us to do. We should look at the possibilities, make our choices, then be decisive in implementation, eliminating on-and-off nervousness. But there are so many issues and alternatives. A 30-minute statement is highly inadequate; a full 2 days of hearings, even 200 days of hearings, cannot end the process. The selecting of national goals in the use of science will require a major, continuing study from now on.

I shall touch only on a few aspects that are especially pertinent, I think, to the space program, and that have not yet received the full public discussion their importance seems to warrant.

There are signs that as a nation we are still immature in our views regarding the reasons for large national projects in science.

We lack a clear enunciation and acceptance of some commonsense rules and facts.

WE ARE NOT THE ONLY NATION STRONG IN SCIENCE

For instance, one truism that we ought to learn to live with is that we are not the only nation strong in science and technology. With a number of nations all engaged competently in frontier work in science, we cannot expect to be first in everything. Our world will not necessarily fall apart if some other nation, even a potential enemy, sometimes does something important ahead of us. We must learn that the intelligent, reasoned approach for us is to choose always what we want to do, to select what is best for us, and to do that confidently and well.

NATIONAL SECURITY IS FIRST PRIORITY

The public does understand, I believe, that the most important rule of all in the use of science is that national security has to be first priority. With the insuring of national survival, nothing must be allowed to interfere. But, perhaps, because we understand this rule relatively well, we tend sometimes to overapply it in relating science to security.

We frequently act as though any worthwhile, national, science project needs to be defended on the basis of short-term, urgent, military requirements. If no immediate application to security is apparent, we tend to invent one. It ought to be recognized that this Nation has the technological resources to provide both for our urgent nearterm military needs and for numerous long-range benefits of science, including the long-range application of science to national security. Science programs may be deserving of strong support because they affect our position of leadership in the world, our prestige, or they may have to do with supporting our economy, or making social advance, all of which will in turn improve our position and hence, in the long run, our security as well.

We should learn not to oversimplify the banners we use for large science programs that involve security. If they are related to security only in an indirect and long-term way, let us say so. By now we have ample evidence that virtually all research into the unknown has the potential of long-term military application. We cannot afford to allow any major field of science to be explored alone by, or monopolized by, a potential enemy, because it is conceivable that even though we do not see the military application today, they might discover

something that could be of vital importance in a new military embodiment, and it might be too late before we discovered it.

One legitimate reason for advanced research, then, is its necessity for long-term military strength. Specifically, as we shall discuss a little later, some projects in space are clearly short range and vital in a military application. Other space research is related to security only in a nebulous, speculative, extremely long-range fashion.

In this second category, space is no different from much other pure research and deserves no special security claims automatically just because space is new and conspicuous internationally.

Perhaps one reason for confusion about the relation of science to security is the common misconception that underrates our technological resources-more specifically the concern that longer-range research and engineering can only be performed at the expense of vital military development, owing to a shortage of engineers and scientists.

Admittedly, this Nation ultimately would be in serious danger if it lacked engineers and scientists compared with some highly unfriendly power, because then they presumably could put themselves eventually in a position to destroy us if they so chose.

NO SHORTAGE OF ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS AT PRESENT

At the present time, however, we are not limited by engineers and scientists in performing the typical engineering project which characterizes so much of the space program and almost all of the defense program. In fact, on the contrary, we have today an overexpanded capability with a surplus of organizations, large and small, equipped with experienced technical teams geared to handle more projects than the Nation has in the offing.

True, we have no oversupply of the great, creative genius. But groups capable of doing work of the quality that we have come to regard as typical and acceptable are apparently in abundance. If there were a short supply, the Government would have to plead with companies to take on portions of the space program.

The best scientists and engineers would be busy doing science and engineering.

The actual facts are that never has competition been so severe for government work, and, despite the relatively low profit margin, the best engineers and scientists are usually found selling hard on future programs in order to insure a stable backlog for the organizations that they represent.

I am personally involved with the management of a $500 million a year industrial operation that happens to be about one-half government or government-related business, and one-half nongovernment, purely commercial ventures. I have yet to find a single project of interest to us commercially that we cannot man because of a shortage of engineers and scientists.

The problem that limits advances along private lines has to do with an unsatisfactory relationship between anticipated return on investment and the risk in cost of embarking on new, difficult, speculative, technological adventures. The bottleneck is not in availability of engineers and scientists.

A similar statement can be made, I believe, if one notes that the science and engineering "fruit cocktail" contains "apples" and

"oranges," the growing of which do not need to interfere with each other.

Whether we do or do not design a huge space booster, for example, need not have much bearing on our capabilities-in terms of scientific talent, that is to search for a cure for cancer-the specialists are completely different. One can argue that funding for one may preclude allocating funds for another, but to fail to sponsor one does not guarantee sponsorship of the other.

WORLD "SCIENCE OLYMPICS"

We must learn to categorize our objectives clearly in the use of science in national projects. One such new category is that called world prestige. There is now what might be called the world "Science Olympics." Let us not underestimate or be ashamed of an interest in science that is partly for prestige purposes. To much of the world, scientific superiority tends to connote military superiority, not immediately perhaps, but in the long run.

To many it implies an ascendancy of the systems of society and government standing behind that scientific excellence. Some research achievements will be interpreted as resting on a superiority of daring and spirit, of open-minded creativity, of pioneering strength. Such achievements can have emotional appeal and can capture the imagination and men's minds.

If we accept that there is such a thing as a legitimate and proper utilization of science projects to attain the advantages of world prestige, then let us not overlook one other thing. To attain prestige through scientific prowess requires both the substantive achievement and the worldwide recognition of the importance of that achievement when it comes.

