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that, the Automobile Manufacturers Association and the individual manufacturers, given a cue, maybe to pursue it independently by reason of supplemental research.

Senator RIBICOFF. They could, but it does not necessarily mean that they do.

Dr. JOLIET. I don't know that; no, sir.

Senator RIBICOFF. But if you had the information, you then could pursue it and make it available. Now, it could very well be that there are certain defects in automobiles which are sold by the hundreds of thousands about which people should have knowledge and which should be made available, but are not made available. Automobile manufacturers get the information and you don't get the information, but it is not made available. I am at a loss to understand this failure of governmental responsibility, especially when you are making the money available to the research organization.

Dr. JOLIET. Well, it is a matter of statistics, I guess. I don't know that I can explain it adequately.

For example, supposing we were concerned with a new type steering wheel on a car. The information from Cornell would have to provide data comparing the performance of this steering wheel with all other steering wheels in the accident situation. The accidents would have to be matched before we would be able to say that this steering wheel is safer or less safe-by the way, there are other ways that we could get at this information if we were able to do it--but through this research grant, we have to compare numbers of cases with one device with numbers of cases without that device. Then, we begin to arrive at the truth. There is very little in medicine

Senator RIBICOFF. You have picked an item that is one of the greatest causes of injury, the question of the steering wheel.

Dr. JOLIET. Yes, sir.

Senator RIBICOFF. You might discover that a certain type of steering wheel is very bad; whether it is relatively bad compared to other steering wheels isn't the point. You might have a steering wheel that is very harmful, and you may be able to find this out with one or two steering wheels. Something ought to be done about it, it is easy to understand, if you have a bad steering wheel that causes an unusual type of injury when a person is in an accident.

Dr. JOLIET. We have another means of control. Not only myself but also Doctor Goldstein are in contact with Cornell and with the other grantees, We hold frequent conferences with them. We are acquainted with the work they are doing directly. We believe that if the kind of events you infer were to happen, we would know about them.

Senator RIBICOFF. What would you do then? Have you ever made known to the public a basic defect that you have found in an automobile?

Dr. JOLIET. We have not found basic defects in automobiles at a time when we could tell the public anything about them. Through this grant, as you have pointed out, the information forthcoming is after the end of that model year. Telling people they should not drive car X that was built 2 or 3 years ago isn't going to do very much good. What we are after is the design features that made car X unsafe.

Senator RIBICOFF. That is because you are not getting current information. This is what is bothering me, when we are talking about data for 1956. There are comparatively very few automobiles today of 1956 vintage-there are some. But when you consider the obsolescence in automobiles, and how automobiles are turned over and used, having data of 1956 in 1965 does not give us very much information.

Dr. JOLIET. We would like to get other information. The design of this grant is to supply us information on over-the-road experience of actual cars and actual crashes with actual people. Now, this will feed us certain kinds of information. Other kinds of information, in addition to the kind you request, require other kinds of experiments, so that the information would be obtained faster. For example, it is possible to run cars through simulated tests. Mathematical models can be set up. We are investigating these and we are working with them so that reasonal predictions may be made on the track or elsewhere. But one can't expect to get everything from one kind of a grant.

Senator RIBICOFF. How are you spreading the grants to make sure that you get what you need for public information?

Secretary CELEBREZZE. Mr. Chairman, I think you must remember that this is one grant-and there are about 64 grants, active grants which we have made from the Department-and this covers a whole maze of scientific matters. In other words, the grand total of grant money that we have spent is $11,395,000 since 1956, and $1,695,000 in 1965.

RESEARCH FINDINGS RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC AND THE INDUSTRY

Senator RIBICOFF. Out of all these millions of dollars that you have spent for research, what are some of the suggestion that you have made to the automobile industry and the public as a result of any finding? Secretary CELEBREZZE. Well, for example, I will read this for the record; it was handed to me. This came out of studies on injuries related to the size of cars. It brought out that occupants in small cars are apt to be injured 10 percent more frequently in an accident than those in standard cars. The frequency of dangerous and fatal injuries in small cars was about 20 percent higher than in standard cars. The percentage of fatalities was about 50 percent higher than among standard car occupants.

EXHIBIT 20

Car Design and
Public SafetyTM

by James Ridgeway

An unusual series of lawsuits involves General Motors' compact car, the Corvair. Twenty-four suits in Californía are based on claims of defective engineering in the car. In each one the charge is that a Corvair unexpectedly went out of control and crashed.

Introduced in 1959, the Corvair is the only rearengine auto made by an American firm; over one million of them are on the roads.

General Motors has denied the charges and says it is reluctant to discuss the pending litigation; nor does it want to discuss design factors of the car which might have bearing on it.

One suit, however, was settled in June. In this case, Arthur and Rose Pierini of Santa Barbara had sued GM and a local dealer for $300,000 in damages for injuries Mrs. Pierini suffered when her Corvair tipped over in 1961. She lost her left arm in the crash.

Mrs. Pierini's attorney, David Harney of Los Angeles, contended the Corvair was "inherently dangerous because 63 percent of its weight is concentrated over the rear end." He said this made the car over-steer and caused the accident.

