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through the use of these waters for irrigation and power. Old irrigation systems should be rehabilitated and extended as needed and new lands should be brought under development as rapidly as is feasible.

In considering a plan for the full utilization of the water storage at Kajakai and Arghandab the following construction and planning operations appear to fit into a complete development program.

1. The completion of the Kajakai and Arghandab Dams and the Boghra Canal system. This construction should be practically completed by the end of 1952. 2. The irrigable area under the Boghra Canal system. This development is under way and could continue to completion in a continuous operation program. It will include:

(a) The construction of laterals, farm ditches, on project roads, surface drains, and necessary structures. (b) Subsurface drains.

(c) Village construction, including necessary domestic and sanitation installations.

3. The irrigable area under the Arghandab Reservoir. Approximately 170,000 jiribes are now irrigated in the Arghandab Valley. Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., has recently made a new water use analysis for this valley, including the water required for the Arghandab powerplant and the analysis indicated that there would be water available in the Arghandab Reservoir for approximately 130,000 jiribes of additional land. Possible irrigated lands in the Arghandab and Tarnak Valleys are now being investigated by Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., technicians to determine which lands will be best suited for the use of this water. Proposed construction here is:

(a) Diversions and possible additions to the present canal systems; (b) Canal and main lateral systems on the new lands;

(c) Laterals, farm ditches on project roads, surface drains and necessary struc

tures on the new lands;

(d) Subsurface drains;

(e)

4.

On project roads on lands now irrigated.

Seraj, Garns

and Chakhansur areas. Surveys have not been made in these areas but preliminary investigations are underway. Possible work here would include:

(a) Rehabilitation and extension of present irrigation systems; (b) Canal construction on new lands;

(c) Laterals, farm ditches on project roads, surface drains and necessary

structures on new lands;

(d) Subsurface drains;

(e) Possible village construction.

5. Interproject roads. As the agricultural areas are developed, interproject roads will probably have to be improved to allow all season travel and easy access to Kandahar.

6. Kandahar-Kabul Road. This road will ultimately have to become an allseason road to keep pace with the developments in the Holmand Valley.

7. Arghandab power development. - Plans are now underway for the design and construction of this project.

8. Girishk power development. The foundation for this plant is installed and the project can be developed as soon as the power need is justified.

9. Development survey of the Holmand Valley. - Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., has this survey underway and when it is completed it will include a plan for the full utilization of the soil and water resources in the Holmand Valley.

10. Completion of Kajakai Dam for power development and installation of the Kajakai powerplant and transmission lines. This development will come when it is justified by the power demand.

It should be understood that surveys have not been completed for much of the proposed work and any cost estimates made at this time would have to be of a very general nature. However, to help develop an appreciation of the approximate annual costs for such a program over a period of years, the Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc., engineering staff has made up tentative construction estimates. Mr. T. Y. Johnston and Mr. W. A. Hohlweg will have these estimates in Kabul on May 24.

I would appreciate the opportunity of having representatives of your Government meet with Mr. Sidney Sherwood, Mr. William Gates, and myself on May 25 or May 26 to discuss Afghanistan plans for the cevelopment of the Helmand Valley. Following this meeting, it would appear advisable for both groups of representatives to meet with Mr. Johnston and Mr. Hohlweg to discuss the cost estimates for the development operations your Government will plan on carrying

out.

Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Gates, and I plan on leaving Kabul on May 28, but we will be free at any time during our stay in Kabul for consultations on Helmand Valley matters. If satisfactory, appointments can be arranged for meetings with the Government representatives. I would appreciate having Mr. Sherwood notified of the plans.

Five copies of this letter are being enclosed with the original.

K. KOHLER, Jr., Engineer, Export-Import Bank.

[Restricted]

Mr. Т. Ү. JOHNSTON,

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON,

Kandahar, Afghanistan, May 14, 1952.

Project Manager, Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan, Inc.,

Kandahar, Afghanistan.

