Finally, a former officer of Congress should be prohibited from representing a person before any officer or employee of the House of Congress in which the individual served for two years.

These prohibitions would most nearly parallel the Ethics in Government Act's two-year ban on former executive branch officials. They are based on specific matters. In the instance of executive branch officials, it relates to matters of

official responsibility.

In the instance of former Members of

Congress, it is matters within the jurisdiction of the standing

committees on which they last served.

While former executive branch officials have restrictions placed upon contacts within their agencies, there is no branch-wide

prohibition.

Similarly, oppose a branch-wide prohibition on former Members of Congress in favor a ban only on matters under the jurisdiction of the former Members' committees.

The focus should be on restricting the behavior of former government officals only in the matters in which they were most active while in the government. In other words, symmetry: a

balanced application of the law.

This would respect historical precedents by targeting potential areas of abuse. It would apply equal ethical standards to the executive and legislative branch while recognizing the unique nature of Congress as a representative body. Finally, it would mean that former Members could anticipate careers outside of Congress that utilizes their talents, interests and abilities. I believe that any bill which fails to meet these tests is fundamentally flawed. We must approach this issue, on which the

public demands attention, with a thoughtful, responsive, and appropriate legislative effort.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate having this time to share my views on this question, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses here before us.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, Americans expect honesty, integrity, and accountability from Members and employees of Congress. Democratic Government must have the confidence of the public to function properly. So it is with a sense of urgency that we approach these hearings on post-government employment, especially with regard to the application of the law to the Legislative Branch. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership in bringing this crucial issue to the forefront, and also thank Mr. Shaw, our ranking Republican, for his assistance in this effort.

It is crucial that any extension of the Ethics in Government Act to Congress satisfy four conditions: that it provides continuing opportunities for the exchange of talent between the Government and private sectors; that it is consistent with historical precedents; that a nexus exist between the Federal employee's job responsibilities and actual opportunities for abuse; and that it treats Members of Congress fairly.

Our revolving door between private life and Government service is a distinctly American institution. We benefit from regular infusions of managerial and technical talent into Government from the private sector. If the revolving door was stopped altogether, we would have a Government consisting solely of lifetime officials.

For nearly a century, legislation has been on the books restricting the relations of former Government employees with their own agencies. Congress saw a need for these statutes that arose from three potential problems: first, that a former Government employee could utilize inside information; second, that an employee could switch sides on an issue; and, third, that employees could exercise excessive influence.

The crux of these issues is that former employees' particular knowledge about matters within their own agency's jurisdiction might enable them to betray the public's trust. Thus, the first law in 1872 prohibited former Executive Branch employees for two years from acting as counsel or agent for prosecuting claims pending against the United States in their own department. In such a case, former employees could use their specific inside knowledge of a matter for personal gain, in contravention of the public interest. In 1962, the Bribery, Graft and Conflicts of Interest Act was enacted. Section 207 of that Act is the basis for today's revolving door provisions. It continued restrictions on the ability of former employees to use particular knowledge by mandating a lifetime ban on lobbying on matters in which they participated personally and substantially and set a one-year prohibition on activities within one's official responsibility.

Sixteen years later, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 was passed. It amended Section 207 to add a one-year cooling-off period for senior Government officials in which they could not lobby again their former agencies on any matter.

The cooling-off period was based on an assumption that former Government officials could exercise undue influence over former colleagues, but it is important to note that the restriction remained just agency-wide and did not contemplate a Government-wide ban. The bill also extended to two years a prohibition on lobbying on matters under one's official responsibility.

It has been ten years since Congress passed the Ethics in Government Act. A widespread public perception that former Government employees in both the Executive and Legislative Branches are wrongfully capitalizing on their Government experience for exorbitant fees is underlying a grass-roots demand for legislative action. In addition to this public perception, there are certain areas of legislative activity that offer the potential for abuse of the public trust. The Legislative Branch has undergone enormous growth and restructuring over the last 20 years. The complexity of current legislative procedures and the sheer size of today's bills contribute to a dispersal of decisionmaking authority in the Legislative Branch. Today, one bill can be more than a thousand pages. It can involve more taxpayer's money than the entire budget in 1978, the year the Ethics in Government Act was passed. Much more emphasis is placed on legislative staff to prepare the detailed and intricate documents involved in today's legislation. Reliance on staff is, in fact, a mandatory condition of the modern legislative process.