GM attorneys denied this charge, said the car had no engineering defects and blamed driver negligence for the crash. The suit was settled for $70,000 before the trial was concluded.

In answer to an interrogatory question in one of the 24 cases, GM said that between May 17, 1962, and December 31, 1963, it had received reports of 102 accidents in which the complaint was that the Corvair unexpectedly went out of control. It denied the truth of the complaints.

Recently an official of the National Safety Council in Chicago told The New Republic it had received a number of letters from concerned people who either saw Corvairs in crashes or themselves had been in Corvair accidents.

Harney, who is one of a small group of lawyers engaged in bringing the 24 cases, says that they involve 1960-63 model Corvairs.

The Corvair has been openly criticized for design flaws on several counts. One is tire pressure. Unlike many other cars, on the Corvair there is a good deal of difference in the recommended tire pressure between

The New Republic, Sept. 19, 1964, p. 9.

front and rear wheels. The 1964 owner's manual says that front wheels should carry 15 pounds "cold," that is when the car has been idle; the rear wheels need 26 pounds. "Hot" (for long-distance driving) pressure should be adjusted so that front wheels carry 18 pounds; rear wheels, 30 pounds. The manual notes: "Over-steer problems may be encountered with incorrect pressures. Maintain recommended pressures at

all times."

Corvair has "4-Wheel Independent Suspension," as described in a sales booklet: "It's the main reason for Corvair's agile handling. Ingredients include solf-acting coil springs and double-acting shock absorbers. What happens is that each wheel absorbs its own bumps with minimal effect to the other three wheels. (The whole system is nicely cushioned by rubber to keep out noise and vibration.)" However, critics of the car have maintained in effect, that the Corvair's wheels are not steady enough. When there is pressure on them, they sometimes are said to tuck-under, until the rim of the wheel itself hits the pavement, swerving the car or even tipping it over. EMPI of Riverside, Calif., sells special stabilizing equipment for 1960-63 model Corvairs. In the 1964 models, GM added an anti-sway bar between the front wheels, and a single leaf transverse spring across the rear end. These additions have helped reduce the "car's well-known tendency to over-steer," according to an article in the May Consumer Reports. In the August issue an article says that the '64 Corvair handles very well on curving roads, and that any tendency to over-steer has been almost completely eliminated. The 1965 model Corvairs which will be unveiled ----next week will have an improved four-wheel independent suspension system as well as wider tread tires front and rear for better handling.

Where does this leave the man who owns a 1960-63 model Corvair? Should he equip it with the sway bars and special springs GM put on its 1964 models? Is the tire pressure critical or is the manufacturer merely being overcautious in the owner's manual? Since GM itself was reluctant to discuss the design of the car in

USA

any detail because of pending litigation, we talked to several Washington, D. C., GM dealers who both sell and service the Corvair to find out what tire pressures they were recommending and what they could tell us about stabilizing equipment.

The first dealer said tire pressure should be 24 pounds front and rear; or 26 pounds front and rear depending on the weight in the auto. (This, of course, contradicted the owner's manual.) When it came to discussing safety aspects of the car's independent suspension system, he became vague but did say there were some sort of special sway bars one could buy to make the car into a hot rod. A second dealer, however, answered all questions in detail. He said it was absolutely imperative to follow tire pressure recommendations in the owner's manual, and went on to describe how a sway bar had been added to the '64 model to steady the rear wheels. (We got down on the ground and he pointed it out.) He said that under certain adverse conditions previous model Coroairs, unequipped with the antisway equipment could turn over because the rear wheel rims might catch the pavement and flip the car. When we discussed the possibility of purchasing a '63 model and adding stabilizing equipment he said this might cost more than $125, and we would be advised to forget it and buy a new car. But he added, if we were intent on buying a used model, there really was little danger. He had one himself and had been driving it hard, never experiencing any difficulties with the rear end being unsteady.

A third GM dealer looked at us in disbelief when we asked about sway problems in the Corvair. He had never heard about such a thing, but took us over to the service department chief. The chief said flatly there was no problem with the Corvair, there was no sway bar or any other stabilizing equipment on the '64 model, that indeed, there was absolutely no difference whatever between the '63 and '64 model in this respect. But we persisted, and finally he did admit there was a bar of some kind running across the car between the rear

wheels on 1964 models. He was sure it had nothing to do with stabilizing the vehicle, but on the other hand, neither did he know precisely what it did do. When we asked about tire pressure, he said to forget the owner's manual; it was all wrong. Carry 24 pounds in the front tires and 26 pounds in the rear. Then he added, "Cars are like women. They're all different."

Calls to half a dozen other GM garages resulted in blank answers to questions about stabilizing equipment. Each had a different idea about the tire pressure.

Finally we made a call to the Tire and Rim Association, a technical group that sets standards for tire sizes and safe loads. An official said the association's recommendations for 1963 and 1964 model Corvair cars were 24 pounds pressure for each tire.