DEAR MR. JOHNSTON: You have requested a clarification of Mr. H. E. Gaston's letter of June 28, 1951, to Mr. H. W. Morrison regarding the use of Export-Import Bank funds for the extension of wasteways. You also asked about the use of Export-Import Bank funds for structural work on the Boghra Canal outside of schedules IV, V, VI, and VII.

Mr. Gaston's letter states, "under and over pass wasteways were necessary integral parts of the canal system and therefore included in the approved project for financing under the credit." Therefore, Export-Import Bank funds can be used for their installation, including the construction of necessary ditches and structures for the distances from the canal necessary to make them function. However, as is pointed out in Mr. Gaston's letter, the extension of these ditches beyond that point, for the prevention of damage to lower lying lands, is not necessary for protection to the main canal and such construction would be "incident to the lateral and wasteway system required for land development." The term "over and under pass wasteways" is considered to be the protective installations for the prevention of runoff damage to the canal. This interpretation would also apply to canal wasteways necessary for the protective control of water in the main canal.

The agreement between the Royal Government of Afghanistan and the ExportImport Bank, dated April 21, 1950, states that funds would be advanced from time to time for the completion of the Boghra Canal system. You have explained that it will be necessary to install more canal drops and turnouts than had been anticipated at the time the target estimate was made and you wish to know whether these structures can be included under bank credit. Since Export-Import Bank funds are being advanced for the completion of the Boghra Canal system, my interpretation of the answer to this question would be that whatever structures are necessary to make the canal function properly can be included under the bank credit even though the number of structures was not the same as those shown in the target estimate. I understand that these structures are of a type that was approved in the original project.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Export-Import Bank in Washington and if my interpretation of the use of Export-Import Bank funds for structural work on the Boghra Canal outside of schedules IV, V, VI, and VII is not consistent with the bank's thinking, you will be so notified.

Yours very truly,

KARL O. KOHLER, Jr.

COST-CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE (GENERAL PLAN PROPOSED BY MKA)

PROJECT AND PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION DATES

1. Area under Boghra Canal system (July 1952-July 1954):

(a) Laterals, farm ditches, on-project roads, surface drains, and necessary

structures.
(b) Subsurface drains.

(c) Village construction, including necessary water developments, elec

tricity, and sanitation.

2. Area under Arghandab Canal system (July 1952-July 1955):

(a) Diversions and possible additions to present canal system.
(b) Canal system for new lands.

(c) Laterals, farm ditches, on-project roads, surface drains, and necessary

structures on new lands.

(d) Subsurface drainage.

(e) On-project roads on lands now irrigated.

3. Saraj, Garmsel, and Chakansur areas (January 1955—————):

(a) Possible additions and controls on present irrigation system.

(b) Possible canal construction on additional lands.

(c) Laterals, farm ditches, on-project roads, surface drains, and necessary

structures if additional lands put under cultivation.

(d) Subsurface drainage.

(e) Diversions and canal system.

(f) Village construction, including necessary water developments, elec

tricity, and sanitation.

4. Inter-project roads (July 1952-).

5. Kandahar-Kabul road (January 1953-).

6. Arghandab power development (July 1952-

7. Girishk power development (indefinite).

-).

8. Development survey of Helmand watershed (March 1952-January 1955).

9. Completion Kajakai Dam for power development (indefinite).

10. Kajakai power development (indefinite).

11. Completion Kajakai and Arghandab Dam, Boghra Canal ( to December

1953).

Total cost approximately $60 million. United States dollar cost approximately $50 million. (Includes approximately $7 million Export-Import Bank funds.) If this work would all be completed by 1960, with the exception of the Kajakai power development, it would cost an average of about US$5 million a year, ranging from a maximum of $9 million in 1953 to $1,150,000 in 1959. This is proposed purely for general guidance; it is not based on detailed surveys or studies, or concurred in by the Afghan Government.

