General ELLIS. Mr. Bennett, the difference in the FB-111 and the B-1 is fractional in many respects. The FB-111 is as good a penetrator, as fast a penetrator, as low level a penetrator as the B-1. There are certain technical improvements in the B-1 that have not been incorporated into the FB at this point.

As I indicated in my statement, we are concerned about the availability of as much force as possible as soon as possible. That is the reason for our recommendation.

Mr. BENNETT. I understand.

General Ellis, the costs associated with modernizing our strategic forces is heavy, as we know. If you had to choose between a new manned penetrating bomber with cruise missile carrying capability or the proposed M-X system, which would you prefer and why?

General ELLIS. That is an either/or question, Mr. Bennett. The requirement for a Triad which includes, of course, the submarines, the ICBM, the new M-X, and the manned bomber, is based on over 30 years of tried and true deterrence.

I would first like to say that in my opinion it is not an either/or situation, it is mandatory, and I think this administration and every preceding administration has insisted that we maintain the Triad.

But having said that, there are certain requirements in the ICBM force, that it is mandatory we meet. We know the vulnerability of the Minuteman is serious and something must be done. M-X is the first priority program in my opinion of all forces in the strategic field. today.

Mr. BENNETT. Land based ICBM's offer certain unique advantages in our Triad. Would you describe why those advantages are not now inherent in the sea-based missiles and the possibility of building those advantages into sea-based?

General ELLIS. At this point in time there are certain advantages, technical advantages, reaction advantages, accuarcy advantages, high state of alert advantages, that we cannot obtain either in the bomber force or in the submarine force.

Mr. BENNETT. Do you think you could work them in?

General ELLIS. Our ICBM force is on 98-plus percent alert, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. It would be extremely difficult to maintain either bombers or submarines at that high a level. Mr. BEARD. Would you yield?

General, could you comment, on the effectiveness of the M-X system in the absence of SALT, that is, in the absence of any arms control agreement. Is the M-X and its basing mode the preferred solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem?

General ELLIS. Mr. Beard, in my classified statement I have an outline of those steps I think are required in any M-X force of the future. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. CHARLES WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to compliment General Ellis for coming here and presenting himself to the committee. I know that it may get him in the doghouse with the Secretary of Defense but I appreciate your honesty and your willingness to come and talk to us about the matters that you are.

General you indicated that in the case of the FB-111B and C, you would have to have new engines put in place, you would have to have

enlarged weapon capacity and a greatly increased range. Really, wouldn't you be almost rebuilding the 111 and there will be considerable time required in order to accomplish this, wouldn't there?

General ELLIS. Yes, sir. We are not the experts in production, Mr. Wilson. We have gone to those units in the Air Force who are and they have run out a comparative time period for this modification in detail plus that of the B-1 production and they have given us the results.

Mr. CHARLES WILSON. I have talked to the Rockwell people and they have advised me that they can have a production line ready by 1983 for the B-1. I don't know how long it takes to build 100 B-1's, but the production line is ready to move immediately and as quickly as the Air Force wants to go, by 1983 if the program were to be

restarted.

Doesn't that take care of the time problem that you are addressing! General ELLIS. Mr. Wilson, after we get into a closed session I would like to show you comparative production charts on the B-1 and FB-111 as provided by Air Force Systems Command.

Mr. CHARLES WILSON. What is your opinion about the remodification programs going on for the B-52? I assume you would prefer getting into either the 111 or B-1 as quickly as possible. It seems to me that we have figures that show the modification program for the B-52 as a cruise missile carrier is getting close to $20 billion. That is not counting any of the costs for the missiles, and they are having tremendous problems with the missiles in the testing program. The cartoonists are having a field day in California with the way they have been going in circles instead of straight.

I wonder if it isn't your belief-I think you have indicated sothe penetrating bomber is the most dependable course to follow at this point?

General ELLIS. I consider the ALCM to be an integral part of the future force structure. Our point is that the penetrator is still required even when the ALCM system comes on line.

