way (1900) 104 Fed. 369, 44 C. C. A. 312.

The fact that, upon the trial of an action arising out of contracts or dealings of the parties, a question may arise involving the construction of a federal law, will not give the court jurisdiction. Act March 3, 1875, § 1. Dowell v. Griswold (C. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 4,041.

That a state inspection law was expressly made subject to revision and control by congress does not take away the jurisdiction of the federal courts to determine whether it is an inspection law or not. New York v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (C. C. 1882) 10 Fed. 357, 364, affirmed (1882) 2 Sup. Ct. 87, 107 U. S. 59, 27 L. Ed. 383.

Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as grow out of the legislation of congress, whether they constitute the right, privilege, claim, or protection, or defense of a party in whole or in part by whom they are asserted, and it is no objection to the right of removal on that ground that it is invoked in behalf of defendant. Ellis v. Norton (C. C. 1883) 16 Fed. 4; Rothschild v. Matthews (C. C. 1884) 22 Fed. 6, 7.

The federal court has jurisdiction of a suit by a citizen against his own state, where it is brought under act of congress, passed in pursuance of a provision of the national constitution, which is in effect a grant from the state itself. Virginia Coupon Cases (C. C. 1885) 25 Fed. 654, 661.

A court of the United States, since the passage of the act of 1875, has original jurisdiction over all cases where a United States law, whether constitutional or congressional, is involved. Leonard v. City of Shreveport (C. C. 1886) 28 Fed. 257.

Where the parties to a suit in a federal district court are all citizens of the same state, the court has jurisdiction of only so much of the suit as arises under the laws of the United States. St. Luke's Church v. Sowles (C. C. 1892) 51 Fed. 609.

Cases arising under the laws of the United States grow out of the legis lation of Congress, whether constituting a right or privilege or claim or protection, or defense in whole or in part by whom asserted. Cound v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1909) 173 Fed. 527.

Pendency of suit in state courts involving the constitutionality of statute held not to oust federal court of jurisdiction

of causes subsequently

brought involving the same question. R. M. Rose Co. v. Southern Express Co. (D. C. 1915) 223 Fed. 868.

Where the United States acquires territory by convention with another sovereign power, it has authority to enact laws for the protection and determination of the property rights of the

inhabitants of such territory in accordance with the terms of the treaty, and such laws, affecting title to real property within a state, must be construed by the United States courts. Gardiner v. Miller (1874) 47 Cal. 570.

180. Civil rights acts.-Where the effect of a state statute limiting the right of foreign corporations to sue in its courts is to deprive a corporation of another state of the equitable right to set off against a judgment rendered against it in such courts a judgment in its favor against the plaintiff therein, rendered in another state, such corporation is deprived of its constitutional right to have full faith and credit given to such judgment, and also of the right to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings given it by R. S. § 1977, post, § 3925; and under R. S. §§ 1979 (post, § 3932), and 629, subd. 16, substantially re-enacted in this section, a court of the United States has jurisdiction to afford it appropriate relief. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co. (C. C. 1900) 105 Fed. 536.

181. Laws relating to public lands.A suit involving rights to land acquired under law of the United States does not arise under that law for jurisdictional purposes unless it involves a dispute as to the validity or effect of such law. Shulthis v. McDougal (1912) 32 S. Ct. 704, 225 U. S. 561, 56 L. Ed. 1205.

In an action to enforce the trusts of a will bequeathing property situated on the territory of the United States at Fortress Monroe, where the question arises whether or not the constitution and federal laws have segregated that territory from the state of Virginia, and conferred exclusive jurisdiction over it in the federal courts, those courts will have jurisdiction independently of the citizenship of the parties. Woodfin v. Phoebus (C. C. 1887) 30 Fed. 289.

182.- Accretions.-The petition in an action of ejectment does not present a case arising under the laws of the United States of which a federal court has jurisdiction without diversity of citizenship because it states that there is a dispute between the parties over the construction of the patent from the United States and several acts of Congress set out as the source of plaintiff's title, where its averments show that the real controversy is over the claim of plaintiff that he is entitled to the land formed by accretion, since the patent was issued, and after the statutes were passed. Joy v. St. Louis (1906) 26 Sup. Ct. 478, 480, 201 U. S. 332, 50 L. Ed. 776, affirming order (C. C. 1903) 122 Fed. 524.

