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Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963. It is administered by the National Institute of Mental Health, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). Each center is required to provide inpatient, outpatient, emergency, partial hospitalization (such as day care), and consultation and educational services.

HEW agreed to implement our recommendations for improving the administration of the program by (1) establishing a national goal for the number of centers to be built and supported by Federal funds and a time-phased program for meeting this goal, (2) initiating the Institute's plan to obtain adequate information on the financial needs and resources of recipients of staffing grants, (3) improving the administration of the staffing grant program through more comprehensive and timely onsite evaluations of newly established centers, adequate guidance to centers and review staffs on accountability for grant funds, and other means, and (4) obtaining settlements of overpayments made under staffing grants. Most of these recommendations were subsequently implemented. (Report to the Congress, B-164031 (2), July 8, 1971)

Narcotic Addiction Treatment

and Rehabilitation

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79. Limited Use of Federal Programs to Commit Narcotic Addicts for Treatment and Rehabilitation. The Departments of Justice and Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) jointly administer narcotic addict treatment and rehabilitation services provided under titles I and III of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, which authorized a Federal civil commitment program. Title I authorizes the pretrial civil commitment for treatment, in lieu of prosecution, of addicts charged with certain Federal crimes, and title III provides for the civil commitment for treatment of persons not charged with any criminal offenses.

We reported that pretrial civil commitment under title I of the act had not been used to the extent anticipated during the first 3 years of the program; only 179 addicts had been committed during the first 3 years compared with about 900 a year estimated before the act was passed. Also, about 57 percent of the persons who voluntarily applied for examination and evaluation of treatment potential during the first 3 years of the title III program were rejected as unsuitable for treatment by the two Public Health Service clinical research centers.

We attributed the shortfall in the title I program to (1) a lack of emphasis by U.S. attorneys on implementation of the program, (2) a preference by U.S. attor neys for posttrial commitments, and (3) the practice of referring addicts to State and local courts for prosecution when violations of State law were also involved. Referral of addicts to State and local courts excluded the addicts from eligibility for pretrial civil commitment. We noted that neither Justice nor HEW had directed its financial assistance programs toward the development of close working relationships between State or local courts and federally funded State or local | narcotic addict rehabilitation programs, despite the recognition that the majority of crimes committed by addicts fell under the jurisdiction of State and local courts. With respect to the title III program, U.S. attorneys generally indicated that they did not regard their offices as appropriate intake points for requests from persons seeking treatment.

In response to our recommendations, Justice stated that, prior to the effective date of title I of the act, all U.S. attorneys had been instructed to encourage the use of this program by the courts. Justice cited other possible reasons for the limited use of the program and

pointed out that its use was wholly discretionary with the courts. Both Justice and HEW indicated that grant guidelines would be used to encourage development of State and local civil commitment programs. Although HEW did not concur with our proposal that grantees and contractors be used to perform certain intake functions under the title III program, primarily because the functions were believed to be largely legal in nature, HEW did agree that its current advisory role to U.S. attorneys could be expanded if additional resources were to become available. (Report to the Congress, B-164031 (2), Sept. 20, 1971)

80. Narcotic Addiction Treatment and Rehabilitation Programs in Washington, D.C.-At the request of the Chairman, Subcommittee No. 4, House Committee on the Judiciary, we obtained information on programs concerned with the treatment and rehabilitation of narcotic addicts in several locations, including Washington, D.C. The request called for data on the (1) amount of money spent by governmental agencies on narcotic treatment and rehabilitation programs, (2) number of addicts being treated under various types of treatment, (3) goals of the programs, (4) criteria to measure accomplishments of the programs, and (5) efforts by sponsors to measure the effectiveness of programs. We were not asked to evaluate program performance.

We reported that the Narcotics Treatment Agency (NTA), which was organized in February 1970 as a part of the District of Columbia Government, carried out most of the addiction treatment programs in the District of Columbia and had set the following four primary goals in treating and rehabilitating addicts:

Assist the addict in finding productive employment or job training.

