act, within any bay, inlet, harbor, or port of the United States, for rendering the navigation thereof easy and safe, should be defrayed out of the treasury of the United States; and further, that it be the duty of the secretary of the treasury to provide by contracts, with the approbation of the President, for rebuilding when necessary and keeping in good repair the lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and public piers, in the several states and for furnishing them with supplies. Appropriations for similar objects have been continued from that time to the present without interruption or dispute. As a natural consequence of the increase and extension of our foreign commerce, ports of entry and delivery have been multiplied and established, not only upon our seaboard, but in the interior of the country, upon our lakes and navigable rivers. The convenience and safety of this commerce have led to the gradual extension of these expenditures; to the erection of lighthouses, the placing, planting and sinking of buoys, beacons, and piers, and to the removal of partial and temporary obstructions in our navigable rivers, and the harbors upon our great lakes, as well as on the seaboard. Although I expressed to Congress my apprehension that these expenditures have sometimes been extravagant and disproportionate to the advantages to be derived from them, I have not felt it to be my duty to refuse my assent to bills containing them, and have contented myself to follow, in this respect, in the footsteps of all my predecessors. Sensible, however, from experience and observation, of the great abuses to which the unrestricted exercise of this authority by Congress was exposed, I have prescribed a limitation for the government of my own conduct, by which expenditures of this character are confined to places below the ports of entry or delivery established by law. I am very sensible that this restriction is not as satisfactory as could be desired, and that much embarrassment may be caused to the executive department in its execution, by appropriations for remote and not well-understood objects. But as neither my own reflections, nor the lights which I may properly derive from other sources, have supplied me with a better, I shall con

tinue to apply my best exertions to a faithful application of the rule upon which it is founded. I sincerely regret that I could not give my assent to the bill entitled, “An act to improve the navigation of the Wabash river;" but I could not have done so without receding from the ground which I have, upon the fullest consideration, taken upon this subject, and of which Congress has been heretofore apprized, and without throwing the subject again open to abuses which no good citizen, entertaining my opinions, could desire.

I rely upon the intelligence and candor of my fellowcitizens, in whose liberal indulgence I have already so largely participated, for a correct appreciation of my motives in interposing, as I have done, on this, and other occasions, checks to a course of legislation which, without, in the slightest degree, calling in question the motives of others, I consider as sanctioning improper and unconstitutional expenditures of public treasure.

I am not hostile to internal improvements, and wish to see them extended to every part of the country. But I am fully persuaded, if they are not commenced in a proper manner, confined to proper objects, and conducted under an authority generally conceded to be rightful, that a successful prosecution of them can not be reasonably expected. The attempt will meet with resistance where it might otherwise receive support; and instead of strengthening the bonds of our confederacy, it will only multiply and aggravate the causes of disunion.

MESSAGE IN RELATION TO TEXAS. Delivered December 21st, 1836.

To the Senate of the United States:

DURING the last session, information was given to Congress by the executive, that measures had been taken to ascertain "the political, military, and civil condition of Texas." I now submit for your consideration, extracts from the report of the agent who had been appointed to collect it, relative to the condition of that country.

No steps have been taken by the executive toward the acknowledgment of the independence of Texas; and the whole subject would have been left without further remark on the information now given to Congress, were it not that the two houses at their last session, acting separately, passed resolutions "that the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States, whenever satisfactory information should be received that it had in successful operation a civil government, capable of performing the duties, and fulfilling the obligations of an independent power." This mark of interest in the question of the independence of Texas, and indication of the views of Congress, make it proper that I should, somewhat in detail, present the considerations that have governed the executive in continuing to occupy the ground previously taken in the contest between Mexico and Texas.

The acknowledgment of a new state as independent, and entitled to a place in the family of nations, is at all times an act of great delicacy and responsibility; but more especially so when such state has forcibly separated itself from another, of which it had formed an integral part, and which still claims dominion over it. A premature recognition under these circumstances, if not looked upon as

justifiable cause of war, is always liable to be regarded as a proof of an unfriendly spirit to one of the contending parties. All questions relative to the government of foreign nations, whether of the old or new world, have been treated by the United States as questions of fact only, and our predecessors have cautiously abstained from deciding upon them until the clearest evidence was in their possession, to enable them, not only to decide correctly, but to shield their decisions from every unworthy imputation. In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes relating to the crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the separation of the American possessions of both from the European governments, and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish America, so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the action of our government, that we have, under the most critical circumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good will in those against whom we have been by force of evidence compelled to decide.

It has thus made known to the world, that the uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and eventually to recognise the authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests and views, or to the merits of the original controversy. Public opinion here is so firmly established and well understood in favor of this policy, that no serious disagreement has ever risen among ourselves in relation to it, although brought under view in a variety of forms, and at periods when the minds of the people were greatly excited by the agitation of topics purely domestic in their character. Nor has any deliberate inquiry ever been instituted in Congress, or in any of our legislative bodies, as to whom belonged the power of originally recognising a new state-a power, the exercise of which is equivalent, under some circumstances, to a declaration of war-a power nowhere expressly delegated, and only granted in the constitution, as it is necessa

rily involved in some of the great powers given to Congress; in that given to the president and senate to form treaties with foreign powers, and to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers; and in that conferred upon the president to receive ministers from foreign nations.

In the preamble to the resolution of the house of representatives, it is distinctly intimated that the expediency of recognising the independence of Texas should be left to the decision of Congress. In this view, on the ground of expediency, I am disposed to concur; and do not, therefore, consider it necessary to express any opinion as to the strict constitutional right of the executive, either apart from, or in conjunction with the senate, over the subject. It is to be presumed that on no future occasion will a dispute arise, as none has heretofore occurred, between the executive and the legislature in the exercise of the power of recognition. It will always be considered consistent with the spirit of the constitution, and most safe, that it should be exercised, when probably leading to war, with a previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared, and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be furnished. Its submission to Congress, which represents in one of its branches the states of the Union, and, in the other, the people of the United States, where there may be reasonable ground to apprehend so grave a consequence, would certainly afford the fullest satisfaction to our own country, and a perfect guarantee to all other nations, of the justice and prudence of the measures which might be adopted.

In making these suggestions, it is not my purpose to relieve myself from the responsibility of expressing my own opinions of the course the interests of our country prescribe, and its honor permits us to follow.

It is scarcely to be imagined that a question of this character could be presented, in relation to which it would be more difficult for the United States to avoid exciting the suspicion and jealousy of other powers, and maintain their established character for fair and impartial dealing. But on this, as on every other trying occasion, safety is to be found in a rigid adherence to principle.