An action involving the right to accretions along the river front by the owners of lands whose title is derived through a patent issued pursuant to the provisions of an act of congress, in

which the lands are described as "lying on the west bank of the Mississippi river," presents a case for the construction of the grant, and is a question arising under a law of the United States, of which a federal court has jurisdiction. King v. City of St. Louis (C. C. 1899) 98 Fed. 641.

183.

Claims under different laws or grants.-The federal courts have jurisdiction of an action to recover possession of lands which plaintiff claims by virtue of pre-emption under the laws of congress, and which defendant claims under an act of congress granting land to railroads, and where it appears that defendant resisted the plaintiff's pre-emption claim in the different stages of the prosecution thereof. Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Bell (1898) 87 Fed. 369, 31 C. C. A. 9, judgment reversed (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 399, 176 U. S. 321, 44 L. Ed. 486.

A bill to protect a homestead entryman in making the improvements required by law, by enjoining interference by defendants, who, as is alleged, claimed a portion of the land under the townsite act, but whose claims were rejected by the secretary of the interior, does not present any question arising under the laws of the United States. King v. Lawson (C. C. 1897) 84 Fed. 209.

184. Conflicting claims. The question of federal jurisdiction is not raised by an issue as to which of two parties is entitled to the benefit of a title claimed under the general government, where the issue turns solely on the personal identity of the individual to whom the records of land titles confirmed a lot of ground. Carpenter v. Williams (1869) 9 Wall. 785, 19 L. Ed. 827.

the

Plaintiff sued to restrain an alleged continuing trespass on his homestead entry, alleging that he had a subsisting uncanceled homestead entry on land in controversy, and that proceedings had progressed so far as to entitle him to a patent; also, that defendant had taken possession of the land. The bill did not allege that defendant's possession had been taken under any claim of right, and defendant in his answer did not assert any claim of right under any provision of the land laws of the United States or under any grant or deed, only claiming that proceedings were pending to cancel complainant's title, and that defendant was in possession to make a homestead entry on the land in case plaintiff's entry was finally canceled. The bill further alleged that, though complainant's entry be canceled, his improvements and relinquishment were vendible and worth $4,500. Held that, since a homestead settler's right to transfer his possession and sell his improvements depended on no statute, the complaint did not show a case of federal jurisdiction depending on the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States. Hare v. Birkenfield (1910) 181 Fed. 825, 104 C. C. A. 335.

A question involving the right to public land claimed by one of the parties to have been pre-empted by him under a statute of the United States does not fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit court unless it actually involves the construction of a United States statute. Theurkauf v. Ireland (C. C. 1886) 27 Fed. 769.

A bill for possession of lands claimed under the homestead laws alleged that, at the time of complainant's entry, defendants were in actual possession, claiming the right to purchase the land under Act Sept. 29, 1890, providing for the forfeiture of unearned land grants, but that those in possession under "deed, written contract, or license from" the corporation, executed prior to January 1, 1888, or who had entered such land with bona fide intent to secure title from the corporation, should be entitled to purchase it, and that defendants were not within the discretion of those entitled to purchase under said act. Held, that no federal question was presented, so as to give the court jurisdiction. Butler v. Shafer (C. C. 1895) 67 Fed. 161.

A complaint, in an action of ejectment, alleging that the plaintiff claims title to land under a patent issued by the United States, and that the defendants deny the validity of such patent, or that it conveyed any title in or to the lands, is sufficient to give the federal courts jurisdiction. Pierce v. Molliken (C. C. 1897) 78 Fed. 196.

A suit to determine conflicting claims to the right of entry of public lands is one arising under the laws of the United States, and a federal court has jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of the parties. Linkswiler v. Schneider (C. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 203.

185. Derivation of title alone as federal question.-The fact that the title to lands in controversy was originally derived from the United States does not give the federal courts jurisdiction. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co. (1895) 68 Fed. 2, 15 C. C. A. 167, decfee affirmed (1897) 18 S. Ct. 946, 42 L. Ed. 1212.

In ejectment in the United States court, plaintiff alleged that it derived title to the lands from acts and grants of congress, and that defendant denied the validity of those grants. Defendant answered, admitting the validity of the acts and grants, and claimed that the land in controversy lay outside of the grants. Held, that no federal question was presented, and the action must be dismissed. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Whittaker (C. C. 1891) 47 Fed. 529.

In ejectment, plaintiff claimed title under a railroad land grant, alleging as ground of federal jurisdiction that defendants denied the validity of the grant. The pleadings and evidence

showed that defendants not only asserted the validity of the grant, but themselves claimed title through one holding under the grant. Held, that the action must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Stayton Min. Co. v. Woody (C. C. 1892) 50 Fed. 633.