APPENDIX E

JUNE 26, 1953.

MEMORANDUM TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS RE CREDIT No. 470, AFGHANISTAN. REQUEST FOR USE OF $726,757 OF AFGHANISTAN LOAN FOR PROJECTS IN HELMAND VALLEY

The agreement for the loan of $21 million to Afghanistan, executed on April 21, 1950, was made for "financing the United States dollar costs of equipment, materials and services required in connection with the construction of the the Kajakai Dam and the completion of the Boghra Canal system in the Helmand River Valley, the construction of the Arghandab Dam in the Arghandab Valley, and, to the extent that any balance of the credit is not required for the completion of the aforesaid project, to finance the United States dollar costs of equipment, materials and services required in connection with such supplemental and additional river developments and irrigation projects in the Helmand River Valley and in the Arghandab Valley as may be approved by Export-Import Bank.

STATUS OF THE PRIME CONTRACT WORK AND SURPLUS FUNDS

The Arghandab Dam was completed in May 1953. Kajakai Dam is complete with the exception of the installation of the valves in the irrigation outlets and some small clean-up jobs. The Boghra Canal system will require installation of 16 checks in the Shamalan Canal and some riprap before it is completed. The valves at Kajakai will not be available for installation until October, and the work should be completed in December. The checks in the Shamalan Canal will be put in during the summer and fall irrigation season, and this work should also be completed in December.

The San Francisco office of Morrison-Knudsen Co. of Afghanistan, the contractor under the prime contract, has been furnishing Export-Import Bank with a monthly budgetary control of Export-Import Bank funds since December 1952. These monthly reports have been showing a surplus of funds above the needs of the three prime contract jobs at about $1,500,000. The bank must necessarily rely on MKA's estimates; however, they appear to be reasonably accurate.

On January 8, 1953, Export-Import Bank approved the use of up to $385,000 for the construction of the Nad-I-Ali detention dam, the Marja dike and the surfacing of the Shamalan Canal service road. These three projects were considered to be part of the completion of the Boghra Canal system and not as work beyond the intent of the prime contract.

By letter of June 19, 1953, M. Hashim Maiwandwal, Counselor Charge d'Affaires of the Afghan Embassy, presented a request to Export-Import Bank for the use of $726,757 of the surplus funds for five projects in the Helmand Valley. These projects are:

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On the same day Mr. Hakim Maiwandwal also notified the bank that an additional $258,730 would be required under the prime contract to complete the Shamalan Canal, so the surplus fund total would have to be reduced by that amount. The status of the surplus funds would then be:

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Since MKA's completion cost estimates made at the San Francisco and also at the Kandahar offices varied by about $50,000, it was suggested that the figure of $1,400,000 be used as available surplus funds until the work is nearer to completion. Included in this amount is a $250,000 incentive fee on the prime contract, and there is real question whether this or even a part of it will be allowed as incentive fee when construction is completed. These items, plus the possibility of the Nad-I-Ali detention dam, the Marja Dike and the Shamalan service road projects costing about $60,000 less than the original estimate should leave a safe surplus to cover any unanticipated costs. The Afghan Government contemplates requesting the use of the remaining surplus funds (which the chargé d'affaires states in his letter will not be less than $134,000) sometime this fall.

Nad-I-Ali drainage

DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

At the time the agreement was made with Afghanistan no provision was made for drainage work on the Boghra Canal lands since the Afghan Government stated they would do the land development program with their own funds. F. O. Youngs, the soils man, working for MKA, reported in 1946 that because of the local soils conditions a drainage problem would develop after irrigation was started on the lands under the main Boghra Canal. Irrigation was started in the Nad-I-Ali project in 1950 and since then almost half of the 9,840 acres placed under cultivation has been abandoned due to the steadily rising water table and crops on 3,200 of the remaining acres are being damaged by salts and high ground water.

