structure, capable of being used for transportation, whether intended to be or actually used for that purpose. Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat (D. C. 1909) 169 Fed. 895, 900. 2. Manner of propulsion.-A vessel is none the less one on account of the manner of her propulsion, whether by oars, sails, or steam. The Devonshire (C. C. 1882) 13 Fed. 39, 41. The section includes sailing yachts. U. S. v. Holmes (C. C. 1900) 104 Fed. 884, 886. A navigable structure, intended for the transportation of a permanent cargo, that has to be towed in order to navigate, is a vessel. Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat (D. C. 1909) 169 Fed. 895, 900. 3. Barges, canal boats, etc.-Barges or canal boats, etc., used in transportation, though having no masts or sails or motive power of their own, are vessels, within admiralty jurisdiction. The Dick-Keys (C. C. 1863) Fed. Cas. No. 3,898; The Kate Tremaine (D. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 7,622; The Wilmington (D. C. 1880) 48 Fed. 566; Disbrow v. The Walsh Brothers (D. C. 1888) 36 Fed. 607. Coal barges, which are mere open boxes, floated downstream, and usually sold for lumber at the end of the voyage, are not ships or vessels in the maritime sense of the term. Jones v. Coal Barges (C. C. 1855) Fed. Cas. No. 7,458; Wood v. Two Barges (C. C. 1891) 46 Fed. 204. A claim against a barge for wharfage is cognizable in admiralty. Ex parte Easton (1877) 95 U. S. 68, 74, 24 L. Ed. 373. 4. Scows.-Scows, having no propelling power of their own, held vessels. The General Cass (D. C. 1871) Fed. Cas. No. 5,307; Endner v. Greco (D. C. 1880) 3 Fed. 411. The section includes a scow, 110 feet long and 34 feet wide, without motive power of its own, employed in carrying mud from a harbor to the dumping ground. In re Eastern Dredging Co. (D. C. 1905) 138 Fed. 942, 943. 5. Rafts.-A raft made of cross-ties, used as a convenient mode of bringing them to market, manned by a pilot, crew, and cook, who lived and had shelter thereon during the voyage, which lasted many days, and propelled by the tides and by poles and large oars, is a vessel, within this section, so as to give jurisdiction to admiralty of a libel in rem against it for a collision on navigable waters. Seabrook v. Raft of Railroad Cross-Ties (D. C. 1889) 40 Fed. 596. A steam tug towing a raft of logs must carry the lights required by law, though such raft may not be strictly a vessel, as defined by this section. The Annie S. Cooper (D. C. 1891) 48 Fed. 703, 704. 6. Floating elevator.-A former canal boat, on which had been built an elevating apparatus for hoisting grain, for transferring grain from one vessel to another, though without motive power of its own or capacity for cargo other than its elevator, is nevertheless a vessel, a subject of maritime lien. The Hezekiah Baldwin (D. C. 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 6,449. 7. Pump boat.-A pump boat, which is a floating structure equipped with engine, boiler, pumps, pipes, and capstans, used for pumping out coal barges, capable of being moved on the water by ropes attached to its capstans or by being towed, is a vessel within this section, and subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat (D. C. 1909) 169 Fed. 895. 8. Dredges, etc.-A steam dredge, without motive power of its own, but capable of being towed from place to place, is a vessel, within the definitions given by this section. Saylor v. Taylor (1896) 77 Fed. 476, 477, 23 C. C. A. 343; McRae v. Bowers Dredging Co. (C. C. 1898) 86 Fed. 344, 347; The Pioneer (D. C. 1886) 30 Fed. 206; Aitcheson v. The Endless Chain Dredge (D. C. 1889) 40, Fed. 253, 254; The Atlantic (D. C. 1893) 53 Fed. 607, 608. A steam dredge and scows used in connection therewith are vessels, within the admiralty jurisdiction. The Alabama (C. C. 1884) 22 Fed. 449; Id. (D. C. 1884) 19 Fed. 544; The Starbuck (D. C. 1894) 61 Fed. 502. A marine pump, used to suck mud from the bottom or from scows and force it on the adjacent land, resting, while at work, on piles driven into the ground, and weighted with heavy ballast to keep it in place though capable of being towed from place to place, has none of the characteristics of a ⚫ vessel. The Big Jim (D. C. 1894) 61 Fed. 503. A steam dredge and the scows used in connection with it are each a vessel within this section, and, as such, not subject to duty under the Tariff Act of 1894. The International (D. C. 1897) 83 Fed. 840, affirmed (1898) 89 Fed. 484, 32 C. C. A. 258. A hydraulic steam dredge, operating afloat, by sucking up material from the bottom and discharging it through adjustable pipes on adjacent land is a ship or vessel, within the admiralty ju⚫ risdiction. Bowers Hydraulic Dredging Co. v. Federal Contracting Co. (D. C. 1906) 148 Fed. 290, 294. See In re Hydraulic Steam Dredge No. 1 (1897) 80 Fed. 545, 25 C. C. A. 628. 