into account in determining the question of amount. Porter v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1908) 161 Fed. 773. In an action of trespass for the wrongful taking of property under an attachment against a third person, where malice is alleged, and acts of oppression which may properly be the basis for exemplary damages, the damages claimed in apparent good faith, and not the value of the property attached, are to be taken as the amount involved for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of a federal court. Breard v. Lee (C. C. 1911) 192 Fed. 72. Where, in an action for the death of plaintiffs' minor son, the damages were laid at $10,000, the fact that it appeared that, if decedent had lived and continued to earn the same amount he was earning when he died, he could only have earned $1,571.22 before attaining his majority, did not show as a matter of law that the case did not involve an amount within the jurisdiction of the federal court. Evans v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. (D. C. 1913) 205 Fed. 637.

74. Injunctions.-The amount involved in a suit for an injunction, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of a federal court, is the value of the right to be protected, or the extent of the injury to be prevented, by the injunction. Board of Trade of City of Chicago V. Cella Commission Co. (1906) 145 Fed. 28, 76 C. C. A. 28 (reversing decree [C. C. 1903] 121 Fed. 1012); Same v. Donovan Commission Co. (1906) 145 Fed. 31, 76 C. C. A. 16 (reversing decree [C. C. 1903] 121 Fed. 1012); Evenson Spaulding

V.

(1907) 150 Fed. 517, 82 C. C. A. 263, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 904 (affirming order Spaulding v. Evenson [C. C. 1906] 149 Fed. 913); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. McConnell (C. C. 1897) 82 Fed. 65; Humes v. City of Ft. Smith, Ark. (C. C. 1899) 93 Fed. 857; State of Arkansas v. Kansas & T. Coal Co. (C. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 353; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Cunningham (C. C. 1900) 103 Fed. 708; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Frank (C. C. 1901) 110 Fed. 689; Anderson v. Bassman (C. C. 1905) 140 Fed. 10; Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine (C. C. 1909) 170 Fed. 725; Bureau of National Literature V. Sells (D. C. 1914) 211 Fed. 379; Harbison v. Allen (1910) 68 S. E. 207, 152 N. C. 720. And see Whitman v. Hubbell (C. C. 1887) 30 Fed. 81.

jurisdiction, does not depend on the profits sought to be recovered. Symonds v. Greene (C. C. 1886) 28 Fed. 834.

In a suit to enjoin the further infringement of a trade-mark, and for an accounting, the amount in controversy is the value of the trade-mark to be protected, and not the amount of damages which may have been sustained. Hennessy v. Herrmann (C. C. 1898) 89 Fed. 669.

In a suit to restrain infringement of a trade-name not registered as a trademark, the injury to complainant's business from the infringement, past and prospective, measures the amount in controversy, for the purposes of federal jurisdiction. Draper v. Skerrett (C. C. 1902) 116 Fed. 206.

A federal court has jurisdiction of a suit between citizens of different states to enjoin infringement of a trade-mark, though the actual value of the trademark is not alleged, and it is not averred that it will be destroyed by defendant's unlawful use. Griggs, Cooper & Co. v. Erie Preserving Co. (C. C. 1904) 131 Fed. 359.

A complaint for injunction alleging that complainant's trade-name is worth in excess of $5,000; that defendant's acts are calculated to deceive and mislead intending purchasers of complainant's product, to its "great loss, injury, and damage"; and that unless defendant's acts are checked the reputation of complainant and its rifles will still further suffer great and irreparable damage-does not show jurisdiction in the federal court, as it cannot be assumed that the trade-name will be destroyed, or that complainant's damages are in Winexcess of the statutory amount. chester Repeating Arms Co. v. Butler Bros. (D. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 976.

77. Injury to land.-In a suit to enjoin a permanent injury to land, the value of the land determines the amount in controversy for the purposes of the jurisdiction of a federal court. In re Turner (C. C. 1902) 119 Fed. 231.

