ed and the alien thereafter went. U. S. v. Krsteff (D. C. 1911) 185 Fed. 201. 15. Interstate Commerce Act, violations.-Section 10, par. 3, of the interstate commerce law (Act March 2, 1889, c. 382, 25 Stat. 858), makes it a misdemeanor for any person, for himself, or as officer or agent of any corporation or company, who shall deliver property for transportation to any common carrier, subject to the provisions of the act, or for whom as consignor or consignee any such carrier shall transport property, to obtain transportation for such property at less than the regular rates, by means of false billing, classification, or weighing, or false representation of the contents of the package, etc., and provides for the prosecution of the offense in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction "within the district in which such offense was committed." Held, that such offense is not one which requires the transportation of the property to its destination before it is complete, and which may therefore, under this section, be prosecuted either in the district where the shipment is made or in that where it terminates, but that the gist of the offense is the fraudulent act by means of which the lower rate is obtained, and the offense is complete where such act has been committed, the property delivered for transportation, and the contract for the illegal rate secured, and can only be prosecuted in that district. Davis v. U. S. (1900) 104 Fed. 136, 43 C. C. A. 448.

Elkins Act Feb. 19, 1903, § 1, post, § 8597, provided that every violation of Interstate Commerce Act, post, § 8563, should be prosecuted in the district in which the violation was committed or through which the transportation may have been conducted. Held, that the last clause of such provision had no application to a carrier's violation of the act by failing to file a rate schedule with the Interstate Commerce Commission; transportation being no element of such offense. It also provided that, if a violation of the act occurs in one federal district and is completed in another, it may be dealt with in either jurisdiction, as though the offense had been actually and wholly committed therein. It was held applicable only to a "continuing offense," viz., a continuous unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy, and did not apply to a violation of the act by the carrier's failure to file a rate schedule with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, post, $ 8569, in force in and prior to 1904, requiring the filing of schedules of interstate rates with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and Elkins Act Feb. 19, 1903, § 1, post, § 8597, making the willful failure to comply therewith a misdemeanor punishable in any fed

eral court having jurisdiction of crimes within the district in which the offense was committed, the offense of failing to file a rate schedule with a commission is committed in Washington, where the commission has its office, and hence must be prosecuted there. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. U. S. (1908) 166 Fed. 267, 92 C. C. A. 331, reversing judgment U. S. v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. (D. C. 1907) 153 Fed. 630.

The signing of a "line voucher" by a freight claim agent at Philadelphia, in the Third circuit, relating to the payment of freight in the Eighth circuit, if an offense punishable under section 8574, post, is not begun in one judicial circuit and completed in another, within this section, and is therefore not cognizable in a district court in the Eighth circuit. U. S. v. Fowkes (1892) 53 Fed. 13, 3 C. C. A. 394, distinguishing In re Palliser (1890) 136 U. S. 257, 10 Sup. Ct. 1034, 34 L. Ed. 514, and Horner v. U. S. (1892) 143 U. S. 207, 12 Sup. Ct. 407, 36 L. Ed. 126.

Under the interstate commerce act, section 8574, post, making it an offense to secure the transportation of property by any carrier subject to the act at less than the regular rates by means of false billing, weights, or representations as to the contents of any package delivered to the carrier for transportation, which shall subject the offender to a fine and imprisonment on conviction in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction "within the district in which such offense was committed," the offense is fully committed by a consignor at the place where the property is delivered for transportation, the false billing made, and the illegal rate secured; and a court of another district, where the property is delivered to the consignee, has no jurisdiction of such offense. In re Belknap (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 614.

The requirement that the prosecution of crimes against the United States be had in the state or district where the offense was committed, which is made by Const. Amend. 6, is not violated by the provision of Elkins Act Feb. 19, 1903, post, § 8597, under which the offense of obtaining transportation of goods from Kansas City to New York City at less than the carrier's published rates may be tried in any federal district through which such transportation was conducted. Armour Packing Co. v. U. S. (1908) 28 Sup. Ct. 428, 209 U. S. 56, 52 L. Ed. 681 (affirming judgment [1907] 153 Fed. 1, 82 C. C. A. 135, 14 L. R. A. [N. S.] 400); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Same (1908) 28 Sup. Ct. 439, 209 U. S. 90, 52 L. Ed. 698 (affirming judgment [1907] 157 Fed. 830, 85 C. C. A. 194).

