has great power.

Senator FERGUSON. And that when seniority does control of course there is great power there.

Dr. GALLOWAY. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And anything that can be done to solve the problem of getting better committee chairmen is always desirable. That is one of the things that you had in mind when you said you reduced the 33 Senate committees to 15 now?

Dr. GALLOWAY. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Plus the fact that it has taken away quite a lot of the power where, let us assume, it was almost possible for him to carry the committee around in his pocket, as it were, and report or not. report as he desired.

Dr. GALLOWAY. Exactly.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you think that has been entirely eliminated by the section to which you referred?

Dr. GALLOWAY. Well, Senator Ferguson, I have not been able to follow the conduct of all the committees of both Houses of Congress closely enough to be able to answer that question with conviction, but rumor has it that section 133 of the act has not always been fully carried out. But, as you know, during the past year I have been preoccupied with working for a committee of the House on a particular assignment and thus I haven't been able to pay as close attention to the operation of this act as I should like to have done.

Senator FERGUSON. We have to acknowledge that we are dealing with a huge machine.

Dr. GALLOWAY. We certainly are.

Senator FERGUSON. And when we set up that section as we did, it does not control it as it would a mechanical machine. The human element sometimes varies, and that is what is wrong with some of our activities.

Dr. Galloway. Exactly. This section does not automatically enforce itself.

Senator BRICKER. It does not, per se, make an able chairman or a fair one.

Dr. GallowAY. After canvassing several methods of selecting committee chairman, I have been led to think that two methods might result in a better solution of this problem. I suggest, first, the possibility of the selection of committee chairman by the committee on committees of the majority party which now makes the other committee assignments and which, freed from the incubus of seniority, could be counted upon to appoint the majority party's ablest men to the chairmanships.

Senator FERGUSON. Would you include the word "ablest” in all cases?

Dr. Galloway. That is a difficult question to answer, Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Doctor, you don't have to answer that question. If that were true, I think you have solved the problem.

Senator BRICKER. You would have to have more than a slide rule.

Dr. GALLOWAY. As you know, the committee on committees in making its assignments on the majority side takes into consideration several criteria. They consider not only seniority in the Senate but seniority of service upon the committee; they consider the question of geographical balance; they consider the offices that the Senator has previously held in his home State; they consider the population of the State, the relative size of the State in point of population.

Senator FERGUSON. And even the date that the State was admitted to the Union, on occasion.

Dr. GALLOWAY. Exactly.

And I believe they also consider age among their criteria. So that seniority is not the sole criterion of selection.

Another possible method of selection would be appointment of the committee chairmen by the majority leaders in each House. These men are responsible for steering their party's legislative program through the stormy waters of floor debate to the safe harbor of final passage. They receive legislative proposals from the committees and determine the order of business on the floor. To vest the power of appointing committee chairmen in the floor leaders would greatly strengthen party responsibility and the authority of the majority leaders in both Houses.

It may be objected that this suggestion would lead to a return to “Cannonism." But I should like to remind the committee that it was not simply the power of Speaker Cannon and his predecessors to appoint the chairmen of the standing committees of the lower House so much as it was the power of the Speaker to grant or withhold recognition on the floor and his powers as chairman of the Rules Committee of the House which gave rise to the revolution of 1910 which overthrew the Speaker and deprived him of all these powers. If I remember my history correctly, it was these other powers that I have mentioned rather than the power of the Speaker to appoint committee chairmen which gave rise to the alleged abuses that were complained of.

Senator BRICKER. Of course, if he had the power to appoint the chairmen of the committees he could also control what bills should be presented to those committees in the House.

Dr. GALLOWAY. That is true.

Senator BRICKER. And he would have a great deal of influence over what they would recommend.

Dr. GALLOWAY. That is quite true.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, after all, there is something in the theory that party responsibility does permit the people back home every 2 years, talking about the House, and one-third of the Senate,

to change that. That gives party responsibility to the people; does it not?

Dr. GALLOWAY. I think that is true, except in one-party districts.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, but there again in real theory we wouldn't have one-party districts unless the people of those particular districts believe that that is what they want, and of course then if they have a free vote, if they have political freedom-that is, for all to vote and to have their votes counted-and they desire that kind of a system, then that kind of a system should endure. Isn't that correct?

