§ 1083. Same subject-Ejection of | § 1095. Same subject - Liable for

§ 1109. Liability for detention of § 1124. Same subject-Where an

§ 1140. Duty of sleeping-car com- § 1155. These regulations do not pany to furnish means of getting into or out of berth.

I. OF PASSENGER CARRIERS GENERALLY.

Sec. 890. ($495.) Distinction between common carrier and carrier of passengers.-Public carriers may not only be carriers of goods, but carriers of persons also, and while carrying the

goods may at the same time carry their owners. As to the one, in such a case, the carrier would be a passenger carrier, and as to the other, a common carrier of goods; and although he might carry them both upon the same conveyance, and at the same time, the nature of the responsibility which he would incur as to them would be very different; and this difference in the kind of responsibility which the law imposes upon him exists even between the passenger and his baggage, as to which, as we have seen, the carrier becomes responsible as a common carrier of goods, although its carriage is merely incidental to the carriage of the passenger. Of the goods he must have, in order to impose upon him the responsibility of a common carrier, the absolute and unlimited control, and the law supposes that their safety, aside from the acts of God and the public enemy, against which it protects him, depends entirely upon the care and faithfulness with which he discharges his trust. But the passenger being endowed with intelligence and the power of locomotion, which enable him, in a great measure, to foresee and avoid danger, the exercise of at least ordinary prudence is required on his part to escape it, and if by his failure to exercise these faculties for his own preservation, a misfortune befall him, though the carrier may have been in fault, it will be attributed to his own carelessness and inattention, and the responsibility will not be thrown upon the carrier.1

Sec. 891. (§ 496.) Not common carrier in transportation of slaves. This distinction was made the ground of the decision. of the supreme court of the United States in Boyce v. Anderson,2 which was an action against a carrier to recover damages

1. A passenger on a freight boat voluntarily left a place of safety on the boat and went to another part of the boat where lumber was being thrown overboard. While standing near a large beam which was being discharged over the side of the boat, he received a violent blow on the head by that part of the beam which was still

over the boat. He had gone to the rail to see what would happen when the beam struck the water. The vessel was held not liable for the injury. Elder Dempster Ship ping Co. v. Pouppirt, 125 Fed. 732, 60 C. C. A. 500, reversing Pouppirt v. Elder, etc., Shipping Co., 122 Fed. 983.

2. 2 Peters, 150.

for the loss of certain slaves, who were the property of the plaintiff, and had been drowned, as was alleged, by the negli gence of the carrier or his servants whilst in his charge. "A slave," said Marshall, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court, "has volition, and has feelings which cannot be entirely disregarded. These properties cannot be overlooked in conveying him from place to place. He cannot be stowed away as a common package. Not only does humanity forbid this proceeding, but it might endanger his life or health. Consequently, this rigorous mode of proceeding cannot safely be adopted unless stipulated for by special contract. Being left at liberty, he may escape. The carrier has not and cannot have the same absolute control over him that he has over inanimate matter. In the nature of things and in his character, he resembles a passenger, not a package of goods. It would seem reasonable, therefore, that the responsibility of the carrier should be measured by the law which is applicable to passengers, rather than by that which is applicable to the carriage of common goods. There are no slaves in England, but there are persons in whose service another has a temporary interest. We believe that the responsibility of a carrier for injury which such person may sustain has never been placed on the same principle with his responsibility for a bale of goods. He is undoubtedly answerable for any injury sustained in consequence of his negligence or want of skill; but we have never understood that he is responsible further. The law applicable to common carriers is one of great rigor. Though to the extent to which it has been carried, and in the cases to which it has been applied, we admit its necessity and its policy, we do not think it ought to be carried further, or applied to new cases. We think it has not been applied to living men, and that it ought not to be applied to them."

Sec. 892. ($497.) Carrier of passengers not insurer of their safety-Liable only for negligence.-Consequently, the policy of the law, as it is called, which induced the judges in early times to establish the rule of the extraordinary responsibility of common carriers as to the goods intrusted to them, the reasons for which, as stated by Lord Holt, were to prevent them