early cases upon the subject,15 carried the exemption from the obligation to make an actual delivery further in the case of railway carriers than had even been allowed to carriers by water, and held that all that could be required of railways was a safe deposit of the goods upon the platform or in the warehouse of the road at the end of the transit, to await delivery to the consignee, when he should call for them, and that from the time of such deposit, even without notice by the carrier to the consignee, the liability of the former was changed from that of common carrier to warehouseman. This was said by Shaw, C. J., in Norway Plains Company v. The Railroad, to afford a plain, precise and practical rule of duty, of easy application, well adapted to the security of all persons interested. It determines, it was said, that such companies are responsible as common carriers until the goods are removed from the cars and placed on the platform, and that if, on account of their arrival in the night or at any other time when by the usage and course of business the doors of the merchandise depot or warehouse are closed, or for any other cause they cannot then be delivered; or if for any reason the consignee is not there ready to receive them, it is the duty of the company to store them and keep them safely under the charge of careful and competent servants ready to be delivered, and actually to deliver them when duly called for by the parties authorized and entitled to receive them; and for the performance of these duties after the goods are delivered from the cars, the company is liable as warehousemen or keepers of goods for hire only. And as to the giving of notices by such carriers as is required of those who carry by water, it was said that the arrivals of goods by this mode of transportation were so numerous, frequent and various, that it would be nearly impossible to send such special notices to each consignee of each parcel of goods or single article as it arrived, and it was therefore held that such notices. should not be required. These decisions of the supreme court of Massachusetts have been repeatedly re-affirmed by that court,16 and have been approved and followed by the courts Railroad Co., 1 Gray 263. 16. Barron V. Eldredge, 15. Thomas v. Railroad Co., 10 Met. 472; Norway Plains Co. v. 100 of Georgia,17 Illinois,18 Indiana,19 Iowa,20 Missouri,21 North Carolina, 22 Pennsylvania23 and South Carolina.24 Mass. 455; Stowe v. Railroad Co., railroads on their ordinary classi113 id. 521; Rice v. Hart, 118 id. fied freights." 201. 17. The Southwestern R. R. v. Felder, 46 Ga. 433; Western, etc., R. Co. v. Camp, 53 Ga. 596; Almand v. Railroad Co., 95 Ga. 775, 22 S. E. Rep. 674; Railway Co. v. Pound, 111 Ga. 6, 36 S. E. Rep. 312. 18. Porter v. Railroad Co., 20 Ill. 407; Richards v. Railroad Co., 1 id. 404; Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Scott, 42 id. 132; Merchants' Des. Co. v. Hallock, 64 id. 284. In this case a dispatch or transportation company was put upon exactly the same footing, as to the manner of delivery, as a railroad company. "It appears from the bill of exceptions that appellants own a line of freight cars plying between the Atlantic seaboard and the west, carrying freight at the same tariff of charges the railroad companies do whose tracks they use. Their only business is that of freighters. They have an office in the city of New York and one in Chicago. We see nothing in this case to take it out of the rule so long established by this court. There is no essential difference between this company and a railroad company, and it must be subject to no other or greater liabilities. It differs from an express company in this: that the latter have teams and vehicles by which they receive and deliver goods, and such is the established usage. Their compensation is found in the high rates of transportation, whilst appellants receive only the rates established by . Rothschild v. The R. R., 69 Ill. 164; Railway Co. v. Kendall, 72 Ill. App. 105; Gregg v. Railroad Co., 147 Ill. 550, 35 N. E. Rep. 343, 37 Am. St. Rep. 238, affirming 47 Ill. App. 590; Railroad Co. v. Carter, 165 Ill. 570, 46 N. E. Rep. 374, 36 L. R. A. 527, reversing 62 Ill. App. 618; Schumacher v. Railroad Co., 207 Ill. 199, 69 N. E. Rep. 825, affirming 108 Ill. App. 520. 19. Bansemer v. The R. R., 25 Ind. 434; Chicago, etc., R. R. v. McCool, 26 id. 140; Railway Co. v. Reyman, Ind. 73 N. E. Rep. 587; Railroad Co. v. Nash, 43 Ind. 423. 20. Mohr v. The R. R., 40 Ia. 579; Francis v. The R. R., 25 id. 60. 21. Gashweiler v. Railway Co., 85 Mo. 112; Rankin v. Railroad Co., 55 Mo. 168; Buddy v. Railroad Co., 20 Mo. App. 209; Transfer Co. v. Neiswanger, 18 Mo. App. 103; Bell v. Railroad Co., 6 Mo. App. 363; Wilson Mach. Co. v. Railroad Co., 71 Mo. 203; Pindell v. Railway Co., 34 Mo. App. 675; S. c. 41 Mo. App. 84; Standard Milling Co. v. Transit Co., 122 Mo. 258, 26 S. W. Rep. 704; Herf & Frerichs Chemical Co. v. Railroad Co., 100 Mo. App. 164, 73 S. W. Rep. 346. 22. Neal v. Railroad, 8 Jones (Law), 482; Chalk v. Railroad, 85 N. C. 423. 23. McCarthy v. The R. R., 30 Penn. St. 247; Shenk v. Propeller Co., 60 id. 109; Steamship Co. v. Smart, 107 id. 492. 24. Spears v. Railroad Co., 11 S. C. 158. Sec. 703. Same subject.