is currently classified under the criteria established by an Executive order and is, in fact, properly classified may be withheld. It is no longer sufficient to simply determine whether a document bears classification markings or is contained in a file marked "secret." Each document must be examined in light of the criteria set forth in Executive Order 11652.1 The intent of the Executive order is set forth in the first paragraph, which reads as follows: The interests of the United States and its citizens are best preserved by making information regarding the affairs of government readily available to the public. This concept of an informed citizenry is reflected in the Freedom of Information Act and the current public information policies of the executive branch. The basic standard to be applied is whether or not the disclosure of information could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security. The order directs that unnecessary classification and overclassification of documents shall be avoided. In no case may information be classified to conceal inefficiency or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person or department, or any other reason unrelated to national security. It has been our experience that the courts will require a Government agency to rigorously adhere to the requirements of the order. Both at the initial stage or during appeal review, each document-whether it consists of a single page or hundreds of pages must be reviewed to determine whether it is properly classified." A document entitled "Soviet Military Intention" dated 1977 may appear to be properly classified. Upon examination, however, it may be determined that the document deals with purely speculative newspaper accounts of Soviet military intentions of no intelligence value and that the document should be released in its entirety. A document, however, entitled "Weather Forecasting in the Bering Straits" dated 1960 may appear to be completely innocuous and releasable. Upon examination, however, it may be determined that the document deals substantively with Asian nuclear capabilities and explicitly details U.S. ability to detect and monitor nuclear testing. Therefore, a determination would be made that the document warranted classification and should be withheld. I do not believe it is necessary to argue before this subcommittee that certain information must be withheld in the interest of national security. Prior to the enactment of Executive Order 11652 in 1972, it was the practice to classify too much, to err on the side of overclassification rather than run the risk of not properly protecting sensitive information. This is no longer the practice. In reviewing documents which were classified years ago, the substantive criteria of the current Executive order must be applied. It must be determined whether the documents warrant continued classification and at what level. In some cases the answer may be fairly simple. In other cases, however, it may not be so clear. Is the information per se classified? Are there more subtle matters that must be considered? Would release of the information reveal or jeopardize an intelligence source, damage foreign relations, or imperil foreign intelligence operations? 1 See p. 433 of the appendix. In some cases, the act has had a predictably chilling effect on sensitive intelligence sources abroad. Despite assurances, concern has been expressed over the ability of the Agency to protect its sensitive foreign intelligence sources. These types of considerations explain why the document review process is so time consuming. A mistake due to carelessness or time pressures can potentially be severely damaging to the national security. It is precisely for this reason that the most senior officials of the Agency are personally involved in the review of the documents containing classified information. I would now, sir, turn to page 13. Insofar as classified documents and the issue of litigation are concerned, the burden is on the Government to demonstrate by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court that the information is classified. Mere assertions or conclusions are not enough. Each document must be described in sufficient detail and with sufficient specificity to show it is classified. Lengthy documents must be described section by section to demonstrate that no portion of the documents may be released. In some cases only a few pages may be at issue. In others, the affidavits themselves may run into hundreds of pages because of the numbers of documents involved. All such affidavits are closely scrutinized by the courts. It is a difficult proposition to sufficiently describe the type of information being withheld without revealing classified information. The courts have clearly indicated that a claim of classification under exemption (b) (1) of the act will not be upheld if the claim is arbitrary or capricious, does not conform to the criteria of the Executive order, or is made in bad faith. As I have indicated, in no case has a Central Intelligence Agency claim of exemption (b) (1) been disallowed by a court.1 Under the act, the court is required to make a de novo determination whether records or any portion thereof may be withheld. To illustrate, within the past few months decisions were rendered in two cases involving the Central Intelligence Agency in the District Court of the District of Columbia. One case involved almost 250 documents, and classification had been claimed in whole or in part for over 200 of these documents. In each case the (b) (1) exemptions were upheld by the court upon the submission of detailed affidavits. In the second case, approximately 90 documents were involved which were classified in whole or in part. Again, in that case, all (b) (1) claims were upheld. I mention these two cases to illustrate the workload that is imposed both upon the Federal agencies and the courts. In May of this year, then Deputy Director of the Agency issued instructions to all Agency employees concerning the preparation of documents concerning classified material. In compliance with the Executive order, documents will be marked paragraph by paragraph to the extent practical to indicate which portions are classified, at what level, and which portions are not classified. The implementation of this practice should case the burden in the future of determining which portions of documents may be released 1 See n. 112 of the hearing text. 25 U.S.C. 552 (a) (4) (B). to facilitate the release of information to the public. Moreover, it should induce employees to make more precise judgments about what information actually warrants protection under the Executive order and what information does not. I recently directed all Agency components to increase their efforts to review all their active and inactive file holdings to determine what documents should be declassified and whether or not the material is the subject of a freedom of information request. This will prove to be quite a task but one which, in the long run, will increase the efficiency and improve the security of the Agency. Speaking before a group of private citizens in Los Angeles last month, Admiral Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, made known his views regarding openness in government and unnecessary classification. He stated: On the one hand, we can declassify every bit of information that we have which need not be kept secret. I have mentioned a number of our efforts in that direction. By such declassification or restraints on initial classification, we can generate greater respect for the information which must remain secret. On the other hand, we can and must tighten security around truly sensitive information on which much may depend. I said at the outset that I believe in the public's right to