isville & N. R. Co. (C. C. 1889) 37 Fed. 567; Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co. (C. C. 1893) 54 Fed. 730, 19 L. R. A. 387, appeal dismissed Ex parte Lennon (1893) 14 S. Ct. 123, 150 U. S. 393, 37 L. Ed. 1120.

The fact that a lease exempting the lessor from liability for destruction of the buildings on the leased land is of a railroad company's station grounds, that are used for a cold-storage warehouse, does not render the question of the validity of the exemption one affecting interstate commerce, a matter of federal control. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1894) 62 Fed. 904, judgment affirmed (1895) 70 Fed. 201, 17 C. C. A. 62, 30 L. R. A. 193.

The limitation as to the district within which suit can be brought in a United States circuit court, contained in the judiciary acts of 1887 and 1888, does not apply to suits brought under sections 8 and 9 of the interstate commerce act, to recover damages for overcharging, but such suits may be brought in any district in which the defendant can be found. Van Patten v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. (C. C. 1896) 74 Fed. 981.

The jurisdiction of the federal courts to enjoin unreasonable rates of common carriers is a right given under the interstate commerce act, with its amendinents. Tift v. Southern Ry. Co. (C. C. 1903) 123 Fed. 789.

The United States District Court has jurisdiction of an action by a telegraph company to restrain the enforcement of a tax of $1,000 by the municipality, on the ground that it is a tax on interstate commerce and is discriminatory; it being alleged that the damage to the complainant was greatly in excess of $2,000. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. City of Mobile (C. C. 1909) 179 Fed. 955.

Where a suit brought under federal Employers' Liability Act April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, involved a determination of the meaning of the phrase "person employed by such carrier in interstate commerce," federal jurisdiction existed, even though the complaint should be dismissed because plaintiff was not a person so employed. Cola

surdo v. Central R. R. of New Jersey (C. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 832, judgment affirmed Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Colasurdo (1911) 192 Fed. 901, 113 C. C. A. 379.

Section 15 of the interstate commerce act, as amended by Act June 29, 1906, § 4, held not to deprive a Circuit Court of jurisdiction to entertain an action by a shipper under section 9 of the original act of February 4, 1887. Langdon v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (D. C. 1912) 194 Fed. 486.

In an action by an employé against a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, an objection to the jurisdiction of the federal court will not be sus

tained. Kern v. Chicago, M. & P. S. Ry. Co. (D. C. 1912) 201 Fed. 404.

An action by a railroad company against a shipper to recover the difference between the freight paid on an interstate shipment and that due under the published schedules is within the jurisdiction of a federal District Court, regardless of the citizenship, of the parties or the amount in controversy, under this subdivision, as one arising under the Interstate Commerce Act. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Kinkade (D. C. 1912) 203 Fed. 165.

Under this subdivision a federal District Court had jurisdiction of a suit to recover undercharges on interstate freight regardless of diversity of citizenship. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. S. Segari & Co. (D. C. 1913) 205 Fed. 998.

Action for negligent handling of interstate shipment, penalty for failing to stop shipment and feed cattle, overcharge in freight, and attorney's fees, held to arise under the Interstate Commerce Act within this subdivision, and hence to be removable to the United States District Court under section 28. Smith v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (D. C. 1913) 210 Fed. 988.

Obstructions and nuisances in navigable waters.-The conformity of a log boom to the provisions of a state statute, so as to exempt it from prohibition under section 10 of the river and harbor act of 1890, is not a question for the state. courts alone, but must be decided by a federal court, when suit is brought for an injunction against the boom as an obstruction to navigation prohibited by the federal law. U. S. v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co. (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 343, 345, 176 U. S. 211, 44 L. Ed. 437, reversing decree (1897) 81 Fed. 658, 26 C. C. A. 547.

That a log boom constructed under authority of a state statute on a river lying wholly within the state may not conform to the regulations prescribed by the state statute does not make it an unlawful structure, so as to be cognizable in the federal courts, under Act Sept. 19, 1890 (26 Stat. 426). The question whether it does comply with the provisions of the state statute is a state, and not a federal, question. U. S. v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co. (1897) 81 Fed. 658, 26 C. C. A. 547, affirming judgment (C. C. 1896) 72 Fed. 585, judgment reversed (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 343, 176 U. S. 211, 44 L. Ed. 437.

