Page images
PDF
EPUB

Fed. 948, 955, 15 C. C. A. 96 (affirmed [1897] 17 Sup. Ct. 368, 165 U. S. 463, 41 L. Ed. 789); King v. McAndrews (1901) 111 Fed. 860, 863, 50 C. C. A. 29.

In construing public grants, issued in great numbers by the officers of the government, and in accordance with a certain formulary deliberately adopted by those officers, the courts may resort to contemporaneous documents on file in the proper department, for the purpose of ascertaining the intent of the grantors. (1836) 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 111.

Whether patents irregularly issued shall have effect from their date or time of delivery may be determined by parol testimony. (1844) 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 329.

A patent of lands does not pass the title, but is only evidence that it has before passed. Goodlet v. Smithson (1837) 5 Port. 245, 30 Am. Dec. 561. The patent of the government is to be construed strictly, and not most strongly against the grantor. McManus v. Carmichael (1856) 3 Iowa (3 Clarke) 1.

A patent from the government to certain land was signed, sealed, and recorded August 30, 1859; but, as there was a question as to who was legally entitled to a patent for the land, it was not delivered until November 12, 1860. Held, that the patent took effect, so as to vest the legal title in the grantee, on August 30, 1859. Hammond v. Johnston (1887) 93 Mo. 198, 6 S. W. 83.

14.

Title conveyed.-Where patents were issued, the government is estopped from setting up a claim for waste committed by the patentees on the ceded lands. Thayer v. U. S (1885) 20 Ct. Cl. 137.

A patent from the United States, issued in pursuance of, and based solely and exclusively upon, a prior entry accompanied by full payment of the purchase price, does not convey to the entryman a new or independent title disconnected with his equitable title derived from such entry and final payment, but converts the imperfect or equitable title into a perfect legal one, enabling the patentee to seek and maintain legal remedies where theretofore he was, in the absence of statute, confined to equitable ones. Hagan v. Ellis (1897) 22 South. 727, 39 Fla. 463, 63 Am. St. Rep. 167.

On the sale of lands by the United States, the patent transfers to the purchaser the entire legal estate and seisin to as full an extent as the government held them. Cook v. Foster (1845) 7 Ill. (2 Gilman) 652; Vansickle v. Haines (1872) 7 Nev. 249.

The federal government can convey no greater title than it has. Hough v. Porter (1909) 98 Pac. 1083, 51 Or. 318; Id. (1908) 95 Pac. 732, 51 Or. 318, re

hearing denied (1909) 102 Pac. 728, 51 Or. 318.

Equities subject to which one holds legal title to land under a United States patent may be enforced by the courts; so, where the patent is silent as to the respective interests of the grantees, their rights may be settled. Kimball v. McIntyre (1881) 3 Utah, 77, 1 Pac. 167.

15.

Effect of issuance of patent upon powers of land department.-The issuance of a patent, or such other act as passes the legal title from the government, is the final act, and the expression and entry of the final judgment, of the officers of the Land Department, and marks the termination of the jurisdiction of these officers. Peyton v. Desmond (1904) 129 Fed. 1, 63 C. C. A. 651.

A patent signed, sealed, and recorded takes effect from such time, and it cannot be recalled while en route to the local officer for delivery to the patentee, without consent of the patentee. Le Roy v. Clayton (C. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 8,268; Same v. Jamison (C. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 8,271.

Where the identical land, by the same metes and bounds, has been previously granted according to law by the United States to other individuals, no subsequent act on the part of the United States can possibly affect the prior title to the premises derived from their own patent. (1807) 1 Op. Atty. Gen.

159.

After a patent has issued, no further departmental interference is legally possible; the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior being limited to a request that proceedings be instituted to annul the patent. Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Jackson Oil Co. (1913) 129 Pac. 276, 164 Cal. 392; Sage v. Rudnick (1904) 100 N. W. 106, 91 Minn. 325 (reversing judgment on rehearing [1904] 98 N. W. 89, 91 Minn. 325); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Spray (1901) 67 Pac. 377, 27 Wash. 1.

Though a patent to public land has been erroneously issued, it terminates the authority and control of the land department over the title, which does not again attach until the patent has been set aside by the courts. Anderson v. Woodward (Colo. 1914) 140 Pac. 198.

