Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At the hearing held by your Subcommittee on Friday, 16 September 1977, my colleague, Mr. Anthony Lapham, and I promised to provide you with the answers to certain questions and with certain materials which were not available at that time. Subsequent to the hearing, Subcommittee staff have informally requested additional information. The enclosures to this letter contain some of the information requested. We hope to provide the remainder within the next week. With respect to certain classified affidavits made in two court cases, I propose to provide this material to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence where it will be available for the use of your Subcommittee members. This will obviate the need for any special arrangements for the protection of this material. I hope this arrangement will be acceptable to you and other members of your Subcommittee. I am also at this time returning a corrected copy of the portion of the transcript containing the testimony of Mr. Lapham and me. In this respect there is one matter which I believe needs further elaboration. In the course of my appearance before your Subcommittee you asked for my definition of a "blind memo" and when and how it might be used. My testimony accurately describes my understanding of the use of the term. Nevertheless, I believe the record should show that there is no commonly accepted definition of this art form. It can and does mean different things to different people. For example: a. An analyst might prepare a blind memo recording his analysis of an event which could subsequently be forwarded by him or his superior under a covering memorandum to various addresses. b. An operations officer might review an operational file and summarize in a blind memo the significant facts and status of the operation as of a given date. In most cases, this would be routinely reviewed by a supervisor, and then simply inserted in the file. Normally, a routing slip would show who originated the memo and who reviewed it. These are but a few illustrations of situations in which CIA-prepared papers might be referred to as blind memos. It is quite possible-in fact not unlikely— that such papers on occasion end up in Agency files without markings or attachments identifying the originators or intended recipients. The point which I made during my testimony, however, remains valid. It is not accepted practice in CIA, nor does the Agency condone the use of blind memos as a means of avoiding responsibility on the part of the originator. In the course of the inquiries I have conducted subsequent to my testimony, I have found no one who is aware that such practices exist today or have existed in the past. On a related matter, your s aff has requested the Inspector General's report concerning the allegations made by John Stockwell. It has been a long standing CIA practice to protect the confidentiality of the relationship between the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA Inspector General in order to insure that the Inspector General has both the freedom and the objectivity to investigate and make judgments on important matters affecting Agency personnel and practices. I know the Director feels strongly about this matter. Therefore, in lieu of the Inspector General's report on the Stockwell allegations, I hope you will accept my assurances that we have investigated Mr. Stockwell's allegation concerning the Bufkin case and the alleged attempt by CIA to defeat the Freedom of Information Act and the efforts of Senate investigators through the use of "soft files." We concluded that Mr. Stockwell's quote regarding these matters which he attributed to a "young officer" is not a true statement. Moreover, we found no evidence to support the more general allegation that withholding of documents from Senate investigators without their knowledge-was common practice. We have no other allegations or evidence of "soft files" being used to thwart external investigators or FOIA requesters. I am also enclosing a response made to the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights of the House Committee on Government Operations earlier this year on the Bufkin matter. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is presently investigating both the Angola and Bufkin matters, and you may wish to direct any additional inquiries on these matters to that Committee. I hope these answers and arrangements meet with your approval. [Exhibit 57a] JOHN F. BLAKE, Acting Deputy Director. U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Mr. JOHN BLAKE, Washington, D.C., October 14, 1977. Acting Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, DEAR MR. BLAKE: I have received part of the supplementary information requested from the CIA during the Administrative Practice and Procedure Subcommittee's Freedom of Information Act oversight hearings September 16th. Evidently there was a misunderstanding as to what material the subcommittee requested during the course of your testimony. First, I am puzzled by your reference (in the first paragraph of your transmittal letter) to additional information that was "informally requested" after the hearings by subcommittee staff. Subcommittee counsel, in response to a phone call from CIA Congressional liaison officer Edward Sheerman the afternoon of September 16, agreed to review the subcommittee's understanding of what material was requested during the hearing. Mr. Sheerman read his list of items, representing the agency's recollection, which was confirmed by the staff member. Nothing was added by the staff to the list read by Mr. Sheerman, except a request for a more detailed biographical sketch than you provided at the hearing. Mr. Sheerman and the staff confirmed that the agency would furnish the following information to the subcommittee: (1) The present location of the 170 Angola working papers and why these papers were not logged into the agency's official filing system? (Transcript, page 44) (2) Whether, outside Mr. Blake's personal knowledge, any soft file system (other than files of convenience) exists within the CIA? (Transcript, page 41, 44, 47). (3) Whether a soft file (other than a file of convenience) was kept by the CIA on David Bufkin. (Transcript, pages 45-47.) (4) Whether the files recently discovered