that will afford a ism."*

66

practical answer to my Letters on Socinian

From the divine, Mr. Kentish proceeds to discourse on the social and personal virtues. I perceive many things, in this part of his performance, which would admit of a reply; but nothing that requires any, except what he alleges on the innocence of error. "Liberality," Mr. Kentish observes," inclines us to believe, that involuntary religious error exposes not men to the displeasure of their Maker."-And again, “We assert the innocence of involuntary error. It is the unhappiness of many professors of our religion, to consider it as partaking of the nature of sin. Such is the language they use in their writings." Surely Mr. Kentish has not read what he has written against, or he must have noticed, that I also have acknowledged the innocence of involuntary error. Have I not said, "The mere holding of an opinion, considered abstractedly from the motive, or state of mind of him that holds it, must be simply an exercise of intellect; and, I am inclined to think, has in it neither good nor evil;"§ Does not Mr. Kentish know, that the ground on which I have supposed error relating to the gospel to be sinful, is, that it is not involuntary? Not that I accuse those who err of knowing that they do so; or of avowing principles which in their conscience they do not believe this would not be error but gross dishonesty. Voluntary error is that which arises from an evil bias of heart, or a dislike to the truth. Such is the account given of certain characters by a sacred writer: Because they received not the love of the truth—God sent them strong delusions that they should believe a lie. These men were not apprised of their being in an error; they believed their lie: but this belief arose from a dislike of truth; and it was this that denominated it voluntary, and sinful.

What is it that Mr. Kentish would persuade his readers that I believe? "The mere conclusions of the understanding," he says, "where the will is unconcerned, cannot surely participate of guilt" and who thinks they can? "Guilt," he adds, "then, only attaches itself to error, when men wilfully and indolently refuse * See "Wood's Sermon," for Turner of Wakefield, pp. 50, 51, Note.

+ Page 25. + Pages 29, 30.

Letter X. p. 176.

||2 Thes. ii. 10, 11.

to employ the means of better information which are put into their hands."* Very well; and who imagines the contrary?

From these principles, which Mr. Kentish seems willing to have considered as the exclusive property of himself and his brethren, he proceeds to draw certain useful improvements: "By these considerations, my fellow Christians," he says, "we are restrained from placing ourselves in the chair of infallibility; from rashly judging upon the present state, and the future doom of our virtuous, though, it may be, mistaken brethren." Part of this is, no doubt, very good; it is highly proper, that fallible creatures should make no pretence to infallibility: but how can Mr. Kentish say that they do not judge upon the present state of others, when, in the same sentence, he pronounces some men “virtuous,” and calls them " brethren?” Will he give the name of “ virtuous” to every man in the world? If not, he occupies the seat of judgment as really as I do : his censure, therefore, does not affect my judging upon "the present state of men ;” (for he does the same, and that in the same breath ;) but my not acknowledging those as "virtuous, Christian brethren, whom he accounts so.

But, say our opponents, it is illiberal and presumptuous in you, to attribute men's errors on divine subjects to an evil bias of heart. If they were not attributed to this cause in the scriptures, I grant it would be so: but it is neither illiberal nor presumptuous, to view things as they are there represented. I have no more inclination, than Mr. Kentish, to occupy the "chair of infallibility:" but I consider it as a part of my proper work, and that of every other Christian, to judge of the meaning of his decisions who does occupy it. Produce me an example from the New Testament, of a single character who imbibed and taught false doctrine, and who was treated by the apostles as innocent. How different from this is the conduct of Paul, and Peter, and John, and Jude. Nay, produce me a single example of error, in matters of religion, amongst good men, that is treated as innocent in the holy scriptures. Are not the tenets of some amongst the Corinthians, who denied the

* Page 31.

† Gal. i. 7. 8. 2 Thes. ii. 10, 11. 2 Peter, ii. 1. 1 John, iv. 6. Jude 4.

resurrection, called evil communications, which would corrupt good manners? Were not the errors of the Galatians called disobedi ence to the truth; and were they not reproached, on this account, as foolish, and in a sort bewitched, and as needing to have Christ again formed in them? Did not our Lord accuse his own disciples, whose minds were blinded by their notions of an earthly kingdom, with folly and slowness of heart ?*

:

In things purely natural, men may think justly, or make mistakes, without any degree of goodness on the one side, or evil on the other and even in things of a moral nature, if our errors arose either from natural incapacity, or the want of sufficient means of information, they would be excusable but never, that I recollect, do the scriptures represent errors of the latter description, especially those which relate to the gospel way of salvation, as arising from these causes. They teach us, that way-faring men, though fools shall not err therein; intimating that the errors which men make concerning the way of salvation, do not arise from the want of natural capacity, but of a way-faring spirit, or a true desire to walk in it.