The offense of obtaining transportation of property in interstate or foreign commerce at less than the carrier's published rates, created by Elkins Act

Under the provisions of the interstate commerce act, section 8574, post, making it an offense to secure the transportation of property by any carrier subject to the act at less than the regular rates by means of false billing, weights, or representations as to the contents of any package delivered to the carrier for transportation, which shall subject the offender to a fine and imprisonment on conviction in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction "within the district in which such offense was committed," the offense is fully committed by a consignor at the place where the property is delivered for transportation, the false billing made, and the illegal rate secured; and a court of another district, where the property is delivered to the consignee, has no jurisdiction of such offense. In re Belknap (D. C. 1899) 96 Fed. 614.

16. Intoxicating liquor.-An indictment charging that the defendant exported intoxicating liquors from a port of the United States to a port of Alaska, and there landed the same, charges an offense under section 14 of the act providing a civil government for Alaska, which prohibits the importation of intoxicating liquors into the territory; and the exportation of such liquors with intent to import them into Alaska constitutes a part of the offense, which, having been begun in the United States and completed in Alaska, is cognizable in the courts of either jurisdiction, the act of congress creating the crime being a part of the supreme law of both. U. S. v. Murphy (D. C. 1898) 91 Fed. 120.

17. Larceny. A person who steals goods in one jurisdiction, and brings them into another, is guilty of larceny in the latter place. U. S. v. Tolson (C. C. 1803) Fed. Cas. No. 16,530; Same v. Haukey (C. C. 1812) Fed. Cas. No. 15,328; Same v. Mason (C. C. 1823) Fed. Cas. No. 15,738.

Where defendant was charged with larceny of the United States mails committed in Park county, in the First judicial district, he may be indicted and tried in Arapahoe county, in the same district. Beery v. U. S. (1873) 2 Colo. 186.

was their residence. Copies of such paper were deposited in the post office in Indianapolis for subscribers at Washington, D. C. Held, that an alleged criminal libel printed in such paper was published in Indiana only, and not in the District of Columbia within the sixth constitutional amendment. U. S. v. Smith (D. C. 1909) 173 Fed. 227. 19. Murder. If this section is applicable to the crime of murder, it could not apply if the stroke were given in one district, and the death ensued in some other country than the United States. Ball v. U. S. (1891) 11 Sup. Ct. 761, 767, 140 U. S. 118, 35 L. Ed. 377.

The place where the death happens, and not that where the mortal stroke is given, determines the jurisdiction of the court on an indictment for manslaughter; otherwise where the indictment is for assault and battery. U. S. v. Bladen (C. C. 1809) Fed. Cas. No. 14,605.

In the case of a homicide by shooting, the place where the shot takes effect, and not that from which it is fired, determines the jurisdiction of the offense, and, where a shot from an American vessel in a foreign harbor kills a person on board of a foreign vessel lying in such harbor, the jurisdiction of the offense belongs to the foreign government, and not to the courts of the United States, under Act 1790, c. 36, § 12. U. S. v. Davis (C. C. 1837) Fed. Cas. No. 14,932.

Evidence held, on a motion for a new trial, on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence to prove that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the court, sufficient to sustain the conclusion of the jury. U. S. v. Clein (D. C. 1911) 189 Fed. 201.

21.

Postal offenses.-One who mailed a letter containing an offer for a purchase of postage stamps on credit, in a state and district other than the state and district where the letter was received, was triable in the latter district. Palliser v. U. S. (1890) 10 Sup. Ct. 1034, 1036, 136 U. S. 257, 34 L. Ed. 514, affirming order In re Palliser (C. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 575.

