THE

REASONABLENESS

AND

CERTAINTY

OF THE

Christian Religion.

H

Aving in the former Book proved the Divine Authority of the Scriptures, I proceed in this to clear fuch points, as are commonly thought most liable to exception in the Chriftian Religion, and to

propose fome confiderations which may serve to remove fuch prejudices, and obviate fuch cavils, as are usually raised against the Holy Scriptures. But before men venture upon making Objections against the Scriptures, they would do well first to confider the compass and ftrength of their own Parts and Faculties, and to obferve in how many things they daily find themselves deceived; how many men there are who understand much more than themselves, and how much folly and ignorance there is in the wifest - men. Those commonly that raise objections against the Scriptures are as confident in the management of them, as if they understood all things befides, and therefore conclude, that must needs be falfe, which they do not understand 5 not confidering, how very reafonable it is to fuppofe, that God fhould command and reveal many things, the Natures and Reasons of which we may not be able to comprehend. This must be granted by every man who believes God to be infinitely wife, bat doth not think himself to be fo, and acknowledgeth God's foveraignty over him. For as he is infinitely wife, he may reveal things above our capacities, and as he is the fupream Lord and Governor of the world, he may command us what in his infinite wifdom he fhall fee fitting, tho we may not perceive the Reason and Defign of it. And yet this is the utmost, that upon a due examination,

many

many of the objections against the Authority of the Scriptures amount to, that there are several things in them, of which fome men think no clear account can be given, and others, which feem to them unworthy of God. Now what is the meaning of this way of objecting? and where lies the force of fuch Arguments but in this, that it is not to be conceived, that God would reveal or command any thing, with which they are not fatisfied, or which they cannot perfectly understand? This is all the strength of this fort of objections. There is all the Reafon in the world to believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God, if they did not contain things, which these men in their great wisdom think should not be there,if they were his word; which is to make their own understanding the measure and Criterion of Divine Revelation. And fome have turned Scepticks for as good Reasons,and others have been Atheists upon the fame Principles; finding as much fault with the System of the World,and the Order and contrivance of the parts of it, as the Deist doth with the Scriptures; they have renounced all belief of a God, upon the fame grounds upon which he disbelieves the Chriftian Religion. To convince men therefore of the Narrowness and Weakness of HumaneReason,I fhallfhew, I. That in fome things each fide of a Contradiction feems to be demonftrable. II. That very man believes and experiences several things

B 2

things which in the Theory and fpeculative Notion of them would feem as incredible as any thing in the Scriptures can be fuppofed to be. III. That those who reject the Myfteries of Religion, muft believe things much more incredible.

I. In fome things each fide of a Contradiction feems to us demonftrable. Several instances might be given of this. I fhall inftance only in the divifibility of Matter. Nothing feems more evident than that divifibility is effential to Matter, and that therefore all Matter is divifible, fo that the least part of Matter is as divifible as the biggeft, because the least particle of Matter is Matter, that is, it is of the fame Nature and Effence with the whole : and all Matter differs only in Bulk, or Figure, or Place, or Reft, or Motion. It being then of the Nature of Matter to be divifible, it must ever be divifible, tho it be never fo often divided; fince it can never be fo divided, as to lose it own Nature, or ceafe to be Matter. On the other fide, it is demonftrable that Matter cannot be infinitely divifible; because whatever is divifible is divifible into parts, and no parts can be infinite, because no Number can be fo. For all Number is neceffarily in it felf capable of being counted or numbred, tho no Finite Being may be able. to number it, a Numberless Number is a contradiction, it is a Number, which is no Number: therefore all Number must be even or

odd,

odd, and must be capable of Addition and Substraction, which is contrary to the Nature of Infinite. For what is lefs or greater has certain bounds or limits, and therefore cannot be infinite, or without any end or bounds. Matter therefore cannot be divifible in Infinitum, fince all Divifion is into Parts, and all Parts are capable of being numbred, that is, they are more or fewer, even or odd. And it will not fuffice to fay, that Matter can never actually be divided into infinite Parts, tho it be capable of infinite Divifion, fo as that there can be no end of its divifibility. For the Parts into which it is divifible must be actually exiftent, tho not actually divided: for nothing can be divifible into parts which it hath not, and all parts actually exiftent, whither they be divided, or only divifible, are capable of being numbred, or must have a determinate number, and therefore cannot be infinite. But to say that these Parts of Matter are indefinite, but not infinite, is only to confefs, that we know not what to say of them: for they are indefinite in respect to us, not in their own Nature, we cannot determine their Number, or what end there can be of dividing them, but this is an argument of our own ignorance, and proves nothing as to the nature of the thing.

Again, nothing is clearer to every understanding, than that all the parts into which