78. Mortgages. In a suit to enjoin sale under a power in a mortgage for $3,500 on the ground of usury, the matter in dispute exceeded the jurisdictional amount; the principal controversy being over the exercise of the power, the value of which was measured by the sum to secure which it was given. Dickinson v. Union Mortg. Banking & Trust Co. (C. C. 1894) 64 Fed. 895. 79. Nuisances. The jurisdiction is tested by the value of the object to be gained by the bill, and that object is the removal of the nuisance. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward (1862) 2 Black, 485, 17 L. Ed. 311; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Godfrey (1907) 158 Fed. 225, 89 C. C. A. 139, 14 Ann. Cas. 8 (writ of certiorari denied Utah Consol. Min. Co. v. Godfrey [1907] 28 Sup. Ct. 262, 207 U. S. 597, 52 L. Ed. 357); Amelia Milling Co. v.

Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. (C. C. 1903) 123 Fed. 811.

Where a bill to abate a nuisance is brought in a federal court, it need not show that plaintiff's damage amounts to the sum which is required to give the federal courts jurisdiction. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward (1862) 2 Black, 485, 492, 17 L. Ed. 311.

In a suit in a federal court to enjoin a nuisance in the erection of coke ovens, if the amount of damage which will accrue to the plaintiff be not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction, the court will nevertheless have jurisdiction if the value of the prohibited erection equal the jurisdictional amount. Rainey v. Herbert (1893) 55 Fed. 443, 5 C. C. A. 183, following Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward (1862) 2 Black, 485, 17 L. Ed. 311, and affirming decree Herbert v. Rainey (C. C. 1892) 54 Fed. 248.

In a suit to restrain the maintenance by defendant of an awning over a part of a street adjoining the plaintiff's premises, the matter in dispute is the value of the right to maintain the awning, and not the amount of damage done by it to plaintiff. Whitman v. Hubbell (C. C. 1887) 30 Fed. 81.

Plaintiffs' allegation, in a bill to restrain a nuisance, as to the amount of the threatened damage to their property, is the criterion of jurisdiction, where the claim made is not colorable nor so extravagant as to be beyond a reasonable expectation of its allowance. Herbert v. Rainy (C. C. 1892) 54 Fed. 248, decree affirmed Rainey v. Herbert (1893) 55 Fed. 443, 5 C. C. A. 183.

80. Obstruction or diversion of water courses.-In a suit by the several owners of water rights in a stream joining as complainants for convenience only to enjoin the obstruction of the stream or the diversion of water therefrom by defendants, the matter in dispute must exceed the jurisdictional amount, exclusive of interest and costs, as to each complainant, to give a federal court jurisdiction. Eaton v. Hoge (1905) 141 Fed. 64, 72 C. C. A. 74, 5 Ann. Cas. 487, reversing decree Hoge v. Eaton (C. C. 1905) 135 Fed. 411.

A suit to enjoin the defendant from destroying a flume where it crossed his land involves the value of the flume as an entirety, and, where such value is admitted to be equal to the requisite amount, and it is further admitted that defendant had, prior to the suit, partially destroyed the flume on his land, rendering its repair necessary, damages for which injury the plaintiff might recover in the suit, the jurisdictional amount satisfactorily appears. Maffet v. Quine (C. C. 1899) 95 Fed. 199, denying rehearing (C. C. 1899) 93 Fed. 347. 81. Publication of biography.On a bill to enjoin publication of complainant's biography in a set of books, an allegation that the right infringed is worth the jurisdictional amount is prima facie sufficient to confer jurisdiction of

the subject-matter on the federal circuit court, in the absence of proof that the facts which he gave for publication in another set of books were merely formal, or such as any one might learn. Colgate v. James T. White & Co. (C. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 882.

On enjoining publication of complainant's biography in a set of books other than that for which he gave facts of his life, relief cannot be had against a contract to subscribe for a set at $10 a volume; the subject-matter concerning the biography, and the subscription being distinct. Id.

