information other than copies of documents file still is being held outside the Agency' though the Angola project has ended. answers to these questions. Finally, in response to the questior indicates that the recently discover record system. You maintained at only for the convenience of indivi 1975 agency policy mandated des On page 48 of the transcrip files were to be checked agair ments of record were to be procedures were not follow outlined for the subcom that soft files are destro are removed from the of the file. The possibility th Information Act r discovery of the like to know of Please forw mittee as so The subce classified Genera I lo your needs. We have furni fied affidavit atly & your Subc has been discuss aerefore urge your recon and know that some of the class ere executed by officials of the Departments National Security Council. You should direct your reque ons if you wish to obtain those affidavits. Hon. JAMES Chairma the Angola working papers, your letter states that the Subcommittee know how many of those working papers existed, whether they were perational te for spe aterial wh Ses held by the work made part of the official file, and where they currently are stored. As I indicated ment's Angola program for which CIA was responsible are stored in a secure in my last letter, all files pertaining to those aspects of the United States Governvault area. This vault area is located in the Headquarters building, in McLean, Virginia. As I stated earlier, there are thousands of papers in these files which consist of both official record documents and working papers which are primarily duplicates of record documents or draft memoranda or rough notes. These CIA records are the files of the Angola Task Force, a provisional component of the Africa Division of the Operations Directorate. This organizational unit is no longer in existence but the files, including working papers, are being maintained intact in order to permit completion of an investigation of these materials by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In addition to these papers, the Agency is custodian of 162 papers which are the property of the Angola Working Group which was an interagency body created by the National Security Council and composed of representatives of the various Executive Agencies involved in the United States Government's program in Angola. These papers are not the property of the CIA. They are under the cognizance of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As such they are not and will not be incorporated into the CIA records system. It is in the context of these two groups of papers that the Stockwell allegations are confusing. John Stockwell was Chief of the Angola Task Force, which was a CIA temporary organization. Mr. Stockwell was not a member of the Angola Working Group, but he attended some of the meetings of this Group. We do not know whether his reference to working papers was to CIA documents or to those belonging to the NSC. In my letter of 28 September, I stated that we had found no evidence to support a general allegation by Mr. Stockwell that withholding of documents from Senate investigators, without their knowledge, was common practice. I also stated that we had no other allegations or evidence of soft files being used to thwart external investigators of FOIA requestors. Consequently I do not understand your statement that my letter implies that CIA did use such files to thwart investigators and FOIA requestors in the past. However, to clarify the situation, let me restate my earlier response. To the best of our ability, we know of no instance where a manipulation of papers or files was undertaken by a CIA employee for the purpose of hiding or withholding information from any authorized investigator or FOIA requestor. Therefore, I am unable to furnish examples of instances where such was done. Your letter raises some additional questions regarding the Bufkin material; specifically, why did the General Counsel need such a file, whether the file contained any information other than copies of documents from official files, and whether that file is still being held outside the Agency's formal record system. . project a system before u for some explanation ere is no single overall "official" many functions, our papers tend to be. finance, medical and operations. Furtherm requires compartmentation of portions of func operational or project files are kept by the organiza tivities of the several national security, it National Security nal security, and in the Govern'ded, That the "nal-security of the Gove departelligence sible for specific operations. The working file of this su.. may m un an activi ceases, attempts are made to clean up the paper debris. All working files are reviewed to determine what must be kept for historical purposes and what should be destroyed for lack of historical value. However, if working papers are inadthe burden on our archives. And certainly whether working papers are kept vertently kept instead of being destroyed, we see no damage except in terms of deliberately or inadvertently, they are still subject to FOIA requestors. While I am in total agreement with you that our recordkeeping rules should be wel administered, I do not believe the keeping of the MKULTRA files demonstrated any intention to mislead the Congress or the public nor did it interfere with public investigations. Finally, you close your letter by stating that the possibility existed that "soft files" could have been used to avoid disclosure to FOIA requestors and to Congress, and ask what CIA procedures exist to prevent this abuse. In response I am enclosing our regulations governing FOIA searches in the Agency. These regulations do not exclude papers from FOIA searches because they are working papers or held in working files. These regulations are reenforced by the audit and inspection functions of the Agency and by CIA Congressional oversight committees. Consequently, the potential for any employee to deliberately withhold information from any authorized review is procedurally no greater than it is in any other Federal agency. Furthermore, we believe that the responsibilities which this Agency carries require a high standard of conduct which is understood and accepted by CIA employees. I hope these responses are helpful to your Subcommittee. We are prepared to continue to cooperate in any way possible. Sincerely, Enclosure. 1 See p. 534 of the Appendix. JOHN F. BLAKE, Acting Deputy Director. You obviously found that summary insufficient for your needs. We have furnished other information regarding the Bufkin matter previously, and will do so again later in this letter. I am certain that we can provide the specific information you need on this matter without having to produce the actual report made to the Director by the Inspector General and respectfully ask that you give us the opportunity to do so. With respect to your request to have the classified affidavits submitted to your Subcommittee, these affidavits contain sensitive information regarding Agency operating procedures and other material which is classified on a highly restricted basis. In order to provide protection for this information while still making it available to your Subcommittee members, we have arranged for these affidavits to be delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which has the proper facilities for the storage and handling of such documents. This arrangement is intended to facilitate the work of your Subcommittee in a manner which will also permit the Director of Central Intelligence to uphold his statutory responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods. It is in no way intended to challenge the independent authority or jurisdiction of your Subcommittee. Use of this procedure would greatly assist us in making highly classified information available to members of your Subcommittee under reasonable security conditions. This procedure has been discussed with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I therefore urge your reconsideration of this proposal. Incidentally, you should know that some of the classified affidavits submitted in these cases