186. Forfeiture by state.-A suit instituted by a state against a claimant of land, to enforce a forfeiture of the land and subject it to sale for the benefit of the school fund, was not originally cognizable in the federal courts; there being no federal question presented by the bill, and the state not being a citizen within the judiciary act and removal laws. State of West Virginia v. King (C. C. 1901) 112 Fed. 369.

187. Issuance and validity of patent.-A suit in which the complaint sets up an entry of public land by the plaintiff and the subsequent issue of a patent, and seeks to establish an interest in the land during the interval, by an application of the doctrine of relation, is a case of federal cognizance, since the determination of the applicability of such doctrine to the case requires the construction of federal statutes and a consideration of the effect of acts thereunder. Evans v. Durango Land & Coal Co. (1897) 80 Fed. 433, 25 C. C. A. 531, appeal dismissed Durango Land & Coal Co. v. Evans (1898) 19 S. Ct. 875, 43 L. Ed. 1178.

The federal courts have jurisdiction of an action for mesne profits of land during the time between plaintiff's preemption entry and the issuance of the patent. Florida, C. & P. R. Co. v. Bell (1898) 87 Fed. 369, 31 C. C. A. 9, judgment reversed (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 399, 176 U. S. 321, 44 L. Ed. 486.

The federal court has no jurisdiction of a suit by citizens of Oregon, against a citizen of the District of Columbia, to cancel a United States patent to land to which plaintiffs claim they are entitled to have a patent, where the ground for canceling is fraud alleged to have been committed by defendant in procuring the issuance of the patent to one of the plaintiffs, and where defendant is claiming the land under conveyances purporting to have been executed by the plaintiffs. Such a suit involves no federal question, and the parties are not citizens of different states. Holland v. Hyde (C. C. 1890) 41 Fed. 897.

A complaint, in an action of ejectment alleging that the plaintiff claims title to land under a patent issued by the United States, and that the defendants deny the validity of such patent, or that it conveyed any title in or to the lands, is sufficient to give the federal courts jurisdiction. Pierce v. Molliken (C. C. 1897) 78 Fed. 196.

188. Protection of equitable titles or possessory rights.-A suit by a homestead settler on unsurveyed pub

lic land to protect his possessory right as against an adverse claimant does not involve a federal question. Earnhart v. Switzler (1910) 179 Fed. 832, 105 C. C. A. 260.

A question involving the right to public land claimed by one of the parties to have been pre-empted by him under a statute of the United States does not fall within the jurisdiction of the circuit court unless it actually involves the construction of a United States statute. Theurkauf v. Ireland (C. C. 1886) 27 Fed. 769.

Under Act 1875, giving circuit courts jurisdiction in all cases "arising under the constitution or laws of the United States," such courts have jurisdiction of a bill for an injunction to restrain a railroad company from extending its road across land belonging to the United States, and to which the complainant claims to have an equitable title, where the question in dispute is whether complainant has a right to the land under the land laws of the United States. Jones v. Florida, C. & P. R. Co. (C. C. 1889) 41 Fed. 70.

189.

Railroad land grants. Where the only right of a railroad company to build and operate through the Indian Territory is under an act of Congress, a controversy growing out of the exercise of those rights is one arising under the laws of the United States. Southern Kansas R. Co. v. Briscoe (1892) 12 Sup. Ct. 538, 144 U. S. 133, 36 L. Ed. 377, affirming (C. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 273.

Act July 4, 1884, grants to the Southern Kansas Railway Company a right of way through the Indian Territory. Held that, as the company derives from the act all its rights in relation to the construction and operation of its road in the territory, a controversy growing out of the exercise of those rights is necessarily a controversy arising under the laws of the United States, and congress, therefore, had constitutional power to give jurisdiction thereof to the federal circuit and district courts for the Northern district of Texas, Western district of Arkansas and district of Kansas. Id.

A suit over the ownership of real property, in which plaintiff's title rests upon a proper interpretation of the exception of mineral lands in the Northern Pacific Railroad land grant act of July 2, 1864, c. 217, 13 Stat. 365, is one arising under the laws of the United States, of which a circuit court has jurisdiction, wholly independent of citizenship. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Soder berg (1903) 23 Sup. Ct. 365, 366, 188 U. S. 526, 47 L. Ed. 575, affirming decree (1900) 104 Fed. 425, 43 C. C. A. 620.