Mr. CHARLES WILSON. General, Secretary Brown, when he was Secretary of the Air Force-we have used this example so many times— of course at that time he was trying to sell the B-1 to us, that the B-52 could not last beyond 1975. Now they are talking about taking it into the year 2000.

I wonder was that an accurate statement at that time or do you honestly feel that the B-52 can be used in competition with the Soviets up to the year 2000 as a viable weapon system?

General ELLIS. I think all I could say in open session, Mr. Wilson, is that the B-52 as an ALCM carrier will satisfy our requirement, it is SAC's belief, subject to a couple of tests that must be run, and I can identify them later, into the nineties.

We believe, if the Soviet defense develops as we think it is going to develop, that to maintain it as a penetrator longer than the post-1985 period and shortly thereafter would be very chancy.

Mr. CHARLES WILSON, I want to compliment you again on the fine job you are doing and the courage you have displayed. Hopefully your decision will be the B-1 instead of the 111.

General ELLIS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Carr.

Mr. CARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank you as well, General, and thank you for your courage in standing up to the B-1 advocates and siding, at least, although I might disagree with you on the manned penetrator, that the problem if it exists is in the near term and if you need that alternative you need to do it as soon as possible and not pie-in-the-sky far out years, even though if you gave me a choice just on a flyoff and it had nothing to do with anything else, I think the B-1 is a marvel of our ingenuity, and I don't want to put it down at all, but I agree with you if you assume a manned penetrator is necessary, and you take a look at the charts that this committee looked at just yesterday with our Director of Central Intelligence, the problem certainly is near, not far, and I think the judgment with regard to the near-term option of FB-111 is far superior to the out year B-1. Leaving that aside, you paint a pretty dire picture here, General, and I wonder, as you look at the environment from your perspective, let me ask you this:

Would you rather be a commander of the Strategic Air Command for the next 5 years with a SALT agreement or without it?

General ELLIS. I would rather be a Commander of the SAC for the next 5 years, which I won't be, but I would rather be Commander with SALT than without it.

Mr. CARR. In other words, rejecting the SALT agreement is not going to do anything to reverse the trends that you have cited, but could exacerbate them, perhaps?

General ELIIS. That is my feeling, yes, sir.

Mr. CARR. I would have hoped in light of the important environment that you have to operate in that your statement would have voluntarily included a mention of SALT, because I think it is part of the framework.

General ELLIS. In my classified statement, the last page and a half, that subject is addressed.

Mr. CARR. I thank you for your directing me to that. I will read it. On page 4 here, about midway down the page, you say:

However, it does mean that the Soviets can undertake peripheral political and military actions without considering nuclear consequences to the same degree that was necessary in the early and middle years of the last decade.

I think those are very artful words and I think they are instructive. However, I would like to see if you could put some content to that. When I read that I wondered if you were meaning if we had the kind of nuclear superiority, strategic superiority that we had over the Soviets, say, in the mid-sixties, that Afghanistan wouldn't happen or would still have happened, although they would have probably considered the nuclear consquences less, or can you apply that to the real world situation that everyone is looking at today?

General ELLIS. Obviously that judgment is subjective, but I make that judgment based on the experience of 20 to 30 years of strategic superiority. I am mindful of the fact that when the line was drawn in the late forties and early fifties, the Soviets did not expand their activities in a large way outside of the generally recognized Warsaw Pact area.

I also remember in 1962, in the Cuban missile crisis, when they undertook an adventurist course, whatever you want to call it, then we were able to stop it.

I also think in 1973 in the Middle East case, the administration increased our readiness in all areas. The action that was anticipated did not happen.

Whether or not that would have stopped the Soviets, if we had that same superiority, from going into Afghanistan, is obviously a matter of conjecture. I would suggest that they would have thought about it perhaps longer and harder if it had been in the early seventies or in the sixties.

