related in his "New Principles of Gunnery," published in 1742. From thefe experiments it inconteftably appeared that the refiftance made by the air to projectiles, which have a rapid motion, is much greater than had been fuppofed even by Newton and Huygens themselves; and that it is indeed fo great that the path defcribed by any fhot whatever is very different from the curve of a parabola; and, confequently, that all applications of that conic fection to gunnery are falfe, and totally ufelefs.

But Mr. Robins's experiments being made with hot of an ounce weight only, it was much to be wifhed that fuch perfons as had opportunity, might repeat the fame experiments with balls of a larger fize, and alfo with balls of different fizes. This was undertaken by Mr. Hutton: and in the course of his experiments he ufed balls from 20 to 50 ounces weight; the refult of which confirmed Mr. Robins's principles in the most ample manner, as may be seen at large in his paper; fome account of which was given in vol. Ix. p. 417 of our Review.

Some perfons having objected to the fubject of Mr. Hutton's paper, as being not fo immediately an object of the Society's inftitution as others of a different nature; we fhall tranfcribe the concluding paragraph of this fenfible and well-written difcourfe, to fhew that the queftion did not escape the confideration of this learned body, before they conferred the greateft mark of honour which they have to bestow, on the Author of it.

Some,' fays this humane and benevolent man, may think, that the object of this Society are the arts of peace alone, not those of war, and that confidering how nume rous and how keen the inftruments of death already are, it would better become us to difcourage than to countenance their farther improvement. These naturally will be the first thoughts of the beft difpofed minds. But when upon a clofer examination we find, that fince the invention of arms of the quickest execution, neither battles nor fieges have been more frequent nor more destructive, indeed apparently otherwife; may we not thence infer, that fuch means as have been employed to fharpen the fword, have tended more to diminish than to increase the number of its victims, by fhortening contefts, and making them more decifive. I fhall not however infift on maintaining fo great a paradox; but only furmife that whatever state would adopt the Utopian maxims, and profcribe the ftudy of arms, would foon, I fear, become a prey to those who beft knew how to use them. For yet, alas! far feem we to be removed from thofe promised times, when nation fhall not lift up fword against nation, neither fall they learn war any more.'

ART.

ART. VI. An Enquiry into the Policy of making Conquests for the Mabometans in India by the British Arms; in Anfwer to a Pamphlet entitled, Confiderations on the Conqueft of Tanjore *. 4to. 35. Dodfley. 1779.

W

E have here an ingenious and fpirited apology for the conduct of the Directors of the Eaft India Company, in taking the kingdom of Tanjore from the Nabob of Arcot, and reftoring it to its former fovereign. In juftice to the Author, and for the fatisfaction of our Readers, we fhall give a fummary of the principal arguments which are here adduced in juftification of this measure.

Our Author confiders the conqueft of Tanjore, firft on the ground of authority, and then on that of reafon and juftice. On the former ground, he obferves-that there is no evidence of the truth of any material charge against the Rajah, which could lay the Company under an obligation to make this conqueft for the Nabob of Arcot. The authorities produced as records in fupport of the Nabob's right are, for the most part, nothing more than the mere reprefentations of thofe fervants of the Company who have affifted the Nabob in his ufurpation. Of this nature is the correfpondence of the Select Committee of Madras. And even thefe authorities do not come up to the purpose for which they are produced; for the Select Committee never either informed the Directors that they had the conqueft of Tanjore in view, or recommended that meafure; and, befides, they confefs explicitly, that they acted in this affair against their own judgment.The orders of the Company do not amount to an authority to make this conqueft; they only exprefs the Company's difapprobation of the Rajah's conduct, in fome inftances, and their with, that when convenient he may be chaftifed, and the Nabob's pretenfions against him rendered effectual. Thefe pretenfions, communicated to the Directors, were only that the Nabob might receive the arrears of his pifhcufh or tribute money, and a reasonable fum towards the charges of the war with Hyder Ali. The Prefidency themselves expressly acknowledge, that they had no caufe to infer from any orders of the Company, that it was their wifh the country of Tanjore fhould be conquered for the Nabob; and they exprefsly informed the Nabob, that any measures taken for this purpofe could only be temporary, till the Company's pleasure be known; and declare it to be the Company's wifh, not to fubvert the eftablished government of any power, with which they have connection.-Whatever errors the Company may have fallen into in this affair, have been owing to their giving too