A bill by a railroad company alleging that it acquired a right of way for its road over government lands under Act March 3, 1875, post, § 4921, and is pro

ceeding to construct its road thereon, but did not complete the same within the time limited by the act, and that defendant, claiming that its rights have thereby been forfeited, has taken possession of a portion of such right of way, presents a question of the construction of the statute as supplemented by Act June 26, 1906, post, § 4927, which gives a federal court jurisdiction of the suit regardless of the citizenship of the parties. Columbia Valley R. Co. v. Portland & S. Ry. Co. (1908) 162 Fed. 603, 89 C. C. A. 361.

An act of congress granting to a railway company, organized under territorial legislation, right of way through the public domain, does not create the corporation, but only grants to an existing corporation certain rights, and constitutes no ground of jurisdiction on the part of the federal courts in a case in which the cause of action does not in any sense rest upon or grow out of the grant of such right of way. Adams Exp. Co. v. Denver & R. G. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1883) 16 Fed. 712.

Where complainant, a Washington railroad company, had complied with all the provisions of Act March 3, 1875, § 1, post, § 4921, conferring on railroad companies duly organized, etc., a right of way over the public lands of the United States, sought to restrain defendant railroad company, also incorporated under the laws of Washington, from trespassing on complainant's alleged right of way over public lands along the north bank of the Columbia river, on which complainant alleged it intended to construct its railroad in the future, the jurisdiction of the federal court was sustainable on the ground that the case involved the construction of such federal statute. Wallula Pac. Ry. Co. v. Portland & S. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1906) 154 Fed. 902.

190.

1844, c. 95, providing for the enforcing of certain claims to land in the Louisiana purchase by petition in the district court of the United States, apply only to equitable and inchoate titles, and not to perfect legal titles under grants of former governments. U. S. v. Reynes (1850) 9 How. 127, 13 L. Ed. 74; Same v. Cities of Philadelphia and New Orleans (1850) 11 How. 609, 13 L. Ed. 834; Same v. Castant (1851) 12 How. 437, 13 L. Ed. 1056; Same v. Pillerin (1851) 13 How. 9, 14 L. Ed. 28; Same v. McCullagh (1851) 13 How. 216, 14 L. Ed. 118; Same v. D'Auterieve (1853) 15 How. 14, 14 L. Ed. 580; Same v. Roselius (1853) 15 How. 31, 14 L. Ed. 587; Id. (1853) 15 How. 36, 14 L. Ed. 590; U. S. v. Ducros (1853) 15 How. 38, 14 L. Ed. 591.

The title, if any, acquired under a grant of land in Louisiana by the Western or Mississippi Company, in 1817, was a perfect legal title, and therefore the title so acquired, or any confirmation of it by the Spanish government, is not cognizable by the courts of the United States under the acts of 1824 and 1844. U. S. v. D'Auterieve (1853) 15 How. 14, 14 L. Ed. 580.

Where a Spanish grant of land in Louisiana was modified and restricted, and an order for the survey of the land made by the Spanish government, it created an incomplete title in the grantee of which the federal court had jurisdiction, under Act June 14, 1844, providing for the adjustment of certain land claims against the government. But where such a grant was modified and restricted, and an order for the survey of the land made, by the Spanish government, it was held that this right be regarded as an incipient step in the derivation of a title under that government, independent of any previous grant, and therefore cognizable by the courts of the United States. Id.

The nature and extent of the riparian rights and the rights in percolating waters of certain patentees from the United States whose titles were derived from Spain and Mexico by virtue of grants to their predecessors from those countries, which were confirmed by the board of land commissioners, acting under Act March 3, 1851, c. 41, 9 Stat. 631, are not federal questions which will sustain the jurisdiction of a federal Circuit Court but are questions of state or general law. Devine v. Los Angeles (1906) 26 Sup. Ct. 652, 659, 202 U. S. 313, 50 L. Ed. 1046.

The federal court has jurisdiction of an action involving the title to land held under patents issued upon confirmed Mexican grants, and depending upon a controverted construction of such patents. Hills v. Homton (C. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 6,508.

A suit to quiet title to land covered by two patents issued on confirmations of two Spanish grants does not arise under the constitution or laws of the

United States, where neither party denies to the other any right or claim, under any treaty or act of congress, nor denies the validity of the proceedings of the other for a confirmation of the title, and where the question must be determined by an examination of the proceedings of the Spanish and Mexican governments in making the grants to the respective parties, and the subsequent acts of the parties and the Mexican government under the grants, and on the facts and laws of Mexico in force in a state before its acquisition by the United States. McFadden v. Robinson (C. C. 1884) 22 Fed. 10, 11.