The moment a patent passes the great seal, it is beyond the power of the government officers. Lott v. Prudhomme (1842) 3 Rob. 293.

16. Relation back. The patent relates to and takes effect from the date of the entry. Pacific Coast Min. & Mill. Co. v. Spargo (C. C. 1883) 16 Fed. 348; Coleman v. Peshtigo Lumber Co. (C. C. 1887) 30 Fed. 317; Birmingham Coal & Iron Co. v. Doe ex dem. Arnett (Ala. 1913) 62 South. 26; Quinn v. Baldwin Star Coal Co. (1904) 76 Pac. 552, 19 Colo. App. 497; King v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1911) 119 Pac. 709,

20 Idaho, 687; (1875) Waters v. Bush, 42 Iowa, 255; (1876) Rankin v. Miller, 43 Iowa, 11; Steinspring v. Bennett (1861) 16 La. Ann. 201; Clark v. Hall (1869) 19 Mich. 356; Magruder v. Esmay (1878) 35 Ohio St. 221; Washington Rock Co. v. Young (1905) 80 Pac. 382, 29 Utah, 108, 110 Am. St. Rep. 666.

A patent to public lands relates back to the time when they were purchased, and gives the patentee title as of that date. Cavender v. Smith's Heirs (1857) 5 Iowa (5 Clarke) 157; Fisher v. Hallock (1883) 15 N. W. 552, 50 Mich. 463; Nicholson v. Congdon (1905) 103 N. W. 1034, 95 Minn. 188.

The issue of a patent does not cause the patentee's legal title to relate back to the date of his certificate of purchase. Redfield v. Parks (1889) 10 Sup. Ct. 83, 132 U. S. 239, 33 L. Ed. 327.

A land patent relates back to the original land office certificate, and the purchaser's title dates from that time. Cavender v. Smith (1856) 3 G. Greene, 349, 56 Am. Dec. 541.

A patent for lands issued on a prior certificate operates to vest the title in the patentee, and by relation back to the date of the certificate of location cuts off an intermediate certificate. Klein's Heirs v. Argenbright (1869) 26 Iowa, 493.

A patent will not be held to take effect as of the date of the initial step taken by the patentee to obtain title, where the rights by him acquired by such initial step were lost by his lack of diligence, and the effect of such an application of the doctrine of relation would be to render a party accountable for coal mined, who had made a cash entry after the patentee's right to the land had apparently been abandoned, and who had developed mines, and had worked them for several years, with the knowledge of the patentee. Evans v. Durango Land & Coal Co. (1897) 80 Fed. 433, 25 C. C. A. 531, appeal dismissed Durango Land & Coal Co. v. Evans (1898) 19 Sup. Ct. 875, 43 L. Ed. 1178.

A patent to public lands may be shown to be connected with and to relate back to a previous inchoate legal title. Jones v. Inge (Ala. 1837) 5 Port. 327.

The doctrine of legal title relating back to the inception of the grantee's equity is a legal fiction, adopted to protect the legal title. Price v. Dennis (Ala. 1909) 49 South. 248.

A vested right to a patent of public lands is treated as a patent in fact issped; the patent, when issued, relat

inf

back to the inception of the paten's right. Stoneroad v. Beck (N. M. t12) 120 P. 898.

17. Property and rights included. -A patent carries all mines in the lands patented, to which no right has attached 1 U.S.COMP.'16-25

at the time the patent issues. Pacific Coast Min. & Mill. Co. v. Spargo (C. C. 1883) 16 Fed. 348.

A patent from the United States of public lands, without any reservations or exceptions, passes to the patentee everything anywise connected with the soil, forming any portion of its bed, or fixed to its surface-in short, everything included in the term "land." Moore v. Smaw (1861) 17 Cal. 199, 79 Am. Dec. 123.

What rights go to a patentee of land depend, not upon any supposed adjudication contained in the patent, but upon the general law of the state where the land is situated. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Farming & Milling Co. (Cal. 1908) 93 Pac. 869, rehearing denied Id. 1135.

A purchaser of a tract of government land, which has on it a mill and dam, which cause the water of a stream running through it to overflow other public lands, the entry being made and a patent received in the usual form, has no right to continue the dam so as to overflow such other lands after they have been entered by individuals. Wilcoxon v. McGhee (1851) 12 Ill. (2 Peck) 381, 54 Am. Dec. 409.

