(e) Sambandha (connection), "in the nature of power," i.e. according to Dr. Ballantyne, depending on the divine will that such and such words should convey such and such meanings.

(a) Atas tasya | dharmasya | "Hence' is to be supplied before 'this,' which refers to 'duty.''

(e) Jnānam | atra karane lyut | jnapter yathārtha-jnānasya karanam | "In the word jnāna (knowledge) the affix lyuț has the force of 'instrument,' 'an instrument of correct knowledge.""

Upadeśaḥ | artha-pratipādanam | "Instruction, i.e. the establishment of a fact."

(8) Avyatirekaḥ | avyabhichārī dṛisyate ataḥ | "Unerring,' i.e. that which is seen not to deviate from the fact."

(h) Nanu "vahnimän iti sabda-śravanānantaram pratyakshena vahnim dṛishṭvā śabde pramātvam gṛihnāti iti loke prasiddheḥ pratyakshādītarapramāṇa-sāpekshatvāt śabdasya sa katham dharme pramāṇam ata āha "anupalabdhe" iti | anupalabdhe pratyakshādi-pramānair ajnāteʼrthe | "Since it is a matter of notoriety that any one who has heard the words "[the mountain is] ficry' uttered, and afterwards sees the fire with his own eyes, is [only] then [thoroughly] convinced of the authority of the words, it may be asked how words which are thus dependent [for confirmation on] perception and other proofs, can themselves constitute the proof of duty? In reference to this, the word anupalabdhe ('in regard to matters imperceptible') is introduced. It signifies 'matters which cannot be known by perception and other such proofs." "

The

Tat vidhi-ghaṭita-vākyam dharme pramānam Būdarāyaṇāchāryasya sammatam ayam āśayaḥ | 'parvato vahnimān' iti doshavat-purushaprayuktam vākyam artham ryabkicharati | ataḥ prāmānya-niśchaye pratyakshadikam apekshate | tatha 'gnihotram juhoti iti vākyam kāla-traye 'py artham na vyabhicharati | ata itara-nirapeksham dharme pramānam | "This, i.e. a [Vedic] sentence consisting of an injunction, is regarded by Bādarāyaṇa also as proof of duty. The purport is this. sentence, the mountain is fiery,' when uttered by a person defective [in his organ of vision], may deviate from the reality; it therefore requires the evidence of our senses, etc.' to aid us in determining its sufficiency as proof. Whereas the Vedic sentence regarding the performance of the Agnihotra sacrifice can never deviate from the truth in any time, past, present, or future; and is therefore a proof of duty, independently of any other evidence."

The commentator then proceeds to observe as follows: Pūrva-sūtre sabdarthayos sambandho nityaḥ ity uktam | tach cha sabda-nityatvādhīnam iti tat sisādhayishur ādau śabdānityatva-vādi-matam pūrva-paksham upādayati "In the preceding aphorism it was declared that the connection. of words and their meanings [or the things signified by them] is eternal. Desiring now to prove that this [eternity of connection] is dependent on the eternity of words [or sound], he begins by setting forth the first side of the question, viz. the doctrine of those who maintain that sound is not eternal."

This doctrine is accordingly declared in the six following aphorisms (sūtras), which I shall quote and paraphrase, without citing, in the original, the accompanying comments. These the reader will find in Dr. Ballantyne's work.

Sutra 6.-Karma eke tatra darśanāt | "Some, i.e. the followers of the Nyaya philosophy, say that sound is a product, because we see that it is the result of effort, which it would not be if it were eternal."

Sūtra 7.-Asthānāt | "That it is not eternal, on account of its transitoriness, i.e. because after a moment it ceases to be perceived." Sūtra 8.-Karoti-śabdāt | "Because, we employ in reference to it the expression 'making,' i.e. we speak of 'making' a sound."

Sūtra 9.—Sattvāntare yaugapadyāt | "Because it is perceived by different persons at once, and is consequently in immediate contact with the organs of sense of those both far and near, which it could not be if it were one and eternal.'

Sūtra 10.-Prakriti-vikṛityoś cha | "Because sounds have both an original and a modified form; as e.g. in the case of dadhi atra, which is changed into dadhy atra, the original letter i being altered into y by the rules of permutation. Now, no substance which undergoes a change is eternal."

Sutra 11.-Vriddhiś cha kartri-bhūmnā 'sya | "Because sound is augmented by the number of those who make it. Consequently the opinion of the Mīmānsakas, who say that sound is merely manifested, and not created, by human effort, is wrong, since even a thousand manifesters do not increase the object which they manifest, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps."

These objections against the Mīmānsaka theory that sound is manifested, and not created, by those who utter it, are answered in the following Sūtras:

Sūtra 12.-Samam tu tatra darśanam | "But, according to both schools, viz. that which holds sound to be created, and that which regards it as merely manifested, the perception of it is alike momentary. But of these two views, the theory of manifestation is shown in the next aphorism to be the correct one."

Sūtra 13-Sataḥ param adarśanam vishayānāgamat | "The nonperception at any particular time, of sound, which, in reality, perpetually exists, arises from the fact that the utterer of sound has not come into contact with his object, i.e. sound. Sound is eternal, because we recognise the letter k, for instance, to be the same sound which we have always heard, and because it is the simplest method of accounting for the phenomenon to suppose that it is the same. The still atmosphere which interferes with the perception of sound, is removed by the conjunctions and disjunctions of air issuing from a speaker's mouth, and thus sound (which always exists, though unperceived) becomes perceptible. This is the reply to the objection of its 'transitoriness' (Sutra 7).”

