previously "mentally ill." A jury acquitted him of second-degree murder by
reasons of insanity on November 30, 1977. Now, in May of 1979, state
lawyer William Carnahan says, with regard to Robert Torsney: "This man has
been with us a long time. He has been examined over, over and over again
and we can't find that personality disorder the district attorney insists
is there." Carnahan conceded that the jury in the case might have committed
"a miscarriage of justice" when it acquitted Torsney.

PSYCHIATRIC INABILITY TO DIAGNOSE AND PREDICT DANGEROUSNESS

In

Well documented studies prove conclusively what these two cases demonstrate so graphically. A 1973 study by D.L. Rosenhan, professor of psychology and law at Stanford University, showed that psychiatrists were not able to detect the sanity of Rosenhan or 7 other sane individuals who gained access to mental hospitals in 12 different cases. 11 of the 12 admissions were diagnosed as schizophrenic and one was diagnosed with manic-depressive psychosis. a 1972 study by Wenk, Robinson, and Smith, 7000 parolees were assigned to categories of potential aggressiveness based on their case histories and psychiatric reports. In a one year follow-up study, it was found that for every correct identification of a potentially aggressive individual, there were 326 incorrect ones. Another 1972 study by Kozol, Boucher and Garofalo lasted 10 years and involved almost six hundred previous offenders. Each offender was examined by two psychiatrists, two psychologists and a social worker. A complete case history was compiled and a full battery of psychological tests were administered. During a five year follow-up period, it was found that 65% of the individuals identified as dangerous did not commit such an act. Steadmen and Keveles followed 121 patients upon their release from two hospitals for the criminally insane in New York State. These patients were

believed to be some of the most dangerous mental patients in the state of
New York. In the 2 years that they were followed, only 1 patient was
convicted for a violent act and 8 others were convicted of non-violent crimes.
At a National Homicide Symposium hèld in Los Angeles in October of 1977,
Jay Ziskin, a psychologist, lawyer, and professor at California State
University, stated emphatically that psychiatric testimony should not be
permitted in the courts:

"A psychiatric diagnosis is more likely to be wrong than right.
It is even more likely to be wrong when trying to assess the
mental condition at some time previous to the examination."

David L. Bazelon, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit for the past 25 years stated in 1974:

"My experience has shown that in no case is it more difficult to elicit productive and reliable expert testimony than in cases that call on the knowledge and practice of psychiatry." Even the Psychiatric News, mouthpiece for psychiatric views, described the testimony of psychiatrists in the July 7, 1971 issue:

"In the case mentioned above, five psychiatrists produced conflicting testimony at the bank robbery trial in Maryland of Paul DeBruhl, variously describing him as normal, antisocial, and schizophrenic." In the 1960s, 1000 patients were transferred from 2 maximum security hospitals to normaximum security institutions in what was termed "Operation Baxtrom." Staff at the maximum security hospital had diagnosed the patients as too dangerous for transfer to less restrictive facilities. However, after one year, only 7 of the 1000 patients were returned to the maximum security institution. And, as of July 1970, more than one third of the patients had been discharged from the receiving hospitals.

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RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN THE MENTAL HEALTH PROVISIONS

Based on what we feel to be overwhelming evidence, CCHR proposes the removal of psychiatrists from the courtroom, the abolishment of the insanity defense, and the elimination of any involuntary commitment within the criminal justice system. We feel psychiatry has brainwashed the American public into accepting its attrocities and allowing them to play "high priest" in the courtroom.

Since prosecutors have as their major ain the conviction of the defendant rather than the rehabilitation of or assistance to the defendant, the defense counsel should be the only party allowed to raise a motion of incompetence to stand trial. If the court grants such motion, hearings would be held with those directly involved with the accused (friends, relatives, co-workers, those involved with him personally by reason of his involvement with the criminal justice system, etc.) and upon completion of the hearings, a jury would decide upon the competency of the defendant to stand trial. If found competent, the trial would of course proceed. If found incompetent, the defendant would have a certain period of time to attain competency, free from any forced psychiatric treatment (perhaps not to exceed 6 months), before the trial would proceed. The judge would decide whether the accused could be released pending trial or would remain in custody (free from psychiatric treatment or confinement).

The issue of guilt or innocense should be decided first, in the case of all competent defendants. If the accused is found not-guilty, he would of course

be released. If he is found guilty, he is sentenced and then may seek psychiatric 'treatment' if he so desires. He could not in any way be committed to

a psychiatric facility involuntarily.

If he chooses psychiatric treatment, he

may be sent to a 'suitable facility' meaning a facility that is suitable to

provide care or treatment given the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant. The sentence would remain the same length, whether served in a suitable facility, rehabilitation facility, or prison. If the individual no longer wishes psychiatric treatment prior to the expiration of his sentence, he would be imprisoned or if he so desires, could be transferred to a rehabilitation facility. Just as psychiatric treatment should not be forced on the defendant, neither should rehabilitation.

Once imprisoned, no individual should be transferred to a psychiatric facility unless he so consents in writing.

These provisions, we feel, will eliminate the incentive for an insanity plea in hopes of a shortened 'sentence' in a mental hospital, eliminate the mockery psychiatric testimony is making of the criminal justice system, eliminate the involuntary commitment and psychiatric punishment doled out disguised as 'treatment', make the punishment more nearly fit the crime while still keeping the door wide open for rehabilitation and treatment of the guilty if he so desires.

Warren E. Burger stated in 1964:

"Perhaps we should consider abolishing what is called the 'insanity
defense'; the jury would decide within the traditional framework of
drawing inferences as to intent from the accused's conduct only
whether he committed the overt acts charged. I suggest this not as
a new idea but to stimulate a serious debate on the subject."

Psychiatrist Abraham L. Halpern stated in 1977:

"It is time to acknowledge this futile pursuit and, in the interests
of 'good morals
good science
(and) good law,' to abolish

the insanity defense."

SUBCOMMITTEE IMPROVEMENTS IN OTHER CIVIL LIBERTIES PROVISIONS

In regards to the other sections of the "rough working draft" of July 13, 1979, we are in favor of the vast reforms made by the Drinan subcommittee, over S.1437, and other versions of the criminal code.

The adoption of the principle of "strict construction" is vital in any wholesale revision of laws such as the criminal code and the subcommittee's elimination of "general construction" in favor of "strict construction" is supported by CCHR.

Other aspects of the Drinan subcommittee draft which CCHR supports are as follows :

1. Elimination of the criminal solicitation provisions as contained in S.1437. 2. Revision of the attempt provision to (a) narrow applicability to specific crimes, and (b) require a substantial step toward the commission of the crime with intent that the crime be completed.

3. Elimination of the general conspiracy statute opting to apply it to specific

statutes.

4. The requirement that false statements must be written to constitute a crime.

5. The reduction of length of sentence for criminal contempt.

6. The elimination of the crime of obstruction of a government function by physical interference.

7. The elimination of the crime of obstruction of a government function by fraud. 8. The specification that it is a crime only when a judge or juror is influenced by a demonstration, as opposed to anyone performing duties at a judicial proceeding.