Stop illegal drug use.

Eliminate criminal behavior.

Keep the addict under treatment.

NTA had initiated several studies to determine how well its programs were achieving these goals. Data was periodically collected on employment status, urinalyses, arrest records, and duration of treatment for each patient in the studies. This data was summarized and evaluated at 6-month intervals. Results of the study after 18 months showed that:

For 450 adult patients, 84 (19 percent) met all program treatment goals and 124 additional patients (27 percent) had been in treatment for 18 months but had failed to meet one or more of the program

goals. Lack of employment posed the largest problem for this group.

For 150 youth patients, two (1 percent) met all program treatment goals and 18 additional youths (12 percent) remained in treatment but failed to meet one or more of the program goals.

We were informed by program administrators, counselors, and patients that NTA's operational needs included (1) additional and better trained staff members to provide more effective services to patients, (2) additional supportive services, such as job placement, training, and recreation for patients, and (3) better physical facilities. (Report to Subcommittee No. 4, House Committee on the Judiciary, B-166217, Apr. 20, 1972)

Pollution Control and Abatement

81. Adequacy of Motor Vehicle Certification Procedures. We examined the adequacy of the motor vehicle certification procedures of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its capacity to oversee preparation of certification data by auto companies and their procedures for developing such data. We reported that the number of EPA personnel assigned to certification activities had been insufficient to adequately perform all activities necessary to insure that auto companies complied with Federal certification regulations. We stated that, because of insufficient personnel and the lack of in-plant monitoring, EPA did not have reasonable assurance that the companies were complying with Federal regulations. EPA officials said that the Agency was considering several procedures for insuring the integrity of certification testing.

We presented certain facts and discussed the circumstances surrounding the violation of Federal certification regulations by the Ford Motor Company, which company officials attributed to a lack of proper management control over certification testing. They stated that some corrective action had already been taken and that a number of additional steps would be taken toward improvement.

Our report also included information on the certification test procedures of the General Motors Corporation, the Chrysler Corporation, and the American Motors Corporation. None of these companies had prepared written procedures, but officials of each stated that it was unlikely that unauthorized maintenance would be performed on their certification test fleet ve

hicles without the knowledge of upper management personnel. (Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, Senate Committee on Public Works, B-166506, June 12, 1972)

82. Assessment of Enforcement Efforts of the Water Pollution Abatement Program.-Enforcement of water quality requirements traditionally has been primarily the responsibility of the States. The Federal role, as administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), generally has been to take action when the States fail to act or when they request assistance. Our review of the Federal and State enforcement efforts in Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and North Carolina showed that in the past both the States and the Federal Government relied heavily on voluntary compliance with water quality requirements and that few enforcement actions were taken against polluters. As a result only limited success was achieved in abating water pollution. After 1970 Federal and State programs improved substantially and enforcement actions were pursued vigorously. Even so, more could be done.

The policies and practices of some States led to more effective enforcement and should, in our opinion, be adopted by other States. Some States, for example, established time-phased interim dates in their plans requiring municipalities and industrial plants to construct waste treatment facilities. The States that used interim dates had more effective bases for measuring the progress in constructing waste treatment facilities and for taking timely enforcement action when progress lagged.

Other good practices included a close working relationship between the State pollution control agency and the State attorney general's office and an effective system for monitoring the progress of polluters in abating pollution.

Federal enforcement under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was hampered by the lack of authority to enforce specific restrictions. Enforcement action against a polluter had to be based on a showing that waste discharge reduced the quality of the water below established standards or endangered health and welfare, which might be difficult and costly. The use of effluent restrictions would permit treatment requirements to be set before pollution became a problem and would facilitate enforcement action, because evidence of a failure to meet the restrictions would be sufficient grounds to start enforcement proceedings.

The act also did not permit swift enforcement action. A minimum waiting period of 6 months was required between the date that EPA notified a polluter of the violation and the date that EPA could refer the case to the Department of Justice for court action.