The offense of delivering lottery matter through the mails is distinct from that of depositing it in the mails and is committed at the place of the delivery, and, where it was alleged that defendant deposited a lottery circular in the mail at New York, and in another count

that he caused it to be delivered through the mails to a person in Illinois, the district judge for the Southern District of New York properly issued a warrant for the removal of the defendant to Illinois for trial. Horner v. U. S. (1892) 12 Sup. Ct. 407, 409, 143 U. S. 207, 36 L. Ed. 126. Under section 10383, post, an indictment having been found in the Southern district of Illinois against defendant containing five counts, the first four of which alleged deposit of lottery matter in the mails by defendant at New York, and the last that he knowingly caused such matter to be delivered, by mail, to a person in the Southern district of Illinois, and that he had previously deposited such matter in the mails in New York, for such delivery, the offense charged in the fifth count was not completed except upon the delivery of the prohibited matter in Illinois; and the offense was, therefore, consummated and "committed" there, though begun in New York, and was, therefore,

an

offense legally triable in Illinois. U. S. v. Horner (D. C. 1891) 44 Fed. 677, order affirmed Horner v. U. S. (1892) 12 Sup. Ct. 407, 143 U. S. 207, 36 L. Ed. 126.

The offense of depositing obscene matter in the mails is completed by the act of depositing, and the indictment and prosecution must be had in the district where the matter was mailed. U. S. v. Comerford (D. C. 1885) 25 Fed. 902.

Violations of R. S. § 3894, post, § 10383, by depositing lottery circulars in the mail, or by sending them by mail, are complete without transmission or delivery of such matter, and an indictment therefor can be tried only in the district in which the matter is mailed; and so much of that section as, amended by Act Sept. 19, 1890, provides for the trial of those offenses in another district, to which such matter is carried by mail for delivery, conflicts with Const. art. 3, § 2, and also with the sixth amendment. But the offense of causing the prohibited matter to be delivered by mail, not being complete until such delivery, may be tried and punished in the district in which delivery is made. U. S. v. Conrad (C. C. 1894) 59 Fed. 458, explaining Horner v. U. S. (1892) 12 Sup. Ct. 522, 143 U. S. 570, 36 L. Ed. 266.

A prosecution under section 10385, post, prohibiting the use of the post office for promoting a scheme to defraud, can only be instituted in the district in which the fraudulent matter was placed in the post office. U. S. v. Sauer (D. C. 1898) 88 Fed. 249.

22. Receiving pay by senator or member of congress in violation of law. -In a transaction whereby a United States Senator in Washington received checks sent from St. Louis, Mo., for services rendered in violation of section 10283, post, the payment was in Washington, and there was no beginning of the offense in Missouri, so as to bring the case within this section. Burton v. U. S. (1905) 25 Sup. Ct. 243, 245, 248, 196 U. S. 283, 49 L. Ed. 482.

The physical absence of accused from Missouri when the acceptance by a St. Louis corporation of an offer to render services in consideration of the compensation forbidden by section 10283, post, was sent by mail or telegram does not deprive the circuit court for the Eastern district of Missouri of jurisdiction of the offense. Burton v. U. S. (1906) 26 Sup. Ct. 688, 702, 202 U. S. 344, 50 L. Ed. 1057, 6 Ann. Cas. 392.

24. Violation of revenue laws.Upon an indictment for removing whisky from a distillery in Pekin, Ill., and sending it to St. Louis, under a false inspector's brand, and without paying the tax, defendant contended that the whisky was taken from Illinois to St. Louis by government officials after seizing it, and that the district court for the Eastern district of Missouri therefore had no jurisdiction of the offense. Held, that if the whisky was not taken from the possession of the railroad company by which it was shipped, before it arrived in St. Louis, the court had jurisdiction. U. S. v. Sperry (D. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 16,369.

in

25. Objection to prosecution wrong district.-An objection that defendant corporation was indicted in the wrong district could not be raised by plea based on the wording of the information. U. S. v. J. L. Hopkins & Co. (D. C. 1912) 199 Fed. 649.