194.

Waters on public lands.One who has acquired a right to the use of water from a stream flowing through the public land for domestic or irrigation purposes, in accordance with the laws of the state, is protected therein by R. S. §§ 2339, 2340, post, $$ 4647, 4648, and the jurisdiction of a federal court to determine the conflicting rights of the parties is not affected by the fact that their lands and their points of diversion of water are in different states. Anderson v. Bassman (C. C. 1905) 140 Fed. 14.

195. Laws relating to mines and mining rights-Abandonment of claim.The question as to whether a mining claim has been abandoned does not involve the construction of an act of congress so as to give the federal courts jurisdiction since the abandonment of a claim is not provided for in the mining act. Inez Min. Co. v. Kinney (C. C. 1891) 46 Fed. 832.

196. Adverse claims.-A suit brought in pursuance of R. S. § 2326, post, § 4623, and based upon an adverse claim made upon the filing of an application for a patent for mining ground, is a suit arising under the laws of the United States. Rutter v. Shoshone Min. Co. (C. C. 1896) 75 Fed. 37, decree affirmed Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter (1898) 87 Fed. 801, 31 C. C. A. 223 (following Burke v. Concentrating Co. [C. C. 1891] 46 Fed. 644, and distinguishing Bushnell v. Smelting Co. [1893] 13 Sup. Ct. 771, 148 U. S. 682, 37 L. Ed. 610, judgment reversed [1900] 20 Sup. Ct. 726, 177 U. S. 505, 44 L. Ed. 864); Burke v. Bunker Hill & S. Mining & Concentrating Co. (C. C. 1891) 46 Fed. 644 (distinguishing Trafton v. Nougues [C. C. 1877] Fed. Cas. No. 14,134, and Water Co. v. Keyes

[1877] 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. Ed. 656); McFadden v. Mountain View Min. & Mill. Co. (1899) 97 Fed. 670, 38 C. C. A. 354; Strasburger v. Beecher (C. C. 1890) 44 Fed. 209, 213; Frank G. & S. M. Co. v. Larimer M. & S. Co. (C. C. 1881) 8 Fed. 724.

A suit in support of an adverse claim under the federal mining laws is not one of which a federal court necessarily has jurisdiction. Blackburn v. Portland Gold Min. Co. (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 222, 228, 175 U. S. 571, 44 L. Ed. 276; Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter (1900) 20 Sup. Ct. 726, 177 U. S. 505, 44 L. Ed. 864; Mountain View M. & M. Co. v. McFadden (1901) 21 Sup. Ct. 488, 180 U. S. 533, 45 L. Ed. 656; Butt City Water Co. v. Baker (1905) 25 Sup. Ct. 211, 196 U. S. 119, 49 L. Ed. 409; Larned v. Jenkins (1901) 109 Fed. 100, 48 C. C. A. 252; Willitt v. Baker (C. C. 1904) 133 Fed. 937.

A suit over the ownership of ore taken by defendants from a mining claim alleged to be the property of complainant by virtue of a patent from the United States is not brought within the jurisdiction of a circuit court of the United States by allegations in the bill that defendants intend to assert a defense based on certain other patents and the mining laws of the United States, on the theory that such suit, being alleged to have been brought in equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits. is in effect one to quiet title, and that such averments are therefore necessarily set forth as part of the cause of action. Boston & M. Consol. Copper & Silver Min. Co. v. Montana OrePurchasing Co. (1903) 23 S. Ct. 434, 188 U. S. 632, 47 L. Ed. 626; Id. (1903) 23 S. Ct. 440, 188 U. S. 645, 47 L. Ed. 634.

A suit in equity to determine conflicting claims under mining locations on public lands is not within the jurisdiction of a federal court, as involving the construction or effect of the mining laws of the United States, where, so far as appears from the averments of the bill, the only controversy between the parties may be over questions of fact. Dewey Min. Co. v. Miller (C. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 1.

Where the allegations of a bill show that the respective parties to the suit are making adverse claims to the same land under the mineral land laws of the United States, and that the proper determination of such conflicting claims necessarily requires the application and construction of those laws, a federal court has jurisdiction of the suit for such purpose, the property in controversy being alleged to be of the requisite statutory value; and having jurisdiction for that purpose, and such suit being equitable in its nature, the court will entertain and determine all incidental questions between the parties growing out of their conflicting claims, and will grant an injunction or appoint