were executed by officials of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Council. You should direct your requests to those organizations if you wish to obtain those affidavits. Regarding the Angola working papers, your letter states that the Subcommittee wants to know how many of those working papers existed, whether they were made part of the official file, and where they currently are stored. As I indicated in my last letter, all files pertaining to those aspects of the United States Government's Angola program for which CIA was responsible are stored in a secure vault area. This vault area is located in the Headquarters building, in McLean, Virginia. As I stated earlier, there are thousands of papers in these files which consist of both official record documents and working papers which are primarily duplicates of record documents or draft memoranda or rough notes. These CIA records are the files of the Angola Task Force, a provisional component of the Africa Division of the Operations Directorate. This organizational unit is no longer in existence but the files, including working papers, are being maintained intact in order to permit completion of an investigation of these materials by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In addition to these papers, the Agency is custodian of 162 papers which are the property of the Angola Working Group which was an interagency body created by the National Security Council and composed of representatives of the various Executive Agencies involved in the United States Government's program in Angola. These papers are not the property of the CIA. They are under the cognizance of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As such they are not and will not be incorporated into the CIA records system. It is in the context of these two groups of papers that the Stockwell allegations are confusing. John Stockwell was Chief of the Angola Task Force, which was a CIA temporary organization. Mr. Stockwell was not a member of the Angola Working Group, but he attended some of the meetings of this Group. We do not know whether his reference to working papers was to CIA documents or to those belonging to the NSC. In my letter of 28 September, I stated that we had found no evidence to support a general allegation by Mr. Stockwell that withholding of documents from Senate investigators, without their knowledge, was common practice. I also stated that we had no other allegations or evidence of soft files being used to thwart external investigators of FOIA requestors. Consequently I do not understand your statement that my letter implies that CIA did use such files to thwart investigators and FOIA requestors in the past. However, to clarify the situation, let me restate my earlier response. To the best of our ability, we know of no instance where a manipulation of papers or files was undertaken by a CIA employee for the purpose of hiding or withholding information from any authorized investigator or FOIA requestor. Therefore, I am unable to furnish examples of instances where such was done. Your letter raises some additional questions regarding the Bufkin material; specifically, why did the General Counsel need such a file, whether the file contained any information other than copies of documents from official files, and whether that file is still being held outside the Agency's formal record system. The General Counsel at one point in time needed the Bufkin materials because other Federal agencies had an interest in Mr. Bufkin and their point of contact with the Agency was the Office of the General Counsel. As to the file itself, it contains only official documents or copies of official documents. At present the file is being held with all of the other papers relating to Angola. As I indicated above, this is to facilitate an investigation being conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. When there is no longer any need to retain the Angola papers in a single place for the convenience of some review, all of these papers will be sorted in accordance with Agency regulations. Papers required to be kept as official records will be made part of the official records. All other papers will be destroyed. Since Mr. Bufkin is not an Agency employee or agent of CIA, all of the information concerning him will probably be destroyed. Correspondence with other Government agencies or with Congressional committees concerning Mr. Bufkin may be kept, not because of any interest in Bufkin, but only as incidental to the historical recording of correspondence with these organizations. You also refer to the MKULTRA case where working papers which should have been destroyed at the end of their use were inadvertently kept and filed, and you request procedures that would guarantee that working papers be destroyed at the end of a project and that official documents be removed and put in the regular filing system before destruction of the file. I believe your concerns indicate the need for some explanation of the record-keeping system in CIA. First of all, there is no single overall "official" file. As with any large organization performing many functions, our papers tend to be kept in functional files such as personnel, finance, medical and operations. Furthermore, the nature of intelligence work requires compartmentation of portions of functional files so that much of the operational or project files are kept by the organizational subcomponent responsible for specific operations. The working file of this subcomponent provides the material which is selected for retention in an official file of record. Other working files held by organizational components may duplicate much of the material held in the working file of the responsible subcomponent in order to facilitate their input into an operation. Some of the material in these working files may also be retained as an official file of record by these functional offices. When an activity ceases, attempts are made to clean up the paper debris. All working files are reviewed to determine what must be kept for historical purposes and what should be destroyed for lack of historical value. However, if working papers are inadvertently kept instead of being destroyed, we see no damage except in terms of the burden on our archives. And certainly whether working papers are kept deliberately or inadvertently, they are still subject to FOIA requestors. While I am in total agreement with you that our recordkeeping rules should be well administered, I do not believe the keeping of the MKULTRA files demonstrated any intention to mislead the Congress or the public nor did it interfere with public investigations. Finally, you close your letter by stating that the possibility existed that "soft files" could have been used to avoid disclosure to FOIA requestors and to Congress, and ask what CIA procedures exist to prevent this abuse. In response I am enclosing our regulations governing FOIA searches in the Agency. These regulations do not exclude papers from FOIA searches because they are working papers or held in working files. These regulations are reenforced by the audit and inspection functions of the Agency and by CIA Congressional oversight committees. Consequently, the potential for any employee to deliberately withhold information from any authorized review is procedurally no greater than it is in any other Federal agency. Furthermore, we believe that the responsibilities which this Agency carries require a high standard of conduct which is understood and accepted by CIA employees. I hope these responses are helpful to your Subcommittee. We are prepared to continue to cooperate in any way possible. Sincerely, Enclosure. 1 See p. 534 of the Appendix. JOHN F. BLAKE, Acting Deputy Director. [Exhibit 57e] Hon. JAMES ABOUREZK, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have received your letter of 7 December 1977, and by now you should have my letter of 8 December 1977, addressing the same subjects. I hope you will find my responses of the 8th adequate to meet the needs of your Subcommittee. We are prepared to assist you in any further manner required. Sincerely, JOHN F. BLAKE, Acting Deputy Director. |