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"I have only further to express to you, on the CHAP "part of Her Majesty's Government, their entire “reliance in your judgment, zeal, and discretion; "and their conviction that, whilst you will not ex"pose the army under your command to unnecessary "risk, you will not forget that to the gallantry and "conduct of your troops their countrymen dre now "looking to secure, by the blessing of Providence, "the great object of a just war, the vindication of "national rights, and the future security of the peace "of Europe.

stringency

structions.

In common circumstances, and especially where Extreme the whole of the troops to be engaged are under one of the incommander, it cannot be right for any Sovereign or any Minister to address such instructions as these to a General on a distant shore; for the General who is to be intrusted with the sole command of a great expedition must be, of all mankind, the best able to judge of its military prudence, and to give him orders thus cogent is to dispense with his counsel.

But in this war the united forces of France and Considerations tendEngland were under two commanders; and, besides, ing to justify since the expedition was dependent upon naval co-this strinoperation, the Admirals of the two fleets would gency.

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CHAP. necessarily be taken into council. It is true that the French Admiral was under the orders of Marshal St Arnaud, but there was no corresponding arrangement in regard to the English services, and our Admiral's command was independent of the General commanding the land-forces.

Thus it seemed to the Home Government that the question, if left to be decided on the shores of the Black Sea, would have to be weighed, not by one commander, but by a council of at least four, and to be actually decided by a council of not less than three; and it could scarcely be expected that such a body, deliberating freely, would come to that vigorous decision which might easily perhaps be attained by any one of them singly. On the other hand, the two Governments were perfectly agreed. Upon the whole, therefore, there was some ground for resolving to transmit to the camps at Varna the benefit of that concord which reigned between Paris and London, and to subject the Generals and Admirals to the overruling judgment of the authorities at home.

Again, the chief reason which makes it unwise to fetter the discretion of Generals namely, the superior knowledge which they are supposed to have of the enemy's strength and of the field of operations was in this instance wanting; for the Generals in the camp at Varna had absolutely no trustworthy information except what came to them from Paris or London; and in their power of testing the

statements which reached them in this

XXXIII.

way they CHAP. they did

were below the Home Governments, for
not so well know the sources from which the ac-
counts were drawn.

Justice requires that these considerations should have their weight, for they tend in some measure to explain the extreme stringency of the instructions. The Minister who framed them had determined, with a boldness very rare in modern times, to take upon himself an immense weight of responsibility; and, having brought himself to this strong resolve, he rightly and generously did all he could to simplify the task of the General whom he ventured to direct, and to make the path of duty seem clear.

Allied The power
Home for or

of deciding

against the expe

dition

vested in

lan alone.

But Lord Raglan had a station in the camp which made it very difficult for the Government to take his burthen upon themselves by any mere bold form of words. He commanded becomes the landforces, but he was clothed with a power of practically older date than the Queen's commission. He had Lord Ragbeen privy to the business of the wars which England waged in the great days; and if he had seen how Wellington ordered affairs in the field, he had witnessed too his endurance, and helped him in the patient, unapplauded toil by which he prepared the end. Men serving under Lord Raglan were none of them blind to the distance which history herself interposed betwixt their General and themselves. There were none near the chief who would not feel bitter pain if they imagined that words or acts of

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CHAP, theirs had thrown upon his face a shadow of displeasure. There were no men near him who would not fly with alacrity to execute his slightest wish. The ascendancy of the English General over his own people could not but reach into the French camp. Upon the whole, Lord Raglan had so great an authority in the camp of the Allies, and amongst public men in England, that if he had taken upon himself to resist the pressure of the Secretary of State, he would not have been left without support. On the other hand, if he should determine to follow the will of the Home Government, he would carry, the French Marshal with him. So, in effect, the power of deciding for or against the expedition had passed from Paris and from London, and was all concentred in the English General.

Lord
Raglan's

delibera-
tions.

Of the general officers in the English camp there was one whom Lord Raglan had always been anxious to have near at hand: this was Sir George Brown. He was a Scotsman, sixty-six years old, and had served, with a great repute for his daring forwardness, in some of the most bloody scenes of the Peninsular War. He was of an eager, fiery nature, and devoted to the calling of a soldier. After the peace of 1815 he began to hold office in the general staff of the army at the Horse Guards, and in time he became AdjutantGeneral. He now commanded the Light Division. His zeal, and his lengthened toils in the AdjutantGeneral's office, had drawn him too far in a narrow path, and he overplied the idea of discipline; but he

XXXIII.

abounded in energy, and he was in many respects an CHAP. accomplished soldier. He wrote on military subjects with clearness, with grace, and seemingly with a good deal of ease.

quests the

opinion of

Sir George
Brown.

After receiving the Duke of Newcastle's despatch, He reLord Raglan sent for Sir George Brown, and expressed to him a wish to have his opinion about it. He handed the paper to Sir George across the table, and then went on with his writing, leaving Sir George to consider its contents at his leisure. When he had read it, Lord Raglan asked him to give him his opinion. Before giving it, Sir George naturally inquired what information Lord Raglan had obtained in regard to the strength of Sebastopol, and what force he expected might be opposed to him in the Crimea.

Lord Raglan's answer was that he had no information whatever; that neither he nor Marshal St Arnaud knew what amount of force the enemy had there; that they believed and hoped there might not be more than 70,000 men in the peninsula; but that in fact, it had not been blockaded, and that no means had been taken to procure information, and that, therefore, they did not in reality know they might not be opposed by 100,000 men, or even more.

Then Sir George Brown said: "You and I are accustomed, when in any great difficulty, or when 'any important question is proposed to us, to ask "ourselves how the Great Duke would have acted "and decided under similar circumstances. Now, I