The Refuse Act provided EPA with more effective enforcement authority with regard to industrial plants discharging wastes into navigable waters. Under the act, EPA and the Corps of Engineers implemented a permit program to regulate the discharge of industrial pollutants into navigable waters. Violators could be referred without delay to the Department of Justice for court action. The act, however, did not provide EPA with the comprehensive authority needed to adequately carry out Federal enforcement because municipalities discharging sewage in a liquid state and industrial plants discharging wastes into municipal sewers generally were not subjected to enforcement proceedings. In addition, enforcement authority was split between EPA and the Corps.

Some Federal enforcement actions were taken without coordination among the Federal agencies concerned and/or without consultation with the State water pollution control agencies. The lack of coordination among the Office of Water Programs, EPA; U.S. attorneys; and State water pollution control agencies, in some cases, resulted in duplication of State and Federal efforts and caused confusion among polluters as to which agency had responsibility for enforcement. During 1971 both the Department of Justice and EPA issued guidelines designed to promote coordination among Federal and State enforcement agencies.

EPA agreed, in general, with our conclusions and said that it was acting to resolve the problems. The Corps of Engineers, the Department of Justice, and the six State water pollution control agencies also agreed, in general.

The enactment and effective implementation of legislation pending before the Congress when we issued the report should resolve the major problems discussed in the report. The legislation would:

Expand Federal authority over municipal discharges into all navigable waters.

Authorize the establishment and enforcement of specific effluent limitations.

Establish a comprehensive permit program.
Facilitate swift enforcement action.

Require a water quality inventory.

(Report to the Congress, B-166506, Mar. 23, 1972)

83. Cleaner Engines for Cleaner Air: Progress and Problems in Reducing Air Pollution From Automobiles.-The Congress, in the 1965 amendments to the Clean Air Act, called for a Federal program to reduce air pollution from cars by prohibiting the sale of new cars-domestic and foreign-that did not conform to Federal emission standards. Further amendments in 1967 provided for Federal assistance to States to develop programs for on-the-road inspections to insure that cars would continue to meet the standards. Our review of the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) progress and the problems encountered in controlling auto-caused air pollution showed that some progress had been made but that much remained to be done before the desired control over pollutants from cars was achieved.

EPA's program provided for testing emissions during three stages of a car's life cycle-design, production, and actual use. In the design stage EPA had been testing and certifying prototypes since the 1968 model year, but there were a number of weaknesses in the certification program. Starting with the 1972 model year, however, a number of changes were made which should result in a more effective certification program.

Although we believed that EPA had authority in 1965 to test emissions from cars as they came off the assembly line, an assembly-line test program had not been developed. EPA's goal was to begin testing on 1973 model cars, but the testing was delayed until the 1974 model year because a number of problems had to be resolved problems that might have been resolved earlier had EPA initiated efforts several years before to develop an assembly-line testing program.

We reported that even less progress had been made in the final, and perhaps most important, step-the periodic inspection of a car's emission throughout its useful life. Tests of cars in actual use showed that their emissions often exceeded the standards applicable to the certified prototypes. EPA had awarded a few grants to State and local governments to develop highway inspection programs, but it informed us that implementation of an effective nationwide highway inspection program was 2 to 4 years away. Although various programs were being considered, EPA hoped to achieve some measure of control over the emissions from cars on the road through a recall program planned for 1972 models.

The recall program had one inherent weakness, however, in that the return of cars to the manufacturers for modifications when emissions exceeded established

standards was voluntary. The manufacturers were required to notify owners whose cars' emissions exceeded standards, but the owners were not required to have the emission control systems modified. We recommended that the Congress consider the need for additional legislation to require car owners to return their cars for modification, if they have been notified that their cars' emissions exceeded established standards.

We reported also that EPA's efforts to research, develop, and test control devices for conventional automobile engines were limited because EPA did not (1) have adequate financial resources, (2) obtain detailed information from the automobile manufacturers on a timely basis, and (3) disseminate all available information to interested persons.

