vision is waived.60 Where, however, the provision is merely that it will not be accepted if transferred, the company's right does not extend further than to a refusal to accept it, and does not extend to a confiscation of the ticket,61 though a stipulation giving that right would be valid.62

Mo. App. 333; Drummond v. Railroad Co., 7 Utah, 118, 25 Pac. Rep. 733; Railroad Co. v. Frank, 110 Fed. 689; Davis v. Railroad Co., 107 Ga. 420, 33 S. E. Rep. 437; Dangerfield v. Railway Co., 62 Kan. 85, 61 Pac. Rep. 405; Schubach v. McDonald, 179 Mo. 163, 78 S. W. Rep. 1020, 65 L. R. A. 136, 101 Am. St. Rep. 452; Levinson v. Railway Co., 17 Tex. Civ. App. 617, 43 S. W. Rep. 901.

So a condition on a commutation ticket that it shall be good for the passage of those only who have signed it is valid. Granier v. Railroad Co., 42 La. Ann. 880, 8 S. Rep. 614.

And if other names than that of the purchaser are fraudulently inserted into a railway mileage book which is non-transferable, the book will be inoperative as to the carrier. Holden v. Railroad Co., 73 Vt. 317, 50 Atl.. Rep. 1096.

When the one to whom a mileage book is issued dies, it passes to his personal representatives and cannot be used for the purpose of transporting his remains. Minish v. Railway Co., 135 N. Car. 342, 47 S. E. Rep. 432.

60. Thus, see Robostelli v. Railroad Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 796.

A mileage ticket provided that, when requested by the conductor at the time the ticket was presented for passage, the purchaser would sign his name in the presence of the conductor and otherwise identify himself as the ori

ginal purchaser. It was held that where the conductor refused the purchaser's offer to identify himself by signing his name to the ticket, he had no right to insist on other means of identification, and that the carrier was liable for the act of the conductor in expelling him from the train for his refusal to pay fare. Railroad Co. v. Anderson, 90 Va. 1, 17 S. E. Rep. 757, 44 Am. St. Rep. 884.

ex

Where the purchaser of a nontransferable mileage ticket plains to the agent of the company that he is purchasing the ticket in an assumed name, and the agent assents thereto, the company will be bound by such assent and will be liable for the act of its conductor in taking the ticket when presented by the purchaser. Railway Co. v. Pendergast, 75 Ill. App. 133.

A purchaser from the original holder of a non-transferable ticket has no right to act upon the assurance given by a ticket agent that the ticket will be accepted for such purchaser's passage, when it is further stipulated in the ticket that no agent shall have authority to alter, modify, waive in any particular the terms or conditions therein set forth. Coyle v. Railway Co., 112 Ga. 121, 37 S. E. Rep. 163.

or

61. Post v. Railroad Co., 14 Neb. 110; Railway Co. v. Pendergast, 75 Ill. App. 133.

62. Friedenrich v. R. R. Co., 53 Md. 201; Rahilly v. Railroad Co.,

The fact that a non-transferable ticket, presented by another than the one lawfully entitled to ride thereon, is accepted by the conductor, in ignorance that such person is not the rightful holder, will not estop a second conductor, while performing his duties, from questioning that person's right to its use, and, if it appears that he is not entitled to ride, he may be ejected from the train on refusal to pay the proper fare.63

By the weight of authority, a carrier is also entitled to look beyond the transferee who actually presents a non-transferable ticket on the train, and may obtain an injunction restraining ticket brokers from buying and selling non-transferable tickets issued at a reduced rate;64 but in at least one case this right has been denied, the court holding that the ticket itself may be lawfully and properly transferred to any one, though the right to transportation may be limited to the purchaser under the provisions of the contract.65

Sec. 1057. Same subject-Passenger should truthfully answer questions of conductor concerning his identity. As the carrier has a right to satisfy himself that the holder of a

66 Minn. 153, 68 N. W. Rep. 853; Mueller v. Railway Co., 75 Minn. 109, 77 N. W. Rep. 566; Eastman v. Railroad Co., 70 N. H. 135, 46 Atl. Rep. 54; Moore v. Railroad Co., 41 W. Va. 160, 23 S. E. Rep. 539.

But such a clause will be strictly construed and, if presented by another than the lawful owner, and the same is done without the knowledge or consent of the owner, it is not subject to forfeiture as against such owner. Mueller v. Railway Co., supra.

The only provision as to forfeiture being when the ticket is presented by other than the original purchaser, if it is taken up from the original purchaser be

cause he refuses to identify himself in a manner not required by the ticket, such act is a violation of the contract. Railroad Co. v. Anderson, 90 Va. 1, 17 S. E. Rep. 757, 44 Am. St. Rep. 884.

63. Dangerfield v. Railway Co., 62 Kan. 85, 61 Pac. Rep. 405.

64. Railroad Co. v. Caffrey, 128 Fed. 770; Railroad Co. v. Bitterman, 128 Fed. 176, aff'd, - C. C.

A. -, 144 Fed. 34; Railroad Co. v. Frank, 110 Fed. 689; Railway Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65; Schubach v. McDonald, 179 Mo. 163; 78 S. W. Rep. 1020, 65 L. R. A. 136; Kinner v. Railway Co., 69 Ohio St. 339, 69 N. E. Rep. 614.