In this radically new environment, legitimate concerns may be raised concerning the opportunities for undue influence. The question is no longer whether Congress should apply post-employment restrictions to itself. Instead, the question is what the proper parameters of such restrictions should be.

The Ethics in Government Act, as it has evolved since 1872, addresses Executive kinds of decisionmaking, approvals, disapprovals, and directing Government action on specific matters. These are quite distinct from traditional perceptions of legislative decisionmaking, which is more likely to be characterized by deliberation, debate, and consensus.

Historically, revolving door legislation has been concerned with restricting undue influence on such Executive Branch administrative-type decisionmaking. It can and should be extended to shelter and assure the integrity of the same type of decisionmaking in the Legislative Branch.

Application of the revolving door provisions must occur, however, with due respect for Congress as the seat of our people's two elected legislative bodies. Trust in our representative form of Government is vested in the special, even sacred relationship between the people and their elected representatives. Members are accountable to their constituents.

In my view, an extension of the Ethics Act that would prohibit a former member from lobbying a sitting member would not serve a constructive public purpose. Consider that such a provision in the law would necessarily have to be based on a policy assumption that a member of Congress will violate his sworn public duty and be unduly influenced.

Such an unfortunate extension of the Act to Congress actually would lower the public standard for representative Government and it would tend to put restrictions on the ability of persons to obtain representation to petition their grievances to the Government.

A prohibition on lobbying sitting members would also run counter to established public policy. The Justice Department and the Office of Government Ethics has ruled that the President and Vice President, as the only elected officials in the Executive

Branch, are exempt from the restrictions of the Ethics Act. Again, it is unwise and constitutionally risky to attempt to stifle input to elected officials.

To address the needs identified above, while remaining mindful of Congress' unique constitutional status, I believe that Congress should prohibit its former members for two years from lobbying the staff of the standing committees on which they served during the last term on any matter within the jurisdiction of such committees.

Further, former senior committee staff should be prohibited for two years from lobbying the staff on the Committee on which they last served on any matter within that committee's jurisdiction. Finally, a former officer of Congress should be prohibited from representing a person before any officer or employee of the House of Congress in which the individual served for two years.

These prohibitions would most nearly parallel the Ethics in Government Act's two-year ban on former Executive Branch officials. They are based on specific matters. In the instance of Executive Branch officials, it relates to matters of official responsibility. In the instance of former Members of Congress, it is matters within the jurisdiction of the standing committees on which they last served.

While former Executive Branch officials have restrictions placed upon contacts within their agencies, there is no branch-wide prohibition. Similarly, I oppose a branch-wide prohibition on former Members of Congress and favor a ban only on matters under the jurisdiction of the former members' committees.

The focus should be on restricting the behavior of former Government officials only in the matters in which they were most active while in the Government; in other words, symmetry, a balanced application of the law.

This would respect historical precedents by targeting potential areas of abuse. It would apply equal ethical standards to the Executive and Legislative Branch while recognizing the unique nature of Congress as a representative body. Finally, it would mean that former members could anticipate careers outside of Congress that utilize their talents, interests and abilities.

I believe that any bill which fails to meet these tests is fundamentally flawed. We must approach this issue, on which the public demands attention, with a thoughtful, responsive, and appropriate legislative effort.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate having this time to share my views on this particular question, and I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses who are here before us.

Mr. FRANK. The gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SHAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would like to compliment the gentleman from Texas for a very, very finely crafted bill and a very fine statement, also to welcome our two colleagues and, of course, to welcome the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina to the upper House. It is very nice to have you with us this morning, Senator Thurmond.

If there ever was a bill whose time has come, I believe this is it. It has been extremely hypocritical of Congress to pass law after