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of the district courts, and Act May 17, 1884, establishing the district of Alaska, the district court of Alaska has jurisdiction to declare a forfeiture of vessels guilty of taking fur seal in violation of R. S. § 1956, post, § 8850, in any of the navigable waters acquired from Russia by the treaty of March 30, 1867, over which the United States. may lawfully exercise dominion. Ex parte Cooper (1892) 12 Sup. Ct. 453, 459, 143 U. S. 472, 36 L. Ed. 232.

6. Intervention by state authority.United States courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all seizures under laws of the United States, and any intervention of a state authority is unlawful which might obstruct the exercise of this jurisdiction by taking the thing seized out of the hands of the United States officer. Slocum v. Mayberry (1817) 2 Wheat. 1, 9, 4' L. Ed. 169.

7. Property subject to statute.-Act Aug. 6, 1861, extended to all property. Union Ins. Co. v. U. S. (1867) 6 Wall. 759, 763, 18 L. Ed. 879. A vessel begun to be fitted and equipped for a slave voyage in a port of the United States, then going to a foreign port, to evasively complete the fitting and equipping, and so completing it, and from such port continuing the voyage,

is liable to seizure and condemnation when driven in its subsequent course into a port of the United States. The Slavers (1864) 2 Wall. 383, 395, 17 L. Ed. 911.

8. Procedure.-Though the proceedings may be shaped in general conformity to the practice in admiralty, they do not necessarily constitute a "cause in admiralty." Proceedings as to trial by jury and exceptions to evidence held required to conform to the course of proceedings by information on the common-law side of the court. Union Ins. Co. v. U. S. (1867) 6 Wall. 759, 766, 18 L. Ed. 879.

9. Trial by jury.-Issues of fact, on demand of either party, held triable by jury. Union Ins. Co. v. U. S. (1867) 6 Wall. 759, 764, 18 L. Ed. 879.

10. Appeal.-Where a proceeding to enforce forfeiture was carried on in a circuit court by libel monition, claim interposed, and testimony taken in conformity with admiralty practice, and without a jury anywhere, jurisdiction was taken by the supreme court on appeal only to reverse the decree as irregular and direct a new trial. Union Ins. Co. v. U. S. (1867) 6 Wall. 759, 765, 18 L. Ed. 879.

§ 1028. (Jud. Code, § 46.) Capture of insurrectionary property, where cognizable.

Proceedings for the condemnation of any property, captured, whether on the high seas or elsewhere out of the limits of any judicial district, or within any district, on account of its being purchased or acquired, sold or given, with intent to use or employ the same, or to suffer it to be used or employed, in aiding, abetting, or promoting any insurrection against the Government of the United States, or knowingly so used or employed by the owner thereof, or with his consent, may be prosecuted in any district where the same may be seized, or into which it may be taken and proceedings first instituted.

R. S. § 735. Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 46, 36 Stat. 1100.
Notes of Decisions

Property subject to proceedings.Act Aug. 6, 1861, extended to all property. Union Ins. Co. v. U. S. (1867) 6 Wall. 759, 763, 18 L. Ed. 879.

§ 1029. (Jud. Code, § 47.)

Procedure.-See notes under ante, §

1027.

Cited without definite application, Titus v. U. S. (1874) 20 Wall. 475, 22 L. Ed. 400.

Certain seizures cognizable in any district into which the property is taken. Proceedings on seizures for forfeiture of any vessel or cargo entering any port of entry which has been closed by the President in pursuance of law, or of goods and chattels coming from a State or section declared by proclamation of the President to be in insurrection into other parts of the United States, or of any vessel or vehicle conveying such property, or conveying persons to or from such State or section, or of any vessel belonging, in whole or in part, to any inhabitant of such State or section, may be prosecuted in any district into which the property so seized may be taken and proceedings instituted; and the district court thereof shall have as

full jurisdiction over such proceedings as if the seizure was made in that district.