Cited without definite application, Putnam v. U. S. (1896) 16 Sup. Ct. 923, 931, 162 U. S. 687, 40 L. Ed. 1118; Thomas v. U. S. (1907) 156 Fed. 897, 901, 84 C. C. A. 477, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 720; U. S. v. Ehrgott (C. C. 1910) 182 Fed. 267; U. S. v. Albert Steinfeld & Co. (D. C913) 209 Fed. 904, 906.

(1101)

And

Applicability of statute in general.This section is applicable to a multitude of penalties and forfeitures concerning which there is no other provision unless to the place where the suit may be brought. Pentlarge v. Kirby (D. C. 1884) 19 Fed. 501, 506. merely affirms the common-law rule applicable to all actions ex contractu that they may be brought whereever the defendant is found and repeals pro tanto the Statutes of Elizabeth and James the First, which confine the jurisdiction in actions for penalties solely in the county where the cause of action arose. U. S. v. Craig (C. C. 1886) 28 Fed. 795, SOO.

District in which action may or must be brought.-Neither Const. art. 3, § 2, nor the sixth amendment, relating to venue in criminal cases, requires an action for a penalty incurred out of the limits of a state under the 28-hour law (Act June 29, 1906, post, §§ 8651-8654), to be brought or tried in the district where the violation occurs, and the action may be tried in the district where the defendant resides or carries on business, as provided by, post, section 8654 of that act. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. U. S. (1909) 169 Fed. 69, 94 C. C. A. 437.

An action of debt to recover a penalty for violation of the embargo laws (1807-1808) may be brought in any district where the offender may be found. Act Feb. 28, 1839. U. S. v.

Woolsey (D. C. 1845) Fed. Cas. No. 16,762.

Any court, within whose territorial jurisdiction the vessel may be at the time of the commencement of a suit for penalties under sections 8229, 8239, post, and the attachment of the vessel by the marshal, has jurisdiction. Pollock v. The Sea Bird (D. C. 1880) 3 Fed. 573.

No suit for a penalty can be maintained except in the district where the act of stamping was committed, and this section does not apply to suits under, post, § 9447. Pentlarge v. Kirby (D. C. 1884) 19 Fed. 501. An action for the penalty provided for by section 9447, post, may be brought in the district court where the offense is committed; and the jurisdiction of the court does not depend on the residence of the parties. Winne v. Snow (D. C. 1884) 19 Fed. 507. And this section is limited by section 9447, post, to the district where the offense was committed, though applicable when the defendant is found within the district where the offense was committed. Hat-Sweat Mfg. Co. v. Davis Sewing Mach. Co. (D. C. 1887) 31 Fed. 294, 296.

Cited without definite application, U. S. v. Matthews (1899) 19 Sup. Ct. 413, 415, 173 U. S. 381, 43 L. Ed. 738; Davey v. U. S. (1913) 208 Fed. 237, 125 C. C. A. 437; U. S. v. Payne (D. C. 1884) 22 Fed. 426, 427.

Notes of

Statute enlarging or affecting general jurisdiction of the court.-This section extended the part of Act of May 4, 1858, which is embodied in R. S. § 741, incorporated in Jud. Code, § 54, post, § 1036, to the case of a defendant residing out of the state, but interested in property of a local nature within the jurisdiction which plaintiff was seeking to subject to a lien, but did not otherwise enlarge or affect the general jurisdiction of the court in a suit of a

Decisions

1. "High seas" defined.

2. Lawful seizure essential to jurisdiction. 3. Jurisdiction on restoration of property. 4. District in which proceedings may be brought.

5. District Court of Alaska.

6. intervention by state authority.

7.

8.

Property subject to statute.
Procedure.