by the agency on the MK Ultra program were found within the agency's official record system. (Transcript, page 59) (5) A copy of the Inspector General's report on the Stockwell allegations. (Transcript, pages 43-47) (6) The number of Freedom of Information Act requests received by the CIA since 1975. (Transcript, page 77) (7) A list of all CIA Freedom of Information Act litigation that concerned the b(1) exemption. (Transcript, page 80) (8) Copies of all CIA affidavits, filed in lieu of actual documents, in Freedom of Information Act litigation. (Transcript, page 81) (9) Arrangements for furnishing the subcommittee copies of all affidavits (mentioned in the previous request) that are classified. (Transcript, pages 81-82) (10) A list of cases in which a judge has requested to examine actual documents at issue in a Freedom of Information case rather than affidavits submitted by the CIA. (Transcript, page 83) I understand that some of this information still is being compiled. However, some of the material that has been forwarded to the subcommittee is incomplete. In other instances, the Agency now is apparently refusing to provide the information to the subcommittee. Regarding the Inspector General's report, you and Mr. Lapham, (Transcript, pages 43-47) in answering questions about the Angola working papers and soft files in the Bufkin case referred to that report. Your initial responses to my inquiry were based on the information in that report. Thus, my request for more definite data on these issues was made in the context of the discussion of the Inspector General's investigation. From your responses it was clear that the answers to my questions about soft files were contained in the report and I expected you to forward a copy to the subcommittee. I might add that in your supplemental response (Transmittal letter, last paragraph, page two) you seem to agree with my interpretation of what was being requested, as you acknowledge that the report contains the answers to my inquiries. Thus, I do not understand why you now consider the request for the report to be an additional staff request made after the hearing, rather than one that was understood by the CIA at the time of the hearing. I appreciate your concern for confidentiality regarding this report. I am sure, therefore, that the Subcommittee can make appropriate arrangements consistent with the confidentiality required for the Report. Therefore, I reiterate the Subcommittee's request for the Inspector General's report. On another matter, your proposal to provide the classified affidavits the Agency filed in two court cases to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence where it will be available for the use of Members of the Administrative Practice and Procedure Subcommittee is unacceptable. This Subcommittee has independent authority and jurisdiction and will not enter into any agreement which abrogates that responsibility. Accordingly, I request that, as was promised at the hearing (Transcript, page 81-82) the Agency make arrangements with this subcommittee's staff for review of those affidavits. Let me assure you that the Subcommittee is fully aware of its responsibility in this matter, and will take necessary precaution to safeguard the material. Your supplemental response expresses confusion as to which Angola working papers I referred at the hearing. I gather from your testimony at the hearing that Mr. Stockwell raised a question about the whereabouts of these papers and that the Inspector General's report considered this issue. If there was no confusion as to the papers involved in his allegation, I do not understand why you are confused by my reference. Furthermore, your own response to me mentions cables, dispatches and other official files on the program as distinguished from the "working papers." The Subcommittee simply wants to know how many of these "working papers" existed on the Angola program, whether they were made part of the official file, and where they currently are stored. Perhaps the Inspector General's report would shed some light on these questions. Nonetheless, in an effort to assist you in identifying the documents, I shall reiterate my request in greater detail. An Angola Task Force was established in the Africa Division of CIA. John Stockwell was the Chief of that task force. This working group operated from August 1975 until sometime in the spring of 1976. During that period, approximately 170 sequentially numbered working papers were prepared and circulated by the group. Those approximately 170 documents are what I referred to as the Angola working papers. Your transmittal letter also states that the Inspector General's report turned up no evidence that the use of soft files to withhold information from a Freedom of Information Act requester or a Senate investigation was a "common practice." (Transmittal letter, page 3) That seems to imply that, while not common, the practice has existed in the past. Please let the subcommittee know, under what circumstances, if any, soft files have been employed for this purpose. Please cite specific examples where applicable. Your responses to the House Government Information Subcommittee's inquiries about soft files were helpful but raised additional questions in my mind. The answers concede the existence of a soft or informal file on David Bufkin that was kept on the General Counsel's Office. However, the response does not indicate why the General Counsel needed such a file, whether it contained any information other than copies of documents from official files, and whether that file still is being held outside the Agency's formal record keeping system even though the Angola project has ended. Please provide the subcommittee with answers to these questions. Finally, in response to the question about the MK Ultra files, your answer indicates that the recently discovered files were not found within the official record system. You maintained at the hearing that working or soft files are kept only for the convenience of individuals working on a project, and that prior to 1975 agency policy mandated destruction of these files when a project ended. On page 48 of the transcript you also testified that before destruction these files were to be checked against the contents of official files, and that any documents of record were to be