judgment affirmed (1908) Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. v. U. S., 162 Fed. 835, 90 C. C. A. 211, writ of certiorari denied (1909) 29 Sup. Ct. 689, 212 U. S. 579, 53 L. Ed. 659.

This section does not limit the power of succeeding Congresses, but merely prescribes a rule of construction, binding upon the courts, as a substitute for the common-law rule with respect to the effect of a repealing statute as a release from penalties and prosecutions for offenses committed under the statute repealed, and under it the repeal of the penal statute extinguishes no penalties previously incurred thereunder, in the absence of an express extinguishing clause in the repealing act. U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C. 1907) 148 Fed. 719, 722; United States v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. (D. C. 1907) 151 Fed. 84, judgment affirmed (1908) Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 162 Fed. 835, 90 C. C. A. 211, writ of certiorari denied (1909) 29 Sup. Ct. 689, 212 U. S. 579, 53 L. Ed. 659.

It was the obvious intention of this section to extend the similar_provision of R. S. § 5598, post, § 10595, relating to the repeal of statutes embraced in the Revised Statutes, to the repeal of any statute not embraced in said revision. U. S. v. Reisinger (1888) 9 Sup. Ct. 99, 100, 128 U. S. 398, 32 L. Ed. 480.

In enacting this provision, in Act Feb. 25, 1871, c. 71, § 4, Congress was not addressing itself particularly to succeeding Congresses, but to the courts. The courts are commanded by this section to treat a repealed statute as still remaining in force for punishment of violations thereof, unless the courts shall find that the repealing act "expressly provides" that such repealed act shall not sustain any prosecution for its violation. Lang v. U. S. (1904) 133 Fed. 201, 205, 66 C. C. A. 225 (concurring opinion).

As applied to subsequent repealing acts, which do not, expressly or by necessary implication, contravene its provisions, this section is effective and obligatory upon the courts, but beyond this it is without effect and not obligatory upon any one. Notwithstanding its enactment, Congress remained at liberty to legislate respecting its subject-matter in any manner they might choose. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. U. S. (1907) 155 Fed. 945, 958, 84 C. C. A. 93, affirmed (1908) 28 Sup. Ct. 313, 208 U. S. 452, 52 L. Ed. 567.

Offenses and penalties, etc., and prosecutions within section.-The words "penalty," "forfeiture," and "liability," are synonymous with "punishment," in connection with crimes of every grade, and the section was intended to apply to all offenses. U. S. v. Reisinger (1888) 9 Sup. Ct. 99, 100, 128 U. S. 398, 32 L. Ed. 480; U. S. v. Ulrici (C. C. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 16,594; U. S. v. Barr (D. C. 1877) Fed.

Cas. No. 14,527; U. S. v. Van Vliet (D. C. 1885) 23 Fed. 35.

It is no defense to a prosecution for taking illegal fees, under Act June 20, 1878, relating to claim agents and attorneys in pension cases, instituted after the repeal of that act by Act July 4, 1884, that the repealing act contained no reservation of the right to punish for offenses committed prior to the repeal. U. S. v. Reisinger (1888) 9 Sup. Ct. 99, 128 U. S. 398, 32 L. Ed. 480.

The section covers a prosecution under a statute which authorizes imprisonment as well as fine. U. S. v. Mathews (C. C. 1885) 23 Fed. 74.

Statutes and repeals within section.The exception from the operation of the general repeal of conflicting laws, made by Hepburn Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 10, in favor of pending causes, which "shall be prosecuted to conclusion in the manner heretofore provided by law," did not supersede the general provision of this section, so as to prevent future criminal prosecutions for offenses against Elkins Act Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708, committed prior to the enactment of the Hepburn Act. Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1908) 28 Sup. Ct. 313, 208 U. S. 452, 52 L. Ed. 567; U. S. v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (D. C. 1907) 153 Fed. 630, judgment reversed New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. U. S. (1908) 166 Fed. 267, 92 C. C. A. 331.

In view of this section, the inheritance tax imposed by the War Revenue Act of 1898, although not "due and payable" under section 30 of that act, as amended by Act March 2, 1901, § 11, post, §§ 2851, 2868, until one year after the death of the testator, must be deemed to have become an obligation immediately upon the passing by death of a vested right to the present possession or enjoyment of a legacy or distributive share, so as to be within the saving clause of section 6369, preserving all taxes "imposed" prior to the taking effect of that act, although the testator's death was less than one year prior to such date. Hertz v. Woodman (1910) 30 Sup. Ct. 621, 218 U. S. 205, 54 L. Ed. 1001.

Jurisdiction of the federal courts to establish title of heirs of an Indian allottee dying intestate during the trust period was taken away, even as to pending cases, by Act June 25, 1910, notwithstanding this section. Hallowell v. Commons (1916) 239 U. S. 506, 36 Sup. Ct. 202, 60 L. Ed.

This section applies only to cases where the statute defining an offense has been repealed. Moore v. U. S. (1898) 85 Fed. 465, 470, 29 C. C. A. 269.

The section is inapplicable where a law affecting the territories of the United States becomes inoperative as to one of them by its admission as a state, as this is not a repeal of the statute. Moore v. U. S. (1898) 85 Fed. 465, 29

C. C. A. 269. CONTRA, U. S. v. Baum (C. C. 1896) 74 Fed. 43, 45.

Although Chinese Exclusion Act May 6, 1882, post, § 4290, was, by its terms, limited to a period of 10 years, a violation thereof committed within that period might be indicted and punished after its expiration, even without the continuance of that act in force by Act May 5, 1892, § 1, post, § 4315. Sims v. U. S. (1903) 121 Fed. 515, 58 C. C. A. 92.