* See Review for April, 1779, p. 296.

cafy

eafy credit to their fervants abroad, who fcrupled not to miflead them by the most unjustifiable mifrepresentations, of which the Directors have frequently complained.

Our Author next confiders the conqueft of Tanjore on the ground of reafon and juftice.-When the Company first began to interfere in the politics of India, they found the then king of Tanjore an hereditary fovereign, formed their first regular alliance with him, and, by his affiftance, gave the first turn to the war with France. The exertions of the king of Tanjore were immediately in fupport of the Nabob against his rival Chunda Saheb, and put him in peaceable poffeffion of his government. But the wealth and fplendour in which the king then lived, excited the envy of the Nabob, and led him to form the defign of extirpating him. This the Prefidency acknowledged. When he was compelled by neceffity to relinquish this defign, he formed a plan for the extirpation of Hyder Ali, the Nabob of Myfore, and engaged the arms of the Company in this wicked fcheme. Still, however, he kept in view the conqueft of Tanjore, and omitted no means to bring on a rupture with that kingdom. At length, having failed in his attempt against Hyder Ali, that he might balance the loffes that he had fuftained, and accomplish his favourite object, he engaged in the war of 1771 against Tanjore, supported by the Prefidency.

After this account of the real motives of the war, our Author proceeds to examine the pretexts on which it was undertaken. The first pretext was, that in the war with Hyder Ali, the Rajah had not fent affiftance to the Nabob.-To this it is replied, that the King of Tanjore was not bound by any treaty whatever to take part in this war, as even his enemies confefs. The war was undertaken, without confulting the Rajah, and in direct oppofition to his interefts: had it been fuccessful, it would have left Tanjore entirely at the mercy of the Nabob. Yet, notwithstanding this, from a defire of being on good terms with the English, the Rajah fent 3000 men, under Colonel Wood, to the affiftance of the Nabob. Befide, if he had incurred any blame in this transaction, it was wiped off by the treaty of peace with Hyder Ali, in which the Rajah was in

cluded.

The second pretext was, the non-payment of the pishcush to the Mogul, through the hands of the Nabob, according to the treaty of 1762. Here no proof of the refufal of payment is brought. The payment was only delayed for three months, on account of the expence the Rajah had fuftained from the war with Hyder Ali. The Company had been themselves in the fame fituation with refpect to the Rajah, having neglected for five years to pay a pifhcufh for the town of Devicota.

The

The third pretext was, that the Rajah had made war on the princes or Polygars of Marawar and Nalcooty, whom the Nabob alleged to be his dependants.-The fact of the war is admitted; but the fovereignty of the Rajah being acknowledged, (which was allowed by the Prefidency in 1772, and by the Nabob himself in 1762) he must be at liberty to right himself on his neighbours who had injured him. The Nabob had be-" fore expreffed, in the strongest terms, his defire that no protection fhould be given to the Marawar princes: he even acknowledged the juftice of the war by calling the territories in difpute the King of Tanjore's country. Yet he clandeftinely incited the Polygars to hoftilities, while he was preparing to make war with the Rajah for having a quarrel with them. On inquiry, it has appeared that there is no proof of these Polygars having any dependence on the Nabob, and their fovereignty is found to be ancient and hereditary.

The refult of this war, undertaken on fuch frivolous pretexts, was, that Tanjore, after fuffering great devaftation and plunder, was obliged, in 1771, to fubmit to pay near 700,000l. and to fuch other terms as the Nabob thought fit to exact.