9. Pile drivers.-A pile driver, consisting of a floating platform carrying a derrick, engine, and pile driving apparatus, having a stern wheel, by which it could propel itself, and a rudder and steering wheel, but in its existing condition not fitted for purposes of transportation, is not such a vessel as to be the subject of admiralty jurisdiction. Pile Driver E. O. A. (D. C. 1894) 69 Fed. 1005. A flatboat, with a pile driver and its engine erected thereon, mainly used in constructing bulkheads for the erection of channel lights, but also employed in transporting materials used in the work, being towed by a tug for that purpose, is to be classed as a vessel, subject to maritime jurisdiction. Lawrence v. Flatboat (D. C. 1897) 84 Fed. 200, affirmed Southern Log Cart & Supply Co. v. Lawrence (1898) 86 Fed. 907, 30 C. C. A. 480. 10. Wharfboats, landing floats, etc.A float, supporting a floor and a house, used to store oars and sails of small boats landing at it, and as a means of egress from there to the wharf at which it was moved, and thence to the shore, being stationary, and never employed in transportation upon the water, cannot be held to be a ship or vessel. Woodruff v. One Covered Scow (D. C. 1887) 30 Fed. 269. A floating structure, designed to be moored alongside a wharf, SO that carts could be driven over it with refuse to be dumped into boats lying alongside, which was mainly stationary, though capable of being towed from one wharf to another, is not a vessel within the meaning of the maritime law. Ruddiman v. A Scow Platform (D. C. 1889) 38 Fed. 158. 11. Dry docks.-A floating dry dock, being a fixed structure, not used for the purpose of navigation, is not a ship or vessel, such as to be a subject of salvage service. Cope v. Vallette Dry Dock Co. (1887) 119 U. S. 625, 7 Sup. Ct. 336, 337, 30 L. Ed. 501; § 4. (R. S. § 4.) Vehicle. Snyder v. A Floating Dry-Dock (D. C. 1884) 22 Fed. 685. A dry dock held not a vessel, within R. S. §§ 4283-4285, post, §§ 8021-8023, providing for limitation of liability on behalf of the owners of any ship or vessel. Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co. (D. C. 1915) 219 Fed. 763. 12. Dismantled vessels.-A steamboat, stripped of her boiler, engine, and paddle wheels, and fitted up and used as a saloon and hotel, is not, while being towed to another place, to be there used in a similar way, engaged in commerce or navigation, so as to be liable in rem in admiralty for services rendered to it. The Hendrick Hudson (D. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 6,355. A dismantled steamboat, moored on a navigable river, and undergoing alterations and repairs to fit her for use as a wharfboat, such use being in aid of commerce and navigation, is liable in rem to a charge for salvage. The Old Natchez (D. C. 1881) 9 Fed. 476. An old steamboat, from which the boilers, wheel, engines, and machinery had been removed, and which had been changed into a pleasure barge for the transportation of excursion parties, having no independent means of propulsion, but intended to be towed by a towboat, is a vessel, within the meaning of the term as used in Pennsylvania statutes and in the maritime law, and as such subject to a maritime lien. The City of Pittsburgh (D. C. 1891) 45 Fed. 699. Cited without definite application, The Conqueror (1897) 17 Sup. Ct. 510, 513, 166 U. S. 110, 41 L. Ed. 937; U. S. v. One Gasoline Launch (1904) 133 Fed. 42, 43, 66 C. C. A. 148 (dissenting opinion). The word "vehicle" includes every description of carriage or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on land. Act July 18, 1866, c. 201, § 1, 14 Stat. 178. § 5. (R. S. § 5.) Company; association. The word "company" or "association," when used in reference to a corporation, shall be deemed to embrace