-These decisions were of course made upon the assumption that every consignee is already advised, either by the consignor or in some other manner, that the goods have been forwarded by the company's line; and that, in consequence of the great regularity of this mode of transportation, compared with that by other modes of conveyance, he will know with reasonable certainty when his goods will arrive, and when it will be his duty to call for them and take them away. It is therefore considered, by those who approve this view of the subject, more reasonable to require of the consignee the duty of sending for his goods at the time at which he is advised they must arrive, than to impose upon the company the task of giving notice, as the goods arrive, to each consignee. It is said, also, that the real contract of the railroad company, as the carrier of merchandise, is only to transport from point to point on its road, and that when it has done this, and has, at the end of the transit, or at their destination, unloaded the goods from its cars and put them in a place of safety for the consignee, ready to be delivered to him whenever he may call for them, it has fulfilled its contract as common carrier; and that, having provided depots. and warehouses for the safe deposit and custody of the goods, until the consignee shall call for them, when the goods are safely deposited therein, the new relation of bailor and bailee. takes the place of that of carrier and consignee, with a corresponding change in the degree of responsibility. Sec. 704. (§ 369.) Same subject-New Hampshire rule as to delivery by railroads.-The same questions were brought before the supreme court of New Hampshire in the case of Moses v. The Railroad.25 It was said in this case that it would be unreasonable to require of a consignee of goods, being transported by a railroad as common carrier, that he should be in attendance at the precise moment when his goods arrived, to receive or to take care of them, the trains of such roads, as was well known, being more or less irregular in their hours of arrival. Such a requirement, it was thought, would be as 25. 32 N. H. 523. unreasonable as to require of the road a delivery of the goods at a distance from its track. The arrival of the goods might be in the night or after the close of business hours, and it might be impossible for the consignee to get them away immediately; and that until he had had a reasonable opportunity to remove them, the duty rested upon the carrier to take care of them for him. It thus became a matter of necessity for such companies, transacting business as common carriers, to provide depots and warehouses for the reception of freight at the stations established for its delivery; and if the goods are placed in their warehouses upon its arrival, it cannot be said to be done in any sense for the convenience or accommodation of the consignee, nor be considered, upon any sound view, as equivalent to a delivery. The servants of the carrier still continue in charge of them. They are equally shut off from observation and the oversight of others as when in transit; and if they are lost, damaged or purloined, he has no greater opportunity of ascertaining or proving by whose fault or negligence it was done, than if such loss had occurred during the transportation. Consequently, the same reasons for holding the carrier to extraordinary responsibility during the transportation of the goods exist after their arrival, at least, until the owner or consignee shall have had an opportunity to take them in charge. Supposing that the consignee, it was said, has been advised of the sending of the goods; that he has provided himself with the proper means for their receipt and removal at the earliest opportunity, and that he is also advised of the course of business of the road, and that he will exercise reasonable diligence to be at the place of delivery as soon as practicable after their arrival, it was the opinion of the court that he should be allowed a reasonable time after the arrival of the goods to accept and remove them, during which the company should continue under its original liability, as common carrier, for their preservation; and the conclusion of the supreme court of Massachusetts was, to this extent, expressly disapproved. It was, however, said that "the extent of the reasonable opportunity to be afforded him for that purpose is not to be measured by any peculiar circumstances in his own condition or situation, rendering it necessary for his own convenience and accommodation that he should have a longer time or better opportunity than if he resided in the vicinity of the warehouse and was prepared with the means and facilities for taking the goods away. If his peculiar circumstances require a more extended opportunity, the goods must be considered after such reasonable time, as but for those peculiar circumstances would be deemed sufficient, to be kept by the company for his convenience and under the responsibility of depositaries and bailees for hire." The conclusion reached by the supreme court of New Hampshire has been followed in Alabama,26 Arkansas,27 Kansas,28 Kentucky,29 Louisiana,30 Vermont,31 West Virginia32 and Wisconsin.33 Sec. 705. Same subject-Limitations upon Massachusetts and New Hampshire rules.-All the cases, however, which concede the change of the relation of railroad carriers to the goods from that of common carriers to that of warehousemen at the termination of their transit, and without notice to the consignee of their arrival, require that before such carriers can claim exemption from the more onerous responsibility the goods shall be unloaded from the cars with due care and deposited in a safe and suitable place; and some of them seem 26. Tallahassee Falls Mfg. Co. v. Railway Co., 128 Ala. 167, 29 So. Rep. 203; Bowden v. Railway Co., Ala. - 41 So. Rep. 294; Ala. & Tenn. Rivers R. R. v. Kidd, 35 Ala. 209; Mobile, etc., R. R. v. Prewitt, 46 id. 63; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. McGuire, 79 Ala. 395; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Oden, 80 Ala. 39. 27. Railway Co. v. Nevill, 60 Ark. 375, 30 S. W. Rep. 425, 28 L. R. A. 80, 46 Am. St. Rep. 208. 28. Leavenworth, etc., R. R. v. Maris, 16 Kan. 333; Railroad Co. v. Wichita Wholesale Grocery Co., 55 Kan. 525, 40 Pac. Rep. 899; Railway Co. v. Newberger & Bro., 67 Kan. 846, 73 Pac. Rep. 57. 29. Jeffersonville, etc., R. R. v. Cleveland, 2 Bush, 468. See also, Wald v. Railroad Co., 92 Ky. 645. 30. Maignan v. The Railroad, 24 La. Ann. 333. 31. Ouimit v. Henshaw, 35 Vt. 604; Blumenthal v. Brainard, 38 id. 402; Winslow v. The Railroad, 42 id. 700. 32. Berry v. Railroad Co., 44 W. Va. 538, 30 S. E. Rep. 143, 67 Am. St. Rep. 781. 33. Wood v. Crocker, 18 Wis. |