65. Railroad Co. v. Reeves, 85 N. Y. Supp. 28, 41 Misc. 490.

non-transferable ticket is actually the person named therein, it is the duty of a passenger to make frank and truthful answers to the questions put to him concerning his identity, and, if he wilfully and obstinately refuses to do so, his conduct deserves full consideration in determining whether punitive damages are allowable for his consequent ejection from the train, even though it subsequently appears that he was rightfully thereon. This rule was announced in a case in which the plaintiff, a passenger on defendants' train, tendered to the conductor a mileage book. Among the conditions upon which the book was issued was one that it was good only for the person in whose name it was issued. The conductor was not personally acquainted with the plaintiff, and for identification asked him if the name on the ticket was his name. The plaintiff refused to say whether it was or not. The evidence showed that the plaintiff, when asked if the name was his, replied that it was none of the conductor's business. As the plaintiff was leaving the train, the conductor caused his arrest for fraudulently evading the payment of his fare. It appeared that the book belonged to the plaintiff, and that he was entitled to ride thereon. In an action for false arrest, it was held that while the plaintiff's arrest was unlawful, and that he was entitled to compensatory damages for the false arrest, still the above rule applied as to punitive damages.1

Sec. 1058. (§ 580e.)

Same subject-Provision that ticket shall not be good on certain trains.-As has been seen,2 a railroad company is not required to carry passengers upon all its trains, but may lawfully divide its traffic, accepting passengers upon some and refusing them upon others. A person, therefore, cannot insist upon being received as a passenger upon trains to which his ticket does not entitle him to admission as such. So where it has provided adequate facilities for

1. Palmer v. Railroad Co., 92 Me. 399, 42 Atl. Rep. 800, 69 Am. St. Rep. 513.

2. Ante, § 964.

3. Railroad Co. v. Feeley, 163 Mass. 205, 40 N. E. Rep. 20; Eng

general traffic, it may run limited or special trains upon which only a given number will be accepted as passengers, and for carriage upon which a higher rate of fare may be charged.*

Sec. 1059. (§ 580f.) Same subject-Passenger can go only in direction which ticket indicates. So where the ticket provides for a passage in a given direction, as from A. to B., the passenger cannot insist upon riding in the opposite direction, as from B. to A.5

But where, in the case of a round-trip ticket, the conductor

takes up and retains by mistake the return coupon instead of the going one, it is held that the passenger has the right to be carried on the return trip on the going coupon, where he has not discovered the mistake and explains it to the conductor on his return trip.

Sec. 1060. (§ 580g.) Same subject-How when train does not stop at passenger's destination. The railroad company is not required to stop all of its trains at every station, and upon all roads of importance through trains are run which stop only at the larger towns upon the line. The passenger, therefore, is bound to inquire and ascertain whether the train which he proposes to take stops at the station to which his ticket entitles him to ride, and if, without such inquiry, he boards a train which, by the regulations of the carrier, does not stop at his destination, he cannot require the conductor to stop there, though he may lawfully ride to the nearest point short of his destination at which the train regularly stops.

116 Ind. 30; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray, 125 Ind. 229, 25 N. E. Rep.

439.

6. Railroad Co. v. Fix, 88 Ind. 381; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray, 125 Ind. 229, 25 N. E. Rep. 439.

7. Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Ashby, 79 Va. 130; Railroad Co. v. Cameron, 66 Fed. 709, 14 C. C. A. 358, 32 U. S. App. 67; Railway Co. v. Ludlam, 57 Fed. 481, 6 C. C. A. 454, 13 U. S. App. 540; Railway Co. v. Bell, (Tex. Civ. App.) 87 S. W. Rep. 730; Railway Co. v. Walden, (Tex. Civ. App.) 46 S. W. Rep. 87, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Railway Co. v. Moore, 98 Tex. 302, 83 S. W. Rep. 362; Railroad Co. v. Miles, 18 Ky. L. R. 580, 37 S. W. Rep. 486; Hancock v. Railroad Co., 27 Ky. L. R. 434, 85 S. W. Rep. 210; Sira v. Railway Co., 115 Mo. 127, 21 S. W. Rep. 905, 37 Am. St. Rep. 386; Usher v. Railway Co.,

Kan.

But he can

80 Pac. Rep. 956. The same rule holds good if a person, without proper inquiry, takes a train which follows another branch of the road than the one leading to his destination. Railway Co. v. Dawson, (Tex. Civ. App.) 29 S. W. Rep. 1106.

But the doctrine that a passenger, who, by mistake, takes a wrong train, is not obliged to pay for his ride to the first station at which he has the opportunity to alight, does not apply to the holder of a season ticket who boards a train on which the ticket is not good to go to the next station at which he left the train. In such case the railroad is entitled to recover from him the amount of fare which he should have paid for the trip. Railroad Co. v. Feeley, 163 Mass. 205, 40 N. E. Rep. 20.

In an action of damages for