the words "successors and assigns of such company or association," in like manner as if these last-named words, or words of similar import, were expressed. Act July 25, 1866, c. 242, § 9, 14 Stat. 241. § 6. (R. S. § 6.) Seal. In all cases where a seal is necessary by law to any commission, process, or other instrument provided for by the laws of Congress, it shall be lawful to affix the proper seal by making an impression. therewith directly on the paper to which such seal is necessary; which shall be as valid as if made on wax or other adhesive substance. Act May 31, 1854, c. 60, § 2, 10 Stat. 297. Impression on paper or parchment.Any forcible indentation on a parchment, though it be not wax, wafer, or a scrawl, may be a seal, if so intended. Follett v. Rose (C. C. 1844) Fed. Cas. No. 4,900. A seal impressed on paper is equiva lent to sealing with wax. Roberts v. Pillow (C. C. 1851) Fed. Cas. No. 11,909. Scroll or other mark.-The word "Seal" in a scroll is a sufficient seal. U. S. v. Hedges (C. C. 1812) Fed. Cas. No. 15,339. The common-law rule, that a seal must consist of wax, or some tenacious substance, does not apply to a bond taken under an act of congress; and, under the general usage, a scroll is sufficient to make the instrument a sealed instrument. U. S. v. Stephenson's Ex'rs (C. C. 1839) Fed. Cas. No. 16,386. A scroll made with a pen, inclosing the letters "L. S.," will be held to be a seal, if so intended, though not expressly stated in the instrument. Burton v. Le Roy (C. C. 1879) Fed. Cas. No. 2,217. A mark with ink, acknowledged by the maker of a deed, held sufficient to create a specialty. U. S. v. Coffin (D. C. 1799) Fed. Cas. No. 14,823. Joint seal.-There cannot be a joint seal for diverse persons not incorporated. Tingey v. Carroll (C. C. 1829) Fed. Cas. No. 14,056. Official seal.-Any impression upon sealing wax or wafer adhering to the paper, without any device or words indicative of the particular official, is evidence of the official character of the officer signing. In re Phillips (D. C.) 1876) Fed. Cas. No. 11,098. Evidence and determination of fact.Person acquainted with parchment patents may be examined, as to the traces of a seal, on the question whether such a writing had been originally sealed. Follett v. Rose (C. C. 1844) Fed. Cas. No. 4,900. Where there is doubt whether an instrument has been sealed, the fact is properly referable to the jury. Id. Cited without definite application, Clough v. U. S. (C. C. 1891) 47 Fed. 791, 795, modified 55 Fed. 374, 5 C. C. A. 140. CHAPTER TWO Form and Enactment of Statutes and Effect of Repeals Sec. 7. Enacting clause. 8. Resolving clause. 9. No enacting words after first sec tion. 10. Numbering and frame of sections. 11. Title of appropriation acts. § 7. (R. S. § 7.) Enacting clause. 14. Repeals not to affect liabilities, unless, etc. The enacting clause of all acts of Congress hereafter enacted shall be in the following form: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled." Act Feb. 25, 1871, c. 71, § 1, 16 Stat. 431. § 8. (R. S. § 8.) Resolving clause. The resolving clause of all joint resolutions shall be in the following form: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled." Act Feb. 25, 1871, c. 71, § 1, 16 Stat. 431. § 9. (R. S. § 9.) No enacting words after first section. No enacting or resolving words shall be used in any section of an act or resolution of Congress except in the first. Act Feb. 25, 1871, c. 71, § 1, 16 Stat. 431. § 10. (R. S. § 10.) Numbering and frame of sections. Each section shall be numbered, and shall contain, as nearly as may be, a single proposition of enactment. Act Feb. 25, 1871, c. 71, § 1, 16 Stat. 431. § 11. (R. S. § 11.) Title of appropriation acts. The style and title of all acts making appropriations for the support of Government shall be as follows: "An act making appropriations, (here insert the object) for the year ending June thirtieth (here insert the calendar year.)" Act Aug. 26, 1842, c. 207, § 2, 5 Stat. 537. No act of Congress was to be construed to make an appropriation out of the Treasury of the United States unless such act, in specific terms, declares an appropriation to be made, by Act June 30, 1906, c. 3914, § 9, post, § 6763. The committees of Congress in reporting general appropriation bills were required, as far as