To bring obstructions and nuisances in navigable waters lying within a state within the cognizance of the federal courts, there must be some statute of the United States directly applicable to such streams. Id.

Where a river within a state was navigable for some distance from its mouth, and was actually navigated by small steamboats and river craft for the purpose of carrying up groceries, supplies, clothing, loggers' tools, etc., to the head of navigation, and returning

with farmers' products, a bill was maintainable in the federal courts to restrain a boom company from maintaining a boom in the river in such a manner as to be an obstruction to navigation, though the river was chiefly valuable for floating logs, and there was no proof of actual carriage of goods on the river in interstate commerce. U. S. v. Wishkah Boom Co.. (1905) 136 Fed. 42, 68 C. C. A. 592, appeal dismissed Wishkah Boom Co. v. U. S. (1906) 26 Sup. Ct. 765, 202 U. S. 613, 50 L. Ed. 1171. When congress has declared a navigable river to be a common highway, the state cannot authorize an obstruction therein, and anything which materially interferes with or limits the navigability thereof, considering the use which it is or may be subject to, is an obstruction and a violation of such act of congress, over which the United States circuit court had jurisdiction, under the judiciary act of 1875 (18 Stat. 470), to prevent or abate by injunction. Hatch v. Wallamet Bridge Co. (C. C. 1881) 6 Fed. 780.

Under the ruling in Cardwell v. American Bridge Co. (1885) 113 U. S. 205, 5 S. Ct. 423, 28 L. Ed. 959, the provision in Act Feb. 14, 1859 (11 Stat. 383), admitting Oregon into the Union, which declares that "the navigable waters of said state shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of said state as to all other citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor," does not prevent the state from authorizing the erection of a bridge across the Wallamet river, at Portland, however much it may impede and obstruct the navigation thereof, nor has the United States circuit court any jurisdiction of a suit to enjoin the same. Scheurer v.

(9) Of penalties and forfeitures.

Columbia Street Bridge Co. (C. C. 1886) 27 Fed. 172.

The federal courts have jurisdiction of an action by a steamboat company to recover damages of a railroad company for obstructing a navigable river of the United States by building a bridge across it, regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Sunflower River-Packet Co. v. Georgia Pac. R. Co. (C. C. 1889) 39 Fed. 229.

By 24 Stat. 326, appropriations were made for the improvement of certain rivers in California, with a provision that part of such appropriation should not be used until certain hydraulic mining, hurtful to navigation, had ceased on such rivers, and the secretary of war was authorized to institute legal proceedings to prevent the continuance of such mining. Held, that this legislation was a sufficient assumption of national jurisdiction over the waters in question to confer on the federal courts jurisdiction of a suit by the United States to enjoin the deposit of mining débris injurious to navigation. U. S. v. North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. (C. C. 1892) 53 Fed. 625.

Where a private canal constructed and used as a cut-off to take the place commercially of the tortuous channel of a navigable stream has been abandoned, and its uses for such purpose entirely destroyed by the owner of the rights therein, the rights of the public revert to the original channel of the stream, and under Act March 3, 1899, c. 425, 30 Stat. 1151, the United States may maintain a suit to enjoin the obstruction of such channel by a bridge. U. S. v. President, etc., of Jamaica & R. Turnpike Roads (C. C. 1910) 183 Fed. 598, decree reversed (1913) 204 Fed. 759, 123 C. C. A. 128.

See notes under § 1027, post. See, also, notes under subdivisions 1 and 3, ante.

Repeal of former statute.-There is no conflict between Act March 3, 1875, § 1, c. 137 (18 Stat. 470), and Act Sept. 24, 1789, § 9, c. 20 (1 Stat. 76), which conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the district courts of suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States, and the latter, except as modified by statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit courts in special cases, still remains in force. U. S. v. Mooney (1885) 6 S. Ct. 304, 116 U. S. 104, 29 L. Ed. 550, affirming judgment (C. C. 1882) 11 F. 476.

The judiciary act of 1789, giving exclusive original cognizance to the district courts in cases of penalties incur

red under the federal laws, was pro tanto repealed by Act Aug. 2, 1813, giving the state courts jurisdiction in certain cases. Stearns v. U. S. (C. C. 1835) Fed. Cas. No. 13,341.

Penalties in general.-See, also, notes under subdivision 16, post.