I am not conscious of retaining any error, yet there is little doubt but that I do : from having discovered many in my past life, I have reason to suspect, that there are many more about me undiscovered. But, whatever they be, I suppose they are owing to some sinful prejudice of which I am not aware and I know not that I am obliged to think differently of the errors of other people.

I perceive Mr. Kentish himself can omit the morality of opinion, where himself or a fellow-creature is the object of it. He pleads for liberality of sentiment, (by which he seems to intend an equally good opinion of men, notwithstanding their errors,) as a virtue, a virtue in which he thinks his brethren to excel. He must, therefore, consider its opposite as a vice, a vice which operates to our disadvantage. Now, I would ask Mr. Kentish, as before I asked Mr. Lindsey, "Supposing that I am in an error, in thinking amiss of my fellow-creatures, why should it not be as innocent as thinking amiss of Christ? Why ought I to be reproach

* 1 Cor. xv. 33, 34. Gal. ii. 1. iv. 19. Luke xxiv. 25.

ed as an illiberal, uncharitable bigot for the one, while no one ought to think the worse of me for the other?" I wish some one of our opponents would answer this question.

If "the language of liberality be," what Mr. Kentish says it is, "that in every nation, he that feareth God and worketh righteousness, is accepted," we can assure him, that we are not such strangers to it as he may be apt to imagine. Such language not only approves itself to our judgments, but rejoices our hearts. And, if bigotry be, as he defines it, "such an inordinate attachment to our own modes of faith and worship as prompts us to have no dealings with those who prefer others, to think of them with unkindness, and to act towards them with violence," provided he do not extend his dealings to Christian fellowship, which, according to his note in page 44, he does not, we can cordially unite with him in reprobating it. Liberality and candour, of this description, may exist, as Mr. Kentish observes, in harmony with zeal for religious principle.

But if liberality must incline us to treat errors of a moral and religious nature, especially those which relate to the gospel way of salvation, as mere mistakes of the understanding, "in which the will is unconcerned," it is a kind of virtue to which we make no pretence: and if bigotry consists in the reverse of this, we have no objection to be thought bigots, believing, as we do, that such bigotry is abundantly recommended in the holy scriptures.

But, "it is impossible, surely," says my opponent, "that, maintaining this opinion, they should regard the man whose religious sentiments differ from theirs, with perfect complacency, satisfaction and benevolence."* Where, then, did Mr. Kentish learn to confound "perfect complacency and satisfaction" with "benevolence?" To exercise the former towards characters who renounce what we consider as the fundamental principles of the gospel, or even towards any man, but for the truth's sake that dwelleth in him, is, in our esteem, sinful: but the latter ought to be exercised towards all mankind, whatever be their principles or characters. I cannot be conscious of another's feelings; but, for my own part, I find no difficulty, in this matter, arising from my religious principles: and it is a satisfaction to my mind, to see not only * Page 30.

the Apostle of the Gentiles ardently desiring the salvation of his countrymen, but my Lord and Saviour weeping over them; while each abhorred both their principles and their practice. If this be a "persecuting" principle, Paul, and even our Saviour, must both have been persecutors.

Mr. Kentish, having thus reviewed the social and personal virtues, calls upon "fair and unbiassed observation to determine, what is the character which they bear in their commerce with mankind." "If," says he, "it be not more exemplary than that of other Christians, it is not, perhaps, in any degree, inferior."* Mr. Kentish knows very well, that the authorities from which I drew a contrary conclusion, were no other than those of Dr. Priestley and Mr. Belsham. "It cannot be denied," says the former," that many of those who judge so truly concerning particular tenets in religion, have attained to that cool, unbiassed temper of mind, in consequence of becoming more indifferent to religion in general, and to all the modes and doctrines of it." "Men who are the most indifferent to the practice of religion," says the latter, "and whose minds, therefore, are least attached to any set of principles, will ever be the first to see the absurdities of a popular superstition, and to embrace a rational system of faith." Such was the method in which these writers attempted to account for the alleged fact," that Rational Christians were indifferent to practical religion" This fact they could not deny; and, by attempting to account for it, they tacitly admitted it; yea, Mr. Belsham expressly grants, that "there has been some plausible ground for the accusation."

To the authority of Dr. Priestley and Mr. Belsham I may now add that of Dr. Toulmin and Mr. Kentish. The former, after the example of his predecessors, endeavours to account for their "neglecting the culture of the heart and affections ;" and the latter acknowledges, without scruple, that, "with less restraint than is practised by some of their brethren, they enter into the world, and indulge in its amusements."‡

But Mr. Kentish, though he grants the above, denies that there is any thing in it that can be fairly improved to their disadvantage