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conduct, not to acquiesce in their declarations has the appearance of questioning their veracity, because it is taken for granted that every man must know the principles of his own conduct. But the human mind is so complex a thing, that there is great room for selfdeception, especially in cases where the passions and affections are strong, and when they occasion similar emotions as well as produce similar effects. In this case a by-stander may be a better judge than a man's self. A zeal for our opinions, and a zeal for our party, on the advancement of which our own personal reputation and influence depend, are necessarily connected, and reciprocally promote one another. For the same reason, a dislike of opinions has an affinity with the dislike of those who hold them, as men who are embarked in an interest opposite to ours, and whose credit and authority obstruct our own; and all the emotions of mind that are excited by the same object, how different soever they be originally, by frequent association mix together, so that the parts of that complex feeling which results from their union are no longer distinguishable. When two persons who have had frequent intercourse, have been a long time at variance, and the subjects of their contention have been numerous, can either of them analyse the sudden emotion they will feel in an unexpected meeting?

"We often begin to act from one motive, but, as we proceed, we come insensibly within the influence of others; so that in some cases the habit shall continue, though the original motive should cease to have any influence at all; and yet it may be impossible to say in what part of this progress the influence of one motive ceased, and that of another began; the change

of principle and character having been insensible, and altogether imperceptible.

"The application of this doctrine may be made both by those who are provoked at others for holding opinions which they think damnable, and by those who laugh at them for opinions which they think ridiculous. In many cases, I am satisfied that the pure love of truth is on both sides absorbed in passions of a very different nature. I would overlook every thing in a man who meant nothing but to inform me of any thing that he thought me ignorant of; but they who have that pretence in their mouths only, when it is far from their hearts, though they may deceive themselves as well as others, are by no means entitled to so favourable a reception.

"It behoves us, however, carefully to distinguish between this latent insincerity, under the influence of which men deceive themselves, and that direct prevarication with which those who are engaged in debate are too ready to charge one another, as if their adversaries knowingly opposed, or concealed, the truth. This last is a crime of so heinous a nature, that I should be very unwilling to impute it to any person whatever. For a man voluntarily to undertake the defence of what he thinks to be error, and knowingly to pervert the scriptures in order to make them favour his purpose, argues the heart to be so totally void of all principle of rectitude; it is such an insult upon the God of truth, and such a contempt of his judgements, that I think human nature could never be so depraved as to be capable of it, and that no situation in human life could supply a sufficient temptation for such conduct. There are such well known instances of the

force of prejudice, that I had rather ascribe any opinion, how absurd soever, in any man, how intelligent soever in other respects, to wrong judgement, than to a bad heart. I can hardly imagine any case in which the chance would not be in favour of the former.

"If these remarks be just, with what caution should we censure any person with respect to a point of mere speculation! How should I be affected at the day of judgement to be convinced of the integrity, and perhaps the right judgement also, of an adversary whom I should have treated in an illiberal and insulting manner!" P. 4, &c.

Whether you, my Lord, will allow the truth of these observations I cannot tell. You certainly have not acted upon them, either with respect to the excellent Origen, or myself. But I have not copied the above for the use of your Lordship; considering you to be a person to whom some of them are so far applicable, that I do not expect the least benefit from the fairest and justest representation of any thing connected with this controversy; and yet without thinking so ill of you, as you profess to do of me.

That your Lordship is in this state of mind, destitute of what I call perfect ingenuousness, is evident from the turn that you have given to a passage in my Sermon to which I had referred you, in answer to your charge of gross illiberality. I there speak in the highest terms that I could of the good understanding, and the sincerity, both of many Catholics, and members of the church of England, even "those who are sensible of the corruptions and errors of the system in which they are entangled, and yet have not been able to break their chains." Of this you say, "It is a long passage,

in which he professes to hold the church of England in no less estimation than the church of Rome;" which I might have done without thinking well of either of them. This I cannot call a fair and ingenuous conduct, because it gives your readers (many of whom, I believe, never read any thing of mine) a false idea of what I write. Besides, I said nothing directly about the two churches of England, or of Rome, but of the members of them; being openly hostile to the systems, but friendly to their adherents.

I am, &c.

LETTER III.

Of the Charge of borrowing from Zuicker.

MY LORD,

THOUGH н my rule in controversy is by no means your Lordship's above mentioned, viz. " to strike without remorse at whatever in your adversary you find to be vulnerable, in order to destroy his character and credit," I must, now that I am upon the subject of latent disingenuousness, produce an instance which has much the appearance of it in your Lordship's conduct

to me.

You charged me with having "produced few, if any, arguments, but what are found in the writings either of Zuicker or Episcopius." From this it might naturally be concluded, that you had compared my arguments with those of those two writers, and had found them to be the same; which implies that you

had seen, and perused, their works. I entertained no doubt of it myself; and taking it for granted that your Lordship had the work of Zuicker, or had access to it, (and it being a book that I had never seen, and could not by any means procure,) I desired a common friend to apply to you for it. Your answers, which were different at different times, convinced him that you had never seen the book at all. It has since been sent to me by a learned foreign correspondent, and I find Zuicker's views of the state of opinions in early times to be so different from mine, that I am confident, if you had ever seen his work, you had never read it. For, if you had, you could never have asserted that I had borrowed from him at all.

Zuicker says, p. 16, that Justin Martyr, besides availing himself of his Platonic principles, derived his notion of a trinity from the spurious verses of Orpheus, which he supposes to have been written by some disciple of Simon Magus. He also makes Simon Magus the parent of the Praxeans, Patripassians, and Sabellians, p. 17. Now these opinions are fundamentally different from mine. I suppose Justin Martyr to have borrowed from nothing besides his Platonism; and he was so far from being friendly to Gnosticism, which was the offspring of the school of Simon Magus, that he wrote a treatise against it. And I consider the Praxeans, Patripassians, and Sabellians, as no other than philosophical Unitarians.

Except these opinions, there is nothing of much consequence in the work of Zuicker, besides a proof, very much detailed for so small a treatise as his is, of the christian fathers before the council of Nice not having believed the equality of the Son to the Father;

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