82. Suits to restrain acts of municipalities. Where the primary purpose of a bill was to enjoin the execution of a contract for the construction of a city water system and to restrain the issuance and delivery of bonds on the ground that the issue of the bonds was void, and the bill alleged that, if the bonds were issued, complainant would be required to pay in taxes a sum exceeding $10,000, such amount represented the amount in controversy for the purpose of determining federal jurisdiction, and not the amount of the first annual assessment on complainant's property to pay interest and provide a sinking fund for the payment of the bonds. City of Helena v. Helena Waterworks Co. (1909) 173 Fed. 18, 97 C. C. A. 320.

In a suit by a property owner and taxpayer in a city against the city and a bidder for public work to enjoin them from entering into a contract for such work, the value of the contract, and not the amount of the tax complainant may be required to pay if the contract is performed, is the sum or amount in controversy, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of a federal court. Johnston v. City of Pittsburg (C. C. 1901) 106 Fed. 753.

In a suit to enjoin a city on constitutional grounds from shutting off a supply of electric power furnished under a contract, the amount or value in dispute for jurisdictional purposes is the value of complainant's rights under the contract, and not the amount of the payments to be made thereunder. Riverside & A. Ry. Co. v. City of Riverside (C. C. 1902) 118 Fed. 736.

Where, in a suit in a federal court to enjoin the enforcement of a municipal smoke ordinance, complainant alleged that it was a foreign corporation, and that the amount involved was largely in excess of the jurisdictional amount, exclusive of interest and costs, the bill sufficiently showed jurisdiction of the federal courts. Glucose Refining Co. v. City of Chicago (C. C. 1905) 138 Fed. 209.

83. Suits relating to the rates and operation of common carriers.-In a suit by a railroad company to restrain a shipper from prosecuting a multiplicity of suits for overcharge in freight, the

maintenance of the rate under which the charges were made being the real subject of dispute, if the value of such maintenance is not fixed by law, the value alleged in the bill is conclusive on demurrer. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Kuteman (1893) 54 Fed. 547, 4 C. C. A. 503.

In a suit by a railroad company in a federal court against a number of landowners to enjoin threatened interference with its use of its right of way through their lands the value of the right sought to be protected, and not the value of the land constituting the right of way across the lands of defendants, constitutes the value in controversy for jurisdictional purposes. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Smith (1904) 128 Fed. 1, 63 C. C. A. 1.

Where a state railroad commission imposed a fine of not exceeding the jurisdictional amount on each of two connecting railroads for through charges made on shipments, in alleged violation of an order of the commission, a bill for an injunction, filed by the companies as joint complainants, alleging such fact, and that the commission threatened and intended also to enforce its said order with respect to future shipments, shows a sufficient value in controversy to give a federal court jurisdiction. Railroad Commission of Louisiana v. Texas & P. Ry. Co. (1906) 144 Fed. 68, 75 C. C. A. 226.

In a suit to enjoin railroad companies from establishing a new schedule of rates, the matter in dispute is the right of the defendants to enforce such proposed rates, and, where the value of such right exceeds the jurisdictional amount, a federal court has jurisdiction. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pacific Coast Lumber Mfrs.' Ass'n (1908) 165 Fed. 1, 91 C. C. A. 39; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Oregon & Washington Lumber Mfrs.' Ass'n (1908) 165 Fed. 13, 91 C. C. A. 51.

A federal court held without jurisdiction of a suit by a property owner to enjoin the exercise by an electric railroad company of a privilege of crossing certain streets, where it was not shown that the injury would equal the jurisdictional amount. Orleans-Kenner Electric Ry. Co. v. Dunbar (1915) 218 Fed. 344, 134 C. C. A. 152.

In a suit to restrain taking of right of way, damages to the remainder of the tract, as well as the value of the land taken, is to be considered in determining the amount in controversy. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Mills (1915) 222 Fed. 481, 138 C. C. A. 77.

In a suit to restrain the operation of a railroad by one not the owner of it, the matter in dispute is not the railroad itself, but merely the right to operate it, and it must appear from the bill itself that the value of this right is such as to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of the United States circuit court, in which the suit is brought. Oleson v.