Where a patent for land, on which stood a mill and dam, whereby adjoining public lands were overflowed, was issued in the usual form, it was held that the right to overflow such adjoining lands belonging to the government was not annexed to the grant, as an appurtenance, by any natural or legal necessity. Id.

A grantee by patent of a legal subdivision of land cannot thereby derive title to land in another legal subdivision. Kinsella v. Stephenson (1914) 106 N. E. 950, 265 Ill. 369.

A transfer by the government of its title to public lands passes title to a fence that had been built on the land by the maker. Burlerson v. Teeple (Iowa 1850) 2 G. Greene, 542.

A patent to land covers all right to the use of water thereon, though another, before the patent, had attempted to divert the water. Vansickle v. Haines (1872) 7 Nev. 249.

18. Quantity and boundaries of land conveyed.-The quantity of land granted to a patentee must in an action at law be ascertained from the description in the patent, and cannot be controlled by any supposed original equity to a quarter section to which a claim might have been made before the register and receiver. Gazzam v. Phillips (1857) 20 How. 372, 376, 15 L. Ed. 958.

Whether a survey and patent rightfully or wrongfully excludes certain lands, the patent is conclusive as to title in a law action, and the patent including the lands must prevail over a patent excluding them, and the decree of con

firmation on which it is issued. Mora v. Nunez (C. C. 1882) 10 Fed. 634.

Certain boundaries are of more importance than quantity in designating lands. Therefore, where a patent calls for a subdivision of a fractional quarter section, described as lying north of a certain creek, and containing a specified number of acres, it embraces all the land in the subdivision north of the creek, although the actual number of acres exceeds the number specified in the patent. Stein v. Ashby (1854) 24 Ala. 521.

The lands formerly occupied by Old Fort Charlotte, as shown by the map and plat returned to the general land office by the surveyor general, were separated from the river by a narrow strip of land. Held, that a patent from the United States for such lands did not pass this strip nor adjacent land on the river front, since reclaimed from the water. Boulo v. New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. (1876) 55 Ala. 480.

A patent describing land as the S. E. 14 of the S. W. 4 of a section, "according to the official plat of survey," held to convey all of the S. 2 of the quarter section, surveyed in a single tract, as shown by the official plat, except a portion beyond the banks of a navigable stream. Perry v. Board of Com'rs of Caddo Levee Dist. (1913) 61 South. 511, 132 La. 415.

Where a patent to an island was regular on its face and conveyed a tract containing "about one hundred acres" for a consideration of $125, it was not subject to collateral attack because the island in fact contained 127 acres, and was therefore conveyed for a price less than that authorized by law. Frank v. Goddin (1906) 91 S. W. 1057, 193 Mo. 390, 112 Am. St. Rep. 493.

In order to determine the extent of a title included in a conveyance from the government, the courts must consider all acts in force at the time affecting the public domain, to ascertain what interests remain subject to transfer. Hough v. Porter (1909) 98 Pac. 1083, 51 Or. 318; Id. (1908) 95 Pac. 732, 51 Or. 318, rehearing denied (1909) 102 P. 728, 51 Or. 318.

The fact that a patent describes the land as "the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section 8." instead of as lot 4, does not exclude from the grant any of the land that would properly be in lot 4, when it appears by the government plat that it was intended to pass lot 4, which was marked as containing the same number of acres as were granted by the patent. Sheppard v. Wilmott (1891) 79 Wis. 15, 47 N. W. 1054.

The fact that lot 4 is in two quarter sections is immaterial, as a given fractional lot may be crossed by quarter section lines, when the lines of the plat show that it was not intended to extend the intersecting line of the adjoining quarter section so as to exclude from

lot 4 the land in controversy, which is necessary to make up the number of acres as called for in the plat for lot 4. Id.

Where the proofs, together with the maps filed with a patent, and the surveys and field notes, including the records of the general land office, conclusively show that a certain piece of land was intended to be included in a patent describing the land as "lot 1, section 6," it will pass by the patent, though the land extends beyond section 6. Lyon v. Fairbanks (1891) 79 Wis. 455, 48 N. W. 492, 24 Am. St. Rep. 732.

19. Conditions and exceptions.When public lands are conveyed to private individuals, no especial rights or exemptions, which might have been, but were not, prescribed by Congress, pass to the patentee. Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co. (1913) 205 Fed. 123, 123 C. C. A. 355, reversing decree in part Cascade Town Co. v. Empire Water & Power Co. (C. C. 1910) 181 Fed. 1011.