practicable, to follow the general order and arrangement of the respective appropriation acts for the year preceding, by a provision of Act June 22, 1906, c. 3514, § 4, post, § 6672. § 12. (Act March 2, 1895, c. 177, § 1.) Printing in lieu of engrossing and enrolling of bills and joint resolutions. Hereafter the engrossing and enrolling of bills and joint resolutions of either House of Congress shall be done in accordance with the concurrent resolution adopted by the Fifty-third Congress at its first session, November first, eighteen hundred and ninetythree: Provided, That during the last six days of a session such engrossing and enrolling of bills and joint resolutions may be done. otherwise than as prescribed in said concurrent resolution, upon the order of Congress by concurrent resolution. (28 Stat. 769.) This was a provision of the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation act for the fiscal year 1896, cited above. The concurrent resolution referred to in this provision was as follows: "Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That, beginning with the first day of the regular session of the Fifty-third Congress, to wit, the first Monday in December, 1893, in lieu of being engrossed, every bill and joint resolution in each House of Congress at the stage of the consideration at which a bill or joint resolution is at present engrossed, shall be printed, and such printed copy shall take the place of what is now known as, and shall be called the engrossed bill, or resolution as the case may be, and it shall be dealt with in the same manner as engrossed bills and joint resolutions are dealt with at present, and shall be sent in printed form, after passing, to the other House, and in that form shall be dealt with by that House, and its officers in the same manner in which engrossed bills and joint resolutions are now dealt with. "Resolved, That when such bill or joint resolution shall have passed both Houses, it shall be printed on parchment, which print shall be in lieu of, what is now known as, and shall be called, the enrolled bill, or joint resolution as the case may be, and shall be dealt with in the same manner in which enrolled bills and joint resolutions are now dealt with. "Resolved, That the Joint Committee on Printing is hereby charged with the duty of having the foregoing resolutions properly executed, and is empowered to take such steps as may be necessary to carry them into effect, and provide for the speedy execution of the printing herein contemplated." Conc't Res. Nov. 1, 1893, 28 Stat. Appendix, 5. The printing and distribution of copies of bills and resolutions were provided for by the Printing and Binding Act of Jan. 12, 1895, c. 23, § 55, as amended by Act Jan. 20, 1905, c. 50, § 2, post, § 7025. § 13. (R. S. § 12.) Repeal not to revive former act. Whenever an act is repealed, which repealed a former act, such former act shall not thereby be revived, unless it shall be expressly so provided. Act Feb. 25, 1871, c. 71, § 3, 16 Stat. 431. Previous rule.-Before the enactment of this provision, by Act Feb. 25, 1871, c. 71, § 3, the repeal of a repealing act restored the law as it was before the passage of the latter act, without formal words for that purpose, unless the effect of such repeal was limited by its own terms, or by some general statutes to the abrogation of the act repealed. U. S. v. Philbrick (1887) 7 Sup. Ct. 413, 416, 120 U. S. 52, 30 L. Ed. 559. No retroactive effect.-The provision of the act of 1871, re-enacted in this section, was not retroactive. U. S. v. Philbrick (1887) 7 Sup. Ct. 413, 416, 120 U. S. 52, 30 L. Ed. 559. Rule of construction merely.-This section prescribes a rule of construc tion and does nothing more. Jacksonville, P. & M. R. Co. v. U. S. (1886) 21 Ct. Cl. 155. Implied repeal of repealing act.-A statute providing that the repeal of a repealing act shall not revive the original act applies to cases of repeal by implication. Milne v. Huber (C. C. 1843) Fed. Cas. No. 9,617. Expiration of repealing act.