Sugars remaining in the place where they were refined when Act June 5, 1794, was repealed, are not subject to duties. Coxe v. Pennington (C. C. 1803) Fed. Cas. No. 3,311.

The provision of Act Feb. 25, 1871, § 4, embodied in this section, did not apply to an act not forbidden by statute at the time of its commission, although such act was an offense under a statute which had then been repealed, and was again made punishable under a subsequent statute. U. S. v. Bennett (C. C. 1874) Fed. Cas. No. 14,570.

Act June 27, 1898, c. 503, amending Act March 3, 1887, § 2, post, § 991 (20), which conferred jurisdiction on the Circuit and District Courts over suits on claims against the government, by excluding from such jurisdiction suits by officers of the United States or their assigns for the recovery of fees or compensation having been passed without a saving clause, applies to such suits then pending. Fairchild v. U. S. (C. C. 1899) 91 Fed. 297.

In a federal court suits were instituted by railroad companies against the Railroad Commission of Alabama and the Attorney General to enjoin the enforcement of a statute fixing railroad rates and to test its constitutionality, and as provided for by the statute itself injunctions were granted suspending its operation on the giving of bonds by the complainants to repay to shippers any sums collected above the statutory rates in case they should be sustained. Pending each suit, and after claims had been filed by shippers for recovery on the bonds of excess charges, the statute was repealed and substitutes enacted, which were subject to the same constitutional objections, but which expressly deprived the Commission and the Attorney General of any power to take action for their enforcement, leaving it to private parties to bring actions and prosecutions for their violation. Held, that such repeal did not abate the suits, and that supplemental bills might be filed therein to enjoin the enforcement of the new acts. Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama (C. C. 1908) 161 Fed. 925, decree reversed Railroad Commission of Alabama v. Central of Georgia R. Co. (1909) 170 Fed. 225, 95 C. C. A. 117.

The repealing clause, paragraph 182 of the Revenue Act of August, 1894 (28 Stat. 521), expressly repealed

those clauses of the revenue act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. 583), granting bounty to licensed sugar producers; and such repeal had reference, not only to licenses to be granted producers thereafter, but also to licenses granted and existing at the date of the passage of the act of 1894. U. S. v. Carlisle (1895) 5 App. D. C. 138.

Liabilities within section.-The liability of a creditor who had received property from his debtor, under circumstances constituting an unlawful preference within the Bankruptcy Act, to refund it to the assignee of the debts in bankruptcy, is a "liability" within this section. Tinker v. Van Dyke (C. C. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 14,058; Warren v. Garber (C. C. 1877) Fed. Cas. No. 17,196; Bradbury v. Galloway (D. C. 1875) Fed. Cas. No. 1,764.

This section is not alone applicable to penalties and forfeitures under penal statutes. It extends as well to "liabilities," and a liability or obligation to pay a tax imposed under a repealed statute is not only within the letter, but the spirit and purpose, of the provision. Hertz v. Woodman (1909) 30 Sup. Ct. 621, 625, 218 U. S. 205, 54 L. Ed. 1001.

The repeal of a lien law after the lien has attached by performance of work does not defeat the lien. In re Hope Min. Co. (D. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 6,681; Sabin v. Connor (D. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 12,197.

The liability to forfeiture of imported goods knowingly entered by means of a false invoice is within the section. U. S. v. Four Cases of Lastings (D. C. 1879) Fed. Cas. No. 15,145.

A tax on capital and deposits of banks, etc., imposed by an internal revenue law, for which such banks, etc., would not become liable until the end of the half year current at the time of the repeal of the provision therefor, is not a "liability incurred," which could be saved by these provisions from the operation of the repeal. (1883) 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 539, 544.

Under this section, after a subcontractor had sued in a state circuit court government building contractors and their surety on a bond given under Act Aug. 13, 1894, post, § 6923, binding them to pay for all labor and material used for a balance due under the subcontract, the subsequent amendment of that act by Act Feb. 24, 1905, c. 778, limiting jurisdiction of such actions to the federal circuit courts, did not oust the state court's jurisdiction; that amendment not disclosing an intent to affect existing actions. Burton v. Frank A. Seifert Plastic Relief Co. (1908) 61 S. E. 933, 108 Va. 338.

Application of section to particular offenses.-Offense saved: Rebating by carriers, Great Northern Ry. Co. v. U. S. (1908) 28 Sup. Ct. 313, 316, 208 U. S. 452, 52 L. Ed. 567; U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C. 1907) 148 Fed. 719,

722; taking excessive pension fee, U. S. v. Reisinger (1888) 9 Sup. Ct. 99, 100, 128 U. S. 398, 32 L. Ed. 480; U. S. v. Mathews (C. C. 1885) 23 Fed. 74; U. S. v. Van Vliet (D. C. 1885) 23 Fed. 35, reversing 22 Fed. 641; landing Chinese laborers, Sims v. U. S. (1903) 121 Fed. 515, 517, 58 C. C. A. 92; importing women for immoral purposes, U. S. v. Lair (1912) 195 Fed. 47, 115 C. C. A. 49; failure to make required alteration of bridge obstructing navigation, U. S. v. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. (D. C. 1891) 45 Fed. 178, 188; failure of carriers to file rates,

U. S. v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (D. C. 1907) 153 Fed. 630, 635, reversed 166 Fed. 267, 92 C. C. A. 331; cutting timber on public mineral lands, in violation of regulation prescribed under Act June 3, 1878, post, §§ 49894991, U. S. v. Williams (1888) 8 Mont. 85, 19 Pac. 288.

Cited without definite application, U. S. v. Jacobus (1899) 96 Fed. 260, 261, 37 C. C. A. 466; Sackett v. McCaffrey (1904) 131 Fed. 219, 223, 65 C. C. A. 205; Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. U. S. (C. C. 1906) 144 Fed. 563, 565. (13)