At the very instant in which this treaty, fo advantageous to the Nabob, was concluded, the Prefidency fent orders not to reftore or demolish the fort of Vallum, according to the agreement, but to have it fufficiently garrifoned, under the pretext of an apprehenfion that the Rajah would not perform all the articles of the agreement: they afferted that he equivocated, and immediately annulled the treaty. But no proof or explanation is given of this equivocation. And the truth is, the Rajah did not equivocate, or hefitate to fulfil the agreement. On the evidence of the Nabob's own minifter, Nazib Khan, it appears that the jewels taken from the Marawars were delivered to the Nabob's eldeft fon, and that the King of Tanjore offered bills, the fame day, for nine lacks out of the fourteen agreed to be paid, and engaged to pay the remainder the Monday following.

On this the Nabob's eldeft fon hefitated on the infraction of the treaty; but his younger brother broke through it at once, on no other pretence than that his father's pleafure muft, by all means, be preferved.' In this manner the treaty of 1771 was broken, and a fecond made agreeable to the Nabob's pleafure, which however, two years after, he found means to diffolve. The Prefidency, having only agreed to, not ratified the laft treaty, thought themselves at liberty to act contrary to it, as guardians of the public peace.

Solely on the charge of the Rajah's enemy, the Nabob himfelf, with only four days deliberation, the Prefidency declared his right to protection forfeited, and that it was dangerous to

fuffer

fuffer him to exift as a power. The first particular of the Nabob's charge is, that by advice confirmed by the Company's refident at Poonah, the Rajah had endeavoured to bring the Marattas into the Carnatic. This charge is made without any direct information to the Prefidency, and refts wholly on the word of the Nabob: and from the account fent by the Prefidency to the Company it appears, that whatever was the negociation, it arofe from a juft dread which the Rajah entertained of the Nabob's infincerity and evil defigns against Tanjore. The fecond charge is, that the Rajah had given the Nabob no affistance against the Polygars, but had received them, and fupplied them with ammunition. Of this no proof is given: befide, it must be remembered, that the Nabob had juft quarrel-. led with the Rajah, for making war on thefe very Polygars, and now, for not making war upon them, and that thefe contradictory charges were made at the interval of about two months, without alleging any act of rebellion fubfequent to the time in which he confidered them as under his protection. A third charge is, that the Rajah had taken fome runaway Polygars under his protection, and given them a refidence. As the nature of the crime of these runaways is not fpecified, and no other proof of the fact is given but the word of the Nabob, it. cannot merit notice. The fourth charge is, that the Rajah had, under the plea of borrowing money, mortgaged fome diftricts of the Tanjore country to the Dutch, French, and Danes. The whole amount of this charge is, that the Nabob forces the Rajah, by invafions and violent extortions, to mortgage fome of his territories, and then makes that mortgage a reafon for robbing him of all the remainder. The laft charge is, that the Rajah had refused to pay the money agreed for by treaty, ten lacks ftill remaining due. Though this charge was admitted by the Prefidency without inquiry, the fact is, that this money was, at the time of the accufation, actually paid. The Rajah, notwithstanding the exhausted state of his finances, had borrowed money of Comora, an Hindoo, for this purpofe, and pledged a territorial revenue for the payment. This Comora drew bills on his mafter, Paul Benfield, the Nabob's banker, for the amount, which bills (by Mr. Benfield's own confeffion) were in the Nabob's or his banker's hands. On thefe flight grounds, which the Prefidency took up on the bare word of the Nabob, the war was renewed, under the protection of the Englifh aims in 1773, which iffued in the plunder of four millions fterling of the wealth of Tanjore, and the conqueft of the country.

Such is the evidence (which must be allowed to carry with it much appearance of truth) on which this Writer juftifics the conduct of the Directors of the Eaft-India Company in reftoring

Tanjore