R. S. § 564. Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 47, 36 Stat. 1100.

§ 1030. (Jud. Code, § 48.) Jurisdiction in patent cases.

In suits brought for the infringement of letters patent the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, in law or in equity, in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have committed acts of infringement and have a regular and established place of business. If such suit is brought in a district of which the defendant is not an inhabitant, but in which such defendant has a regular and established place of business, service of process, summons, or subpoena upon the defendant may be made by service upon the agent or agents engaged in conducting such business in the district in which suit is brought.

Act March 3, 1897, c. 395, 29 Stat. 695. Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 48, 36 Stat. 1100.

1. Repeal of prior statutes.

Notes of Decisions

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1. Repeal of prior statutes.-This section did not repeal prior statutes, so as to oust the courts of jurisdiction in pending cases not falling within the jurisdictional limits prescribed. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. V. Great Northern Ry. Co. (1898) 88 Fed. 258, 31 C. C. A. 525.

The requirements of this section are unaffected by the Judiciary Acts of 1887, 1888. Cheatham Electric Switching D. Co. v. Transit D. Co. (C. C. 1911) 191 Fed. 727.

2. Applicability of statute to inhabitants and aliens.-This section applies only to defendants who are inhabitants of some district within the United States, and does not affect patent suits against aliens, which may be brought in any district where the defendant may be found. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Duplessis Independent Shoe Machinery Co. (C. C. 1904) 133 Fed. 930. 1 U.S.COMP.'16-79

3. Inhabitant within statute.-A corporation not incorporated in Colorado is not an inhabitant of the district of Colorado. Weller v. Pennsylvania R Co. (C. C. 1902) 113 Fed. 502.

4. Regular and established place of business.-Foreign corporation, employing Eastern representative in New York City to solicit orders to be filled from home office, held not to have a regular place of business in Southern district of New York, within Act March 3, 1897, giving federal District Court jurisdiction of patent infringement suits in the district in which defendant has such a place of business. W. S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. (1915) 35 Sup. Ct. 458, 236 U. S. 723, 59 L. Ed. 808, affirming decree (1914) 212 Fed. 156, 129 C. C. A. 12.

The temporary occupation by a corporation of another state of space in an exposition for the exhibition of its wares does not make such place a "regular and established place of business" of the corporation, within this section, so as to give a court in that district jurisdiction of a suit against it for infringement of a patent. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Parker Pen Co. (C. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 544.

Where a manufacturing corporation of Ohio, which there manufactures articles alleged to infringe, consigns them to a second corporation, doing business in New York, which is given the exclusive right to sell the same within a given territory, being charged therewith at a fixed price, but privileged to return any part of the same and receive credit therefor, and the manufacturing corporation pays the cost of advertising, furnishes catalogues, etc., the latter is a participator in the sales of such articles for use in New York, and the office of the second corporation is its regular, established place of business. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Bullock Electric Co. (C. C. 1900) 101 Fed. 587.

A railroad company which maintains

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an office in the district of Colorado, but whose agent there has authority to solicit business only, and who makes no contracts for the carriage of freight or passengers, has no "regular and established place of business" in the district. Weller v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (C. C. 1902) 113 Fed. 502.

To confer jurisdiction in a suit for infringement of a patent filed against a foreign corporation it is not necessary that the defendant should have had a regular and established place of busi-ness within the district at the time the alleged acts of infringement were committed therein, but it is sufficient if it had such place at the time of bringing suit. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Fox Typewriter Co. (C. C. 1908) '158 Fed. 476.

A corporation held to have a "place of business' in New York, and was therefore subject to suit there. Chadeloid Chemical Co. v. Chicago Wood Finishing Co. (C. C. 1910) 180 Fed. 770.

An office of a sales agent on commission, maintained at his own expense, held not to be a "regular and established place of business" of a nonresident corporation, which subjected it to suit for infringement in that district, under this section. General Electric Co. v. Best Electric Co. (D. C. 1914) 220 Fed. 347.