Northern Pac. R. Co. (C. C. 1890) 44 Fed. 1. 84. Suits to control corporate action. The court has jurisdiction of a bill brought by a stockholder for the benefit of the corporation and any other stockholders who may choose to come in to restrain the directors from paying out assets of the corporation to the amount of $100,000, though the complainant holds less than $1,000 worth of stock; the matter in dispute in such case being the wrong done the corporation. Hill v. Glasgow R. Co. (C. C. 1888) 41 Fed. 610.

In a suit by a member of a nonstock corporation to restrain alleged illegal and ultra vires action by its governing body, the amount involved for jurisdictional purposes, is the value of the rights sought to be protected; and a federal court has jurisdiction where it is shown by the bill that the mismanagement complained of, if not restrained, will result in the creation of debts, and may result in the loss of the corporation's property, which largely exceeds in value the jurisdictional amount. MeKee v. Chautauqua Assembly (C. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 808, decree affirmed (1904) 130 Fed. 536, 65 C. C. A. 8.

A bill in a federal court to compel a corporation to transfer corporate stock of the market value of $33.600 and to pay the difference between the market value of the stock on the day transfer was demanded and its highest market value between that day and judgment, which alleges that the corporation refused to make the transfer of the stock which was property within the state of Wisconsin, and subject to an inheritance tax under the laws of Wisconsin of less than the jurisdictional amount until a waiver or consent to the transfer from the state was produced, was demurrable on the ground that the amount in controversy was insufficient; the corporation not claiming the stock nor any right to control it. Jessup v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. (C. C. 1911) 188 Fed. 931.

A suit in a state court by a stockholder for a mandatory injunction to compel the corporation to permit an inspection of its books held not capable of a money valuation such as to give the federal court jurisdiction. Whitney v. American Shipbuilding Co. (D. C. 1911) 197 Fed. 777.

85.

Taxes and assessments.-In a suit to enjoin the collection of a tax, the amount in controversy is the amount of the tax. Linehan Railway Transfer Co. v. Pendergrass (1895) 70 Fed. 1, 16 C. C. A. 585; Turner v. Jackson Lumber Co. (1908) 159 Fed. 923, 87 C. C. A. 103; Turner v. Jackson Lumber Co. (1908) 159 Fed. 926, 87 C. C. A. 106; Eachus v. Hartwell (C. C. 1901) 112 Fed. 564; Purnell v. Page (C. C. 1904) 128 Fed. 496.

Where, in an action by a foreign ex

press company engaged in interstate commerce against a city to restrain the enforcement of an ordinance exacting a license fee, the bill states that the value of the company's right to do business in such city exceeds the jurisdictional amount, the federal court has jurisdiction, though the amount of the license fee is less than such amount. City of Hutchinson v. Beckham (1902) 118 Fed. 399, 55 C. C. A. 333; Southern Exp. Co. v. City of Ensley (C. C. 1902) 116 Fed. 756.

Where a bill by many taxpayers of a county, in behalf of all taxpayers, attacks the validity of certain county bonds issued to aid in constructing a railway, and prays an injunction restraining the sheriff from collecting a tax levied for the payment of interest and the county judge from making any further levies, and also a decree that the bonds are invalid, and that all the holders be brought in by publication and perpetually enjoined from collecting principal or interest, the main controversy is as to the validity of the bonds, and therefore is not separable, as determining the jurisdictional amount, into controversies affecting the amount due from the separate taxpayers. Brown v. Trousdale (1891) 138 U. S. 389, 11 Sup. Ct. 308, 34 L. Ed. 987.

Where a suit is brought by an individual taxpayer to enjoin a municipal corporation from issuing bonds, the jurisdictional amount is not the amount of the whole issue of bonds which is sought to be enjoined, but the amount of taxes which complainant would be compelled to pay for interest on the bonds, and to provide a sinking fund for the principal thereof. Colvin v. Jacksonville (1895) 15 Sup. Ct. 866, 867, 158 U. S. 456, 39 L. Ed. 1053.