-When a statute contains an absolute affirmative repeal of an antecedent statute, or part of it, the expiration of the subsequent statute by its own limitation will not revive the repealed act. U. S. v. Twenty-Five Cases of Cloths (D. C. 1840) Fed. Cas. No. 16,563. On the expiration of a repealing act by its own limitation, the act repealed is revived; this section having no application to such a case. (1892) 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 466, 467. Cited without definite application, Kohlsaat v. Murphy (1877) 96 U. S. 153, 154, 24 L. Ed. 844; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. U. S. (1888) 8 Sup. § 14. (R. S. § 13.) Repeals not to affect liabilities, unless, etc. Act Feb. 25, 1871, c. 71, § 4, 16 Stat. 432. Previous rule.-The repeal of a statute pending proceedings to enforce a penalty or forfeiture under it barred further proceedings, where there was no saving clause. Union Iron Co. V. Pierce (C. C. 1869) Fed. Cas. No. 14,367; Eastman v. Clackamas County (C. C. 1887) 32 Fed. 24, 33; U. S. v. Six Fermenting Tubs (D. C. 1868) Fed. Cas. No. 16,296. By the repeal of an act without any reservation of its penalties, all criminal proceedings taken under it fell. U. S. v. Tynen (1870) 11 Wall. 88, 95, 20 L. Ed. 153; U. S. v. Reisinger (1888) 128 U. S. 398, 9 Sup. Ct. 99, 100, 32 L. Ed. 480. After the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty could be enforced nor punishment inflicted for violations of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision was made for that purpose by statute. Yeaton v. U. S. (1809) 5 Cranch, 281, 3 L. Ed. 101. An offense against a temporary act could not be punished, after the expiration of the act, unless a particular provision was made by law for the purpose. The Irresistible (1822) 7 Wheat. 551, 5 L. Ed. 520. An indictment could not be sustained under a statute which had been repealed without any saving clause. U. S. v. Passmore (C. C. 1804) Fed. Cas. No. 16,005, 4 Dall. 372, 374, 1 L. Ed. 871. An offense created by law fell by a repeal of the law without reservation of jurisdiction. Anonymous (C. C. 1804) Fed. Cas. No. 475. Where a statute giving the right to recover money paid under an illegal contract is repealed, a pending suit and the cause of action involved in it fall with the repeal. Kimbro v. Colgate (C. C. 1864) Fed. Cas. No. 7,778. Particular saving clauses.-An action commenced on the day a law was repealed was within a saving clause of all actions commenced before the passage of the repealing act. re Ankrim (C. C. 1843) Fed. Cas. No. 395. In The repealing clause of Act March 2, 1863, saved prosecution under Act March 3, 1823, for offenses previously committed. U. S. v. Kohnstamm (C. C. 1864) Fed. Cas. No. 15,542. An offense punishable by fine and imprisonment, under Act Jan. 9, 1809, was not saved from repeal by the saving clause in Act June 28, 1809, § 2. U. S. v. Mann (C. C. 1812) Fed. Cas. No. 15,718. The repealing clause of Act Jan. 11, 1868, did not operate to prevent conviction and punishment for an offense under Act July 13, 1866, § 42. In re Callicot (C. C. 1870) Fed. Cas. No. 2,323. Operation and effect of section as to subsequent repeals and saving clauses. -As this section has only the force of a statute, its provisions cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested, either expressly or by necessary implication, in a subsequent enactment. But, while this is true, its provisions are to be treated as if incorporated in and as a part of subsequent enactments, and therefore, under the general principles of construction requiring, if possible, that effect be given to all the parts of a law, the section must be enforced unless, either by express declaration or necessary implication, arising from the terms of the law as a whole, it results that the legislative mind will be set at naught by giving effect to the provisions of this section. Great Northern R. Co. v. U. S. (1908) 28 Sup. Ct. 313, 316, 208 U. S. 452, 52 L. Ed. 567; Hertz v. Woodman (1910) 30 Sup. Ct. 621, 625, 218 U. S. 205, 54 L. Ed. 1001. This section was not an attempt by the Congress which enacted it to curtail the authority of succeeding Congresses by limiting in advance the effect to be given to their enactments, but was the substitution of a new rule of construction to be observed by the courts with respect to statutes to be thereafter enacted which is to be followed until abrogated by some later Congress. U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C. 1907) 148 Fed. 719; (D. C. 1907) U. S. v. Chicago. St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 151 Fed. 84, |