5. Jurisdiction of injunction suit.-So much of a bill as charges defendants with inducing patent licensees from plaintiff to sell devices embodying the patents in a manner not permitted by their licenses and praying for an injunction presents a case arising under the patent laws of which a federal court has jurisdiction under Judicial Code, §§ 24, 48, and 256 (this compilation, §§ 991, 1030, 1233). Geneva Furniture Mfg. Co. v. S. Karpen & Bros. (1915) 35 Sup. Ct. 788, 238 U. S. 254, 59 L. Ed. 1295.

6. Making foreign corporations a party. Under this section and section 1032, post, foreign corporation, which had assumed defense of patent infringement suit against user of its alleged infringing device, held to be made a party to the record. Dicks Press Guard Mfg. Co. v. Bowen (D. C. 1916) 229 Fed. 193.

7. District in which suit may or must be brought. This section restricts the jurisdiction of the circuit courts. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Duplessis Independent Shoe Machinery Co. (C. C. 1904) 133 Fed. 930. And a suit can be maintained only in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in a district in which the defendant has committed acts of infringement, and has a regular and established place of business. Shaw v. American Tobacco Co. (1901) 108 Fed. 842, 48 C. C.

G. & P.

A. 68; Bowers v. Atlantic, Co. (C. C. 1900) 104 Fed. 887. A court has jurisdiction in a district where defendant has an established place of business from which it sold the alleged infringing articles, and in which it also assembled the different parts of such articles. American Stoker Co. v. Underfeed Stoker Co. of America (C. C. 1910) 182 Fed. 642, decree affirmed (1911) 188 Fed. 314, 110 C. C. A. 292.

To sustain the jurisdiction of the court of a suit for infringement of a patent in a district wherein neither party resides or is a citizen under this section, there must have been a completed act of infringement by defendant in such district. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co. v. Republic Rubber Co. (D. C. 1912) 195 Fed. 768, decree reversed (C. C. A. 1913) 202 Fed. 1021. The infringement must not only have been committed within the district, but the defendant must also have, at the time the suit is commenced, a regular and established place of business within the district. The fact that defendant had such place of business when the infringement was committed is insufficient, where for any cause it was abandoned prior to the service of process on its former agent. Feder v. A. B. Fiedler & Sons (C. C. 1902) 116 Fed. 378.

The court for the Southern district of New York has jurisdiction of a suit for infringement of a patent against a corporation of another state under this section, where defendant has a regular and established place of business in New York City, where its agent, acting under his general authority, accepted an offer and completed a contract of sale for an infringing article, which was recognized by defendant as valid. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Philadelphia Pneumatic Tool Co. (C. C. 1902) 118 Fed. 852.

Defendant corporation was organized under the laws of New Jersey, and its manufacturing plant and general offices were in Massachusetts. It maintained an office in New York City, where orders were taken for goods, which were forwarded to the general office, and, if accepted, the goods were there delivered on board cars for shipment to the purchaser. Held, that a suit for infringement of a patent by machines so made and sold by defendant through its New York office, and shipped to the purchasers in New York City for use there, could be maintained in the Southern District of New York. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Electric Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1903) 121 Fed. 101.

A defendant not a resident of the district in which he is sued must both have a place of business and have infringed the patent in such district. United States Consol. Seeded Raisin

Co. v. Phoenix Raisin Seeding & Packing Co. (C. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 234.

To confer jurisdiction in a suit against a foreign corporation it is not necessary that the defendant should have had a regular and established place of business within the district at the time the alleged acts of infringement were committed therein, but it is sufficient if it had such place at the time of bringing suit. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Fox Typewriter Co. (C. C. 1908) 158 Fed. 476.