In addition, we noted that resources committed to the search for a low-polluting alternative to the internal-combustion engine had been considerably less than those considered necessary to accomplish the program objectives by 1976. EPA's allocation of the limited resources to many types of engines, including those with little likelihood of timely success, slowed the research and development work related to the more promising engines. In July 1971 EPA decided to discontinue work on engine systems requiring long-term development and to concentrate its resources on the most promising engines; namely, the gas turbine, the Rankine cycle engine, and the stratified-change engine. (Report to the Congress, B-166506, May 15, 1972)

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mining the range of environmental impacts to be considered. The Council on Environmental Quality provided little guidance to the agencies concerning the range of impacts to be considered in environmental statements. Similarly, none of the agencies had defined. in their procedures for preparing the statements the full range of impacts and alternatives that should be considered.

Although the seven agencies recognized the need for public participation, their procedures varied significantly in the use of mailing lists, news media, and public hearings. Also their efforts to achieve public participation seemed less than what was intended by either the act or the guidelines from the Council.

While the seven agencies had established some procedures for obtaining views and comments from other Federal, State, and local agencies on proposed actions, a systematic approach for identifying and obtaining environmental expertise was lacking in most agency procedures.

In assisting the agencies to resolve issues, the Council on Environmental Quality generally adopted an advisory approach, communicating its views informally on both environmental statements and procedures, and relying upon the agencies to resolve any issues raised.

The Environmental Protection Agency had not met its legislative responsibility on a timely basis to make public its comments on agency impact statements and to review and comment on proposed Federal agency procedures for preparing statements.

Except for water resources projects, the Office of Management and Budget did not require the agencies to furnish environmental impact statements as a prerequisite for legislative proposals significantly affecting the environment. Thus only a limited number of statements had been so prepared.

The agencies generally agreed that improvements were needed in implementing the act and that our findings and conclusions would be helpful in refining their procedures. (Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, B170186, May 18, 1972)

85. Limited Impact of the Solid Waste Disposal Demonstration Grant Program. The major goal of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 was to provide a Federal program to aid in the development of new and improved methods of solid waste disposal, including reduction of the amount of solid wastes and re

covery and reuse of recyclable solid waste material. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) demonstration grant program was supposed to be the primary mechanism to test newly developed solid waste disposal technology on a full scale basis.

We reported that EPA's grants had had limited impact on the national solid waste disposal problem. Few grants had been awarded for projects primarily concerned with recycling-cited by many, including the Senate Committee on Public Works, as the only longterm solution to the solid waste problem. Some funds granted for the purpose of demonstrating new and improved techniques were, in reality, merely for refinements of existing disposal methods. In one case, the equipment or facility funded by a program grant to demonstrate new methods or uses was not used by the grantee in the intended manner.

To improve the effectiveness of the program, we proposed that EPA:

Establish specific goals for the demonstration grant program and a plan for meeting these goals. Establish criteria for evaluating project proposals. Identify priorities and establish procedures to insure that the priorities are made known to prospective grant applicants.

Establish procedures to insure that facilities and equipment are being used for their intended purposes and that project results are promptly obtained, evaluated, and disseminated to potential users.

Place greater emphasis on the selection of civilian personnel as project officers.

Promulgate formal written policies on the functions, duties, and responsibilities of project officers and establish a basic orientation and training program for new officers.

Require that Office of Solid Waste Management personnel follow up on actions taken by grantees to implement plans developed under all completed study and investigation projects.

We proposed also that EPA, in establishing goals and priorities, place greater emphasis on the need to develop and demonstrate new methods, devices, and techniques of solid waste disposal-particularly those related to resource recovery and recycling-which have potential for national or widespread use.

The Agency generally agreed with our proposals and stated that it had taken or planned to take appropriate steps to implement them. (Report to the Congress, B-166506, Feb. 4, 1972)

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