An answer to Sūtra 8 is given in

Sūtra 14.- Prayogasya param | "The word making' sounds, merely means employing or uttering them."

.

The objection made in Sūtra 9 is answered in Sūtra 15.—Aditya-vad yaugapadyam | "One sound is simultaneously heard by different persons, just as one sun is seen by them at one and the same time. Sound, like the sun, is a vast, and not a minute object, and thus may be perceptible by different persons, though remote from one another."

An answer to Sutra 10 is contained in

Sūtra 16.-Varṇāntaram avikāraḥ | "The letter y, which is substituted for i in the instance referred to under Sutra 10, is not a modification of i, but a distinct letter. Consequently sound is not modified." The 11th Sutra is answered in

Sūtra 17.-Nada-vṛiddhiḥ para 65 | "It is an increase of noise,' not

84 "Sound is unobserved, though existent, if it reach not the object (vibrations of air emitted from the mouth of the speaker proceed and manifest sound by their appulse to air at rest in the space bounded by the hollow of the car; for want of such appulse, sound, though existent, is unapprehended)."-Colebrooke, i. 306.

85 The text as given in the Bibliotheca Indica has nāda-vṛiddhi-parā.

of sound, that is occasioned by a multitude of speakers. The word 'noise' refers to the 'conjunctions and disjunctions of the air' (mentioned under Sutra 13) which enter simultaneously into the hearer's ear from different quarters; and it is of these that an increase takes place."

The next following Sutras state the reasons which support the Mimānsaka view:

Sūtra 18.-Nityas tu syūd darśanasya parārthatvāt | "Sound must be eternal, because its utterance is fitted to convey a meaning to other persons. If it were not eternal [or abiding], it would not continue till the hearer had learned its sense, and thus he would not learn the sense, because the cause had ceased to exist."

Sūtra 19.-Sarvatra yaugapadyāt | "Sound is eternal, because it is in every case correctly and uniformly recognized by many persons simultaneously; and it is inconceivable that they should all at once fall into a mistake."

When the word go (cow) has been repeated ten times, the hearers will say that the word go has been ten times pronounced, not that ten words having the sound of go have been uttered; and this fact also is adduced as a proof of the eternity of sound in

Sūtra 20.-Sankhyābhārāt | “Because each sound is not numerically different from itself repeated."

Sūtra 21.-Anapekshatrat | "Sound is eternal, because we have no ground for anticipating its destruction."

"But it may be urged that sound is a modification of air, since it arises from its conjunctions (see Sūtra 17), and because the S'iksha (or Vedānga treating of pronunciation) says that 'air arrives at the condition of sound;' and as it is thus produced from air, it cannot be eternal." A reply to this difficulty is given in

Sūtra 22.-Prakhyābhāvāch cha yogyasya "Sound is not a modification of air, because, if it were, the organ of hearing would have no appropriate object which it could perceive. No modification of air (held by the Naiyayikas to be tangible) could be perceived by the organ of hearing, which deals only with intangible sound."

Sutra 23.-Linga-darśanach cha | "And the eternity of sound is established by the argument discoverable in the Vedic text, with an eternal voice, o Virupa.' (See above, p. 69.) Now, though this sentence had another object in view, it, nevertheless, declares the eternity of language, and hence sound is eternal."

"But though words, as well as the connection of word and sense, be eternal, it may be objected-as in the following aphorism-that a command conveyed in the form of a sentence is no proof of duty."

Sūtra 24.-Utpattau vā rachanāḥ syur arthasya a-tan-nimittatvāt | "Though there be a natural connection between words and their meanings, the connection between sentences and their meanings is a factitious one, established by human will, from these meanings (of the sentences) not arising out of the meanings of the words. The connection of sentences with their meanings is not (like the connection of words with their meanings) one derived from inherent power (see Sūtra 5, remark (c), above, p. 72), but one devised by men; how, then, can this connection afford a sufficient authority for duty?"

An answer to this is given in

Sutra 25.-Tad-bhūtānāṁ kriyārthena samāmnāyoʼrthasya tan-nimittatvāt | "The various terms which occur in every Vedic precept are accompanied by a verb; and hence a perception (such as we had not before) of the sense of a sentence is derived from a collection of words containing a verb. A precept is not comprehended unless the individual words which make it up are understood; and the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence is nothing else than the comprehension of the exact mutual relation of the meanings arising out of each word."

Sūtra 26.-Loke sanniyamāt prayoga-sannikarshaḥ syāt, “As in secular language the application of words is known, so also in the Veda they convey an understood sense, which has been handed down by tradition."

The author now proceeds in the next following Sutras to state and to obviate certain objections raised to his dogmas of the eternity and authority of the Vedas.

Sūtra 27.- Vedāmś cha eke sannikarsham purushākhyāḥ | "Some (the followers of the Nyaya) declare the Vedas to be of recent origin, i.e. not eternal, because the names of men are applied to certain parts of them, as the Kāṭhaka and Kauthuma."

This Sūtra, with some of those which follow, is quoted in Sayana's commentary on the R. V. vol. i. pp. 19 and 20. His explanation of the present Sūtra is as follows:

Yatha Raghuvamśādayaḥ idānīntanās tathā vedāḥ api | na tu vedāḥ anādayaḥ ataḥ eva veda-kartritvena purushāḥ ākhyāyante | Vaiyäsikam