Where a patent to public land reserves the right of a proprietor of a mining vein or lode to extract and remove his ore therefrom, should it be found to penetrate or intersect the lands granted by the patent, the reservation refers only to parties who are proprietors at the time when the right of the patentee attaches to the land, or the date of the entry or patent. Pacific Coast Min. & Mill. Co. v. Spargo (C. C. 1883) 16 Fed. 348.

An exception inserted in a patent, which is not authorized by the statute to be inserted, is void. Francoeur v. Newhouse (C. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 618.

A condition superadded to a patent certificate by the register of a land office, which was not required by the law directing its issuance by him, is void, and the patentee takes it discharged of the condition. Innerarity V. Mims' Heirs (1840) 1 Ala. 660.

Where a patent to agricultural land contained a clause that it should be subject to the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode to abstract and remove his ore therefrom should the same be found to penetrate or intersect the premises granted, such exception only subjected the land to the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode the apex of which lay outside of the land patented, but penetrated into the same on its dip or downward course, to abstract and remove his ore therefrom as provided by law. Paterson v. Ogden (1903) 74 Pac. 443, 141 Cal. 43, 99 Am. St. Rep. 31.

20. Issuance to fictitious person. -A patent for land issued to a fictitious person passes no title. Moffat v. U. S. (1884) Sup. Ct. 10, 14, 112 U. S. 24, 28 L. Ed. 623; U. S. v. Southern Colorado Coal & Town Co. (C. C. 1883) 18 Fed. 273 (decree reversed Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. U. S. [1887] 8 Sup. Ct. 131, 123 U. S. 307, 31 L. Ed. 182);

Thomas v. Wyatt (1857) 25 Mo. 24, 69 Am. Dec. 446; Same v. Boerner (1857) 25 Mo. 27; Same v. Wyatt (1864) 35 Mo. 127.

[ocr errors]

21. Senior and junior patents.Where two conflicting patents have been issued by the United States, each purporting to confirm the same tract of land to a different party, the senior patent is conclusive of the title; and, if the question is solely between the two patents, the junior patent is void. Gallipot v. Manlove (1834) 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 156; Garner v. Willett (1857) 18 Ill. (8 Peck) 455; Magwire v. Tyler (1867) 40 Mo. 406; Parkison v. Bracken (1842) 1 Pin. 174, 39 Am. Dec. 296.

In equity a junior patent or a certificate of purchase of a tract of land will prevail over an older one, if the right on which it is based is prior. Isaacs v. Steel (1841) 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 97; Pujo v. Fouchy (La. 1880) Man. Unrep. Cas. 156.

22. Rights of purchasers.-A purchaser in good faith for a valuable consideration from a patentee of United States lands, without notice of adverse claims, is entitled to rely on the record; and the patent, if valid on its face, will not be vacated, as to him, for matters dehors the record. Neff v. U. S. (1908) 165 Fed. 273, 91 C. C. A. 241; U. S. v. Keleno (1915) 226 Fed. 180, 141 C. C. A. 178; U. S. v. Debell (C. C. A. 1915) 227 Fed. 760; U. S. v. Minor (C. C. 1886) 29 Fed. 134; U. S. v. Sierra Nevada Wood & Lumber Co. (C. C. 1897) 79 Fed. 691.

A purchaser need not go behind the patent, but may rely on its presumptive validity. U. S. v. Laam (C. C. 1906) 149 Fed. 581; State v. Hewitt Land Co. (1913) 134 Pac. 474, 74 Wash. 573.

A purchaser of public lands is not affected with notice of latent defects in a chain of assignments recited in his patent, when such assignments purport to have been made by the proper persons. Bell v. Duncan (1842) 11 Ohio, 192.

23. Recordation.-Failure to record a patent does not defeat the grant. McGarrahan v. New Idria Min. Co. (1877) 96 U. S. 316, 323, 24 L. Ed. 630; McQueen v. Flasdick-Black Land & Lumber Co. (1914) 65 South. 900, 135 La. 698; Sands v. Davis (1879) 40 Mich. 14.

The record of a United States patent for land in the government office at Washington has the same force as the patent. Sands v. Davis (1879) 40 Mich. 14.

