praised without any blessing being invoked, as in the hymn (R. V. i. 37. 'I declare the heroic deeds of Indra,' etc. Again, blessings are invoked without any praise being offered, as in the words, 'May I see well with my eyes, be resplendent in my face, and hear well with my ears.' This frequently occurs in the Adhvaryava (Yajur) Veda, and in the sacrificial formulæ. Then again we find oaths and curses, as in the words (R.V. vii. 104, 15), 'May I die to-day, if I am a Yātudhāna,' etc. (See Vol. I. p. 327.) Further, we observe the desire to describe some particular state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 129, 2), 'Death was not then, nor immortality,' etc. Then there is lamentation, arising out of a certain state of things, as in the verse (R.V. x. 95, 14), ‘The beautiful god will disappear and never return,' etc. Again, we have blame and praise, as in the words (R. V. x. 117, 6), 'The man who eats alone, sins alone,' etc. So, too, in the hymn to dice (R.V. x. 34, 13) there is a censure upon dice, and a commendation of agriculture. Thus the objects for which the hymns were seen by the rishis were very various." 29 181

It is to be observed, however, that although in this passage the author, Yaska, speaks of the various desires which the rishis expressed in different hymns, he nevertheless adheres to the idea which was recognized in his age, and in which he doubtless participated, that the rishis "saw" the hymns.

In the Nirukta, x. 42, the form of the metre in particular hymns is ascribed to the peculiar genius of the rishi Paruchhepa: 189 Abhyase

181 In Nirukta, iv. 6, allusion is made to a rishi Trita perceiving a particular hymn when he had been thrown into a well (Tritam kūpe 'vahitam etat sūktam prati babhau).

182 A Paruchhepa is mentioned in the Taittiriya Sanhitā, ii. 5, 8, 3, as follows: Nrimedhas cha Paruchhepaś cha brahmavādyam avadetām “asmin dārāv ārdreʼgnim janayāva yataro nau brahmīyān” iti | Nrimedho 'bhyavadat sa dhūmam_ajanayat| Paruchhepo 'bhyavadat soʼgnim ajanayat | "rishe" ity abravid "yat samāvadvidva kathā tvam agnim ajījano nāham" iti 【 “samidhenīnām eva aham̃ varṇam veda" ity abravit | "yad ghṛitavat padam anuchyate sa āsām varnas 'tam tvā samidbhir Angiraḥ' ity āha sāmidhenīshv eva taj jyotir janayati" | "Nṛimedha and Paruchhepa had a discussion concerning sacred knowledge. They said, 'Let us kindle fire1 in this moist wood, in order to see which of us has most sacred knowledge.' 2 Nrimedha pronounced (a text); but produced only smoke. Paruchhepa pronounced (a text) and generated fire. Nṛimedha said, Rishi, since our knowledge is equal, how is it that thou hast generated fire, while I have not.' Paruchhepa replied, 'I know the lustre

1 "Without friction."-Comm.

"In regard to the Samidhenī formulas."-Comm.

bhūyāmsam artham manyante yathā "aho darśaniya aho darśaniya" iti | tat Paruchchhepasya silam | "Men consider that by repetition the sense is intensified, as in the words 'o beautiful, o beautiful.' This is Paruchhepa's habit."

In Nirukta, iii. 11, the rishi Kutsa is mentioned as being thus described by the interpreter Aupamanyava: Rishiḥ Kutso bhavati karttū stomānām ity Aupamanyavaḥ | “Kutsa is the name of a rishi, a maker of hymns,' according to Aupamanyava."

So too the same work, x. 32, says of the rishi Hiranyastūpa that "he declared this hymn" (Hiranyastūpaḥ rishir idam sūktam provācha).

I do not, as I have already intimated, adduce these passages of the Nirukta to show that the author regarded the hymns as the ordinary productions of the rishis' own minds, for this would be at variance with the expression "seeing," which he applies to the mental act by which they were produced. It appears also from the terms in which he speaks of the rishis in the passage (Nirukta, i. 20) quoted above, p. 120, where they are described as having an intuitive insight into duty, that he placed them on a far higher level than the inferior men of later ages. But it is clear from the instances I have adduced that Yaska recognizes the hymns as being applicable to the particular circumstances in which the rishis were placed, and as being the bonâ fide expression of their individual emotions and desires. (See also the passages from the Nirukta, ii. 10 and 24, quoted in Vol. I. pp. 269 and 338, which establish the same point.) But if this be true, the supposition that these hymns, i.e. hymns specifically suited to express the various feelings and wishes of all the different rishis, were eternally pre-existent, and were perceived by them at the precise conjunctures when they were required to give utterance to their several aims, is perfectly gratuitous and unnecessary. It might be asserted with nearly the same shew of reason that the entire stock of ordinary language employed by human beings to express their ideas had existed from eternity. 183

of the Samidhenis. The sentence which contains the word ghrita (butter) forms their lustre. When any one repeats the words, "We augment thee, o Angiras (Agni) with fuel and with butter," he then generates that lustre in the Sāmidhenis.””