The first may be in the field of science, but the second is in the field of international public relations. A program whose objectives include prestige, but which is focused entirely on bringing off the technical achievement, is still only half a program for prestige.

We already have proof of this. In the Science Olympics it ought to be total points that count. It is difficult to find an American scientist, industrialist, or Government spokesman who does not believe that on balance we are ahead of any nation in total scientific research. Even in space, while the Soviet Union has had a man in orbit longer, we believe we are ahead in general exploration, in interplanetary probes, in weather observation, in navigation, and in the utilization of space for communications. But most of us are concerned that we have not been doing well on the prestige front. Why? Presumably only because, not having acknowledged fully that there is a prestige battle, having been hesitant to dignify efforts to win prestige by facing up to such a purpose as an important parameter, we have not done the best possible job of presenting our accomplishments to the outside world, or even perhaps to the American public at large.

We have done relatively well on manned flights, where the Soviet Union has led, but poorly in informing the world of the achievements where we have been first. Prestige as an important issue in the selection of goals can be ignored if our Nation is universally recognized as being far ahead in scientific achievement. Then science programs, chosen by other criteria, will automatically generate enhanced prestige

as each new accomplishment unfolds. But if the Olympics scores are going to be at all close, then it becomes important to tell our story well, across the board.

PROBLEM OF THE CENTURY

We have discussed some points bearing on the selecting of national science projects that involve security and prestige. But there is much more.

In the coming, highly technological society, science has an important impact on every aspect of our lives. The goals of national science programs reach out and participate as a factor in all our goals. We have facing us especially what might be the problem of our century, namely, the growing mismatch or imbalance between accelerating technology and lagging social advance. We desperately need to understand much more about both the physical world and the behavior of man. We need more research on the whole spectrum of science. And the Government is involved in this because the resources employed on needed programs oftentimes are so large as to transcend the efforts of private groups alone.

LARGE SCALE OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF SCIENCE IS HERE TO STAY

We should find ways to accelerate private enterprise's research activities by improving the ratio of possible return to the risk that has to be taken, which low ratio is a limiting factor today. But even after we have done this, there is a great deal of scientific research essential to the national interest that involves such speculative and distant gains and such diffused, though eventually certain, benefits, that it does not lend itself to anything but Government sponsorship. Thus, we need to become accustomed to the idea that governmental implementation of pure, long-range, large-scale research is here to stay.

The Government for its part must gradually find ways to organize our machinery for understanding what can be done with science on a national scale, where the Government has to take the lead, and for selecting the right things to do. If we become expert at this, if we choose wisely, and if we choose balanced programs, then certainly in the long run this is the best way to protect our national position and to ensure for ourselves a prosperous, stable, and happy society.

PUBLIC MUST UNDERSTAND BETTER THE NATURE OF RESEARCH

But for the Government to make progress in the selection of national science goals, the public must understand better the nature of research. Scientific exploration cannot be frenzied and panicky without great waste. Long-term benefits must not be confused with the shortterm requirements either of the military for a weapons system or of peacetime industry for new products. We need to adopt the conviction that when we investigate the unknown competently, when nature is explored more deeply, then potentially useful results always turn up, though they cannot be predicted ahead of time. It is especially important to see that this point is widely understood, because much of our space program is of necessity in this truly long-range category.

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MANNED LUNAR EXPLORATION

Having touched now on a few general points relating to the use of science for national objectives, let us next discuss more specifically the Nation's largest, single, national research program, the one with the objective of manned lunar exploration.

From the remarks already made, it is clear that this particular citizen would be strongly against such a program if:

(a) It interfered with security;

(b) We could afford only one large scientific program;

(c) It interfered with economic growth by an imbalanced assignment of engineers and scientists in short supply to one narrow program;

(d) If it were a single, dead-end race or stunt; and finally (e) If there were nothing rather special about space, that is, if it were just another field of research.

If all of these things were true about the lunar program, then, clearly, there would be better ways to use our resources no, this is an understatement-rather, it would represent a colossal blunder.

One thing so singular about the program to land men on the moon during this decade is that if it is improperly conceived and implemented, then all of these negative characterizations might indeed apply.

LUNAR PROGRAM HAS HARDLY REGUN

These evils are not evident today, but the program has hardly begun. We have only to contemplate the program's being gradually oriented to exhibit an unwarranted false urgency, as though there were a guarantee that the Russians might otherwise land a man on the moon ahead of us and capture not only the glory of the act but the unchallenged "total leadership of the world."

We could, if we became sufficiently confused as to goals, pursue this objective fanatically, gradually increasing the priority and funding of the program in a desperate effort to win the race.

The program, then, would interfere with military objectives. It would have to proceed, committed in that way, even in the face of possible repeated failures and catastrophes. It would have to go on, even if new facts turned up indicating that it was a foolish decision, because our prestige would have been committed and our investment would have become too great to turn back. We would exaggerate and kid ourselves about every reason for carrying on the program. It would create Government control over so large a fraction of our technological and industrial effort as to permanently impair free enterprise, and, by making it impossible to give proper attention to other uses of science, would stunt our economic growth.

PROGRAM MUST BE CARRIED OUT ON A SENSIBLE SCALE

But the manned lunar-landing program is unique in another way also. So remarkable and special is this large space project that, if conceived and executed with adequate consideration to the points that I have sought to make earlier and more, it can become a model for the utilization of the large science project in the best national interest. To achieve this it has to be carried out, first of all, on a sensible, total scale. The landing of men on the moon needs to be under