This poses some interesting questions. Does GM I instruct its dealers and its service personnel so that at the least they are familiar with the different parts of the car? If so, why can't they provide a few simple and reliable answers to customers' questions? Should the design of this automobile prove faulty, does the company have any responsibility for fixing the cars that already are on the road? And quite aside from the confusion about Corvair, shouldn't there be some independent organization to tell car owners what is known about safety design?

Right now there is no such organization to tell a customer how safe a car is, and under what conditions; there isn't even a pamphlet to give you an idea of what to look for in terms of a cars safety-design features. The federal government requires safety specifications in airplanes and ships, and keeps a sharp eye on buses and trucks operating in interstate commerce, but has no authority to check on autos. New York persuaded manufacturers to put seat belt attachment points in cars; but this year New York State Senator Edward J. Speno's efforts to pass legislation establishing safety standards for tires were beaten down by auto and tire interests. In Massachusetts a bill was introduced in the state legislature this year to set up a commission to

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determine standards of safe design. But it was tabled *' after the legislative committee which was considering t made a visit to Detroit, all expenses paid by the auto <`makers, to view their research work into car safety.

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Now Speno wants federal and state governments to join in spending $3 million to design a really safe car. Legislation would follow to compel manufacturers to incorporate its safety features in all cars.

Three agencies of the federal government have some slight interest in automobile design. One of them is the Division of Accident Prevention of the US Public Health Service. Between fiscal 1962 and 1963 it administered a $2.7 million study into why accidents happen. # Only $134,000 went for research into automobile safety design. Dr. Paul V. Joliet, division chief, says if he had more money and enough staff he would be willing to put out a report on car design similar to the Surgeon General's report on cigarette smoking. However, Dr. Leon Goldstein, head of the division's research operation, says that while he is anxious to see research into car designs he doubts that the man in the street needs to know much about it or about safety design in general. The consumer should put his faith in government agencies which are there to protect him. And he feels there is fruitful coordination between government sponsored researchers and manufacturers now and that it should not be upset. He doesn't want to start an unfair scare on any one model car.

One recipient of the Public Health Service's research grants is the Automotive Crash Injury Research project of Cornell University. Dr. Horace E. Campbell, a leading specialist in the automobile accident field, said recently that this unit "knows what the chief defects of cars are, and which makes in actual experience on the road are the more dangerous. It is presumed that we are not told the facts that would allow us to buy in a discriminating way because a large portion of the project's support comes from the automobile manufacturers." Since some of the money comes from the government, Dr. Campbell asks why the taxpayer shouldn't be furnished with the data that would "warn him away from the most dangerous cars."

The Bureau of Roads of the Department of Commerce put out a report in 1959 calling for greater safety in auto design However, it spends most of its time getting better roads built. It will begin to get into the regulating business slightly when it administers standards that Congress recently set for manufacturers of brake fluid The General Services Administration is more likely to push the government into vehicle safety design. It was recently instructed by Congress to set safety standards to be met by manufacturers who sell vehicles to the government.

The most curious of all the government programs, and one at first might suspect the one most closely

identified with the consumer, is the President's Committee for Traffic Safety. It has an annual budget of about $200,000. Of the total, $150,000 comes from federal funds; the other $50,000 is a gift from the insurance and automotive industries which appear to dictate its activities. The salaries of the executive director and two assistants come out of the industry funds, and they take their cues from an advisory council which primarily is made up of representatives of private organizations. Although the President's Committee seal is used on the group's literature, the White House has little to do with the committee's activities. For instance, a pamphlet entitled "The Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact" has the President's Committee's shield on its cover, which might seem to imply the backing of both the Committee and the President. Actually the pamphlet is an attack on federal participation in highway safety. It was printed and disseminated by the Automobile Manufacturers Association, without approval of the President's Committee.

"What Motorists Really Think About Traffic Safety" is another pamphlet. On the inside cover is a letter from the executive secretary of the President's Committee praising the Pure Oil Co., the publisher. This seems to be contrary to another Committee policy, for one of its officials, Dr. Richard Tossell, said recently, "The Committee doesn't endorse or sponsor views of any other organization." As Dr. Tossell described the Committee's work, it relies on the advisory council to bring matters to its attention, and then it tries to "stimulate" some sort of program. To put it more bluntly, the Committee is Detroit's public relations annex at the White House.

When we told Dr. Tossell of our inquiries into the Corvair business he said the best thing to do was to go straight to Corvair; they would surely put us straight. And he added: "The interests of industry are in progress."

The government programs concentrate largely on "human failure," to which is commonly attributed 90 percent of all car accidents. But experts have said that a safely designed car could save tens of thousands of lives a year, not to mention preventing hundreds of thousands of injuries.

By the end of July, 25,630 people had died since the first of the year in automobile accidents - an all-time high, and 11 percent above last July's total, which then was a record. Each year the federal government spends millions in aircraft accident prevention research and up to $100,000 per victim to find the causes of airplane accidents. The design of every airplane down to every nut and bolt is checked for safety by the government. When it comes to automobiles, the government spends less than a nickel per casualty to find safer designs for automobiles, and there is no regulation whatever.

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