There was no conflict between Act March 3, 1875, § 1, c. 137 (18 Stat. 470), and Act Sept. 24, 1789, § 9, c. 20 (1 Stat. 76), which conferred exclusive jurisdiction upon the district courts of suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States, and the latter, except as modified by statutes conferring jurisdiction upon the circuit courts in special cases, still remained in force. U. S. v. Mooney (1885) 116 U. S. 104, 6 Sup. Ct. 304, 29 L. Ed. 550.

Act 1789, § 9 (R. S. § 563, and section 711, post, § 1233), gave the United States district courts exclusive jurisdiction of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States. The national banking act of June 3, 1864, as amended Feb. 18. 1875 (R. S. §§ 5197, 5198, post, §§ 9758, 9759), authorized national banks to sue and be sued in any court as fully as natural persons and provided that suits against them might be brought in the United States courts, in the district, or "in any state, county, or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases." Held,

that the latter act modified the former in respect to jurisdiction of actions against national banks for penalties, and gave concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts. First Nat. Bank v. Morgan (1889) 10 Sup. Ct. 37, 132 U. S. 141, 33 L. Ed. 282.

The "further sum," equal to 2 per cent. of the appraised value of imported merchandise for each 1 per cent. that such appraised value exceeds the value declared in the entry, which, under Customs Administrative Act June 10, 1890, § 7, 26 Stat. 131, c. 407, may be collected from an importer for undervaluation "in addition to the duties imposed by law," is a penalty, and exclusive jurisdiction of a suit to recover such sum is therefore, by R. S. § 563, vested in the District Courts of the United States. Helwig v. U. S. (1903) 23 Sup. Ct. 427, 432, 188 U. S. 605, 47 L. Ed. 614.

The district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction of all suits for penalties and forfeitures. The Cassius (C. C. 1796) Fed. Cas. No. 7,743, 2 Dall. 365, 368, 1 L. Ed. 418.

The circuit court could not take original cognizance of a suit for a penalty incurred by an offense against the laws of the United States. If the offense was committed within the state, it must be tried in such state. Evans v. Bollen (C. C. 1800) Fed. Cas. No. 4,554, 4 Dall. 342, 344, 1 L. Ed. 859.

The district courts have exclusive jurisdiction of actions for penalties and forfeitures under the Customs Laws, and the Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, giving the circuit court original cognizance with the courts of the several states of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds $500, and arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States or treaties, does not confer jurisdiction in such cases on the circuit courts. U. S. v. Mooney (C. C. 1882) 11 Fed. 476, affirmed (1885) 6 Sup. Ct. 304, 116 U. S. 104, 29 L. Ed. 550.

The general words of the act of 1875 did not give the circuit court jurisdiction of suits for penalties and forfeitures, of which the district court before had exclusive jurisdiction. Smith v. Sargent Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1895) 67 Fed. 801.

1 U.S.COMP.'16-51

The district court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action for the penalty imposed under the civil rights act of March 1, 1875. Cooper v. New Haven Steam Boat Co. (D. C. 1883) 18 Fed. 588, 589.

An action for the penalty prescribed by R. S. § 4449, post, § 8211, for a failure to comply with any of the provisions of title 52 of the Revised Statutes in navigating a steam vessel, is within the jurisdiction of the district court. The Idaho (D. C. 1886) 29 Fed. 187, 189.

The jurisdiction of district courts over suits for penalties and forfeitures, and in regard to the rights of informers and seizing-officers and persons entitled to share in the distribution, examined and stated. Bradley v. U. S. (1876) 12 Ct. Cl. 578.

Importation of contract labor.-The provision in the contract labor law of 1885 (23 Stat. 332, § 3) that the penalty of $1,000 "may be sued for as debts of like amount are now recovered in the circuit courts of the United States" referred to the form of action, and not the forum, and the district court had jurisdiction, as in suits for other penalties. Lees v. U. S. (1893) 150 U. S. 476, 14 Sup. Ct. 163, 37 L. Ed. 1150.

Act Feb. 26, 1885, prohibiting the importation of contract labor, provided (section 3) that, for every violation of its provisions, the offender shall forfeit for every such offense the sum of $1,000, which may be recovered by the United States in a circuit court. 25 Stat. 434, conferred on the circuit courts jurisdiction of all civil suits at common law or in equity where the amount in controversy exceeds $2,000. Held, that an action for the penalty under the former act, being criminal in its nature, was within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. U. S. v. Mexican Nat. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 769.