transferred to the official file. It is clear that these procedures were not followed in the MK Ultra case. And, to date, you have not outlined for the subcommittee any Agency procedures that would guarantee that soft files are destroyed at the end of a project, and that official documents are removed from them and put in the regular filing system before destruction of the file. The possibility that soft files could be used to avoid disclosure to Freedom of Information Act requesters and to Congress obviously existed at the time of the discovery of the MK Ultra files and may still exist. The subcommittee would like to know of any CIA procedures to prevent this abuse. Please forward the material you and your staff agreed to provide the subcommittee as soon as possible, and also complete the responses already transmitted. The subcommittee staff will be happy to discuss arrangements for review of classified affidavits and for protection of the confidentiality of the Inspector General's report. I look forward to your early response and to your continued cooperation with this subcommittee. Sincerely, JAMES ABOUREZK, Chairman. [Exhibit 57b] Hon. JAMES ABOUREZK, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 14 October 1977. Your letter raises a number of matters which we are studying and hope to provide responses to shortly. In the meanwhile, I am enclosing certain materials requested by your Subcommittee at an earlier date. The bulk of the enclosures are the unclassified affidavits submitted in support of CIA's defense in litigation brought against the Agency under the Freedom of Information Act. Included per the Subcommittee's request, are affidavits filed in cases which are still pending, and it is requested that these affidavits be handled in a manner consistent with the Government's rights in pending litigation. Enclosed herewith is a copy of "Freedom of Information Case List-July 1977 Edition" prepared by the Department of Justice. For the convenience of the Subcommittee, all decided cases in which a (b) (1) claim was involved have been underlined. Áll decided cases involving the (b)(1) claim in which CIA was defendant are underlined and asterisked. Also enclosed are papers listing cases where the court has requested in camera examination of documents withheld under a (b) (1) claim and an explanation of the Government's shift in position regarding disclosure of CIA's involvement in the Hughes Glomar Explorer project in Military Audit Project v. Turner. These enclosures should complete our responses to original Subcommittee requests. Matters raised in your 14 October letter will be addressed in my next response to you. Sincerely, Enclosures. JOHN F. BLAKE, Acting Deputy Director. [Exhibit 57c] U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Mr. JOHN BLAKE, Acting Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, DEAR MR. BLAKE: Your November 1 letter to the Administrative Practice and Procedure Subcommittee was only a partial response to the requests made at the Subcommittee's September 16th Freedom of Information Act hearing, for supplemental information from the CIA. That letter indicated that a further response would be forthcoming More than a month has lapsed since that letter and almost three months since the hearing. Yet, the CIA still has failed to complete its response. Specifically the subcommittee has not received: (1) the Inspector General's report on John Stockwell's allegations; (2) the classified affidavits filed by the CIA in Freedom of Information Act cases; (3) information on the Angola working papers, including how many were written, whether they were made part of the official file and where they currently are stored; (4) information about the David Bufkin soft file kept in the General Counsel's office-specifically why the General Counsel needed the file, whether it contained any information other than copies of documents from official files, and whether that file still is being held outside the agency's formal record keeping system; and (5) what procedures exist at the CIA to guarantee that soft files are destroyed at the end of a project, and that official documents are removed and put in the regular filing system before destruction of the file. Please contact Irene Margolis at the Subcommittee at 224-5617 to make arrangements to transfer the material. The Subcommittee should receive the balance of the information by December 20, 1977. Sincerely, JAMES ABOUREZK. Chairman. [Exhibit 57d] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Hon. JAMES ABOUREZK, Chairman, Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in reply to your letter of 14 October 1977 concerning my earlier letter to you dated 28 September regarding matters raised at the 16 September hearing on implementation of the Freedom of Information Act. With respect to your request for the report of the Inspector General of CIA concerning the Bufkin matter, please accept my assurance that the reference in my earlier letter to an informal request from your staff in no way meant to denigrate the request, nor did it have any effect on my earlier response. We treat staff requests as having the same force and effect as those made by members of Congress, and while my earlier response failed to satisfy you, the difficulty was not in the characterization of the request. In my earlier letter I referred to the confidentiality of the relationship between the Inspector General of CIA and the Director of CIA. Your offer to preserve this confidentiality while reviewing the Inspector General's report indicates the degree to which further explanation of this relationship is required. To put it as directly as possible, the Inspector General needs to have complete assurance that his reports to the Director are privileged information which do not go beyond the Director in the identical form in which they are presented. Only under these conditions can the Inspector General and the Director have the freedom and confidence in their relationship to insure that the plain truth can be reported to the Director without concern for its effect on any other matter. The Inspector General reports are summarized, paraphrased, or restated orally or in writing for other official uses. In my letter of 28 September to you I summarized the findings of the Inspector General regarding the Bufkin matter |