In a suit by a bank to enjoin the collection of taxes for certain years on property claimed to be exempt, the amount of the tax being insufficient to give jurisdiction, the fact that the value of the exemption during the continuance of the charter of the bank will exceed the jurisdictional amount will not give jurisdiction. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. Cannon (1896) 17 S. Ct. 89, 164 U. S. 319, 41 L. Ed. 451.

A bill for injunction against taxes brought by a railroad company against a revenue agent who represents all the parties interested sufficiently states the jurisdictional amount when it alleges that the taxes assessed amount to a specified sum much larger than the jurisdictional limit; and a question not arising on the face of the bill as to how the taxes, when collected, would be disposed of, and in what proportions and amounts they would be parceled out to interested municipalities, is immaterial. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Adams (1901) 21 Sup. Ct. 251, 180 U. S. 28, 45 L. Ed. 410.

A suit to enjoin the enforcement of a tax levied on lands under authority of 1 U.S.COMP.'16-37

a state by the sale of timber from such lands, where it is not alleged that the tax is illegal, but merely that it was erroneously levied, is not a suit to remove a cloud on title, and the amount involved for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of a federal court is the amount of the tax, and not the value of the land. Douglas Co. v. Stone (1903) 24 S. Ct. 843, 191 U. S. 557, 48 L. Ed. 301, affirming decree (C. C. 1901) 110 Fed. 812.

A suit to enjoin the collection of taxes on the property of an educational institution on the ground of a perpetual contract of exemption from taxation, protected from impairment by the contract clause of the Constitution, involves the amount essential to sustain the original jurisdiction of a circuit court, where the contract right exceeds in value that amount, although the particular tax assessed and levied is less than that sum. Berryman v. Board of Trustees of Whitman College (1912) 32 Sup. Ct. 147, 149, 222 U. S. 334, 56 L. Ed. 225.

In a suit by a taxpayer to enjoin a city from issuing bonds claimed to he in excess of the constitutional limit of its indebtedness, the power of the city to issue such bonds is the matter in dispute for the purpose of determining whether the amount or value in controversy is sufficient to give a federal court jurisdiction, and not the tax to which complainant would be subjected. City of Ottumwa, Iowa, v. City Water Supply Co. (1902) 119 Fed. 315, 56 C. C. A. 219, 59 L. R. A. 604.

If nonresident taxpayers, citizens of different states, join in a bill to enjoin the enforcement of an illegal tax, it seems that there must be in dispute as to each complainant the requisite jurisdictional amount. King v. Wilson (C. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 7,810.

The criterion of jurisdiction is the amount of the tax in dispute. Woodman v. Ely (C. C. 1880) 2 Fed. 839. In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a state tax, claimed to be unconstitutional, the subject of controversy is not limited to $500, the tax imposed for a single year; nor can it be determined, on a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction, that the damages will be less than the sum required to give the court jurisdiction, where plaintiff asks to be relieved from threatened penalties and interference with its business, the damage to result from which it places at $10,000. American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture (C. C. 1890) 43 Fed. 609, 11 L. R. A. 179.

The jurisdiction of the federal court to restrain the state board of appraisers from assessing an illegal tax against a telegraph company in several counties is not defeated by the fact that the assessment does not reach the jurisdictional amount in any single county, because, the action being against the

(577)

board of appraisers, the whole amount to be certified is the amount in controversy. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Poe (C. C. 1894) 61 Fed. 449.

In a suit in the federal court to enjoin an assessment under a law alleged to be unconstitutional, a preliminary injunction will be denied where it appears, by uncontradicted affidavits, that the increased tax thus imposed is less than the jurisdictional amount, though the averments of the bill are sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. U. S. Exp. Co. v. Poe (C. C. 1894) 61 Fed. 475.