A government title to land, recorded der the acts of Congress in books ept for that purpose at the seat of government, is sufficient to pass title and impart notice without being recorded in the county where the land is situated, though it may be so recorded under Rev.

St. Mo. 1909, § 10390. Wilcox v. Phillips (Mo. 1914) 169 S. W. 55.

24. Patents as evidence.-A patent under the seal of the United States is conclusive proof of the act of granting by its authority; its exemplification is a record of absolute verity. U. S. v. Arredondo (1832) 6 Pet. 691, 728, 8 L. Ed. 547.

The court will take judicial notice of the fact that patents for public lands are frequently dated several years after the payment of the purchase money and the issuance of the certificate of entry, and therefore the production of a patent dated in 1888 is no proof that the patentee did not have an interest in the lands which was subject to attachment and judicial sale in 1885. Bigelow v. Chatterton (1892) 51 Fed. 614, 2 C. C. A. 402.

The pendency of a suit by the United States to set aside a patent for fraud is not ground for refusing to admit the patent in evidence. Ely v. Frisbie (1861) 17 Cal. 250.

A patent appearing to be signed by the president and countersigned by the commissioner of the general land office, and verified by the seal thereof, is admissible without proof of its execution. Bowser v. Warren (Ind. 1838) 4 Blackf. 522.

The sufficiency of the authentication of records and papers of the federal land department is controlled by the regulations of that department and the federal laws, and not by state laws. Gilman v. Riopelle (1869) 18 Mich. 145. A patent may be shown in evidence without proof that the same was recorded in the land department, or memorandum of such record. Callaway v. Fash (1872) 50 Mo. 420.

The record of a patent is admissible; Comp. Laws Nev. § 324, making special provisions for recording such patents and the use of such records as evidence. Reno Brewing Co. v. Packard (Nev. 1909) 103 P. 415, rehearing denied 104 P. 801.

25.

be Presumptions.-It will presumed from the issuance of a patent for government land that all necessary steps prior to the issuance thereof were taken. King v. McAndrews (1911) 111 Fed. 860, 50 C. C. A. 29; Carroll v. Draughon (Ala. 1911) 56 So. 207; Collins v. Bartlett (1872) 44 Cal. 371; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Purcell (1888) 77 Cal. 69, 18 Pac. 886; Hooper v. Young (1903) 74 P. 140, 140 Cal. 274, 98 Am. St. Rep. 50; People's Water Co. v. Lewis (1912) 127 P. 506, 19 Cal. App. 622; Smith v. Pipe (1877) 3 Colo. 187; Oregon Short Line R. Co. v. Stalker (1908) 94 P. 56; Webber v. Pere Marquette Boom Co. (1886) 30 N. W. 469, 62 Mich. 626; Fulton v. McAfee (1841) 6 Miss. (5 How.) 751; Surget v. Little (1852) 24 Miss. (2 Cushm.) 118; Carter v. Blanton (1857) 33 Miss. 291; Barry v. Gamble (1843) 8 Mo. 88; Allison v. Hunter (1846) 9 Mo. 749;

Hill v. Miller (1865) 36 Mo. 182; Gibson v. Chouteau (1867) 39 Mo. 536; Bradshaw v. Edelen (1906) 92 S. W. 691, 194 Mo. 640; Green v. Barker (1896) 47 Neb. 934, 66 N. W. 1032; Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Morrow (1906) 86 P. 369, 48 Or. 258; Knight v. Leary (1882) 54 Wis. 459, 11 N. W. 600; Demars v. Hickey (1905) 80 P. 521, 13 Wyo. 371, rehearing denied (1905) 81 P. 705, 13 Wyo. 371.

A patent of land issued by the proper officers of the United States is presumed valid, and to pass title. Minter v. Crommelin (1855) 18 How. 87, 88, 15 L. Ed. 279; Jenkins v. Trager (C. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 726 (writ of error dismissed Trager v. Jenkins [1890] 10 S. Ct. 1074, 136 U. S. 651, 34 L. Ed. 557); U. S. v. Laam (C. C. 1906) 149 Fed. 581; Hooper v. Young (1903) 74 P. 140, 140 Cal. 274, 98 Am. St. Rep. 50; Schnee v. Schnee (1868) 23 Wis. 377, 99 Am. Dec. 183.

