point "interfere with enforcement proceedings" within the meaning of exemption 7(A) of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (A). Since the primary question presented in these appeals is now moot, plaintiffsappellants/cross-appellees ("plaintiffs") agree that the appropriate course is to remand this action to the district court. However, plaintiffs believe that if this Court so orders, it should include instructions regarding two matters which the government's motion has not addressed. First, since the government's change in position has mooted this action during the pendency of the present appeals, we respectfully request that this Court vacate the lower court's orders and opinions. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). These include the court's orders of October 8, 1975, December 23, 1975, and January 13, 1976, the Supplemental Memorandum Opinion dated February 2, 1976, and the final Judgment and Opinion entered by the district court on December 26, 1976.1 Second, we direct the Court's attention to the fact that plaintiffs initiated this Freedom of Information Act suit in July, 1975, in an effort to finally bring to public light the facts surrounding the investigation of former Vice-President Spiro Agnew which culminated in his resignation from office in 1973 amid political corruption charges. Despite the great public interest in disclosure of the records plaintiffs seek, these proceedings have already consumed more than two years' time, and the government has indicated that further proceedings will be required to determine the applicability of exemptions other than the one on which it primarily relied below. Since suits brought under the FOIA are to be expedited in every way, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (4) (D), should the Court remand this case to the district court, we request that the Court direct the government to promptly disclose all non-exempt portions of the requested records and instruct that whatever further proceedings are required in the district court proceed with expedition. See Consumers Union of the United States v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 561 F. 2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (petitions for rehearing denied), per curiam memorandum at p. 2 (No. 75–2059, August 25, 1977).3 Respectfully submitted, DIANE B. COHN, Suite 700, 2000 P Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036, (202)785–3704. (Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees). Dated: November 14, 1977. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Response was served by mail, first class and postage prepaid, upon Paul Blankenstein, Esq., Department of Justice, Room 3632, Washington, D.C. 20530, this 14th day of November 1977. DIANE B. COHN. 1 As the government correctly points out, while the district court did rely on other parts of exemption 7 in its order of January 13, 1976, the lower court's ruling as to the privacy interests involved was made without benefit of argument by either the government or the plaintiffs. See Motion at p. 4, n. 2. In light of the fact that all parties agree that it would be appropriate for the district court to reconsider this aspect of its earlier ruling, and since the government has indicated that it intends to review all of the documents to now determine what exemptions other than 7(A) apply, we believe that this Court should vacate all of the lower court's orders in their entirety. 2 For a discussion of the time-consuming history of this litigation, see plaintiff's brief ou appeal, at pp. 4-16. 3 Finally, we note that the government has indicated that it would not object if the Court were to tax the government for the printing costs incurred by plaintiffs in filing their brief and appendix on appeal. Motion at p. 4. We would also like to emphasize that in agreeing to the government's motion to remand these proceedings to the district court, plaintiffs reserve their right to file an application for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. [EXHIBIT 82f] BALDWIN V. FINNEY (Civ. No. 76-1182 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8, 1977)) U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT SEPTEMBER TERM, 1977 No. 76-1182 CIVIL ACTION NO. 75-1221 ROY BALDWIN, ET AL. V. JERVIS FINNEY, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, ET AL., APPELLANTS No. 76-1186 CIVIL ACTION NO. 75-1221 ROY BALDWIN, ET AL., APPELLANTS V. JERVIS FINNEY, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, ET AL. No. 77-1237 CIVIL ACTION NO. 75-1221 ROY BALDWIN, ET AL., APPELLANTS V. JERVIS FINNEY, ET AL. BEFORE: Wright and Wilkey, Circuit Judges ORDER Upon consideration of appellants' motion to remand, and of the response thereto, it is ORDERED by the Court that the aforesaid motion is granted, the orders here under review are vacated and these cases remanded to the District Court. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). Bills of cost, if any, may be submitted within 14 days from the date of this order. The Clerk is directed to transmit a certified copy of this order to the District Court. Per Curiam. [Exhibit 83] PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN BALDWIN V. FINNEY UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT Nos. 76-1186, 77-1237 ROY BALDWIN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JERVIS FINNEY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 76-1182 ROY BALDWIN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, V. JERVIS FINNEY, et al., Defendants-Appellants. On Appeal from the United States District Court The undersigned, counsel of record for plaintiffsappellants/cross-appellees, certifies that the following listed parties appeared below: Roy Baldwin Bruce Feder (Appellants in Nos. 76-1186 and 77-1237, and Jervis Finney, U.S. Attorney for the District Edward Levi, Attorney General of the United Department of Justice (Appellees in Nos. 76-1186 and 77-1237, and Appellants in No. 76-1182) These representations are made in order that the Judges of this */ Pursuant to Rule 25(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., Attorney General |