9. Trial by jury.

10. Appeal.

1. "High seas" defined.-The part of the sea below low-water mark, and not within the body of any country, is the "high seas" within Act 1789, § 9. The Abby (C. C. 1818) Fed. Cas. No. 14; Gedney v. L'Amistad (D. C. 1840) Fed. Cas. No. 5,294a; Johnson v. TwentyOne Bales, etc. (C. C. 1814) Fed. Cas. No. 7,417; The Martha Anne (D. C. 1843) Fed. Cas. No. 9,146; Thackarey v. The Farmer of Salem (D. C. 1835) Fed. Cas. No. 13,852; U. S. v. The Julia Lawrence (D. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 15,502. And see notes under post, § 10445.

2. Lawful seizure essential to jurisdiction.-Lawful seizure is essential to sustain jurisdiction. U. S. v. Larkin (1908) 28 Sup. Ct. 417, 419, 208 U. S. 333, 52 L. Ed. 517.

3. Jurisdiction on restoration of property. Where a seizure is voluntarily abandoned, and the property is restored before the libel or information is filed and allowed, the district court has no jurisdiction of the cause. The Ann (1815) 9 Cranch, 289, 290, 3 L. Ed. 734.

4. District in which proceedings may be brought. The trial of seizures under Act Feb. 18, 1793, post, § 8135, is to be in the judicial district in which the seizure was made without regard to the district where the forfeitures accrued. Keene v. U. S. (1809) 5 Cranch, 304, 3 L. Ed. 108.

This provision, as originally enacted in section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, marks out the general jurisdiction of the district courts and of the several district courts in relation to each other in cases of seizures on waters of the United States, and, if made within the waters of one district, the jurisdiction attaches to the court of that district, but where the seizure is made on the high seas, the jurisdiction is conferred on no particular district court, and it may be exercised by the court of any district into which the property is carried and there proceeded against. The Merino (1824) 9 Wheat. 391, 401, 6 L. Ed. 118.

Jurisdiction of a seizure on the high

seas belongs to the court of the district into which the property is brought. The Abby (C. C. 1818) Fed. Cas. No. 14; The Peterhoff (D. C. 1863) Fed. Cas. No. 11,024, citing The Merino, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 391.

A vessel lying, when seized, a half mile from shore off Colloden Point, Long Island, though in Long Island Sound, is on the high seas, and the court into whose district she is first carried has jurisdiction. The fact that persons were temporarily on shore at the time does not affect the jurisdiction. Gedney v. L'Amistad (D. C. 1840) Fed. Cas. No. 5,294a.

Where an American vessel is seized within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign power, the law does not connect that trespass with a subsequent seizure by the civil authority under the process of the district court, so as to annul the proceedings of that court against the vessel. The Richmond v. U. S. (1815) 9 Cranch, 102, 104, 3 L. Ed. 670.

A libel in rem in the case of seizure and forfeiture of a vessel for violating the laws relating to the slave trade may be prosecuted in any district of the United States where the property is found. The Slavers (1864) 2 Wall. 383, 401, 17 L. Ed. 911; The Washington (D. C. 1855) Fed. Cas. No. 17,222.

The place of seizure, and not the place of committing the offense, gives the court jurisdiction in cases of forfeiture in rem. The Octavia (C. C. 1813) Fed. Cas. No. 10,422; U. S. v. Three Hundred and Ninety-Six Barrels of Distilled Spirits (D. C. 1866) Fed. Cas. No. 16,502.

In a case of seizure, the place of seizure, and not that of the commission of the act on account of which the seizure is made, determines the jurisdiction; and the clause in section 4499 of the Revised Statutes, post, § 8275, that vessels offending in certain ways "may be seized and proceeded against by way of libel in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the offense," does not change this rule; the court in whose district a seizure is made acquiring thereby jurisdiction of the subject-matter or cause of suit. The Idaho (D. C. 1886) 29 Fed. 187.

The district court has no jurisdiction in cases of libel for seizures made in another district from that where the proceedings are instituted. The Little Ann (C. C. 1810) Fed. Cas. No. 8,397.

5. District Court of Alaska.-Under R. S. § 563 (ante, § 991), and this section, defining the admiralty jurisdiction