Where infringing articles are in use in the district in which the owner of the patent resides, though made elsewhere, he is not subject to criticism for exercising his legal right to sue the users in that district instead of going to the district of the manufacture and there bringing suit against the maker. Ryder v. Townsend (C. C. 1911) 183 Fed. 792.

Where one of two nonresident defendants, each of whom had an established place of business in the district of suit, had, prior to such suit, constructed an infringing machine for the other, and assisted the latter in installing the same for use by a third defendant within the district, there was such a completed act of infringement, or threatened infringement, by each defendant within the district, as to give the court jurisdiction. Edison v. Allis-Chalmers Co. (C. C. 1911) 191 Fed. 837.

Suit for infringement of patent held not maintainable in district where no sales had been made, except by taking orders and mailing them to the defendant to accept or reject. United Autographic Register Co. v. Egry Register Co. (D. C. 1915) 219 Fed. 637.

Foreign corporation did not infringe complainant's patent in Southern district of New York, within Act March 3, 1897, where its local representative in New York received and forwarded to its home office in Missouri order for the infringed articles thereafter shipped to New York. W. S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. (1915) 35 S. Ct. 458, 236 U. S. 723, 59 L. Ed. 808, affirming decree (1914) 212 Fed. 156, 129 C. C. A. 12. And see Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v, Great Northern Ry. Co. (1898) 88 Fed. 258, 31 C. C. A. 525, holding that prior to this section a suit for infringement could be brought in any district where valid service could be had.

8. Joinder of causes of action as affecting jurisdiction.-A claim for damages for conspiracy to injure complainant in his property rights cannot be joined in a suit in equity for an injunction and accounting for infringement of a patent for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant who could not be sued in the district for the infringement. Cheatham Electric Switching Device Co. v. Transit Development Co. (C. C. 1911) 191 Fed. 727.

9. Burden of proof of jurisdictional facts. The burden rests on complainant in a suit for infringement of a patent to establish, not only that the infringement occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but also that defendant was regularly engaged in business therein. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Fox Typewriter Co. (C. C. 1910) 181 Fed. 541.

A defendant, not an inhabitant of the district where an infringement suit is instituted, must affirmatively be shown to have committed an act of infringement and have a regularly established place of business therein. Edison v. Allis-Chalmers Co. (C. C. 1911) 191 Fed. 837.

10. Sufficiency of proof of jurisdictional facts.-A return of service of process at "the place of business" of defendant is not conclusive that such place is a regular and established place of business. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Parker Pen Co. (C. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 544.

In an action brought in the Southern district of New York against a New Jersey corporation which has a regular and established place of business in such district, proof that representatives of defendant, who had no power to bind it to terms of sale, solicited proposals for machines manufactured by it in another state, which proposals were invariably forwarded to the factory, where the sales were completed and delivery made, does not show completed acts of infringement in such district, so as to give such court jurisdiction to issue an injunction against defendant. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Electric Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1902) 116 Fed. 641.

Defendant corporation was organized under the laws of New Jersey, and its manufacturing plant and general offices were in Massachusetts. It maintained an office in New York City, where orders were taken for goods, which were forwarded to the general office, and, if accepted, the goods were there delivered on board cars for shipment to the purchaser. Held, that a suit for infringement of a patent by machines so made and sold by defendant through its New York office, and shipped to the purchasers in New York City, for use there, could be maintained in the Southern District of New York.. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Stanley Electric Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1903) 121 Fed. 101.

Infringement within the district of suit required to sustain the suit, under this section, is not made out by proof that an infringing article sold in another state bore a label with the name of defendant and the words "New York" thereon, in the absence of evidence that defendant made, used, or sold the article, or attached the label, or was engaged in the manufacture of similar ar

ticles in New York. Rumford Chemical Works v. Egg Baking Powder Co. (C. C. 1906) 145 Fed. 953.

