Ethical Consensus and the Truth of Laughter: The Structure of Moral TransformationsWe participate in moral debate, instead of taking established morality for granted, because of our discontent with the moral discourse already existing. We feel that something is distorted or concealed, that something remains to be said. One of the strategies to expose the deficiencies of established discourse is critical argument, but under certain specific historical circumstances, the apparent self-evidence of established moral discourse has gained such a dominance, has acquired such an ability to conceal its basic vulnerability, that its validity simply seems beyond contestation. Notwithstanding our discontent, we remain unable to challenge the established truth effectively. Then, all of a sudden, its vulnerability is revealed - and this is the experience of laughter. Moral criticism is preceded by laughter. In fact, all crucial transformations that emerged in the history of morality were accompanied by and made possible by laughter and moral criticism is basically and originally a comic genre. After drawing an outline of the present moral regime in chapter one, the moral significance of laughter is recovered with the help of four 'philosophers of laughter' in chapter two, namely Bakhtin, Nietzsche, Bataille and Foucault. Laughter allows reality to appear in a certain light, it contains a basic truth, it is a philosophical principle in its own right that cannot be reduced to or identified with the truth of science. In the subsequent chapters it is shown how three crucial moral transformations, occuring in the fourth century B.C., the sixteenth century A.D. and the nineteenth century A.D. evolved out of an experience of laughter, articulated by three outstanding protagonists of laughter presented in this book: Socrates, Luther and Ibsen. Finally, the significance of the experience of laughter in view of the present is discussed. |
Contents
The beginning of moral philosophy as a philosophical problem | 7 |
Established Morality and Discontent | 15 |
4 | 37 |
Laughter as a State of Mind | 51 |
Judging Socrates | 95 |
The Transfiguration of the Moral Subject a Rereading | 179 |
Common terms and phrases
allow already ambivalent ancient ancient Greek apparently argument Aristophanes aspect Bakhtin basic objective Bataille become Birth of Tragedy chapter claims comic compartmentalization consensus considered constitute contemporary contestation criticism cynicism Diogenes Laertius discourse effort emphasizes Erasmus established morality etatistic ethics example experience of laughter fact final form of laughter forms of moral Foucault gay laughter Gay Science German gothic grobian grotesque Hegel historical human Ibsen implies individual instance Irene irony Kierkegaard kynicism language laugh liberalism Luther Maia Marx medieval merely mockery mocking mode of speech modern moral philosophy moral regime moral subjectivity moral truth Moreover Nietzsche notably official parody parresia Phaedo philosophical Plato political popular prandial Protagoras Rabelais recognize refers rejected remains remarkable Renaissance rereading revealed ridiculous Rorty Rubek scientific seems sense serious genre sixteenth century Socratic dialogue someone strategy tower experience tragedy tragic transformed truth of laughter understanding vocabulary vulgar whereas word writings Zarathustra