183 A difficulty of the same nature as that here urged, viz. that men and objects which existed in time are mentioned in the Vedas which are yet said to be eternal, was felt by Jaimini, as we have already seen (pp. 77 ff.). I recur to this subject in p. 215.

In regard to the third argument for the authority of the Vedas, viz. that they are eternal, because the words of which they are composed are eternal, and because these words have an inherent and eternal (and not a merely conventional) connection with the significations or objects, or the species of objects, which they represent, it is to be observed that it is rejected both by the Nyaya and Sankhya schools.184 And I am unable (if I rightly comprehend this orthodox reasoning) to see how it proves the authority of the Veda more than that of any other book. If the words of the Veda are eternal, so must those of the Bauddha books be eternal, and consequently, if eternal pre-existence is a proof of perfection, the infallibility of these heretical works must be as much proved by this argument as the divine origin of the Vedas, whose pretensions they reject and oppose. Or if the meaning is that the words of the Veda alone are eternal and infallible, this is an assumption which requires proof. If their reception by great rishis be alleged as evidence, it must be remarked that the authority of these rishis is itself a point which cannot be admitted until it has been established.

In regard to the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh of the arguments above stated, as put forward by the representatives of different schools or opinions in favour of the authority of the Veda, it may suffice to say that they for the most part assume the point to be proved, viz. that the Veda did proceed from an omniscient, or at least a competent, author. The only exception to this remark is to be found in the reasoning of the Nyaya and Sankhya aphorisms that the infallibility of the Vedas is shown by the fact that the employment of the formulas or prescriptions of those parts of them which deal with temporal results, such as can be tested by experience, is always found to be efficacacious; a premiss from which the conclusion is drawn that those other parts of the Veda, which relate to the unseen world, must be equally authoritative, as the authors of these different parts are the same perThis argument cannot appear convincing to any but those who admit first, the invariable efficacy of all the formulas and prescriptions

sons.

See, however, the comment on Brahma Sutra, i. 3, 30, regarding the perpetual recurrence of the same things in successive creations from, and to, all eternity, which will be quoted in the Appendix.

184 See Dr. Ballantyne's remarks on this controversy, in pp. 186, 189, 191, and 192 of his "Christianity contrasted with Hindu Philosophy."

of the Veda which relate to such matters as can be tested by experience, and secondly, the identity of the authors of the parts of the Veda which contain these formulas and prescriptions with the authors of the other parts. It would be impossible to prove the former point, and next to impossible to prove the latter.

cases.

Against the eternity of the Vedas an objection has been raised, which Jaimini considers it necessary to notice, viz. that various historical personages are named in their pages, and that as these works could not have existed before the persons whose doings they record, they must have commenced to exist in time. This difficulty Jaimini attempts, as we have seen above (pp. 77 ff.), to meet by explaining away the names of the historical personages in question. Thus Babara Pravahini is said to be nothing else than an appellation of the wind, which is eternal. And this method, it is said, is to be applied in all similar Another of the passages mentioned by an objector (see above, p. 79) as referring to non-eternal objects is R.V. iii. 53, 14, "What are the cows doing for thee among the Kikaṭas ?" etc. The author of the Mīmānsă Sūtras would no doubt have attempted to show that by these Kikaṭas we are to understand some eternally pre-existing beings. But Yaska, the author of the Nirukta, who had not been instructed in any any such subleties, speaks of the Kikațas as a non-Aryan nation. (Vol. I. p. 342, and Vol. II. p. 362.) It is difficult to suppose that Jaimini-unless he was an enthusiast, and not the cool and acute reasoner he has commonly proved himself to be-could have seriously imagined that his rule of interpretation could ever be generally received or carried out.155 The Brahmanas evidently intend to represent the numerous occurrences which they narrate, as having actually taken place in time, and the actors in them as having been real historical personages. See, for instance, the legends from the Satapatha and Aitareya Brāhmaṇas, the Taittarīya Sanhita, etc., quoted in the First

185 In Sayana's Introduction to R.V. vol. i. p. 23, it is said: Manushya-vṛittāntapratipādakaḥ ṛicho nārāśamsyaḥ | “The Nārāśamsīs are verses which set forth the histories of men." Yaska's definition is the same in substance, Nir. ix. 9. If these Nārāśamsīs are, as Sayana says, verses of the hymns (richaḥ), and if according to his definition their object is to record events in human history, it follows that they must refer to non-eternal objects. See also the explanation of the words nārāsamsena stomena in Vājasaneyi Sanhitā, 3, 53, given by the Commentator Mahidhara, which will be quoted further on.

Volume of this work, pp. 182, 192, 194, 328, 355, etc. And it is impossible to peruse the Vedic hymns without coming to the conclusion that they also record a multitude of events, which the writers believed to have been transacted by men on earth in former ages. (See the passages quoted from the Rig-veda in the First and Second Volumes of this work, passim; those, for example, in Vol. I. pp. 162 ff., 318 ff., 339 ff., and Vol. II. p. 208.)

We shall, no doubt, be assisted in arriving at a correct conclusion in regard to the real origin and character of the hymns of the Veda, if we enquire what opinion the rishis, by whom they were confessedly spoken, entertained of their own utterances; and this I propose to investigate in the following chapter.