Soils. The soils on the Nad-I-Ali are among the poorest under the Kajakai Reservoir. Irrigation was started here because it was part of the largest block

of Government land that could be made available to nomad settlers. The local soils are primarily a shallow clay loam, high in salt content, overlying either gravelly clays or gravelly sandy clay loam, which are also quite salty, and these are underlain by gravel with clay or in places conglomerates. The soils have a slow permeability rate, and the stratification of the underlying stratified or cemented gravels hinders the movement of irrigation water.

Along the toe of the hill slopes, which in places is crossed by the canal, a layer of mixed salt high in gypsum called "gotch" is found from 2 to 4 feet below the surface. Where this layer is found in the canal excessive seepage has taken place. Source ground water. The sources of ground water in the Nad-I-Ali are: 1. Irrigation: The soils have little organic matter and a low field capacity. Irrigation must be done at frequent intervals with a resulting low efficiency, and an excessive amount of water is lost as ground water. Water in excess of the amount necessary for plant growth must also be applied to keep the salts below the root zone.

2. Leakage from the Boghra Canal: Seepage areas are found along the canal where the salt layers were opened by the canal excavation. Seepage through these layers has resulted in serious wet spots along the canal and into the cultivated fields.

3. Discharge from the 56+500 wasteway: This wasteway discharges onto the lower Nad-I-Ali lands, and subsurface investigations indicate it is an important source of underground water for the local lands.

4. Leakage from lateral canals: Any laterals passing through "gotch" have shown seepage losses.

5. Domestic water supply: At present the only source of domestic water is from the irrigation canals which requires that a portion of the system must run water all the time. Seepage from these laterals continually adds water to the ground-water supply where normally, if other domestic water was available, the laterals could be dry at least 2 months out of the year.

6. Rainfall: With an average of about 6 inches of rainfall a year little rainwater is usually added to the ground-water supply.

Ground-water investigations. -Installation of observation wells was started on the project in June 1951, and 22 wells are now ready on the 18,000-acre tract. A constant rise in water table has been noted since that time. For example, in an old well at Nad-I-Ali Fort the water table was 6.35 meters below the ground surface in 1950 and by May 1952 it had risen to 1.57 meters below surface. In some areas the water table is within 0.5 meters of the ground surface. With the rising water table salts were brought to the ground surface by capillary movement and the concentrations became so strong that many acres of land had to be abandoned.

In addition to the observation wells a small drainage test area was started in 1952. A ditch was dug 2 meters deep as an outlet, and several types of drainage were studied. Although the investigation has been underway for only 9 months, the results indicate that the soils can be drained.

Proposed drainage program. - In initiating a drainage program for the Nad-I-Ali area, provision should be made for correcting all the major sources of water that are contributing to the drainage problem. The following is proposed:

1. Irrigation: TCA extension assistance is being made available to the farmers to improve their cultural and irrigation water application practices. It is anticipated that through the use of improved cropping practices and with more efficient water application it will be possible to reduce the excessive amount of irrigation water that finds its way into the ground water. Eventually when the salts have been leached out of the soil profile and removed with the drainage water it will be possible to reduce the amount of water now being applied for leaching.

2. Seepage from the Boghra Canal will be materially reduced by an earthen lining over the "gotch" area. This spring several kilometers of the canal below Nad-I-Ali were successfully treated in this manner.

3. Discharge of 56+500 wasteway: It is intended to deepen the Nad-I-Ali wasteway as a deep drain; it will no longer be used as a wasteway except in case of extreme emergencies. The 56+500 wasteway will be extended to discharge on wastelands beyond the Nad-I-Ali area and will be the wasteway control for this section of canal.

4. Laterals having seepage through a "gotch" layer will either be earth lined or in some instances will be eliminated and the water carried in other laterals.

5. Domestic water supply: Wells will be installed in the villages for domestic use to eliminate the necessity of running water in some of the laterals all year around.

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