know what its Government is doing. At the same time, legitimate secrets relating to the national defense and foreign affairs must be protected. We have not solved all the problems inherent in attempting to reconcile these two needs. Perhaps we never will to everyone's satisfaction. The Central Intelligence Agency is committed to applying good faith and exercising sound judgment to bring these matters into balance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator ABOUREZK. Thank you, Mr. Blake. I wonder if I might ask a couple of questions of you before we hear from the State Department representatives. I want to say at the outset that I personally appreciate the fact that there is certain information that ought to be kept secret. I do not think anybody who lives in this country would disagree with that. In addition to that, I think there is some information that has been kept secret and then released by the Government-sometimes by the CIA, sometimes by other agencies that should have been kept secret and was not. It was done for whatever purposes the leaker of information wanted to pursue. I am thinking specifically of a study that was recently leaked to the press about Soviet military strength. Didn't you entitle it "Soviet Nuclear Intentions"? Mr. BLAKE. I have an understanding of the document to which you make reference, sir. I am not sure of the precise title. Senator ABOUREZK. You know which one I am referring to. Senator ABOUREZK. That was released, as I recall, about the time there was a debate going on in the Congress about the U.S. military budget. That was information I personally thought should have remained secret but was leaked by somebody who had access to it-most likely either in the military or the CIA-and wanted to make a point. I think there are other times that information is kept secret when it need not be. I believe that one of the main reasons that material is not declassified is to protect, in a political sense, somebody in the Government. And that is why it is kept secret. We can always find people who either leak information, or just give it to the media in a press conference. The Secretary of State, in the past, has done that. Other people in the Government have done that when it has suited their own purpose. As a result of these activities the cry of "national security" to protect everything that is contained within Government files rings pretty hollow in a lot of cases. It is hard for a person to believe every claim of national security, after having watched activities like that go on for a period of time. I want to ask you first about what are known as soft files. In your statement you say that there are people in the Agency who keep soft files. Mr. BLAKE. Yes, sir. Senator ABOUREZK. You describe them as "records of convenience." Mr. BLAKE. "Files of convenience"; yes, sir. Senator ABOUREZK. Is that the only purpose for which anyone in the CIA would keep a file outside of the main filing system? Mr. BLAKE. Yes, sir; for the convenience of the individual who is carrying on a certain amount of responsibility at a given physical location. If there is an inference in the question, sir, that such files may be maintained for other purposes, such as not having officially recorded in the main official file, I would have to submit that this is not the reason these files are maintained. There are individuals who are working on all kinds of problems all day long who want to have an instant minor retrieval system, if you will. If you call for the official file, it may be in another building; it may be in another location. It takes you 2 days to get it. I suspect the existence of the so-called soft files, files of convenience, is endemic to any large organization. Senator ABOUREZK. I would agree with that. But, I have obtained information that officers in the CIA also keep another kind of soft file in addition to the file of convenience. These other files are kept because the information contained in them would get somebody in trouble if it were retrieved and divulged to the press, the public, or someone of responsibility in the Government. I just want to get your statement on the record once again so that it is totally clear. You are saying that there is no such soft filing system, as I just described. Mr. BLAKE. No, sir, I have not said that. What I did say, was, I described the theory and the concept of the soft file, the file of convenience. I have not said the latter part of your statement. I would certainly reject it from the point of view of anything that would be officially tolerated by the Agency, or from the point of view of any knowledge that the Agency had that people were maintaining files for that purpose. I think, to a certain degree, I can demonstrate the truthfulness of that position. If you go back in your mind's eye, sir, in the case of the last 6 to 8 months. By virtue of continuing searching of records that have been in an archival situation, we ourselves on our own terms have found information and have surfaced that information to the appropriate committee of the Congress, and our oversight committee. I cannot speak for each and every individual who is in the organization. But I can certainly tell you, sir, what organizational policy is. I can certainly tell you that we try to enforce it. Senator ABOUREZK. It does not surprise me that it would be the organization's policy, to have no hidden files or soft files. Mr. BLAKE. I am sure it doesn't. Senator ABOUREZK. What I am asking you is, are there CIA officers who keep a file for the purpose of preventing discovery of information that might get somebody in trouble? Mr. BLAKE. To my knowledge, absolutely no. To my knowledge, absolutely no. Senator ABOUREZK. You have never heard of anyone or you have never known of anybody in the CIA who has kept a separate file for the purpose of preventing disclosure of information should the main file be requested? Mr. BLAKE. No, sir, I have not. Senator ABOUREZK. Mr. Blake, can I ask how long you have served in the Central Intelligence Agency? Mr. BLAKE. Thirty years, sir. Senator ABOUREZK. Can you give just a brief description of where you served, in what jobs you have served? I don't know if you are able to. Mr. BLAKE. It is 30 years' history. If I may, sir, let me answer your question this way. We are an organization that has four directorates, directorates being our major unit. I have served in all four of those directorates in my 30 years. I have served overseas. I have served in a domestic office. I have served in the Inspector General's office. I have served as Director of Personnel and Director of Logistics; since August 3, 1974, I have been the Deputy Director for Administration. On July 13, I became the Acting Deputy Director of the agency during the temporary absence of Admiral Turner. I am the Acting Director; I will revert to the Acting Deputy Director upon his return on Saturday. Someday, I assume, I will revert back to my normal position, the Deputy Director for Administration.1 Senator ABOUREZK. Let's put aside the files of convenience and talk about the soft files I described. It is my understanding that those soft files are usually kept in the operational desk or, if they are extremely sensitive, in the deputy director for operation's desk, the director's desk, or the division chief's desk. Is that true or false? Mr. BLAKE. Sir, I must ask you, if I may, for a definition. You say, "the soft files to which you refer." Senator ABOUREZK. Yes. Mr. BLAKE. Which are these, now? Senator ABOUREZK. Those are the files that contain information removed from a main file and kept separately to prevent disclosure and to keep somebody out of trouble. Mr. BLAKE. Sir, I do not know of the existence of any files of that type. 1 See exhibit 45, p. 458 of the appendix for biography of Mr. Blake. |