The jurisdiction granted by this section is not limited by Act Feb. 26, 1888, c. 16, § 3, that the penalty for the importation of alien contract laborers may be recovered as debts of like amount are recovered in the circuit court of the United States, but such penalty may be recovered in the district court. Lees v. U. S. (1893) 14 Sup. Ct. 163, 164, 150 U. S. 476, 37 L. Ed. 1150.

Act Feb. 26, 1885, prescribing a penalty of $1,000 for importing foreigners under contract to perform labor, and providing that the penalty may be sued for and recovered "as debts of like amount are now recovered in the circuit courts," does not give the circuit courts exclusive jurisdiction of such suits. The district courts have concurrent jurisdiction under R. S. § 563, which gives them jurisdiction of "all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States." U. S. v. Whitcomb Metallic Bedstead Co. (D. C. 1891) 45 Fed. 89. Such jurisdiction is not taken from

(801)

the district courts by Act Aug. 13, 1888, providing that the circuit courts shall have original cognizance of "all suits of a civil nature," where the amount involved exceeds $2,000; since a suit to recover the penalty under the act of Feb. 26, 1885, is of a penal and quasi criminal nature. U. S. v. Whitcomb Metallic Bedstead Co. (D. C. 1891) 45 Fed. 89.

A suit under Act Feb. 26, 1885, to recover penalties for importing foreigners under contract to perform labor, may be maintained regardless of the amount. U. S. v. Whitcomb Metallic Bedstead Co. (D. C. 1891) 45 Fed. 89.

Under R. S. § 563, subd. 3, embodied herein, giving district courts of the United States jurisdiction "of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under any law of the United States," such court has jurisdiction of a suit to recover the penalty imposed by Act Feb. 26, 1885, c. 164, § 3, 23 Stat. 333, for importing a foreign laborer under contract. Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works (D. C. 1901) 109 Fed. 844, 845.

Forfeitures.-See note ante.

A seizure of corporate stocks held sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to condemn them as forfeited under the confiscation acts. Page v. U. S. (1870) 11 Wall. 268, 294, 20 L. Ed. 135.

Seizure of land held sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to condemn it as forfeited. Tyler v. Defrees (1870) 11 Wall. 331, 345, 20 L. Ed. 161.

An order of the president for the seizure, under Confiscation Act July 17, 1862, of the property of persons engaged in armed rebellion against the United States, or in aiding and abetting the same, is a prerequisite to the

(10) Of suits on debentures.

exercise by a United States district court of its jurisdiction to adjudge the forfeiture, and decree the condemnation, of such property. U. S. v. Winchester (1878) 99 U. S. 372, 25 L. Ed. 479.

The circuit courts had no original jurisdiction of a proceeding for the forfeiture of a vessel for an offense. Ketland v. The Cassius (C. C. 1796) Fed. Cas. No. 7,743.

The exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether property which has been seized by customs officers has become forfeited to the United States, under the revenue laws, is vested in the federal courts, and is to be exercised by proceedings in rem; and it depends upon the final decree of such courts whether the seizure is to be deemed rightful or tortious. McGuire v. Winslow (C. C. 1886) 26 Fed. 304.

To give the court jurisdiction to adjudicate upon a cause of forfeiture, the property must have been seized by process within its territorial jurisdiction, or brought within its limits, where the seizure is upon the high seas. The Washington (D. C. 1855) Fed. Cas. No. 17,222.

The District Court of the United States was without jurisdiction in a confiscation proceeding, where the record fails to show any seizure of the property under executive order before the filing of the information, as the executive seizure is the foundation of all subsequent proceedings under the confiscation act. Henry v. Carson (1884) 96 Ind. 412.

Cited without definite application, Stern v. Jerome H. Remick & Co. (C. C. 1908) 164 Fed. 781, writ of error dismissed (1909) 30 Sup. Ct. 404, 215 U. S. 585, 54 L. Ed. 338.

Notes of

Repeal of former statute.-The repealing clause of the Judiciary Act of 1887-88 (24 Stat. 552, c. 373; 25 Stat. 433, c. 866), did not reach the act of March 3, 1875, § 8 (R. S. § 629, subd.

Decisions

embodied herein). Citizens' Savings & Trust Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. (1907) 27 Sup. Ct. 425, 427, 205 U. S. 46, 51 L. Ed. 703.

act of August 13, 1888, did not repeal R. S. § 629, subd. 4 (this section, subd