11. Waiver of limitations as to jurisdiction. The court of the United States having full jurisdiction of patent cases, the limitation in respect to the district of residence of a defendant or of place of business and acts of infringement may be waived. General Electric Co. v. Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1903) 123 Fed. 101, decree affirmed (1904) 130 Fed. 772, 66 C. C. A. 82.

This section affects only the proceedings taken to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court, and is a matter of personal privilege. United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Phoenix Raisin Seeding & Packing Co. (C. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 234.

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12. Acts constituting waiver.The personal privilege granted by this section is waived by defendant's appearance and failure to object to the jurisdiction before answer. United States Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Phoenix Raisin Seeding & Packing Co. (C. C. 1903) 124 Fed. 234.

Where a federal court in which suit was brought was without jurisdiction, because neither plaintiff nor defendant resided in the state or district, and such want of jurisdiction was raised by demurrer, defendant did not waive the objection either by appearing at the taking of depositions and cross-examining witness without declaring its intent to insist on its objection to the jurisdiction, or by stipulating during the taking of such depositions that copies of letters and telegrams might be used by either party in lieu of the originals. Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (C. C. 1905) 139 Fed. 271.

The objection that a court is without jurisdiction of a suit for infringement of a patent because not brought in the district of which defendant is an inhabitant or a district in which infringement was committed, and defendant has a regular and established place of business, if apparent on the face of the pleadings, is waived by the filing of a general demurrer or any other act which constitutes a general appearance. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Electrose Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1907) 155 Fed. 543.

13. Time and manner of raising objections to court's jurisdiction.-In a suit against a corporation of another state, the question whether it has been shown that the article complained of, conceding it to be an infringement, was sold by defendant within the district, so as to give the court jurisdiction, may be presented by a motion to dismiss made at the close of plaintiff's proofs. Streat v. American Rubber Co. (C. C. 1902) 115 Fed. 634,

The court having full jurisdiction of patent cases, the limitation in respect to the district of residence of a defendant or a place of business and acts of infringement may be waived, and objection cannot be made after the case has proceeded beyond the pleadings, and into the taking of testimony. General Electric Co. v. Wagner Electric Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1903) 123 Fed. 101, decree affirmed (1904) 130 Fed. 772, 66 C. C. A. 82.

14. Service of process.-Where a suit was commenced for an infringement of a patent right, and process was served by attaching property of an absent defendant, this was not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. Chaffee v. Hayward (1857) 20 How. 208, 215, 15 L. Ed. 804.

This section is permissive only, and service on a corporation may be made on an officer found in the district. National Electric Signaling Co. v. Telefunken Wireless Telegraph Co. (D. C. 1912) 194 Fed. 893.

Under this section a service of process in a suit against a nonresident corporation, on one shown only to be the designated agent of the corporation under a state statute, is not sufficient to give the court jurisdiction. United States Gramophone Co. v. Columbia Phonograph Co. (C. C. 1901) 106 Fed. 220.

In a suit against a corporation, in order to authorize service on an agent, the complaint must show the place of incorporation, so as to show that defendant is not an inhabitant of the district. Weller v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (C. C. 1902) 113 Fed. 502.

15. Return of service of process as showing jurisdictional facts.-A return of service of process at "the place of business" of defendant is not conclusive that such place is a regular and established place of business, where the defendant is not an inhabitant of the district, dependent on the defendant having a regular and established place of business therein. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Parker Pen Co. (C. C. 1900) 100 Fed. 544.

16. Pleading, requisites, of bill to show jurisdiction.-An undenied allegation, in a bill for infringement against a nonresident corporation, that defendant "has a regular and established place of business" within the district, relates to the date of the suit, and establishes such fact for jurisdictional purposes. Streat v. American Rubber Co. (C. C. 1902) 115 Fed. 634.

A court is without jurisdiction where the bill shows that defendant is a nonresident of the district, and it is not alleged that any act of infringement was committed within the district, or that defendant has an office or place of business within the district, with an agent in charge on whom service could

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