Mr. CARR. Thank you, General.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Ellis, I thank you for your testimony. I think it is important that we get as much of this as we can into the public record so that the American people can see just what our true condition is like. I am in favor of having things in executive session when they need to be, but I think the American people need to know more about our critical situation we are in.

When the production of the B-1 bomber was deferred, or whatever you want to call it, the reason given was that we are going to have a cruise missile and, as a matter of fact, an attempt was made to compare the cruise missile and B-1 bomber as alternative weapon systems, and I have never been able to quite get that straight in my mind because I don't think they are alternative weapons.

I always thought that a cruise missile had to be carried, at least part way, to its objective by either an airplane or a ship or some mobile way of transportation.

In any event, how long will it be before we will have the cruise missile deployed and in our inventory?

General ELLIS. We should have an initial alert capability in the latter part of 1981 and we should have our first full squadron operational in the latter part of 1982.

Mr. SPENCE. That is a best case estimate. I understand things aren't going too well right now with a lot of our R. & D.

General ELLIS. I am not a research and development man, but I have watched a lot of test programs over the years, Mr. Spence, and in my opinion, we are not having any more trouble with that program than we have with the average high technology program.

Mr. SPENCE. Assuming they are deployed and on line by that time, and they will be carried by the B-52's how many would they carry, how many would each B-52 carry?

General ELLIS. Eventually each one will carry 20.

Mr. SPENCE. And the B-1 would carry how many?

General ELLIS. More than that. I am not sure of the exact number. Mr. SPENCE. The question I wanted to get down to is could the cruise missile take the place of the B-1 bomber, as was presented to us, or do we have to have an airplane, B-1 bomber or some other type carrier, to carry the cruise missile ?

General ELLIS. If I can take a moment and go back to the time of the 1977 B-1 decision, Mr. Spence.

Mr. SPENCE. That would be good.

General ELLIS. As I will show you on some charts when we get into closed session, and as I said in my opening statement, SAC agrees that we had essential equivalence at that time. Although the Air Force and SAC recommended the B-1 to the President for decision, in our opinion, with essential equivalence then, cost became a very decisive element, I can't argue with the way the decision was made due to costs at that time based on the intelligence estimates and the state of equivalence between the two superpowers.

In retrospect, we made bad guesses on what the Soviets were going to do. When I say we, I mean the entire country. Now that we know what the situation is, it is time to move forward. We say that we need the cruise missile and we need the penetrator.

Mr. SPENCE. Well, I don't know if bad guesses were made by the entire country, because the Congress voted for the B-1 bomber, I don't know how many times after the decision was made to start production, maybe five different times. This Congress even voted in favor of it, and I think at least some people were guessing pretty close that we still needed it.

General, strategically, from what you say, and you say everything but the bottom line, I guess, are we inferior to the Soviet Union today? General ELLIS. I am trying not to equivocate.

Mr. SPENCE. I understand.

General ELLIS. And there are, as you have heard Secretary Brown say-I consider Secretary Brown one of the most knowledgeable men on nuclear strategy in the country today-as he has said many times, there are many ways of measuring this. We are going to show you how we measure and the factors we use, and we want you to make your judgment. We believe we are right.

Now, whether or not we are inferior, deterrence is made up of many things. It is made up of military force, it is made up of our geographical location, it is made up of the soundness of our allies, or economic bases, our technology. There are many things that go into consideration when you talk about deterrence. The thing we are concerned about is if deterrence does fail then you are left with just one of those factors, and that is military power-raw military power at that time. The situation today, according to our measurements, requires action and I would like to leave it right there.

Mr. SPENCE. You can leave it right there. But when you said that such equivalance did exist in mid-1977, and early 1978, and then by today's measurements an adverse strategic imbalance has developed and will continue for several years, that just leaves me with only one conclusion-I will say it if you don't mind-and I just hope the American people realize from the testimony we are being presented with that they can read between the lines and assume all the things that we are having to assume.

I hope the American people will realize the real critical position we are in in every phase of our defense and will demand that action be taken.

Thank you again for being so candid with us, General.

General ELLIS. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Badham.

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