Patents for lands issued by the United States carry the presumption of verity, and can only be set aside on the most clear and convincing proof; and the rule applies, although they are attacked by the United States in defense of a suit to restrain their cancellation by the department. La Clair v. U. S. (C. C. 1910) 184 Fed. 128.

There is no presumption in favor of a patent to lands issued by the Land Department as against a claim that the land was within an Indian reservation and not subject to disposal as public land. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. U. S. (1911) 191 Fed. 947, 112 C. C. A. 359, decree affirmed (1913) 33 S. Ct. 368, 227 U. S. 355, 57 L. Ed. 544.

Issuance of a patent by the federal land department is an adjudication that grantee has performed acts necessary to entitle him to a patent, if the land belongs to the United States and provision has been made for its sale; the adjudication having the same force in his favor as any adjudication by a tribunal having jurisdiction, and not being subject to collateral attack. Jameson v. James (Cal. 1909) 100 P. 700.

Where the preamble of a patent describes the applicant as the "legal representative" of the entryman, but the grant is to the applicant "and to his heirs and assigns," the presumption is that the register properly discharged his duty. McQueen v. Flasdick-Black Land & Lumber Co. (1914) 65 South. 900, 135 La. 698.

A patent is conclusive evidence that the patentee has complied with the act of Congress as concerns improvements on the land, etc. Jenkins v. Gibson (1848) 3 La. Ann. 203.

The principle that, when a patent is issued by the government, all necessary prerequisites are presumed to exist, is applicable to an assignment when the patent issues to an assignee. Clark v. Hall (1869) 19 Mich. 356.

Where the United States government

has issued a patent for land, it will be presumed that it held the title to and the possession of the land at the time that the patent was issued. Long v. McDow (1885) 87 Mo. 197.

In a suit by one claiming to be the rightful claimant to public land, to enforce his remedy against a person to whom the patent has been issued by the Land Department, all reasonable presumptions will be indulged in support of the department officers. Johnson v. Riddle (Okl. 1914) 139 Pac. 1143. 26. Recitals. A mere stranger has no right to dispute the truth of the recitals in a patent. Jones v. Inge (1837) 5 Port. 327.

While the recitals of fact contained in a patent are binding on all concerned, an opinion of the executive officers as to matters of law indicated either by the act of issuing the patent or by the recitals contained therein is not conclusive. McGarrahan v. New Idria Min. Co. (1874) 49 Cal. 331.

When a patent of land recites that it was purchased by the patentees in trust for beneficiaries named, and nothing appears to contradict the recital, it will be conclusive, as to the facts recited, that a trust only is conveyed by the patent. Dean v. Long (1887) 122 Ill. 447, 14 N. E. 34.

The recitals of the patent are to be taken as true. In this case the recital was that A. had got a certificate of entry and assigned to B., and that the United States got a judgment against B., had his rights sold on execution, and bought them, and thereupon patented the land to M., the present patentee. Held, that on its face, which was to be taken as true, it appeared that the United States had good right to patent the land to M. Sweatt v. Corcoran (1859) 37 Miss. 513.

The acts of Congress control the force of patents, which cannot be varied in their effect by the omission from them of statutory provisions, or the insertion of others. Tonopah & G. R. Co. v. Fellanbaum (Nev. 1910) 107 Pac. 882.

An owner of land is chargeable with notice of facts recited in a patent to which he traces his title. Bonner v. Ware (1841) 10 Ohio, 465.

27.

[ocr errors]

Validity.-A patent issued for lands reserved from sale by law is void. Stoddard v. Chambers (1844) 43 U. S. (2 How.) 284, 11 L. Ed. 269; Garrard v. Silver Peak Mines (C. C. 1897) 82 Fed. 578 (judgment affirmed [1899] 94 Fed. 983, 36 C. C. A. 603); Eastern Oregon Land Co. v. Brosnan (C. C. 1906) 147 Fed. 807; Mille Lac Band of Chippewas v. U. S. (1911) 46 Ct. Cl. 424; (1900) 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 283; Hit-tuk-ho-mi V. Watts (1846) 7 Smedes & M. (Miss.) 363, 45 Am. Dec. 308; Perry v. O'Hanlon (1848) 11 Mo. 585, 49 Am. Dec. 100; Wright v. Rutgers (1851) 14 Mo. 585; Cummings v.

« PreviousContinue »