The circuit court has jurisdiction, where the citizenship is diverse, of a bill by a telegraph company to enjoin a state auditor from collecting alleged illegal state taxes, and from certifying to the county clerks the proportion of local taxes to be collected in each county, where the amount claimed to be due the state and the aggregate amount of such local taxes each exceeds the jurisdictional amount. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Norman (C. C. 1896) 77 Fed. 13. appeal dismissed (1896) 17 Sup. Ct. 1002, 41 L. Ed. 1182.

The federal courts have equity jurisdiction, on the ground of preventing multiplicity of suits and irreparable injury, of a bill by a telegraph company to enjoin a state auditor from certifying to the county clerks the proportions of an illegal tax to be collected in their several counties, though such local taxes, taken separately, are less than the jurisdictional amount. Id.

In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance imposing a license tax on complainant's business, alleged to be prohibitory, the amount in controversy, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of a federal court, is the value of such business. Humes v. City of Little Rock (C. C. 1898) 138 Fed. 929.

In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a city ordinance alleged to impose a tax on interstate commerce, federal jurisdiction was determined by the value of the right to be protected, and not the amount of the tax to be enjoined. Jewel Tea Co. v. Lee's Summit, Mo. (D. C. 1912) 198 Fed. 532.

86.

Trespass.-A bill by the owner of a number of tugs and barges employed in navigation which required them to pass through defendant's canal to enjoin defendant from enforcing certain alleged illegal regulations and charges states a cause of action in the nature of a continuing trespass, and, where it shows that complainant is subjected to charges owing to such exactions amounting to some $1,600 per year, it discloses a sufficient amount in dispute to give a federal court jurisdiction. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. Gring (1908) 159 Fed. 662, 86 C. C. A. 530, writ of certiorari denied Gring v. Chesapeake & Delaware Ca

nal Co. (1908) 29 Sup. Ct. 682, 212 U. S. 571, 53 L. Ed. 655.

87.

Unlawful interference with business.-Value of complainant's right to maintain its electric plant free from interference by a rival company, rather than the cost of removal of defendant's poles and wires, interfering with complainant's, and their replacement, is the test in determining whether amount in controversy supports jurisdiction of federal District Court of a suit for injunction. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co. (1915) 36 Sup. Ct. 30, 239 U. S. 121, 60 L. Ed. -.

Where bondholders of a corporation sued to restrain strikers from interfering with the operations of the corporation, the amount in controversy was the value of the bonds held by the complainants, which were being jeopardized by defendants' acts. Fortney v. Carter (1913) 203 Fed. 454, 121 C. C. A. 514.

In a suit to enjoin defendants from continuing a business in which they have engaged in violation of a contract with complainant, the amount or value in dispute for jurisdictional purposes is the value of the object to be gained by the suit, and not the amount of complainant's damages, and a federal court has jurisdiction where the value of the plant owned and operated by defendants and the amount of the business done by them annually largely exceeds the jurisdictional amount. American Fisheries Co. v. Lennen (C. C. 1902) 118 Fed. $69.

In a suit to restrain certain voluntary labor organizations and officers and members of the same from interfering with the business of complainant, the amount in dispute for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of a federal court is the value of complainant's right to conduct its business, and an allegation in the bill that complainant will be damaged by the acts of defendants in a sum exceeding the jurisdictional amount is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor (C. C. 1907) 156 Fed. 809.

88. Effect of counterclaim and crossbill.-Where the issue raised by a counterclaim and reply exceeds the jurisdictional amount, the matter in dispute exceeds that sum, although the original action was brought for a less sum. Clarkson v. Manson (C. C. 1880) 4 Fed. 257; Same v. Monson (N. Y. 1880) 60 How. Prac. 45, reversing (N. Y. 1880) 59 How. Prac. 480.

A matter in dispute exceeding the value of $2,000, the requisite amount at that time, was presented by a cross-bill which sought to recover a balance of $1,700 due on a contract for the exchange of soda fountain apparatus, where the original bill, which was dismissed on complainant's own motion,