Dr. GALLOWAY. I think that is correct, though in actual practice, as you know, Senator Ferguson, there are seven Southern States in which, because the suffrage is so restricted and for other reasons, only one political party is in existence.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; I found that out a little more forcefully than I had before when I went down into Arkansas on the Privileges and Elections Committee to conduct an inquiry into an election down there. I hadn't realized the full significance of the vote in that State and some other States.

Senator BRICKER. Likewise, it results, also, when the Democratic Party is in control of the Congress, in practically all of the committee chairmen coming from the same general section of the country.

Dr. GALLOWAY. That is correct.

Senator BRICKER. It was true in the last Congress and it would be true again.


Senator FERGUSON. And, of course, seniority does in a way control that situation.

Senator BRICKER. That is what I mean. Under the seniority rule that is what you have.

Dr. GALLOWAY. Precisely.

Senator FERGUSON. Under the one-party system men remain in the Congress much longer than where you have the two-party system.

Dr. GALLOWAY. That is the advantage of the one-party system. Senator FERGUSON. Yes; and, therefore, you really control seniority.

Dr. GALLOWAY. It gives one section of the country the control of the committees of the Congress when that party is in power.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator BRICKER. Have you paid attention to your sixth suggestion here? That is, “Automatic rotation in office at periodic intervals." I can see that it wouldn't work in the House; it might work in the Senate. I know several courts of the country, courts of last resort of the States, that follow that method. Ours does not. I wonder if it has any practical recommendations.

Dr. GALLOWAY. Yes, Senator; I think that the automatic rotation of committee chairmen in office at periodic intervals is worthy of your serious consideration. This method of selecting committee chairmen by rotating the chairmanship at intervals, say 4 or 6 years, among the senior members of the committee was recommended in the final report of the committee on Congress of the American Political Science Association after a 6-year study, a committee of which I had the honor to be chairman. So that might also receive special attention in reviewing the alternatives to the seniority custom.

Shall I proceed?
Senator BRICKER. Yes.

Dr. GALLOWAY. In the fourth place, I suggest that in cases of controversy over the question of committee jurisdiction Senate bills be referred to the claimant committees (a) concurrently, (6) consecutively, or (c) to a joint subcommittee of the claimant committees. The third of these methods is perhaps the best of the three and is a method which has actually been utilized in practice in the lower House.

For example, the Herter committee, the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, is, as you know, or was, composed of members of the standing committees of the House that were interested in the problem of foreign aid. Its membership was drawn from the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Banking and Currency Committee, the Commerce Committee, and perhaps one or two others.

Under the head of proposed improvements in the staffing of Congress, I suggest the expansion of the professional staffs of the standing committees. The standing committees of both houses are now authorized by section 202 (a) of the act to appoint not more than four professional staff members. While some committees have not yet made full use of this authority, either because a smaller number of experts is sufficient for their current needs or because they have been unable to find qualified persons, other committees have found this limitation unduly restrictive. With the rising volume of the legislative and supervisory business of the committees of Congress, some provision for increased staff aid seems to be necessary in certain cases. Congress needs to develop its own unbiased, independent intelligence services more fully as an offset to the incomplete or slanted testimony of executive agencies and pressure groups. I suggest that each standing committee should be authorized to employ at least one staff specialist in each major subject-matter field within its jurisdiction.

I also suggest provision of administrative assistants to Congressmen, as Congressman Moroney did yesterday. The Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress recommended thateach senatorial and congressional office be authorized to employ a high-caliber administrative assistant * * * to assume nonlegislative duties now interfering with the proper study and consideration of national legislationby Members of Congress. Provision for such assistants to Senators was made in a supplemental act, but no provision was made for such aid to Representatives. Many of the busier and abler Congressmen have voiced the need of administrative assistants to help them handle constituent requests and departmental business.

Senator BRICKER. Coming back to your first point on the staffing of the committees, I might say this one is excellently staffed—I have felt that way all along; some are poorly staffed. That is entirely a matter that I think could rest within the jurisdiction of the chairman if he is alert and has the proper contacts and wants to improve his standing. Have you any suggestion whereby a more efficient method of staffing a committee could be developed than to leave it entirely to the chairman of the committee?

Dr. GALLOWAY. Yes, Senator, I have. In the first place, I would venture to remind you that under section 202 (a) of the act, the appointment of professional staffs of the standing committees is to be made with the approval of the majority of the members of the

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